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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review this appeal from the 
judgment of the Fifth Judicial District Court of Beaver County, State of Utah, 
signed January 5, 2000 and entered the same date, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3)0(1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court, relying on Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, erred in dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint with prejudice for failure to 
move for substitution within 90 days of the suggestion of death, when the 90-day 
limitation period was not triggered because the suggestion of death was not tiled 
by a party or a representative of the deceased party, was not served upon 
nonparties pursuant to Rule 4, and did not identify the party to be substituted as 
required by Rule 25? 
1 
Standard of Review. This appears to be a matter of first impression before 
the Utah Supreme Court. The review of a motion to dismiss is a question of law 
and is reviewed for correctness. Robertsons v. Gem Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 496, 499 
(UtahCt.App. 1992). 
Issue preserved below. This issue was preserved in Plaintiffs 
Memorandum Supporting Donahue's Rule 54(b) Motion to Reconsider or. 
Alternatively, Rule 59(e)Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment for Lrror of Law 
(Record at 183.) 
2. Whether the trial court erred by dismissing Donahue's Complaint 
with prejudice when the grounds for dismissal were failure to join an indispensable 
party, which under Rule 41(b) U.R.C.P. is only grounds for dismissal without 
prejudice. 
Standard of Review. The review of a motion to dismiss, and the 
characterization of relief and remedy therein, is a question of law and is reviewed 
for correctness. Robertsons v. Gem Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). 
Issue Preserved Below. Donahue moved for post-judgment relief 
requesting that the court characterize the dismissal without prejudice in his Rule 
59(e) Motion of June 16, 1999. (Record at 99). 
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff s 
motion for an enlargement of time to file a motion for substitution when the 
enlargement was requested in good faith and upon excusable neglect and when a 
2 
personal representative had not yet been appointed who could be substituted for 
the deceased Defendant? 
Standard of Review. An extension of time is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard.1 Crossland v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1994) (holding that 
Utah Supreme Court's review of the trial court's decision to deny party's motion 
to extend time to reply to summary judgment was conducted under abuse of 
discretion standard). 
Issue preserved below. This issue was preserved in Plaintiffs 
Memorandum Opposing Defendant Smith's Motion to Dismiss, and Supporting 
Plaintiffs Rule 6 Motion for Extension of Time. (Record at 72). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, AND RULES 
The determinative statutes and rules in this case are reproduced herein in 
the Addendum. 
1
 Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) provides: 
Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order 
of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified 
time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with 
or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefore is 
made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended 
by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the 
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the 
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any 
action under Rules 50(b), 52 (b), 59 (b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 73 (a) and (g), 
except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them (emphasis added). 
(Bold added.) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from an order dismissing Plaintiff Brian Donahue's claim 
for personal injury with prejudice. That order was entered on January 5, 2000. 
Course of Proceeding and Disposition Below 
During the litigation, the Defendant Seth Albert Smith died. Alter he died. 
the Fifth District Court, Judge Eves presiding, dismissed Plaintiffs Complaint lor 
failure to substitute a party defendant within 90 days after the Suggestion of Death 
filed on December 28, 1998, regardless of the fact that: 1) the 90-day limitation 
period under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 25 was not triggered by the December 
28th Suggestion of Death, 2) Plaintiff demonstrated excusable neglect in not 
moving for substitution, and 3) no personal representative had been appointed who 
could have been substituted for the deceased Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 5, 1998, Plaintiff Donahue filed a Complaint against Defendant 
Seth Albert Smith for injuries arising out of an automobile accident. (Record at 5.) 
The law firm of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson (hereinafter "the law firm") 
represented Defendant Smith in that action. (Record at 13.) 
After Defendant Smith's death on December 23, 1998, the law firm filed a 
"Suggestion of Death" on December 28, 1998, which was signed by S. Baird 
Morgan and S. Brook Millard as "Attorneys for Defendant, Seth Albert Smith." 
(Record at 50.) 
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On March 26, 1999, the law firm—appearing on behalf of the deceased 
Defendant—moved the Fifth District Court to dismiss Donahue's Complaint under 
Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Record at 61.) This motion to 
dismiss was based upon Donahue's failure to file a motion for substitution within 
90 days of his service of the Suggestion of Death. (Record at 65-62.) In response 
on April 2, 1999, Donahue filed a Rule 6 Motion to Enlarge the time for filing a 
motion to appoint a personal representative. (Record at 67.) 
On June 3, 1999, the district court issued a Memorandum Opinion denying 
Donahue's motion to enlarge the Rule 25 time and dismissing his Complaint with 
prejudice. (Record at 96.) Following the dismissal on June 3, 1999, Donahue filed 
a Rule 59(e) Motion. (Record at 99.) In that motion Donahue argued that the 
dismissal should have been without prejudice, as it was in reality a dismissal for 
failure to join an indispensable party under Rule 41(b). Later, Donahue joined 
with a Rule 59(e) Motion filed in a companion case, Stoddard v. Smith (Record at 
106), and then filed an additional motion under Rule 59(e) and 54(b). (Record at 
183). In that motion, Donahue argued that the Suggestion of Death filed by the 
law firm was not valid and was not sufficient to begin the 90-day limitation period 
of Rule 25 because: (1) the Suggestion of Death was a nullity because the law firm 
was not a party, nor was it a representative of the deceased party since the 
attorney-client relationship between the law firm and Defendant Smith terminated 
upon his death; (2) the Suggestion of Death was not served upon Defendant 
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Smith's representatives in compliance with Rule 4; and (3) the Suggestion of 
Death did not identify any person who could be substituted as a party. 
The district court, after hearing oral arguments, entered an Order ruling on 
the Rule 59(e) motions, dated January 5, 2000. (Record at 243.) A Notice of 
Appeal from the January 5 Order was filed on the 18th of January, 2000. (Record 
at 255.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This appeal arises from the death of Defendant Seth Albert Smith during the 
litigation and the subsequent dismissal of Plaintiff Brian Donahue's Complaint 
with prejudice. After Defendant Smith's death, the law firm which had formerly 
represented him filed a Suggestion of Death on December 28, 1998. The law firm 
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint approximately 90 days thereafter. The 
Fifth District Court, Judge Eves presiding, dismissed Donahue's Complaint with 
prejudice, pursuant to Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The dismissal 
was based upon Plaintiffs failure to move for substitution within 90 days of the 
law firm's filing of the suggestion of death. 
The dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint was error for two reasons. First, the 
dismissal should have been without prejudice because it was in reality a dismissal 
for failure to join an indispensable party under Rule 41(b). 
Second, the 90-day time period under Rule 25 was not triggered by the law 
firm's suggestion of death filed on December 28, 1998. The law firm's suggestion 
of death failed to comply with Rule 25 because (1) it was not filed by a party or a 
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representative of the deceased party; (2) it was not served upon nonparties 
pursuant to Rule 4; and (3) it did not identify any person who could be substituted 
as a party. 
(1) The law firm's suggestion of death did not trigger the 90-da\ period 
because the law firm was not a party or a representative of the deceased party. The 
Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 25 reveals that Rule 25 intended to 
limit the entities who may suggest death upon the record to those who may move 
for substitution—a party or a representative of the deceased party. Rende v. Kay, 
415 F.2d 983, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Prohibiting the decedent's attorney from 
moving for substitution or suggesting the death upon the record serves policy 
reasons. It prevents the decedent's attorney from taking actions which might 
prejudice the rights of a successor party to whom the decedent's attorne) bears no 
legal relationship. Hoffman v. Cohen. 538 A.2d 1096. 1099 (Dei. 1988). Because 
the attorney-client relationship is an agency relationship, the relationship and the 
attorney's ability to act on behalf of the client terminates upon the death of the 
client. Certainly, the law firm Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson was not a party. 
The law firm also could not have been a representative of the deceased Defendant 
when it filed the suggestion of death on December 28, 1998 because it did not 
represent the Defendant's estate. Accordingly, the 90-day limitation period did not 
begin running on December 28, 1998, and the denial of Plaintiffs motion to 
enlarge time and the dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint were error as a matter of 
law. 
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(2) The law firm's suggestion of death did not trigger the 90-da\ time 
period because it was not served on nonparties pursuant to Rule 4. By its plain 
language, Rule 25 requires that the suggestion of death and the motion for 
substitution both be served upon parties pursuant to Rule 5, and upon nonparties 
pursuant to Rule 4 for the service of summons. The Tenth Circuit has defined the 
"nonparties" referred to in Rule 25 as "specifically the successors or 
representatives of the deceased party's estate." Grandbouche v. Lovell 913 F.2d 
835, 837 (10th Cir. 1990). Requiring a suggestion of death to be personally served 
upon nonparties in order to trigger the 90-day time period assures that the nonparty 
will be aware of the need to act. Barlow v. Ground, 39 F.3d 231, 233 (9th Cir. 
1994). It is undisputed that the law firm's suggestion of death was not served upon 
Defendant Smith's representatives or successors, as indicated by the certificate of 
service. Therefore, the 90-day time period was not triggered by the law firm's 
suggestion of death and the denial of Plaintiffs motion to enlarge time and the 
dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint were error as a matter of law. 
(3) The law firm's suggestion of death did not trigger the 9()-da\ lime 
period because it failed to identify the person who could be substituted for the 
deceased Defendant. Because Rule 25 plainly requires a suggestion of death to be 
personally served upon nonparties, Rule 25 implicitly requires the suggestion of 
death to identify the successors or representatives of the estate. Fehrenbacher v. 
Quackenbush. 759 F. Supp. 1516, 1519 (D. Kan. 1991). Requiring the suggestion 
of death to identify the person who could be substituted prevents a tactical 
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maneuver to place the unduly heavy burden upon a plaintiff of locating the 
representative of the estate within 90 days. Such a burden can lead to the absurd 
result of having the plaintiff appointed as the representative of the estate of the 
very person he had sued. Wick v. Waterman, 421 N.W.2d 872. 873 (Wis. App. 
1988). In the present case, Donahue was presented with an unduly heavy burden, 
as the personal representative of Defendant Smith's estate was not appointed until 
June 2, 1999.2 Because the law firm's suggestion of death failed to identify the 
person who could be substituted, the 90-day time period was not triggered. 
Consequently, the denial of Plaintiff s motion to enlarge time and the dismissal of 
Plaintiffs Complaint were error as a matter of law. 
In addition, the denial of Plaintiff s motion to enlarge time was an abuse of 
discretion because Plaintiff requested the enlargement in good faith and with a 
showing of excusable neglect. There was no showing of prejudice or dela\ as a 
result of filing the motion to appoint in 99 days as opposed to 90 days. Moreover, 
as explained above, the denial was an abuse of discretion because the 90-day time 
period had not expired when Plaintiff requested the enlargement. 
2
 Donahue notes that the appointment of a personal representative on June 2, 1999 
was only after such request was acted upon in the companion case of Stoddard v. 
Smith, 98-CV-125, (currently before this Court on appeal) in which Mr. Stoddard 
requested to appoint his uncle, Clair Jaussi, a member of the Utah State Bar, as 
personal representative. (Record in 98-CV-125 at 98-97.) 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE 90-DAY LIMITATION PERIOD UNDER RULE 25 WAS NEVER 
TRIGGERED BECAUSE THE LAW FIRM'S SUGGESTION OF 
DEATH: 1) WAS NOT FILED BY A PARTY OR REPRESENTATIVE 
OF A THE DECEASED PARTY, 2) WAS NOT SERVED UPON 
NONPARTIES, AND 3) DID NOT IDENTIFY WHO MAY BE 
SUBSTITUTED AS A PARTY. THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO SUBSITUTE 
WITHIN 90 DAYS OF THE LAW FIRM'S SUGGESTION OF 
DEATH. 
A. The 90-day Limitation Period Was Not Triggered Because the 
Law Firm Was Not a Party and Was Not a Representative of the 
Deceased Defendant When It Filed the Suggestion of Death on 
December 28.1998. 
On December 28, 1998, the law firm filed a Suggestion of Death, which 
was signed by S. Baird Morgan and S. Brook Millard as "Attorneys for Defendant, 
Seth Albert Smith." Plaintiff does not dispute that the law firm has a duty to notify 
the court and opposing parties of the death of its client. However, Plaintiff 
contends that better-reasoned analysis follows the numerous federal and state 
courts, which hold that a suggestion of death filed by the decedent's former 
attorneys does not trigger the 90-day limitation period in which to move for 
substitution of parties under Rule 25. See Al-Jundi v. Estate of Rockefeller. 757 F. 
Supp. 206 (W.D.N.Y. 1990); Campbell v. Campbell. 878 P.2d 1037 (Okla. 1994); 
Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry. 769 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1985); Hilsabeck v. Lane 
Co.. Inc.. 168 F.R.D. 313 (D. Kan. 1996); Hoffman v. Cohen. 538 A.2d 1096 (Del. 
10 
1988); Jones v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 725 P.2d 836 (N.M. App. 1985); 
Rende v. Kav, 415 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Smith v. Planas. 151 F.R.D. 547 
(S.D.N. Y. 1993). 
These courts have so held for two reasons. First, the attornex-client 
relationship terminates upon the death of the client. Therefore, the decedent's 
attorney no longer represents the party. Second, a decedent's attorney is not a 
party, nor is the decedent's attorney a representative of the deceased party. Rule 25 
makes no provision for the filing of a suggestion of death by the attorney who had 
formerly represented the deceased. Hence, any filing of a suggestion of death by 
such an attorney is not sufficient under Rule 25 to begin the running of the ninety-
day period. Because an attorney no longer represents his or her decedent client, 
and because an attorney who formerly represented the deceased is not a party to 
the lawsuit, any suggestion of death by such an attorney is invalid and docs noi 
trigger the running of the ninety-day limitation period for the substitution oi 
parties. As thoroughly explained below, this interpretation of Rule 25 is well 
reasoned and has been adopted in numerous federal and state courts. 
1. Rule 25 Intends that the Suggestion of Death Will Only Be 
Filed by a Party or Representative of the Deceased Party. 
Plaintiff urges this Court to adopt the persuasive and logical reasoning of 
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Rende v. Kay. 415 F.2d 983 
(D.C. Cir. 1969). In Rende, the plaintiffs brought an action individually and on 
behalf of their infant son who was injured by the defendant while driving his car. 
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Id. at 984. During the proceedings, the defendant died. The defendant's attornex 
filed a suggestion of death. The attorney later moved in his own name to dismiss 
the action on the grounds that the plaintiffs had not substituted a proper party 
within 90 days of the suggestion of death. The case was dismissed. Id. On 
appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal 
and held that the 90-day period did not begin to run when the attorney filed the 
suggestion of death because: 1) the attorney was not a party or a successor or 
representative of the deceased, and 2) the suggestion of death did not identify the 
successor or representative of the deceased party who could be substituted. Id at 
985-986. 
The court in Rende based its holding, that the former attorney for the 
deceased could not file the suggestion of death, upon the Advisory Committee 
Notes to Rule 25. The court explained that the 1963 amendment to Federal Rule 
25 changed the measuring of the time limit for making a substitution from the time 
of death to the time the death is suggestion on the record. Id at 984. The 
Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25 provides 
Present Rule 25(a)(1), together with present Rule (6)(b), 
results in an inflexible requirement that an action be 
dismissed as to a deceased party if substitution is not carried 
out within a fixed period measured from the time of death. 
The hardships and inequities of this unyielding requirement 
plainly appear from the cases. 
* * # 
The amended rule establishes a time limit from the motion to 
substitute based not upon the time of death, but rather upon 
12 
the time information of the death is provided by means of a 
suggestion of death upon the record . . . 
A motion to substitute may be made by any party or by the 
representative of the deceased party without awaiting the 
suggestion of death. Indeed, the motion will usually be so 
made. If a party or the representative of the deceased part}' 
desires to limit the time within which another may make the 
motion, he may do so by suggesting the death upon the 
record. 
Id. at 985 (emphasis added). The court stated that Rule 25 cannot fairly be 
construed to make the suggestion of death filed by the deceased defendant's 
attorney "operative to trigger the 90-day period" because the attorney "was neither 
a successor nor representative of the deceased" and because the suggestion of 
death "gave no indication of what person was available to be named in substitution 
as a representative of the deceased." Id at 986. The court concluded: 
Counsel's construction would open the door to a tactical 
maneuver to place upon the plaintiff the burden of locating 
the representative of the estate within 90 days. 
Id; see also Wick v. Waterman, 421 N.W.2d 872, 873 (Wis. App. 1988). The 
court further stated that no injustice results from the requirement that the 
suggestion of death identify the representative or successor who may be 
substituted for the deceased before Rule 25(a)(1) may be invoked by those who 
represent or inherit from the deceased. Id 
The reasoning in Rende was adopted by the Supreme Court of Delaware in 
a case precisely on point, Hoffman v. Cohen. 538 A.2d 1096, 1098 (Del. 1988). In 
Hoffman, the defendant died. The defendant's former attorney filed a suggestion 
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of death. The court adopted the federal construction of Rule 25. explaining: "It 
was clearly the view of the Federal Advisory Committee that the amendments to 
Rule 25(a)(1) would limit entities who may suggest death upon the record to those 
who may move for substitution'' Hoffman, 538 A.2d at 1099 (emphasis added). 
The court held that "the deceased's (Cohen's) attorney was not authorized to 
suggest Cohen's death pursuant to . . . Rule 25(a)(1)," and that the suggestion of 
death filed by the attorney was "a nullity and ineffective to trigger the ninety-day 
provision in Rule 25." Id. at 1100. The court found the reasoning of Rende 
persuasive and compelling and explained: "This conclusion is entirely consistent 
with the general rule that upon the death of a client, a pre-existing attorne\-client 
relationship is completely severed and any action taken on behalf of the deceased 
client is a nullity." Id.; see also, Al-Jundi v. Estate of Rockefeller, 757 F. Supp. 
206, 210 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Death withdrew from the attorney every iota of 
authorization he had to act for or in [the defendant's] behalf); 7 Am.Jur.2d 
Attorneys at Law § 171 (1980); 7A C J.S. Attorney and Client § 224 (1980). 
The reasoning in Rende, that Rule 25 requires a suggestion of death to be 
filed by a party or a representative of the deceased party in order to trigger the 90-
day period for substitution, has been adopted by numerous other jurisdictions. In 
Fehrenbacher v. Ouackenbush, 759 F. Supp. 1516 (D. Kan. 1991). the United 
States District Court for Kansas held: 
[T]he attorney for the deceased party may not make the 
suggestion of death since he is not himself a party to the 
action and, since his authority to represent the deceased 
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terminated on the death, he is not a 'representative of the 
deceased party' of the sort contemplated by the rule. 
Id. at 1518 (quoting 7C Wright & Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, 
Civil § 1955 at 545): see also Hilsabeck v. Lane Co.. Inc., 168 F.R.D. 313, 314 (D. 
Kan. 1996). This reasoning has also been adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Fariss 
v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 961 (4th Cir. 1985); by the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York in Smith v. Planas, 151 
F.R.D. 547, 549-550 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); by the South Dakota Supreme Court in 
Ripple v. Wold, 572 N.W.2d 439, 443 (S.D. 1997); by the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court in Campbell v. Campbell 878 P.2d 1037, 1043 (Okla. 1994); by the Nevada 
Supreme Court in Barto v. Weishaar, 692 P.2d 498, 499 (Nev. 1985); and by the 
Arizona Court of Appeals in Varela v. Roman, 753 P.2d 166, 168 (Ariz. App. 
1987). 
Moreover, prohibiting the decedent's attorney from moving for substitution 
or suggesting the death upon the record is based on policy considerations. Simply 
stated, actions taken by the decedent's attorney "could clearly prejudice the rights 
of a successor party to whom that attorney bears no legal relationship." Campbell, 
878 P.2d at 1043 (quoting In re Klein, 36 B.R. 390, 392 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984)). 
Because the holdings in Rende and the subsequent following cases are well 
reasoned, Plaintiff urges this Court to adopt the federal construction of Rule 25 and 
hold that a suggestion of death filed by the deceased's former attorneys does not 
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trigger the 90-day limitation period in which to move for substitution undci Ruk 
25. 
2. Adopting the Federal Construction of Rule 25 Would Be 
Consistent with Utah Law. 
The analysis in Rende, which holds that a suggestion of death filed by the 
former attorney of a deceased party does not trigger the 90-day limitation period 
because death severs the attorney's authority to act on behalf of the deceased, is 
consistent with Utah law. The Utah Supreme Court has held that the attorney-
client relationship is an agency relationship. Russell v. Martell 681 P.2d 1193, 
1195 (Utah 1984). The general rule for agency relationships is that the authority 
of the agent terminates upon death of the principle 3 Am lui 2d Agcm\ ^ ^ 
(1986); 2A CJ.S. Agency §§ 135, 137 (1973). Likewise, the relationship between 
an attorney and his or her client terminates upon the death of the client. 7 
Am.Jur.2d Attorneys at Law § 184 (1980); 7A CJ.S. Attorney and Client § 224 
(1980). Thus, any action taken by the former attorneys on behalf of the deceased 
client is a nullity. 
Because the attorney-client relationship terminates upon the death of the 
client, the law firm did not, and could not as a matter of law, represent Defendant 
Smith when it filed the Suggestion of Death because Mr. Smith had died 
Therefore, the law firm's suggestion of death was not filed by a part) oi a 
representative of the deceased. Therefore, the 90-day period never began to inn. 
16 
and the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint with prejudice was error as 
a matter of law. 
3. The Law Firm Was Not Representing Defendant Smith or 
His Estate or Personal Representative When It Filed the 
Suggestion of Death on December 28,1998. 
The law firm may claim that when it filed the Suggestion of Death on 
December 28, 1998, it was acting as counsel for Defendant Mr. Smith and as 
attorney for the Defendant's estate and personal representative. This claim is 
disingenuous for three reasons. 
First, as explained above, the attorney-client relationship is an agency 
relationship which terminated upon the death of Defendant Smith. When the 
Defendant died, the law firm which had previously represented him could not file a 
suggestion of death or, for that matter, a motion to dismiss on his behalf. Stated 
plainly, Defendant Smith was dead. 
Second, the personal representative of Defendant Smith's estate was not 
appointed until June 2, 1999. The law firm simply could not, as a matter of law, 
have represented the personal representative until such person was appointed. See 
Smith v. Planas. 151 F.R.D. 547, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("before a motion to 
substitute may be granted, a representative of [the deceased defendant's] estate 
must be named as the proper party for substitution"). 
Finally, the law firm's representations to the trial court reveal that the law 
firm was not representing the estate or the personal representative of the deceased 
Defendant. The signature on the Suggestion of Death clearly demonstrates that it 
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was not filed by the successors of the deceased. The Suggestion of Death was 
signed by S. Baird Morgan and S. Brook Millard as "Attorneys for Defendant, 
Seth Albert Smith." Additionally, the Motion to Dismiss and supporting 
memorandum were submitted on behalf of "Defendant Seth Albert Smith/' by and 
through his counsel of record. These filings were also signed by S. Baird Morgan 
and S. Brook Millard as "Attorneys for Defendant, Seth Albert Smith." Based 
upon the representations made by the law firm when it filed the Suggestion of 
Death and the Motion to Dismiss, the law firm admits that it was not representing 
Defendant Smith's estate. See Hilsabeck v. Lane Co.. Inc., 168 F.R.D. 313, 314 
(D. Kan. 1996) (holding that 90-day period was not triggered because "Counsel 
did not purport to make the suggestion of death on behalf of the decedent's heirs or 
successor or as a representative of his estate"). 
Indeed, if the law firm had been representing the Defendant's estate at the 
time it filed the Suggestion of Death on December 28, 1998, it would have been a 
simple matter for the law firm to comply with Rule 25 by serving nonparties and 
identifying the person who could be substituted for the deceased.3 However, the 
3
 See Points LB. and I.C. below. If the law firm had been representing the estate of 
the deceased Defendant at the time it filed the Suggestion of Death on December 28, 
1998, it appears that the dismissal for failure to substitute was error as a matter of law 
because the substitution of parties had already occurred. By filing the suggestion of 
death, the estate of Defendant Smith entered a general appearance. By moving the 
court to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint for failure to substitute, the estate asked the 
court for affirmative relief and subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the court. See 
Barlow v. Crappo. 821 P.2d 465, 466-467 (Utah Ct. App.) ("by asking the court for 
any affirmative relief, a defendant thereby submits himself or herself to that court's 
jurisdiction"). Because the party to be substituted—the estate or personal 
representative—had appeared as a party in the lawsuit, it appears that the dismissal 
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law firm's arguments below reveal that the law firm was not representing the 
estate of the deceased Defendant when it filed the Suggestion of Death on 
December 28, 1998. First, the law firm argued that Rule 25 does not require the 
suggestion of death to identify the person to be substituted as a party and that at the 
time of Mr. Smith's death [December 23, 1998], his counsel was not aware of 
whether any testamentary instrument existed which named a personal 
representative of Mr. Smith's estate. Second, the law firm argued that it was 
unreasonable to require the law firm to serve the suggestion of death on ihe 
representative. It argued that as counsel had no idea who the successor party 
would be, it would not be reasonable to place the burden on the defendant to serve 
an unknown person. The law firm also argued that it could not identify the person 
to be substituted because at the time of Mr. Smith's death, decedent's counsel did 
not know any details of his estate.4 The law firm's claim that it was acting as 
attorney for the Defendant's estate and personal representative when it filed the 
Suggestion of Death on December 28, 1998 places the law firm in an embarrassing 
circumstance.5 
of Plaintiff s Complaint for failure to substitute was error as a matter of law. 
4
 These arguments are from the law firm's Objection to Plaintiffs Joinder in Rule 
59(e) Motion, dated June 28, 1999. 
5
 The law firm first claimed that it was representing the Defendant's estate on June 28, 
1999, in its Notice of Authority of Appearance and the Affidavit of Phyllis Myers, 
dated June 28,1999 (Record at 134). As noted in the previous footnote, this claim is 
inconsistent with the law firm's June 28,1999 Objection to Plaintiffs Joinder in Rule 
59(e) Motion, which unequivocally states that following the death of the defendant, 
the law firm knew no details of the Defendant's estate and had no idea who the 
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Because the law firm's ability to represent Defendant Smith terminated 
upon his death and because the law firm was not representing the personal 
representative of the estate of the deceased Defendant, the law firm was not a part} 
nor was it representing a successor of the deceased when it notified the court of its 
client's death. Therefore, the 90-day limitation period never began to run. and the 
trial court's denial of Plaintiff s motion for an enlargement of time and dismissal 
of Plaintiffs Complaint for failure to substitute within 90 days was error as a 
matter of law. 
B. The 90-day Limitation Period Was Not Triggered Because the 
Suggestion of Death Was Not Served on Nonparties as Required 
by Rule 25. 
It is undisputed that the Suggestion of Death filed by the law firm on 
December 28, 1998 was not served upon the personal representative of the 
deceased's estate, as indicated by the Certificate of Service attached to the 
Suggestion of Death. Rule 25 requires a suggestion of death to be served upon 
nonparties—specifically the successors or representative of the deceased's 
estate—in order to trigger the 90-day limitation period. Because Defendant 
Smith's representative was not served with the Suggestion of Death filed on 
December 28, 1998, the 90-day time period never began to run and the dismissal 
of Plaintiff s Complaint was error. 
personal representative was. 
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1. The Plain Language of Rule 25 Requires the Suggestion of 
Death to Be Served upon the Personal Representative 
before the 90-day Period Begins to Run. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1) provides: 
If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court 
may order substitution of the proper parties. The motion for 
substitution may be made by any party or by the successors or 
representatives of the deceased party, and together with the notice of 
hearing, shall be served on the parties as provided in Rule 5 and 
upon persons not parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the 
service of summons. Unless the motion for substitution is made not 
later than ninety days after the death is suggested upon the record 
by service of a statement of the fact of death as provided herein 
for the service of the motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the 
deceased party. 
(Bold added.) 
Rule 25 explains that "death is suggested upon the record," or in other 
words a suggestion of death is made, "by service of the statement of the fact of 
death as provided herein for service of the motion." (Bold added.) The motion 
referred to is the motion for substitution explained in the second sentence of Rule 
25, which is to be served on parties as provided in Rule 5 and upon persons not 
parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of summons. Thus, Rule 
25 clearly requires that the motion for substitution and the suggestion of death be 
served upon parties and nonparties. The requirement of service upon nonparties 
indicates that service should be made upon interested persons, most often the 
personal representative or successors of the deceased party. Significantly, Rule 25 
also provides that the 90-day period does not begin to run until after the suggestion 
of death has been served upon parties and nonparties. 
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Reading the plain language of Rule 25 as requiring service of both the 
motion for substitution and the suggestion of death is consistent with the recent 
holdings of the Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, the United States District Court 
for Kansas, and the Alabama, Delaware, Mississippi, and South Dakota Supreme 
Courts. Additionally, these courts have interpreted the requirement that service be 
made upon "nonparties" by requiring service upon the personal representative of 
the deceased's estate. As stated by the Tenth Circuit in Grandbouche v. Lovell 
913 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1990), 
the service required by Rule 25(a)(1) on nonparties, specifically the 
successors or representatives of the deceased party's estate, must be 
service pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4. 
Id at 837 (bold added). 
The above reasoning is precisely illustrated in Fehrenbacher v. 
Quackenbush. 759 F. Supp. 1516 (D. Kan. 1991). In Fehrenbacher, Dr. 
Quackenbush died while a medical malpractice lawsuit against him was pending. 
The law firm which had previously represented him filed a suggestion of death. 
followed by a motion to dismiss after the plaintiff failed to substitute within 90 
days. Id at 1517. The defendant's estate had not been served with the suggestion 
of death. Id at 1518. The court held that "Rule 25 has not been satisfied as the 
suggestion of death has not been served in compliance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 4 of [the 
defendant's] representatives." IcL Therefore, the court concluded that the ninety-
day limitation period had not begun to run because the representatives had not 
been served: "The time limit for substitution of parties "is measured from the time 
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the suggestion of death has been served upon the parties to the action and other 
interested parties." Id at 1519 (quoting 3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, Moored 
Federal Practice f 25.06 (2d ed. 1990)). The court held that because the 
defendant's "own estate had not been given proper notice of [the] pending action 
. . . the ninety-day limitation [had] not yet started to run." Fehrenbacher. 759 F. 
Supp. at 1518. 
The better-reasoned view, which holds that the 90-day period does not 
begin until nonparties have been served, is consistent with holdings in other courts 
See Grandbouche v. LovelL 913 F.2d 835, 836-837 (10th Cir. 1990) (90-day period 
did not begin to run because the personal representative of the decedent's estate 
was not personally served a suggestion of death in accordance with Rule 25); 
Barlow v. Ground. 39 F.3d 231, 233 (9th Cir. 1994) (the 90-day period of Rule 
25(a)(1) is not triggered "until the appropriate representative of the estate is served 
a suggestion of death in the manner provided by [Rule] 4"); Fariss v. Lynchburg 
Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 961 (4th Cir. 1985) (suggestion of death must be personally 
served on nonparty representative of deceased, rather than on deceased's attorney); 
United States v. Miller Brothers Constr. Co.. 505 F.2d 1031 (10th Cir. 1974) (90-
day time limitation does not commence until proper service effectuated); 
Hilsabeck v. Lane Co.. Inc.. 168 F.R.D. 313, 314 (D. Kan. 1996) (because the 
suggestion of death was not served on representatives of deceased's estate, the 
time for filing motion to substitute had not run); Ripple v. Wold. 572 N.W.2d 439, 
443 (S.D. 1997) ("Even if the successor or representative had actual knowledge of 
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[the] deaths, the ninety-day rule is not invoked absent formal suggestion of death" 
served on that representative); Kissic v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co.. 641 So.2d 250, 
252-253 (Ala. 1994) (even if a cross-claim had been sufficient to constitute a 
proper suggestion of death, "because the personal representative of [the 
deceased's] estate was never served with it the limitations period would not have 
begun to run"); Jones v. Montgomery Ward & Company, Inc., 725 P.2d 836. 839 
(N.M. App. 1985) (90-day period not triggered because new party to be substituted 
was not served the suggestion of death under Rule 4; no representative had been 
chosen when suggestion of death was filed). 
There is an important policy reason behind the requirement in Rule 25 that 
nonparties be personally served with the suggestion of death. As explained by the 
Ninth Circuit: 
[n]on-party successors or representatives of the deceased 
party . . . may not be protected by the attorney of the deceased 
party. It is entirely possible that no relationship will exist 
between them, and that the successor or representative will be 
represented by other counsel or no counsel at all. Because of 
the nonparty's distance from the litigation, it may be that a 
nonparty will be unaware of the need to act to preserve the 
claim. 
Barlow v. Ground, 39 F.3d 231, 233 (9th Cir. 1994). By requiring nonparties to be 
personally served with the suggestion of death, Rule 25 recognizes that nonparties, 
specifically the successors or representative of the deceased party, may not 
necessarily have the same interests as the deceased's personal attorney. The fact 
that successors or representatives of the deceased may have actual knowledge of 
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the death does not suffice for failure to personally serve the suggestion of death on 
nonparties. As this Court has previously explained 
Service of summons in conformance with the mode prescribed by statute is 
deemed jurisdictional, for it is service of process, not actual knowledge of 
the commencement of the action, which confers jurisdiction.... The proper 
issuance and service of summons is the means of invoking the jurisdiction 
of the court and of acquiring jurisdiction over the defendant; these cannot 
be supplanted by mere notice, by letter, telephone or any other such means. 
Murdock v. Blake. 484 P.2d 164, 167 (Utah 1971): see also Garcia v. Garcia. 712 
P.2d 288 (Utah 1986) (holding that the requirements of Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 4 relating to service of process are jurisdictional). 
The law firm may contend that the cases relied upon by Donahue are not 
relevant because many of the cases deal with the death of a plaintiff, rather than 
the death of a defendant as in the present case. This argument fails for two 
reasons. First, Rule 25 does not distinguish between the death of a plaintiff or a 
defendant. Rule 25 specifically states "If a party dies. . . " (Bold added.) 
Second, personal service of the suggestion of death upon the nonparty successors 
or representatives of a deceased defendant fulfills an important policy 
consideration. As previously explained, nonparties may not be aware of the need 
to act to preserve a claim. It is reasonable to assume that the nonparty successors 
or representatives of a deceased defendant's estate may need to act to preserve a 
counter-claim, cross-claim, or third-party complaint for the estate. If the estate 
does not act upon such claims, the estate will be bound by res judicata. The cases 
relied upon by Donahue are relevant because Rule 25 requires personal service of 
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the suggestion of death on nonparties in order to trigger the 90-day time period 
regardless of whether a defendant or plaintiff has died. 
In the present case, a plain reading of Rule 25 requires that nonparties be 
served with the suggestion of death before the 90-day limitation period begins. 
The better-reasoned view, which is consistent with numerous other courts, require^ 
that the suggestion of death be personally served upon the personal representative 
or successor of the decedent's estate in order to trigger the running of the 90-day 
time period. It is undisputed that the law firm's Suggestion of Death was only-
served upon Donahue, as indicated by the Certificate of Service attached to the 
Suggestion of Death. Because Defendant Smith's representative was not served 
with the suggestion of death, the 90-day time period never started. Therefore, the 
trial court erred as a matter in of law in denying Plaintiffs motion for an 
enlargement of time and in dismissing Donahue's Complaint for failure to timely 
substitute within 90 days. 
2. Plaintiff Has Standing to Challenge the Lack of Service 
upon the Personal Representative as Required by Rule 25. 
The trial court found below that Donahue lacks standing to complain about 
lack of service upon the estate. A brief review of the requirements for standing set 
forth by this Court in Terracor v. Utah Bd. of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d 
796 (Utah 1986) demonstrates that the trial court's finding is erroneous because 
Donahue satisfies all three criteria for standing to challenge the lack of service 
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upon the estate. This Court held in Terracor that a plaintiff has standing if he can 
establish any one of three criteria. 
First, the "plaintiff must show that he has suffered some distinct and 
palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in the outcome of the legal 
dispute." W., 716 P.2d at 799 (quoting, Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 
(Utah 1983)). Donahue satisfies the first criterion because the erroneous dismissal 
with prejudice of his Complaint bars any possible recourse. Donahue certainly has 
a personal stake in whether the service required by Rule 25 has been effectuated 
and whether the 90-day time period under Rule 25 has been triggered. 
Second, a plaintiff may have standing if "no one else has a greater interest 
in the outcome of the case and the issues are unlikely to be raised at all unless that 
particular plaintiff has standing to raise the issue." Terracor. 719 P.2d at 799 
(quoting Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451, 454 (Utah 
1985)). Donahue satisfies this criterion as well. The estate is not a party to the 
action.6 Consequently, Donahue has the greatest interest in the failure to serve the 
suggestion of death upon the estate because Donahue has the greatest interest in 
whether Rule 25 was complied with and whether the 90-day time period under 
Rule 25 has began to run. Further, the issue of failure to serve the estate is 
unlikely to be raised at all unless Plaintiff has standing. 
6
 If the estate is a party, then the dismissal for failure to substitute was certainly in 
error because the need for substitution became moot the moment the estate entered 
an appearance as a party. 
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Finally, "a plaintiff may . . . have standing if the issues are unique and of 
such public importance that they ought to be decided in furtherance of the public 
interest." Terracor. 719 P.2d at 799 (quoting Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1150). Donahue 
satisfies this criterion because the service required under Rule 25 is a matter of 
first impression before the Court. In order to set precedent for future cases, a 
decision in this area of the law ought to be decided in furtherance of the public 
interest. 
Because Donahue satisfies not only one, but all three criteria set forth for 
standing in Terracon he has standing to complain about the lack of service upon 
Defendant Smith's estate. 
C. The 90-day Limitation Period Was Not Triggered Because the 
Suggestion of Death Did Not Identify Who May Be Substituted 
as a Party. 
Numerous federal and state courts have also held that a suggestion of 
death must identify who may be substituted as a party in order to trigger the 90-
day period in which to move for substitution. These holdings are based on the 
requirement in Rule 25 that a suggestion of death be served upon nonparties and 
on a public policy desire to eliminate tactical maneuvering. 
1. Rule 25 Implicitly Requires the Suggestion ol Death to 
Name the Person to Be Substituted, 
Because Rule 25 requires the suggestion of death to be personally served 
upon nonparties, it is reasonable to infer that Rule 25 also requires the suggestion 
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of death to identify who may be substituted. This reasoning was explained b\ the 
United States District Court in Fehrenbacher: 
In reality, Rule 25 implicitly imposes such a requirement. B\ 
requiring service of the suggestion of death on parties and non-parties, the 
rule implicitly allocates the burden of identifying the substitute party to the 
party making the suggestion of death. 
759 F. Supp. at 1519; see also McSurelv v. McClellan. 753 F.2d 88, 98 (D.C. Cir. 
1985); Barto v. Weishaar. 692 P.2d 498, 499 (Nev. 1985) ("Because the 
suggestion of death in the present case was neither filed by nor identified a 
successor or representative of the deceased, we hold that the ninety-day limitation 
in NRCP 25(a)(1) was never triggered"); Rende v. Kav. 415 F.2d 983, 986 (D.C. 
Cir. 1969) ("No injustice results from the requirement that a suggestion of death 
identify the representative or successor of an estate who may be substituted a^  a 
party for the deceased before Rule 25(a)(1) may be invoked by those who 
represent or inherit from the deceased. If the heirs or counsel fear that delay may 
prejudice the litigation they may move promptly for appointment of a 
representative, perhaps a temporary representative. . ."); Wick v. Waterman. 421 
N.W.2d 872, 873 (Wis. App. 1988) (suggestion of death did not identify a proper 
person to substitute and was insufficient to trigger the 90-day period; placing the 
burden on the plaintiff to locate the representative of the estate within 90 days led 
to the "absurd result of [plaintiff] having appointed himself as the representative of 
the estate of the very person he had sued"'). 
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The law firm contends that Rule 25 does not implicitly require the 
suggestion of death to identify the proper party to be substituted because Utah has 
not adopted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Form 30. On this model form, the 
suggestion of death identifies the party to be substituted. It is true that some cases 
include discussion of Form 30. However, the law firm's emphasis on Form 30 is 
misplaced. The implicit requirement that the suggestion of death identify the party 
to substitute is not found in Form 30; rather the implicit requirement arises from 
the mandate in Rule 25 that nonparties be personally served with the suggestion o( 
death. This is the conclusion of the United States District Court in Fehrenbacher. 
759 F. Supp. at 1519. 
2. Public Policy Requires a Suggestion of Death to Identify 
the Person to Be Substituted in Order to Trigger the 90-
day Limitation Period. 
In Rende, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals expressed 
concern that failure to identify a party who could be substituted for the decedent 
"would open the door to a tactical maneuver to place upon the plaintiff the burden 
of locating the representative of the estate within 90 days." Rende, 415 F.2d at 
986. See also, Wick. 421 N.W.2d at 872; BartQ, 692 P.2d at 499. 
Such a tactical maneuver is precisely what happened in the case at hand. 
The law firm filed a suggestion of death on December 28, 1998 without identifying 
any individual who could be substituted on Mr. Smith's behalf. In fact, the law 
firm later stated on June 28, 1999 that at the time of filing the suggestion of death, 
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it did not know who the personal representative was. If the law firm's suggestion 
of death had indeed triggered the 90-day limitation period, Plaintiff was presented 
with an unduly heavy burden. The personal representative of Defendant Smith's 
estate was not appointed until June 2, 1999. Therefore, it would would have been 
impossible for Donahue to have moved to substitute the personal representative 
before the running of the 90-day limitation period. 
Indeed, requiring substitution of parties within 90 days of a suggestion of 
death which does not identify the party to be substituted can lead to "absurd 
results." In Wick, the defendant died. The suggestion of death was mailed to the 
plaintiff by the defendant's former attorney, in his own name, but the suggestion 
did not identify a person who could be substituted for the defendant. The plaintiff. 
in order to preserve his claim, petitioned the court to be appointed personal 
representative of the defendant's estate. 421 N.W.2d at 872. The Wisconsin Court 
of Appeals agreed with the holding in Rende that allowing a suggestion of death 
which fails to identify a proper party to substitute to trigger the 90-day time period 
"'would open the door to a tactical maneuver to place upon the plaintiff the burden 
of locating the representative of the estate within 90 days.'" id. at 873 (quoting 
Rende, 415 F.2d at 986). The court explained: 
Here that same burden led to the absurd result of Wick having himself 
appointed as the representative of the estate of the very person he had sued, 
no other person having been appointed or having sought appointment. 
Id. Such result is not intended under Rule 25 and is contrary to public policy. In 
order to obviate the tactical manuevers and public policy concerns, the better-
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reasoned view holds that the 90-day limitation period does not begin to run if the 
suggestion of death fails to identify the party to be substituted.7 
Because the law firm's suggestion of death failed to identify a proper party 
to be substituted, the suggestion of death did not trigger the 90-day period under 
Rule 25. Therefore, the denial of Plaintiff s motion for an enlargement of time and 
the dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint were error as a matter of law. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION i N DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME IN WHICH 
TO MOVE FOR SUBSTITUTION BECAUSE THE 90-DAY PERIOD 
HAD NOT EXPIRED, BECAUSE PLAINTIFF DEMONSTRATED 
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT, AND BECAUSE THERE WAS NO 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE APPOINTED WHO COULD BE 
SUBSTITUTED, 
Plaintiff notes that a determination under Point I, that the 90-day limitation 
period was not triggered by the law firm's Suggestion of Death filed on December 
28, 1998, is dispositive of Point II. Nonetheless, Plaintiff has briefed Point II. 
7
 If a suggestion of death which fails to identify a proper person to be substituted 
triggers the 90-day period under Rule 25, then the burden is placed upon the plaintiff 
to appoint a personal representative of the deceased defendant's estate. In Stoddard 
v. Smith (98-CV-125)(a companion to this case), Stoddard moved to appoint his 
uncle, Clair Jaussi, as the representative of Defendant Smith's estate. The law firm 
objected to Stoddard's suggested appointee, as Mr. Jaussi was a member of the law 
firm which had previously represented Stoddard in that action. Requiring Donahue 
to move for substitution when no personal representative had been appointed led to 
the similar "absurd result" which occurred in Wick. 421 N.W.2d at 872. 
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A. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in the Denial of Plaintiffs 
Motion to Enlarge Time Because the 90-dav Period Had Not 
Expired. 
As set forth in Point I of this brief, Plaintiffs motion to enlarge the time in 
which to move for substitution was filed in a timely manner because the 90-day 
period had not expired. The Suggestion of Death filed by the law firm on 
December 28, 1998, was not valid and did not trigger the running of the 90-day 
period of Rule 25 because (1) the Suggestion of Death was not filed by a party or 
representative of the deceased party, (2) the Suggestion of Death was not served 
upon Defendant Smith's representatives pursuant to Rule 4, and (3) the Suggestion 
of Death did not identify any person who could be substituted as a party. 
Because the requirements of Rule 25 were not satisfied, the 90-day 
limitation period had not expired, and Plaintiffs motion to enlarge time was made 
before the expiration of the prescribed period. By denying Plaintiffs motion, the 
trial court abused its discretion. 
B. Even Assuming that the 90-day Period Had Expired, the Trial 
Court Abused Its Discretion by Denying Plaintiffs Motion to 
Enlarge Time Because Plaintiff Demonstrated Excusable Neglect 
in Failing to Move for Substitution within 90 days of December 
28.1998. 
1. The Lower Court Erred in Denying Donahue's Rule 6 
Motion. 
Donahue filed a Rule 6 motion for an extension of time in which to file his 
Rule 25 motion nine days after the time to do so expired. Apart from the 
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appearance that defendant had lain in wait for all of these events to transpire, the 
rules provide that the plaintiff should haved received an extension of time to file 
the motion required under Rule 25. U.R.C.P. 6 provides that a party may request 
an extension of time to make a filing after the deadline to do so has expired upon a 
showing of "excusable neglect." 
Here, there was excusable neglect. What is excusable neglect? In West v. 
Grand County, 942 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997), the Utah Supreme Court discussed 
excusable neglect in the context of U.R.A.P. 4(e), which discussion equally applies 
to U.R.C.P. 6. Once it is determined that neglect has occurred (presumably b\ the 
missing of a deadline) the question becomes whether that neglect is excusable. In 
addressing excusability, the court noted: 
[T]he question of whether [neglect] is excusable 
is an equitable one, and such a determination should 
take into account all relevant circumstances 
surrounding the party's neglect. !See Pioneer Inv. 
Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. 507 U.S. 380, 395, 
113 S.Ct. 1489, 1498, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) 
(interpreting term "excusable neglect" in context of 
late filing provision of bankruptcy law). 
Both the United States Supreme Court and the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
have articulated four factors relevant to a 
determination of excusable neglect: 
n[i] the danger of prejudice to [the 
nonmoving party], [ii] the length of the delay and its 
potential impact on judicial proceedings, [iii] the 
reason for the delay, including whether it was 
within the reasonable control of the movant, and 
[iv] whether the movant acted in good faith." 
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City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co.. 31 F.3d 
1041, 1046 (10th Cir.1994) (bracket numbering added) 
(quoting Pioneer. 507 U.S. at 395, 113 S.Ct. at 1498), 
cert, denied. 513 U.S. 1191, 115 S.Ct. 1254. 131 
L.Ed.2d 135 (1995). While these factors are not 
dispositive, they are helpful in determining the equities 
of whether a finding of excusable neglect is warranted. 
West v. Grand County. 942 P.2d 337, 340-41 (Utah 1997) (emphasis supplied). 
The four West factors demonstrate that excusable neglect occurred below, 
and that the plaintiff should have been granted an extension to file his motion now. 
"THE DANGER OF PREJUDICE TO [THE NONMOVING 
PARTY]." 
Simply put, there was no prejudice to the defendant in granting the motion. 
None. 
"THE LENGTH OF THE DELAY AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT 
ON JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS." 
There would have been no delay. Nine days had elapsed since the motion 
deadline passed. That was simply not a delay. 
"THE REASON FOR THE DELAY, INCLUDING WHETHER IT 
WAS WITHIN THE REASONABLE CONTROL OF THE 
MOVANT." 
The motion was not filed earlier because of the inadvertence of counsel and 
the press of other matters. This, combined with the relative obscurity of Rule 25's 
requirements, accounts for why a motion was not filed earlier. 
"WHETHER THE MOVANT ACTED IN GOOD FAITH." 
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The plaintiff clearly is acting in good faith, given the nine days that had 
elapsed since the deadline passed and the one day that has passed between the time 
of service (April 1, 1999) and the date of the motion. 
A final overarching concern in this equitable determination, West, 942 P.2d 
at 340, is the relative benefits and prejudices to each party. Defendant can only 
point to an inconsequential nine-day delay that it made no attempt to cure. 
Plaintiff, on the other hand, loses his entire cause of action. Denying plaintiffs 
motion for extension of time would therefore be grossly disproportionate and 
unfair. 
2. Defendant Suffered No Prejudice Because No Personal 
Representative Had Been Appointed. 
In Haro v. Haro. 887 P.2d 878, 880 (Utah App. 1994), the Supreme Court 
averred that unless a party bringing suit on the behalf of the deceased party has 
"the capacity to sue on behalf of the 'real party in interest,' the suit is a nullity." 
The Court further stated that "an executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee 
of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made 
for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in that person's 
name." Id at 880 (quoting Rule 17 (a) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure). 
In this case, the deceased Defendant's former attorneys acted improperly by 
filing the Suggestion of Death on December 28, 1998. Because the law firm's 
ability to represent Defendant Smith terminated upon his death and because the 
law firm was not representing the personal representative of the estate of the 
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deceased Defendant, the law firm was not a party nor was it representing a 
successor of the deceased when it notified the court of its client's death. 
Therefore, the law firm had no authority to move the trial court to dismiss 
Plaintiffs Complaint. 
Furthermore, no personal representative of Defendant Smith's estate had 
been appointed within the 90 days following December 28. 1998. In fact, the 
personal representative was not formally appointed until June 2. 1999. (Record at 
91.) Therefore, the deceased Defendant suffered no prejudice as a result of 
Plaintiff not moving for substitution, as it was impossible for Plaintiff to have 
substituted the personal representative within 90 days of December 28, 1998. As a 
result, the trial court's denial of Plaintiffs motion for an enlargement of time 
amounts to abuse of discretion. 
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING THE DISMISSAL 
FOR FAILURE TO FILE A RULE 25 MOTION AS A DISMISSAL 
WITH PREJUDICE, WHEN IT SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE 
ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 
The lower Court's conclusion that dismissal in this matter would be with 
prejudice is improper. Rule 25 clearly is a reflection of the principle that a dead 
person can no longer proceed as a litigant in any action. A personal representative 
is required to be substituted for the dead person in order for the action to continue. 
For this reason, the personal representative is by definition a necessary party to the 
action. Consequently, any mandate issued by Rule 25 that a personal 
representative be substituted is in effect a requirement that a necessary party be 
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joined. Under rule 41(b) of the Utah R. Civ.P., a dismissal for failure to join an 
indispensable party is automatically without prejudice. 
For these reasons, any dismissal under Rule 25 should be treated as a 
dismissal for failure to join an indispensable party and that is automatically 
without prejudice. In this regard, the lower Court erred when it concluded that 
failure to file an option for substitution of parties does not amount to failure to join 
an indispensable party. Indeed, the very reason that this litigation cannot continue 
renders the personal representative "indispensable." Black's Law Dictionary 
defines an indispensable party as "a party whose interest in the lawsuit is such that 
a final decree cannot be issued without either affecting that interest or leaving the 
controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly 
inconsistent with equity and good conscience." 
In this matter, the personal representative is such a party. The action cannot 
proceed without him or her. Therefore, the failure to substitute (which is simply 
another word for join) the personal representative for the decedent amounts to 
failure to join an indispensable party. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the law firm's Suggestion of Death filed on 
December 28, 1998 did not trigger the running of the 90-day limitation period. 
The Suggestion of Death was not filed in accordance with Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 25. The Suggestion of Death was not filed by a party or representative 
of the deceased Defendant; was not served upon nonparties, specifically the 
personal representative or successor of the deceased Defendant, pursuant to Rule 
4; and did not identify the person who could be substituted as a party. Because the 
90-day limitation period was never triggered, the trial court erred as a matter of 
law in dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint for failure to move for substitution within 
90 days of December 28, 1998. 
Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to adopt the logical reasoning of 
the numerous federal and state courts cited herein and hold that, in order to trigger 
the 90-day time period under Rule 25, a suggestion of death must 1) be filed by a 
party or representative of the deceased party, 2) be served upon the personal 
representative or successor of the deceased party, and 3) identify the person who 
can be substituted as a party. Therefore. Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court 
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to reverse the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint and remand this case 
for further proceedings. 
DATED this <J2_ day of May, 2000 
CRAJ&--&L--S-NYDER anc 
PHILLIP E. LOWRY, 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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Attorneys for Defendant 
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Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN KEITH DONAHUE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SETH ALBERT SMITH and DAVID R. 
STODDARD, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE 
Civil No. 98CV102 
Judge: J. Philip Eves 
A hearing on Defendant' s Motion to Dismiss came before the Honorable J. Philip Eves 
on May 12, 1999. A hearing on Plaintiffs Rule 54(b) Motion to Reconsider, or Alternatively, Rule 
59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment for Error of Law and Plaintiffs Joinder in Stoddard's 
Rule 59(e) Motion to Amend the Findings and Conclusions came before the Honorable J. Philip Eves 
J. Philip Eves on September 22,1999. Plaintiffs Motion to Substitute Phyllis Meyers, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Seth Albert Smith, for Defendant also came before the Court on 
September 22, 1999. The Court also heard arguments in the companion case of David Stoddard v. 
Seth Albert Smith, Civil No. 980500125. The Court, having heard the arguments of counsel, having 
reviewed the pleadings on file and being otherwise duly informed, now rules as follows: 
1. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted based on Plaintiffs failure to 
comply with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court prepared a Memorandum Decision which 
provides the relevant facts, legal arguments, and analysis underlying the Court's decision. A copy 
of the Court's Memorandum Decision from the May 12, 1999 hearing is attached hereto as 
Exhibit " 1 " and expressly incorporated herein by this reference. 
2. Plaintiff s Motion pursuant to Rule 54(6) and/or Rule 5 9(e) to Alter or Amend 
the Findings and Conclusions is denied. The Court issued a ruling which identifies the facts, 
analysis and legal arguments underlying the Court's decision. A copy of the Court's ruling from the 
September 22, 1999 hearing is attached hereto as Exhibit "2" and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
3. Plaintiff s Motion to Substitute Phyllis Meyers as Personal Representative of 
the Estate of Seth Albert Smith, for Defendant is denied. The facts and legal arguments relied upon 
in reaching this decision are incorporated in the Court's ruling. (See Exhibit "2"). 
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Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND 
ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs Complaint against Defendant Seth Albert Smith be and is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. 
DATED this t> - day of^ctober, Igjfe. "^ft 
BY THE COURT: 
AS TO FORM: 
CRAIG M) SNYDER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
J. PHILIP EVES 
Jistrict Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was maiJed, 
first-class, postage prepaid, on this / ^ f W a y of December, 1999 to the following: 
Craig M. Snyder 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
P.O. Box 1248 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, UT 84603 
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Civ. No. 980500102 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
This case comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss, filed Apr. 1, 1999, on behalf 
of Defendant Seth Albert Smith who is deceased. On April 5,1999, Plaintiff Brian Keith 
Donahue responded by filing a Rule 6 Motion for Extension of Time, along with a Memorandum 
Opposing Defendant Smith's Motion to Dismiss, and Supporting Plaintiffs Rule 6 Motion for 
Extension of Time. Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss and in 
Opposition of [sic] Plaintiffs Motion for Extension of Time was subsequently filed on Apr. 14, 
1999. Finally, a Reply Memorandum Supporting Plaintiffs Rule 6 Motion for Extension of 
Time was filed on Apr. 22, 1999. A hearing regarding the two motions occurred May 12, 1999. 
Having reviewed the parties memoranda, having heard oral argument, and having 
reviewed relevant law, the Court now rules as follows: 
BACKGROUND 
This dispute arises from the death of 88 year-old Defendant Seth Smith on Dec. 23, 1998. 
Subsequent to Mr. Smith's death, the counsel of record for the decedent filed a Suggestion of 
Death with the Court and mailed a copy to opposing counsel on Dec. 28, 1998, in accordance 
with Utah R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1). Ninety four days later, on Apr. 1, 1999, counsel for Defendant 
filed the present Motion to Dismiss, based on Plaintiffs failure to file a substitution of parties 
within the 90 day time frame contained in Rule 25(a)(1). 
ANALYSIS 
In relevant part, Utah R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1) provides as follows: 
If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court may order 
substitution of the proper parties The motion for substitution may be made by any party 
or by the successors or representatives of the deceased party Unless the motion 
for substitution is made not later than ninety days after the death is suggested upon the 
record by service of a statement of the fact of the death as provided herein fcr the 
service of the motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party 
The Rule raises at least three issues relevant to the Court's determination in this case. 
Those issues are: (1) Does the "shall" language contained in Rule 25 prevent the Court from 
considering Plaintiffs Rule 6 Motion for Extension of Time; (2) If not, has Plaintiff sufficiently 
demonstrated excusable neglect to justify such an extension; and (3) if the Court does order 
dismissal, is it "with" or "without" prejudice? 
The Court now considers each issue in turn. 
1 Rule 25 
Utah R. Civ. P. 25 is based upon Fed. R. Civ. P. 25, and contains language which is 
"substantially similar" to the Federal Rule. ( See Utah R. Civ. P. 25 compiler's note.) Therefore 
analysis of the advisory committee's note to the Federal Rule is relevant to and helpful in the 
Court's initial determination in this matter. The Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note 
[citations omitted] provides as follows: 
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The amended rule establishes a time limit for the motion to substitute based not 
upon the time of the death, but rather upon the time information of the death is provided 
by means of a suggestion of death upon the record, i.e. service of a statement of the 
fact of death. The Motion may not be made later than 90 days after the service of the 
statement unless the period is extended pursuant to Rule 6(b), as amended. 
The advisory committee's note [citations omitted] continues: 
. . . The only limitation of time provided for in amended Rule 25 is the 90-day period 
following a suggestion upon the record of the death of a party within which to make a 
motion to substitute the proper parties for the deceased party. It is intended that the 
court shall have discretion to enlarge that period. (Emphasis added) 
The Utah Supreme Court has applied this Federal standard to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
in the decision of Connelly v. Rathien, 547 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1976). In addressing the issue of 
dismissal under Rule 25, the Court said: 
"Rule 6(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that for good 
cause shown, the court may order an enlargement of time for any act which is by 
the rules required to be performed within a specified time." 
The Supreme Court then denied relief on appeal because "[t]he plaintiff never asked the court for 
any enlargement of the 90 days in which to move for a substitution of parties," as well as on the 
basis that the motion for substitution had not been brought within the required 90 days. (Id. at 
1337-1338.) 
In the present case, the Plaintiff failed to bring a motion for the substitution of parties 
within the 90 day period required by Rule 25. In addition there was no motion to enlarge the 
time for making the substitution of parties within the 90 day period. However, the court now 
holds that the "shall" language contained in Rule 25 does not automatically prevent this Court 
from considering Plaintiffs Rule 6 Motion for Extension of time. Consequently, the Court now 
considers Plaintiffs Rule 6 Motion. 
2 Rule 6 
In relevant part, Utah R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2) provides as follows: 
When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of the court an 
act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause 
shown may at any time in its discretion . . . permit the act to be done where the failure to 
act was the result of excusable neglect . . . . 
The Court is aware of no Utah case law which specifically addresses excusable neglect under 
Rule 6(b)(2). However, the standard applied by Federal courts in addressing excusable neglect 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2) is similar to the standard used by Utah Courts in addressing 
excusable neglect under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). [ See Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation v. 
Bank of America. 493 F.2d 1288, 1290-1291 (10th Cir. 1974Vciting 4 Wright & Miller Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 1165 (1969)(weighing factors of good faith, prejudice and 
reasonableness of excuse in determining excusable neglect under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2)); 
compare West v. Grand County. 942 P.2d 337, 340-341 (Utah 1997)(weighing factors of good 
faith, prejudice, reason for the delay, and length of the delay in determining excusable neglect 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)] Therefore, this Court will apply the standard of excusable neglect 
used by the Utah Supreme Court in making determinations under Rule 60(b), and weigh the 
factors of (A) good faith, (B) prejudice, (C) reason for delay, and (D) length of delay. 
A. Good Faith 
Plaintiff argues that he in asking for an extension of the time to file a substitution of 
parties, he is "clearly is acting in good faith, given the nine days that have elapsed since the 
deadline passed and the one day that has passed between the time of service (April 1, 1999) and 
the date of [his] motion [for extension of time]." See Memorandum Opposing Defendant 
Smith's Motion to Dismiss, and Supporting Plaintiffs Rule 6 Motion for Extension of Time, p. 4 
[herinafter Plaintiffs Memo in Opposition]. 
In response, counsel for Defendant Smith asserts that Plaintiffs argument might "have 
merit where a five or ten day filing deadline is at issue, [but the argument] is not adequate where 
plaintiff had ninety days in which to respond to the Suggestion of Death with his motion." See 
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Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to dismiss and in Opposition of [sic] Plaintiffs 
Motion for Extension of Time, p. 2 [hereinafter Plaintiffs Reply Memo]. 
The Court agrees with the position expressed by counsel for Defendant Smith. The issue 
at hand is not how promptly Plaintiff filed his Motion for Extension of Time after receiving 
notice of Defendant Smith's Motion to Dismiss. Rather, the issue at hand relates to Plaintiffs 
good faith in waiting 99 days to take action on the Suggestion of Death, which was provided to 
Plaintiff in December of last year. Plaintiff has offered no satisfactory explanation as to why 
there was no filing of a substitution of parties, or at least a request to extend the time for filing 
such a substitution, within the 90 day period. The Court cannot conclude that the delay in filing 
the statutorily required motion for substitution of parties was made in good faith in the absence 
of such explanation. It rather appears that plaintiff simply put this case on the back burner 
because there were more pressing matters pending and chose to let the 90 day period lapse. 
B. Prejudice 
In addressing "the danger of prejudice to the non-moving party," ( See West, supra) 
Plaintiff argues that "[s]imply put, there is no prejudice to the defendant in granting this motion." 
( See Defendant's Memo in Opposition, p. 3.) Plaintiffs argument continues, "Defendant can 
only point to an inconsequential nine-day delay that it made no attempt to cure. Plaintiff, on the 
other hand, loses his entire cause of action. Denying plaintiffs motion for extension of time 
would therefore be grossly disproportionate and unfair." (Id. at 4.) 
Counsel for Defendant has not argued the issue of prejudice. And, given the fact that 
Defendant has passed away, the Court is hard put to envision any prejudice which the defendant 
himself would suffer if the extension of the 90 day time limit for substitution of parties was 
granted. The only prejudice which the Court can envision relates to the potential delay which 
further litigation may cause in the probate of Decedent's estate and the delay of this case while 
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the 99 days has run since the Suggestion of Death was filed. It seems plain to the Court that the 
purpose of the 90 day requirement in Rule 25 is to avoid such delay in the probate process, as 
well as the proceedings in the pending civil case. However, given the apparent intent of the 
Federal advisory committee in making allowance for the extension of the 90 day deadline in 
some circumstances, as discussed above, the Court cannot rely upon any such speculative 
prejudice to decedent's heirs. The defendant has failed to demonstrate that he would be 
particularly prejudiced in this case by the granting of the Motion to extend the time for filing the 
substitution of parties. 
C Reason for Delay 
Plaintiffs only justification for the delay is based on his assertion that "[t]he motion was 
not filed earlier because of the inadvertence of counsel and the press of other matters." ( See 
Plaintiffs Support Memo, p. 3.) 
In response, Counsel for Defendant argues that Plaintiffs "plea[]s [of] inadvertence of 
counsel, [and] the press of other matters . . . fail to demonstrate a reasonable basis for not 
complying with the specified period . . . . " ( See Defendant's Reply Memorandum, p. 3.) 
M[F]ault in the delay is a very important factor—perhaps the most important single factor 
in determining whether neglect is excusable[, and ijgnorance or carelessness of an attorney is 
generally not cognizable" as an excuse. [ See Hilterman v. Furlong, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 
22159 at *6-7 (10th Cir. Sep. 11, 1998)]. Consequently, the Court concludes that in the absence 
of any statement of reason for the delay, other than the busy schedule of Counsel, the court must 
conclude that there is no justification for the tardy motion requesting an extension of time in this 
case. 
D. Length of Delay 
In this case the plaintiff failed to file a substitution of parties within the 90 day period 
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contemplated by Rule 25. The plaintiff likewise failed to seek an extension of the time for such a 
filing until the defendant had already filed a motion to dismiss the suit against the deceased 
party. While it is true that the delay was brief, about 9 days, the delay was not insignificant, in 
view of the fact that the plaintiff had 90 days to address the issue and did nothing. 
Plaintiff has failed to offer a satisfactory explanation regarding the reason for its delay, 
and if Rule 25 is to have any meaning, the Court cannot just disregard its provisions at will. In 
the absence of a satisfactory reason for the delay, the court declines to consider even the most 
brief delay by Plaintiff to be insubstantial or insignificant. Consequently, the Court finds that the 
99 days which Plaintiff waited to act must be weighed against him in deciding the pending 
issues. 
E. Weighing the Results 
In weighing the results of the four-pronged test applied above, the Court finds that 
although there has been no showing of prejudice to the non-moving party, the length of the delay, 
the absence of a showing of good faith, and most importantly the lack of a satisfactory reason for 
the delay all combine to require the Court to rule in favor of Defendant Seth Smith, and against 
Plaintiff Brian Keith Donahue on the pending Motions. Accordingly, the Motion seeking an 
extension of time must be denied and the Motion seeking dismissal against the deceased party 
must be granted. 
3. Dismissal "with" or "without"prejudice 
The final issue to be determined is whether the action against Defendant Smith should be 
dismissed with or without prejudice. In pertinent part, Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b) provides as follows: 
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order 
of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. . . 
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this 
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack 
of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an 
adjudication upon the merits. 
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The term "dismissal with prejudice" operates as an adjudication on the merits. It is a term which 
by definition means that there has been such "an adjudication on the merits, and [that] a final 
disposition [has been entered], barring the right to bring or maintain an action on the same claim 
or cause. It is res judicata as to every matter litigated." See Black's Law Dictionary 325 (abr. 6th 
ed. 1991). By contrast, the term "dismissal without prejudice" is generally used in association 
with an adjudication which was not on the merits. "The effect of the words 'without prejudice' is 
to prevent the decree of dismissal from operating as a bar to a subsequent suit." Id. 
In the present case, there is no indication that anything other than an adjudication on the 
merits is appropriate in this case. The Motion to Dismiss brought by Defendant Smith is not 
based upon any "lack of jurisdiction," "improper venue," or "lack of an indispensable party." 
[See Rule 41(b).] Rather, the Motion to Dismiss is based upon the "failure of the plaintiff to . . . 
comply with the[] rules [of civil procedure]." (]d.) Specifically, the Motion to Dismiss is based 
upon Plaintiffs failure "to file a motion for substitution of parties within the required time 
frame" under Rule 25. ( See Defendant's Support Memo, p. 2.) Consequently, the Court finds 
that the dismissal should be with prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiffs Rule 6 Motion for Extension of Time is hereby 
denied. Furthermore, deceased Defendant Seth Albert Smith's Motion to Dismiss is hereby 
granted. The claims of the plaintiff against the deceased defendant are dismissed with prejudice 
pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the case law cited above. 
ORDER 
Counsel for Defendant Smith is directed to prepare, within 15 days of the date hereof, an 
order dismissing the claim against Defendant Smith with prejudice, and submit it to opposing 
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counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. 
Dated this / - day of Uey, 1999. 
/fa..*. 'T.. J&AJ-&— 
J.fflILIPEVES/7 
STRICT COURT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OR HAND DELIVERY 
I certify that on this _j day of May, 1999 I provided true and correct copies of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION to each of the attorneys named below by placing a 
copy in the United States Mail first-class postage prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
Craig M. Snyder 
PO Box 1248 
Provo UT 84603 
Baird S. Morgan 
PO Box 2465 
SLC UT84110 
' ^ > ? ^ n ^ w > t , — 
DEPUTY CLERK OF THE COURT 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN KEITH DONAHUE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




CASE NO. 980500102 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiffs "Rule 54(b) Motion to Reconsider, or 
Alternatively, Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment for Error of Law," filed with a 
supporting memorandum on July 9, 1999. The motion was filed by Plaintiff in conjunction with a 
"Joinder in Stoddard's Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend the Findings and Conclusions," filed on 
June 16, 1999. An "Objection to Plaintiffs Joinder in Rule 59(e) Motion" was filed by Defendant on 
June 30, 1999. A hearing on the two motions occurred September 22, 1999. The plaintiff was 
represented by Phillip Lowry, attorney of record. The defendant Smith was represented by S. Baird 
Morgan, attorney of record. The defendant Stoddard was represented by Brent Young, attorney of 
record. 
Also before the Court is a "Motion to Substitute Phyllis Myers, as Personal Representative of 
the Estate of Seth Albert Smith, for Defendant," filed by Plaintiff with a supporting memorandum on 
July 9, 1999. An "Objection to Motion to Substitute Phyllis Myers as Personal Representative of the 
Estate of Seth Albert Smith" was filed by Defendant on July 26,1999. A hearing on the matter also 
occurred on September 22,1999. 
This case was argued in conjunction with the companion case of Stoddard v. Smith, case 
number 980500125. The issues raised by the parties in this case are the same as those raised in the 
Stoddard case. Likewise, the facts are identical. However, in this case the court has not yet signed an 
Order dismissing the case with prejudice because an Objection was filed by the Plaintiff to the 
proposed Order prepared by Defendant's counsel. Likewise, no appeal has yet been filed in this case. 
Having reviewed the parties Memoranda, exhibits and affidavits, having reviewed relevant 
law, and having heard oral argument, the Court now rules in this case in the same fashion as it ruled 
in the Stoddard case. The court incorporates, by this reference, the Stoddard ruling in this Ruling. 
The Stoddard ruling will be attached hereto. 
CONCLUSIONS AND ORDERS 
The Plaintiffs Motion under Rule 54 for reconsideration of the court's previous 
Memorandum Decision is hereby denied. The Plaintiffs Motion to substitute Ms. Meyers as the 
party defendant is this case is likewise denied. The Objection of the Plaintiff to the proposed Order 
based on the court's Memorandum Decision is granted. Counsel for the Defendant is to submit to 
this court for signature a revised Order of Dismissal, in keeping with the court's previous 
Memorandum Decision and Rulings in this and the Stoddard cases. That Order of Dismissal is to 
incorporate by reference and have attached the previous Memorandum Decision in this case, the 
Ruling in the Stoddard case and this Ruling, which documents contain the reasoning of this court in 
making its decision. 
DATED this 12th day of October 1999. 
Court Judge 
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Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on this 12th day of October 1999,1 mailed true and correct copies of the 
above and foregoing document, first-class postage prepaid, to the following: 
Brent D. Young, Esq. 
IVIE & YOUNG 
226 West 2230 North 
P.O. Box 657 
Provo, UT 84604 
S. Baird Morgan, Esq. 
Krista A. Weber, Esq. 
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50 South Main, 7th Floor 
P.O. Box 2456 
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Craig M. Snyder, Esq. 
Phillip E. Lowry, Esq. 
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120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID R. STODDARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SETH ALBERT SMITH, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
CASE NO. 980500125 PI 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiffs "Motion Pursuant to 59(e) to Alter or 
Amend the Findings and Conclusions," filed with a supporting memorandum on June 7, 1999. 
Defendant's "Objection to Plaintiffs Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend the Findings and 
Conclusions" was filed on June 21, 1999, and a "Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion 
Pursuant to 59(e) to Alter or Amend the Findings and Conclusions" was filed by Plaintiff on July 
6, 1999. A hearing on the motion occurred September 22, 1999. The Plaintiff was represented 
by Brent D. Young, attorney of record. The Defendant was represented by S. Baird Morgan, 
attorney of record. 
Also before the Court is a "Motion to Substitute Phyllis Myers, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Seth Albert Smith, for Defendant," filed with a supporting 
memorandum on July 6,1999. An "Objection to Motion to Substitute Phyllis Myers as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Seth Albert Smith" was filed by Defendant on July 26, 1999. A 
hearing on the matter also occurred on September 22, 1999. 
This case is a companion case to Donahue v. Smith and Stoddard, case number 
980500102. This issues presented in the two cases are identical. The facts are nearly identical in 
all respects relevant to the issues presented by the pending Motions. Therefore, it is the intent of 
the court that this Ruling apply to both the Stoddard and Donahue cases. 
Having reviewed the parties Memoranda, exhibits and affidavits, having reviewed 
relevant law, and having heard oral argument, the Court now rules as follows: 
BACKGROUND 
The present dispute is rooted in the Court's Aug. 4, 1999, memorandum decision and 
subsequent order dismissing Plaintiffs personal injury claim against defendant Seth Albert 
Smith, after Defendant's death on Dec. 23, 1999. The dismissal was based upon Plaintiffs 
failure to file a motion for substitution of parties within 90 days after the filing on the record in 
this case of a Suggestion of Death under Utah R. Civ. P. 25, and the Court's finding that an 
extension of the 90 day deadline for filing a Motion To Substitute was unjustified under Utah R. 
Civ. P. 6(b)(2) based on Plaintiffs failure to show the Court that the failure to comply with Rule 
25 was based on "excusable neglect." See Court's previous Memorandum Opinion, pp. 1-2. 
S. Baird Morgan, Counsel for Defendant, filed the Suggestion of Death on Dec. 28, 
1999, after being informed of Defendant's death by Defendant's daughter, Phyllis Myers. "At 
the time of [Defendant's passing, [Ms. Meyers and her brothers] knew and consented to Mr. 
Morgan notifying the Court and parties of his death. [Ms. Myers and her brothers] understood 
and agreed that Mr. Morgan would continue to represent the interest of [Defendant]'s estate and 
[Ms. Myers] as Personal Representative " See Affidavit of Phyllis Myers, pp. 1-2. 
A copy of the Suggestion of Death was mailed to Plaintiff Stoddard. The Suggestion of 
Death was not served upon Ms. Meyers, the personal representative of Defendant's estate. See 
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Memorandum in Support of Motion Pursuant to 59(e) to Alter or Amend the Findings and 
Conclusions, pp. 6-9 [hereinafter Amendment Support Memo]. 
ANALYSIS 
The Court will first address Plaintiffs Motion to Amend. The Court will then discuss 
Plaintiffs Motion to Substitute. However, the Court will not revisit the issue of excusable 
neglect within this Ruling. A full analysis has already been provided by the Court in its former 
Opinion in this case, including a review of relevant Utah law and a finding that there is an 
insufficient basis under Rule 6(b)(2) for extension of the 90 day deadline for substitution of 
parties set out in Rule 25. 
1. Motion to Amend 
Plaintiff argues that the dismissal of his case against Defendant should be reversed under 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59(e) based on a mistake of law made by the Court—the mistake being that 
because "[a] formal, valid Suggestion of Death has not been made on the record, therefore the 
ninety-day limitations period has not yet begun to run." .See Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Motion Pursuant to 59(e) to Alter or Amend the Findings and Conclusions, pp. 3-7 [hereinafter 
Amendment Reply Memo]. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the Suggestion of Death filed by 
counsel for Defendant (1) "is not valid because the law firm did not, and in fact could not, 
represent Defendant when the Suggestion was filed because Defendant had died;" (2) that "[t]he 
Suggestion of Death filed by the law firm is not valid because it was not served on Defendant's 
representatives;" and (3) that "Rule 25 implicitly requires that the suggestion of death identify 
who may be substituted as a party." Id. See also Amendment Support Memo, p. 9. 
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In response, Defendant argues that "[t]o prohibit an attorney from alerting the court and 
counsel regarding the death of his client is not sound public policy. The more persuasive 
reasoning is that an attorney who represents a client who dies, has a duty to notify the Court and 
other parties in the action that his client has died." See Objection to Plaintiffs Rule 59(e) 
Motion to Alter or Amend the Findings and Conclusions, pp. 4-5 [hereinafter Defendant's 
Objection to Amendment]. Defendant also argues that "Rule 25 does not state that a Suggestion 
of Death must identify a person to be substituted as a party," and the absence of Federal Form 30 
(which contains such a requirement) from the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure further indicates an 
intent on the part of the drafters of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that the Personal 
Representative need not be named in the Suggestion of Death. Id. at 7. Finally, Defendant also 
argues that "nothing in Rule 25 suggests that the suggestion of death must be served upon the 
Decedent's Representatives," and that "[wjhether the defendant's successor is served with formal 
notice does not effect the plaintiffs claim." Id. at 6-8. 
A. Defendant's Death 
Plaintiff first argues that the Suggestion of Death filed by the counsel for the deceased 
defendant is not valid because the agency relationship between the defendant and his attorney 
ended with the death. In deciding the issue of whether Defendant's death severed the attorney-
client relationship between Mr. Morgan and Mr. Smith, and in the absence of any relevant Utah 
authority, this Court finds that there is a split in authority in other jurisdictions. This split pits 
the sagacity of the Supreme Court of Colorado against that of the United States District Court for 
the District of Kansas. Though the evaluations provided by both courts are interesting, for the 
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reasons stated below the Court finds the judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado to be the 
more well-reasoned, and more applicable to the present conflict. 
In Fehrenbacher v. Quackenbush, 759 F.Supp. 1516 (Dist. Kan. 1991)[hereinafter 
Fehrenbacher] a patient, Fehrenbacher, sued a doctor, Quackenbush, for negligent prescription of 
drugs. The doctor died during the pendency of the action, however, and after the plaintiff failed 
to respond to a suggestion of death as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a), counsel for the defendant 
filed a motion to dismiss. The Federal court denied the motion to dismiss, reasoning in part that 
"[t]he attorney for the deceased party may not make the suggestion of death since he is not 
himself a party to the action and, since his authority to represent the deceased terminated on the 
death, he is not a representative of the deceased party of the sort contemplated by [Rule 25]." Id. 
at 1518 (citations omitted). 
In Farmers Ins. Gr. v. Dist. Court of Sec. J.D.. 507 P.2d 865 (Colo 1973)[hereinafter 
Farmers Ins.]. despite the fact that the plaintiff in a tort action failed to move for substitution of 
parties within 90 days of the service of notification of death upon the plaintiffs attorneys as 
required by Colo. R. Civ. P. 25(a), the trial court refused to dismiss the action. On appeal, 
however, the Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the ruling, and stated, "[i]n our view, an 
attorney for a deceased defendant has a duty to notify the court and the other parties in the action 
that his client has died." Id. at 867. 
In analysis of the two rulings, this Court reviews Model Rule of Professional Conduct 
Rule 1.3 cmt. [3], which provides as follows: 
Unless the [attorney-client] relationship is terminated as provided in Rule 1.16 
[addressing whether an attorney must terminate representation because of crime or 
fraud], a lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client. If 
a lawyer's employment is limited to a specific matter, the relationship terminates when 
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the matter has been resolved. If a lawyer has served a client over a substantial period 
in a variety of matters, the client sometimes may assume that the lawyer will continue to 
serve on a continuing basis unless the lawyer gives notice of withdrawal. 
It is apparent to the Court that the Rules of Professional Responsibility contemplate that 
an attorney will finish the work which he has started, and terminate the relationship only "when 
the matter has been resolved." Id. Although there are obvious practical limitations to an 
attorney's ability to represent a deceased client, it seems to the Court that Rule 1.3 cmt. [3] at 
least would allow an attorney to notify the adverse party of the death of his client. Again, as 
counsel for Defendant persuasively articulates, "[t]o prohibit an attorney from alerting the court 
and counsel regarding the death of his client is not sound public policy. The more persuasive 
reasoning is that an attorney who represents a client who dies, has a duty to notify the Court and 
other parties in the action that his client has died." See Defendant's Objection to Amendment, 
pp. 4-5. Consequently, in keeping with such public policy, and also in keeping with the rules of 
professional responsibility, the Court cannot find the Suggestion of Death to be invalid upon the 
basis that the attorney for the dead party cannot file a valid Suggestion of Death under Rule 25. 
The plaintiffs Motion is denied on that ground. 
There is an additional reason for denying the Motion of the Plaintiff on the point that the 
lawyer for the deceased Defendant cannot properly file a Suggestion of Death. At the time the 
Suggestion of Death was filed in this case, S. Baird Morgan was acting both as attorney for the 
Defendant and as attorney for the Defendant's estate and personal representative. Clearly he had 
actual authority to file the Suggestion of Death, independent of any agency relationship with the 
deceased party. 
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B. Identification of the Personal Representative 
The plaintiff next argues that the Suggestion of Death filed by Mr. Morgan is invalid 
because it does not identify the personal representative of the deceased party's estate. In analysis 
of this second issue, the Court again contrasts the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Colorado 
against that of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. In Rehrenbacher, 
supra, 759 F.Supp. at 1519, the Federal Kansas court noted that "Rule 25 does not explicitly 
require the party making the suggestion of death to identify the decedent's representative." The 
Court further reasoned, however, that "[i]n reality, Rule 25 implicitly imposes such a 
requirement. By requiring service of the suggestion of death on parties and non-parties, the rule 
implicitly allocates the burden of identifying the substitute party to the party making the 
suggestion of death." Id. 
In contrast to this view, in Farmer's Ins., supra, 507 P.2d at 867, the Colorado court 
stated: 
. . . we see nothing in our rules which could reasonably be a basis for requiring that 
notification of death of a defendant should include the identity of the deceased 
defendant's executor, administrator, or representative. It seems quite basic and 
reasonable that a plaintiffs attorney who receives notification of the defendant's death 
has the responsibility to promptly initiate the necessary inquiries to determine the 
identity of a person to be substituted for the deceased defendant, and to file a motion for 
substitution in accordance with our rules of Civil Procedure. 
In analysis of the two arguments, this Court finds the reasoningjjfjhe Colorado Court to 
be more in keeping with the Utah Rules of Civil ^ Procedure and sound practice. After a careful 
review of Utah R. Civ. P. 25(a), the Court is unable to find that the Utah Rule in any way 
explicitly or "implicitly allocates the burden of identifying the substitute party to the party 
making the suggestion of death." See Rehrenbacher, supra, 759 F.Supp. at 1519. Rather, the 
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Rule simply requires that there be a Suggestion of Death upon the record. This court is of the 
opinion that it is more reasonable that the responsibility of determining the identity of the person 
to be substituted should rest with the Plaintiffs attorney, who possesses the greater incentive to 
preserve the claim, and who is already required under Rule 25(a) to file the motion for 
substitution. Once someone becomes aware that the defendant has died, that person may not 
know if there is, or will ever be, a personal representative. If a probate case is to be commenced 
to identify a representative for the deceased party's estate, it seems reasonable to this court that 
the responsibility for pursuing that action should rest with the party pursuing the claim. It would 
be poor logic to require that no one can suggest that a party has died without first launching a 
probate case to have the personal representative appointed. Rule 25 does not contain any such 
requirement. Consequently, the Plaintiff's Motion is denied upon this ground. 
C. Service upon the Personal Representative 
Plaintiff next argues that the Suggestion of Death was invalid under Rule 25 because it 
was not served upon the personal representative of the deceased party's estate. In Fehrenbacher, 
supra, 759 F.Supp. at 1519, the Federal court found that the defendant's "own estate ha[d] not 
been given proper notice of th[e] pending action, and in th[e] court's opinion the ninety day 
limitation ha[d] not yet started to run." This reasoning was echoed by the Federal 10th Circuit 
Court of Appeals In Grandbouche v. LovelL 913 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1990), which found that 
"because the personal representative of [the deceased plaintiff]'s estate did not receive service of 
any purported suggestion of death [from the defendant], the ninety-day limitations period did not 
begin to run." Id. at 837. Similar reasoning has also been espoused by the Federal 9th Circuit 
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Court of Appeals in Barlow v. Ground. 39 F.3d 231,233-234 (9th Cir. 1994 (requiring personal 
service upon the decedent's estate, rather than service by mail). 
This Court understands and appreciates the requirements imposed by Federal courts 
regarding service of the Suggestion of Death upon the personal representative of the Estate. This 
Court is also aware that there is no Utah case law specifically addressing the issue. It does not 
appear that the Utah courts have adopted any analogous requirement of service. Likewise, the 
language of Utah R. Civ. P. 25 does not contain any such requirement. Rather, the Rule provides 
that the death is to be suggested on the record and thereafter the surviving party is to file a 
Motion to Substitute and notice of hearing which "shall be served on the parties as provided in 
rule 5 and upon persons not parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of 
summons". See Utah R. Civ. P. 25(a). The purpose of such a requirement is quite clear: a 
personal representative ought to receive notice of a potential claim against the decedent's estate, 
or of a potential cause of action which she might be able to pursue on the decedent's behalf. 
Without such notice, a personal representative would be unable to effectively perform her 
responsibilities. However, under Utah's Rule, that notice comes to the personal representative 
in the form of a Motion to Substitute and not a copy of the Suggestion of Death served under 
Rule 4. 
In addition, in the case before the court, the fact is that counsel for Defendant, Mr. 
Morgan, himself obtained notice of his client's death from Phyllis Myers, Defendant's daughter 
and personal representative of Defendant's estate. The fact is also that when Mr. Morgan filed 
the Suggestion of Death, he was acting both as the lawyer for the deceased party and the lawyer 
for the estate of that party. See Affidavit of Phyllis Myers, pp. 1-2. The personal representative 
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of the estate, Ms. Myers, and her brothers "understood and agreed that Mr. Morgan would 
continue to represent the interest of [Defendant's estate and [Ms. Myers] as Personal 
Representative . . . . " Id. Under these circumstances, where the personal representative already 
had notice of Defendants death as well as the cause of action against him, imposing a 
requirement that the personal representative be served with the Suggestion of Death when that 
Suggestion came from her, would seem nonsensical. To comply with the Federal Courts' 
interpretation of Rule 25 in these unique circumstances would effectively have led to the service 
of notice upon the person who herself gave council for Defendant original notice. It also would 
have meant providing personal service by an attorney upon his own client. Absent any 
controlling Utah case authority, this Court is unwilling to impose such unreasonable constraints 
upon what ought to be a simple filing of a Suggestion of Death upon the record.. 
Consequently, the court finds that because the personal representative of Defendant's 
estate had already received real notice of Defendant's death, and had also hired counsel for 
Defendant as the attorney for the Estate, the failure of that Counsel to serve the personal 
representative with the Suggestion of Death did not here render the ^ Suggestion of Death invalid. 
There is another concern with the position taken by counsel for the plaintiff in this case. 
Again there is no Utah authority on the point but the issue should be addressed in this decision. 
This court does not find any language in Rule 25, nor has any case authority been cited, which 
would give the Plaintiff any standing to complain about the lack of service of the Suggestion of 
Death upon the personal representative. Plaintiff received appropriate service of that Suggestion. 
The estate and the personal representative have not complained about the lack of service of that 
Suggestion upon them. The court can find no basis for conferring standing on the Plaintiff to 
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argue that the Suggestion of Death is invalid as to Plaintiff because it was not served upon the 
personal representative. For that reason alone, the Plaintiffs Motion is denied as to this point. 
D. Dismissal for "failure to join a necessary party" 
Plaintiff next argues that the dismissal of this case under Rule 25 should have been 
without prejudice, rather that with prejudice. At the oral argument in this matter, plaintiffs 
counsel seemed to argue this issue by analogy to Rule 41, Utah Rules Civil Procedure. Though 
the issue of whether Plaintiff ought to have been dismissed without prejudice under the 
indispensable party prong of Rule 41(b) was not raised by the Plaintiff Stoddard in this case, the 
Court will nonetheless address the issue because of the relationship between this case and the 
corresponding case of Donahue v. Smith. 980500102 [heard in conjunction with the present 
action for the limited purpose of addressing dismissal of both cases under Rule 25(a)]. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b) directs that a dismissal should act as an "adjudication upon the 
merits" unless it is for one of three reasons stated in the Rule, including "for lack of an 
indispensable party". Dismissals for one of the three named exceptions are to be without 
prejudice. 
Relying on Black's Law Dictionary, Plaintiff Donahue contends that "the very reason that 
this litigation cannot continue renders the personal representative 'indispensable.' . . . In this 
matter the personal representative is such a[n indispensable] party [because t]he action cannot 
proceed without him or her. Therefore, the failure to substitute (and that is simply another word 
for join) the personal representative for the decedent amounts to a failure to join an indispensable 
party." See Donahue v. Smith. Case No. 980500102, Memorandum Supporting Plaintiff 
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Donahue's Rule 59(e) Motion, p. 2 [hereinafter Donahue Joinder Memo]. Plaintiff argues that 
this dismissal should be treated like a dismissal for failure to join an indispensable party under 
Rule 41(b), which would result in a dismissal without prejudice. 
Responding to this argument, Defendant contends that Plaintiff confuses Utah R. Civ. P. 
19 with Utah R. Civ. P. 25. "Had the drafters of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure considered 
the substitution of a representative the same as the joining of an indispensable party," Defendant 
declares, "they would not have created two separate rules. Furthermore, the personal 
representative was not an indispensable party at the beginning of the lawsuit. . . ." .See Donahue 
v. Smith. Case No. 980500102, Objection to Plaintiffs Joinder in Rule 59(e) Motion, pp. 13-14 
[hereinafter Defendant's Objection to Joinder]. 
In analysis of the parties arguments, the Court notes that Plaintiff fails to cite any 
authority to support the assertion that a personal representative substituted as a party under Rule 
25(a) should be considered the same as an indispensable party to be joined under Utah R. Civ. P. 
Rule 19(a). Moreover, the Court finds no authority to support this assertion. The reason for this 
lack of authority may lie in Plaintiff Donahue's erroneous assumption that the terms substitution 
and joinder are synonymous in both meaning and effect, under the Rules of Civil Procedure. On 
the contrary, this Court finds that the term "joinder," as outlined in Rule 19, refers to the process 
of "uniting" two or more persons in a legal proceeding. See Black's Law Dictionary 581 (abr. 6th 
ed. 199a). By contrast, the term "substitution" refers instead to "the replacement of one party to 
an action by another party because of death . . . . " Id. at 998. There are two different Rules to 
treat two different procedures. 
In the present case, Ms. Myers, the personal representative, would not be "united" or 
"joined" with the decedent as a second defendant. Instead, if she were to be made a party, she 
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would "replace"or "substitute" for the decedent as the defendant in this action. The drafters of 
the Rules of Civil Procedure obviously appreciated the difference between joinder and 
substitution. The presence of the word "join" in Rule 41(b) rather that "substitute" supports this 
conclusion. It would have been an easy matter for the drafters to include "substitution of a 
party" in Rule 41(b) as one of the dismissals which would be without prejudice, if that had been 
their intent. Instead, a different Rule was created to treat the matter of substitution in the case of 
the death of one or more parties. 
Moreover, under ordinary rules of statutory construction, a statute or rule must be read 
according to its plain meaning. An involuntary dismissal of an action under Rule 41(b) acts as 
an adjudication upon the merits (dismissal with prejudice) unless it is a dismissal for one of three 
specific reasons which are listed as exceptions to the general rule. Rule 41(b) does not list 
"substitution of parties" as one of the three exceptions. The exceptions listed in the Rule are 
"lack of jurisdiction," "improper venue," or "lack of an indispensable party." Consequently, 
even if Rule 41 has application to this case, which this court does not find to be the case, this 
dismissal would be with prejudice under the cleair provisions of that Rule, as the dismissal was 
for failure to substitute a party for a deceased defendant under Rule 25, rather than for failure to 
join an indispensable party under Rule 19. 
As a final note, both Federal case law and case law from sister states contain examples of 
Rule 25(a) claims which have been dismissed "with prejudice." See, e.g.. Frances v. Frances, 
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4257; See also, e.g.. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co. v. Price. 539 
So.2d 202 (Ala. 1989)[hereinafter Price]. In explanation, such cases have reasoned that "[a] 
dismissal for failure to substitute should do more than merely require a plaintiff to seek a new 
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place on the trial calendar; it should put an end to the litigation for all time." See Price, supra, 
539 So.2d at 204. Likewise, as reflected in its prior Opinion, this Court continues to hold that if 
Rule 25(a) is to have any meaningful effect, dismissal under its terms must be with prejudice. 
2. Motion to Substitute 
Because the Court can find no basis upon which to alter or amend its previous decision 
dismissing this action, it does not reach Plaintiffs "Motion to Substitute Phyllis Myers as 
Personal Representative of the Estate of Seth Albert Smith, for Defendant." That Motion is 
mooted by the dismissal of the case for failure to comply with Rule 25. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDERS 
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court orders that Plaintiffs Motion Pursuant to 59(e) to 
Alter or Amend the Findings and Conclusions be, and hereby is, denied. Likewise, plaintiffs 
Motion to Substitute is denied. 
Since Plaintiff has already filed an appeal in this case, and since the parties entered into a 
stipulation at the oral argument that the court should enter the following order, the clerk of this 
court is hereby instructed to accept the filing fee already paid as the fee for an appeal from this 
decision, which will be the final decision of the court. Counsel for Defendant is ordered to 
prepare and submit an Order incorporating this Ruling and the court's previous Memorandum 
Decision and again ordering this case dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this 12th day of October 1999. 
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of January 5, 2000, and is against any and all defendants in this matter and their successors in 
interest. 
DATED this / / day of January, 2000 
PHILLIP E.^LQWRY, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this iQ day of January, 2000. 
Baird S. Morgan, Esq. 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
50 South Main Street, #700 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465 
Brent D. Young, Esq. 
Ivie & Young 
226 West 2230 North 
P.O. Box 657 
Provo, UT 84604 




:•- Kin o n 
S. BAIRD MORGAN (A2314) 
KRISTA A. WEBER (A8019) 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN KEITH DONAHUE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SETH ALBERT SMITH, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF AUTHORITY OF 
APPEARANCE 
Civil No. 98CV102 
Judge Philip Eves 
S. Baird Morgan of and for the law firm of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson and 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-33, hereby responds to Plaintiffs Motion to Demonstrate By 
What Authority Counsel Appears. 
S. Baird Morgan represented Mr. Smith in the above entitled matter. Counsel was 
notified of Mr. Smith's passing by his heirs. At that time, there was no known representative of Mr. 
Smith's estate. Mr Smith's heirs, and trustees of his trust, consented and agreed to counsel's 
^b 
continued representation of the estate in this matter. Additionally, Phyllis Myers, the Personal 
Representative in this matter, has also consented to counsel's representation of the estate in the 
above entitled matter. (See Affidavit of Phyllis Myers attached as Exhibit "A" and incorporated 
herein by reference). 
^ DATED this '£Jfr- day of June, 1999. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
S. BAIRD MORGAN 
Attorneys for D e^fendzjft, Seth Albert Smith 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was mailed, 
first-class, postage prepaid, on this 2% day of June, 1999 to the following: 
Craig M. Snyder 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 
120 East 300 North St. 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 




S. BARD MORGAN (A2314) 
KRISTA A. WEBER (A8019) 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER &. NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
SO South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake dry, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) S31-2000 
Fax No.: (S01) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN KEITH DONAHUE, 
Plaintiff; 
vs. 
SETH ALBERT SMITH, 
Defendant. , 
I AFFIDAVIT OP PHYLLIS MYERS 
Civil No. 98CV1Q2 
Judge Philip Eves 
STATE OF tTTAH ) 
as. 
COUNTY OF *&E4ri)iat, ) 
Phyllis Myers, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. My father was the defendant in the above-entitled matter at the time of his 
death in December 1998. 
2, Although I have not seen, say legal document to the effect, I understand that 
the Court reomtiy appointed me Pergonal Representative of my father's estate. 
3. As Personal Representative of my father's estate, I approved and consented 
to 5. Baird Morgan and the law firm of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson representing the interest 
of the estate in this matter. 
4. At the time of ray father's death, I was aware that he and my mother had 
created a trust. However, I had not seen a complete copy of the Trust document, Additionally, 
neither my brothers nor I knew whether my father left a will. 
5. My mother is incapacitated and is incapable of participating in any aspect of 
the legal proceedings involving my father's estate. 
6. My brothers and I knew that we were co-trustees of my father and mother's 
trusts. However, we did not know whether my father had also appointed a personal representative 
of his estate. 
7. In December 1998,1 called Mr. Morgan and informed him of my father's 
death. At the time of my father's passing, my broth*** and I knew and consented to Mr. Morgan 
notifying the Court and parties of his death We understood and agreed that Mr. Morgan wouid 
continue to represent the interest of my father's estate and me as Personal Representative with 
respect to the two lawsuits. 
DATED this 2£_ day of ()y^<? , 1999. 
2 
STA2E0FUTAH ) 
COUNTY OF &&Ai>cA- ) 
On the 2&-~day of ~TI^**UL^ 1999, personally appeared before me, 
Phyllis Myers, whose identity has been proven on tbe basis of satisfactory evidence, being first 
duly sworn, acknowledges that she executed the foregoing instrument, for the purposes stated 
therein, of her own voluntary act 
MICHAEL F OALTON 
B60 NORTH 100 WEST 
BFAVfrR UT 84713 
COMU EXP 10-10-2001 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
}Jiy Commission Expires: 
CXBTEFtCATE OF SEBVTCE 
I HHRKRY CERTIFY that a trae and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was 
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this day of June, 1999 to the following: 
Craig ML Snyder 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 
120 East 300 North St 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 




S. BAIRD MORGAN (A2314) 
KRISTA A. WEBER (A8019) 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN KEITH DONAHUE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SETH ALBERT SMITH, 
Defendant. 
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
JOINDER IN RULE 59(E) MOTION 
Civil No. 98CV102 
Judge Philip Eves 
Defendant, by and through his counsel of record, S. Baird Morgan and Krista A. 
Weber, of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson, hereby submits the following Memorandum in 
opposition to Plaintiffs Joinder in Stoddard's Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend the Findings 
and Conclusions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mr. Donahue filed a lawsuit against the Defendant Mr. Smith on or about June 
5, 1998, for personal injured arising out of an automobile accident. (See Court File.) 
2. The law firm of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson represented Mr. Smith in 
the above entitled action at the time of his death in December 1998. 
3. Phyllis Myers, Mr. Smith's daughter, was recently appointed Personal 
Representative of her father's estate. (See Affidavit of Phyllis Myers attached as Exhibit "A.")1 
4. As Personal Representative of her father's estate, Mrs. Myers approved and 
consented to S. Baird Morgan and the law finn of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson representing 
the interest of the estate in this matter. (Exhibit "A" at If 3). 
5. At the time of her father's death, Mrs. Myers was aware that Mr. Smith and 
her mother had created a trust. However, she had not seen a complete copy of the Trust document. 
Additionally, none of the Smith children knew whether their father left a will. (Exhibit "A" at ^ 4). 
6. Mrs. Smith, the decedent's spouse is incapacitated and is incapable of 
participating in any aspect of the legal proceedings involving Mr. Smith's estate. (Exhibit "A" at 
115). 
7. Mr. Smith's three children knew that they were co-trustees of their father and 
mother's trusts. However, they did not know whether their father had also appointed a personal 
representative of his estate. (Exhibit "A" at ^ 6). 
8. In December 1998, Mrs. Myers called Mr. Morgan and informed him of Mr. 
Smith's death. At the time of their father's passing, the Smith children knew and consented to Mr. 
Morgan notifying the Court and parties of Mr. Smith's death. They understood and agreed that Mr. 
A copy of Mrs. Myers' Affidavit is attached hereto. The original affidavit will be filed with the Court 
upon receipt. 
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Morgan would continue to represent the interest of their father's estate and Mrs. Myers as Personal 
Representative with respect to the two lawsuits. (Exhibit "A" at f 7). 
9. Counsel filed a "Suggestion of Death" on December 24, 1998. (See Court 
File.) 
10. On March 26, 1999, counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to comply 
with Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Court File.) 
11. On June 1, 1999, this Court issued a "Memorandum Opinion" dismissing the 
Plaintiffs claims in this case. (See Court File.) 
12. On or about June 14, 1999, Plaintiff filed a joinder in Rule 59(e) Motion to 
Alter or Amend the Findings and Conclusions. (See Court File.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S RULE 59(E) ARGUMENTS ARE NOT A BASIS TO OVERTURN THE 
COURT'S RULING 
A. Plaintiff Has Not Satisfied Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Plaintiff has presented the Court with the unusual situation of joining in a motion 
filed by a party in a different civil suit. In any event, this plaintiffs motion fails to present a 
compelling reason for the Court to reconsider it's ruling. A Rule 59(e) motion must be based on one 
of the grounds set forth in Rule 59(a). Hume v. Small Claims Court of Murray City. 590 P.2d 309, 
310-11 (Utah 1979). Rule 59(a) provides: 
(a) . . . [A] motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the 
court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional 
3 
testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new 
findings and conclusions, and direct entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse 
party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party 
was prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the 
jurors have been induced to any general or specific verdict, or to a finding on 
any questions submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by 
chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the 
affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the 
application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at trial 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other 
decision, or that it is against the law. 
(7) Error in law. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59. 
Plaintiffs memorandum does not include any suggestion as to the basis for his Rule 
59 Motion. Admittedly, plaintiffs motion is not based on subsections (1), (2), (3) or (4) as a motion 
pursuant to one of these sections must be supported by an affidavit. (Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 59(c)). Sections (5) and (6) are not applicable considering the facts in this case. Finally, 
plaintiflf does not cite any Utah case law in his memorandum which would suggest his motion was 
4 
filed pursuant to section (7) As plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of this provision, 
plaintiffs Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment should be denied 
B Plaintiff Improperly Attempts to Reargue the Motion to Dismiss 
All of plaintiff s arguments, even if proper, could have and should have been raised 
in response to defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff has not cited any Utah case law or other 
persuasive authority to suggest that the Court's ruling was in error Plaintiff cannot now try to raise 
new arguments from other jurisdiction and ask the Court reconsider the Motion to Dismiss under 
the guise of a Rule 59 motion Consequently, plaintiffs Rule 59(e) motion should be denied 
POINT H 
A VALID SUGGESTION OF DEATH WAS FILED WITH THE COURT. 
Plaintiffs argument that the Suggestion of Death filed with the Court is invalid is 
unpersuasive, not based on controlling Utah law and could have been argued in response to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Assuming arguendo that this motion is timely and states a proper 
basis under Rule 59(e) it is till not persuasive to set aside this Court's prior ruling Plaintiffs 
argument contains essentially three points none of which merit reconsideration of the Court's ruling 
First, plaintiff contends that counsel for Mr Smith may not make the Suggestion of Death as 
authority terminated upon a death of the client Second, plaintiff argues that Rule 25(a)(l)of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure2 was not satisfied as a Suggestion of Death was not served on Mr 
Smith's successor Third, plaintiff argues that Rule 25 implies that the Suggestion of Death must 
2
 All references to Rule 25 in this memorandum will refer to Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
unless otherwise noted 
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identify who may be substituted as a new party Plaintiffs arguments are neither supported by Utah 
case law nor persuasive Therefore, plaintiffs motion should be denied 
A Counsel for Mr Smith Appropriately Entered the Suggestion of Death 
Rule 25 states in part "Unless the motion for substitution is made not later than 
ninety days after the death is suggested on the record by service of a statement of the fact of death 
as provided herein for the service of the motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased 
party" Nothing in this language suggests that a decedent's former counsel is prohibited from 
entering a Suggestion of Death Furthermore, there is no Utah case law that supports such a 
proposition To prohibit an attorney from alerting the court and counsel regarding the death of his 
client is not sound public policy Furthermore, at the time of Mr Smith's death, his heirs consented 
to counsel's continued representation in this matter (See Exhibit "A" -Affidavit of Phyllis Myers) 
The more persuasive reasoning is that an attorney who represents a client who dies, has a duty to 
notify the Court and other parties in the action that his client has died (See e g Farmers Ins Group 
v District Court of the Second Judicial District of Denver. 507 P 2d 865, 867 (Colo 1973), Mullis 
v Bone. 238 S E 2d 748, 750 (Ga Ct App 1977), Brown v Wheeler. 437 So 2d 521 (Ala 1983) 
(overruled on other grounds)) 
In Farmers, the defendant died during the course of litigation and the attorney who 
represented him in the matter mailed notification of the death to plaintiffs attorney and to attorneys 
for the co-defendants When plaintiff did not move to substitute a party within the ninety day time 
limit, decedent's attorney filed a motion to dismiss In response, plaintiff filed a Motion for 
Extension of Time and Motion to Substitute Plaintiff alleged that its failure to substitute a new 
6 
party was due to excusable neglect on the part of counsel Plaintiffs counsel received the 
notification of the defendant's death but it was placed in the attorney's file and overlooked. 
Additionally, plaintiff argued that upon the death of the defendant, the attorneys who represented 
him in the personal injury matter no longer represented him for any purpose and did not have 
standing to make notification of the death. Farmers. 507 P.2d at 866. 
The Court held that the "failure to tact due to carelessness and negligence is not 
excusable neglect" and dismissed the plaintiffs Complaint as to the deceased party. Id. at 867. The 
Court also rejected plaintiffs argument that the decedent's former counsel could not file the 
suggestion of death. The Court stated, "[i]n our view, an attorney for a deceased defendant has a 
duty to notify the court and other parties in the action that his client has died. . . ." Id. at 867. 
Similar reasoning was followed in dismissing the action as to the deceased in MuUis. 
Mullis v. Bone. 238 S.E.2d. 748 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977). In that case, the defendant died and the 
attorney who represented him filed and served on the parties notice of the date of decedent's death. 
Plaintiff did not move to substitute a new party until after the time had expired. Plaintiff argued in 
part that because the Suggestion of Death was filed by decedent's former counsel, the notice was 
invalid. Id. at 750. The Court rejected this argument and noted: 
While the statute provides that the motion for substitution may be made by 
'. . . any party or by the successors or representatives of the deceased party 
. . .,' it is silent as to the identity of the appropriate person to suggest death 
on the record. 
Id. at 751. 
Neither Rule 25 nor Utah case law supports plaintiffs argument that the Suggestion 
of Death was inappropriately filed in this matter. Mr. Smith did not leave a will identifying a 
personal representative or successor. All of Mr. Smith's assets passed by trust to his wife who is 
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incapacitated. As the adverse party, it was against plaintiffs interest to file a Suggestion of Death. 
Decedent's former counsel was the most appropriate party to alert the Court and counsel of Mr. 
Smith's death. This counsel, as indicated by the affidavit of the subsequently appointed Personal 
Representative, had authority and consent of the heirs to proceed under Rule 25. The Suggestion 
of Death was appropriately filed in this matter and plaintiffs motion should be denied. 
B. Nothing in Rule 25 Suggests That the Suggestion of Death Must be Served 
Upon the Decedent's Representative 
Plaintiff does not cite any Utah authority in support of his argument that the 
Suggestion of Death needed to include the name of the person to be substituted in this matter. Rule 
25 does not state that a Suggestion of Death must identify a person to be substituted as a party. At 
the time of Mr. Smith's death, his counsel was not aware of whether any testamentary instrument 
existed which named a personal representative of Mr. Smith's estate. 
The cases cited by the plaintiff in support of this argument can be distinguished from 
the current case in several ways First, none of the cases involve Utah State law. Second, many of 
the cases involve the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure Rule is similar to the federal counterpart. However, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
include a model form for a suggestion of death It appears from this form that the drafters 
anticipated that a suggestion of death would identify the proper party to be substituted. Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Form 30. Where the successor is named on the Suggestion of Death, it 
3
 See e g. Barlow v Ground 39 F 3d 231 (9th Cir 19941 Fanss v Lynchburg Foundry. 769 F.2d 958 (4th 
Cir. 1985V United States v Miller Brothers. 505 F.2d 1031 (10th Cir 1974), Grandbouche v Lovell 913 F.2d 835 
(10th Cir 19901 Fehrenbacher v Ouackenbush. 759 F S>upp 1516 (Dist Kan 1991) 
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may be reasonable to require the notice to be served on that individual However, Utah elected not 
to adopt this form and does not require that the successor party be named Consequently, federal 
law is not persuasive on this issue As counsel had no idea who the successor party would be, it 
would not be reasonable to place the burden on the defendant to serve an unknown person 
Third, a majority of the case law involved the death of the plaintiff which raises 
concerns not present in the current case4 The primary concern when a party dies during litigation 
is that the person with the ultimate burden of substituting a party receive notice of the death When 
the plaintiff dies, the plaintiffs successor has the burden of deciding whether to preserve plaintiffs 
claim by substituting a new plaintiff Therefore, it is reasonable to require a Suggestion of Death 
to be served on the plaintiffs successor However, when the defendant dies, the plaintiff has the 
burden of moving the court to substitute a party Whether the defendant's successor is served with 
formal notice does not effect the plaintiffs claim In this case, plaintiffs counsel, the party with the 
responsibility of substituting a party for the deceased, received notice of the death Consequently, 
there has been no prejudice to plaintiff 
Finally, in two of the cases cited by plaintiff, no Suggestion of Death was filed with 
the court or served on any party (See ejj Kissic v Liberty National Life Ins Co , 641 So 2d 250 
(Ala 1994), United States v Miller Brothers Constr Co . 505 F 2d 1031 (10th Cir 1974)) In sum, 
plaintiff has not presented any persuasive authority in support of the argument that the Suggestion 
4
 See e_g, Kissic v Liberty- National Life Ins Co . 641 So 2d 250 (Ala 1994), Ripple v Wold 572 N W 2d 
439(SD 1997 V Hilsabeck v Lane Co . Inc . 168 F R D 313(DistKan 1996V Grandbouche v Lovell. 913 F 2d 
835 (10th Or 1990V Barlow v Ground. 39 F 3d 231 (9th Or 1994 V Fanss v Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F 2d 958 
(4th Or 1985) 
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of Death filed in this case should have been served upon decedent's representative. The policy 
rationale behind serving the deceased's successor is not present in this case as the decedent's 
successor did not bear the burden of moving the court for a substitution. Plaintiff, the party with the 
burden of substituting a person for the deceased defendant, received notice of the Suggestion of 
Death. As plaintiff failed to substitute a party within ninety days of receiving notice of the 
defendant's death, the Court's Order of Dismissal is appropriate. 
C. Rule 25 Does Not Implicitly Require that the Suggestion of Death Identify 
Who May Be Substituted as a Party. 
As stated above, the federal counterpart to Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure includes a model "suggestion of death" form. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Form 
30. The federal form suggests identifying and naming the person who may be substituted as a party. 
Consequently, it is reasonable that cases involving federal law require that the Suggestion of Death 
filed by the decedent's counsel identify who may be substituted as a party. However, Utah has not 
adopted any form similar to Form 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Nothing in Rule 25 
alerts a party that a Suggestion of Death must include the name of the person to be substituted in the 
action. Utah law does not require the identity of the representative to be included within the 
Suggestion of Death and the notice in this case was valid. 
The plaintiffs in Farmers and Mullis. supra, presented arguments that the Suggestion 
of Death was invalid because the notice did not name the proper party to be substituted. Farmers. 
507 P.2d at 865; Mullis. 238 S.E.2d at 748. In Farmers, the Court refused to impose a duty on the 
decedent's counsel to name an appropriate future representative. The court stated: 
10 
. . . [W]e see nothing in our rules which could reasonably be a basis for 
requiring that notification of death of a defendant should include the identity 
of the deceased defendant's executor, administrator, or representative. It 
seems quite basic and reasonable thai a plaintiffs attorney who receives 
notification of a defendant's death has the responsibility to promptly 
initiate the necessary inquiries to determine the identity of a person to be 
substituted for the deceased defendant, and to file a motion for substitution 
in accordance with our Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Farmers Ins. Group. 507 P.2d at 867-868 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Mullis. the Court rejected a similar argument: 
Although our legal tradition places a premium on fairness, litigation still 
involves an adversary system. The burden of ascertaining the proper party 
to be substituted for a deceased litigant is properly placed on the party who 
would effect the substitution. We hold, therefore, that'. . . the statement of 
the fact of the death . . .' which includes the name of the deceased and the 
date of the death is a sufficient suggestion of death. . .. 
Mullis. 238 S.E.2d at 750 (emphasis added). 
In this case, at the time of Mr. Smith's death, decedent's counsel did not know any 
details of his estate. While counsel had the authority of Mr. Smith's heirs to continue representation, 
none of the heirs knew if their father appointed a personal representative in a will or trust. (See 
Affidavit of Phyllis Myers' filed herewith). Plaintiff asks the Court to impose a duty on the 
opposing party to investigate and ascertain the proper party to be substituted in the matter so that 
plaintiffs suit against the defendant could be maintained. This is contrary to the adversarial system 
of justice. After the Motion to Dismiss was filed, Mr. Stoddard's counsel readily petitioned the 
Probate Court for the appointment of personal representative without the assistance of decedent's 
counsel. Nothing prevented Mr. Stoddard of plaintiff from initiating this proceeding less than ninety 
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days after receiving notice of defendant's death. Plaintiffs argument is unpersuasive. 
Consequently, plaintiffs motion to amend the judgment should be denied. 
POINT m 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR AN 
EXTENSION OF TIME. 
"Failure to fact due to carelessness and negligence is not excusable neglect." Farmers. 
507 P.2d at 867. Consequently, the trial court appropriately denied plaintiffs Motion for Extension. 
Plaintiff relies on United States v. Miller Brothers Constr. Co.. 505 F.2d 1031 (10th Cir. 1974), as 
support that the court should have granted an extension of time in this case. However, the facts of 
case plaintiff relies upon are completely inapposite to the current case. 
In Miller, the defendant died during litigation. A Suggestion of Death was filed on 
March 13, 1972. On June 5, 1972, prior to the expiration of 90 days, the plaintiff moved for an 
extension of time to file a motion for substitution because the hearing on the appointment of a 
representative was not scheduled until June 13, 1972. On June 9, 1972, the defendant moved to 
dismiss the action. On June 26, 1972, plaintiff moved to substitute the representative as a party. Id. 
at 1033-34. The defendant argued that the Court should not have granted an extension to the 
plaintiff because the plaintiff had notice of the defendant's death prior to receiving formal notice. 
The Court disagreed with defendant's argument and permitted the plaintiff to substitute a new 
defendant. Id. at 1034. 
Contrary to the plaintiff in Miller, in the current case, plaintiff did absolutely nothing 
during the 90-day period after receiving the notice of death. Plaintiff did not take any action to 
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substitute a party for the deceased until after defendant's counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss. As the 
Court noted in it's Ruling, 
Plaintiff has offered no satisfactory explanation as to why there was 
no filing of a substitution of parties, or at least a request to extend the 
time for filing such a substitution within the 90 day period. The 
Court cannot conclude that the delay in filing the statutorily required 
motion for substitution of parties was made in good faith in the 
absence of such explanation. It rather appears that plaintiff simply 
put this case on the back burner because there were more pressing 
matter pending and chose to let the 90 day period lapse. 
See Court Ruling of June 1. 1999 at 5. The trial court appropriately denied plaintiffs request for 
an extension under Rule 25 in which the substitute of any party defendant. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THIS MATTER WITH PREJUDICE 
Plaintiffs argument that defendant's Rule 25 Motion to Dismiss was actually a Rule 
19 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join an Indispensable Party is not persuasive. Had the drafters 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure considered the substitution of a representative the same as the 
joining of an indispensable party, they would not have created two separate rules. Furthermore, the 
personal representative was not an indispensable party at the beginning of the lawsuit and Plaintiff 
ignores the fact that, pursuant to Rule 25, he was compelled to act within a specified period of time 
to preserve his claim. His failure to act within the ninety day period after receiving the Suggestion 
of Death was the basis of defendant's motion. As the Court held: 
[t]he Motion to Dismiss brought by Defendant Smith is not based 
upon any "lack of jurisdiction," "improper venue" or lack of 
indispensable party." [See Rule 41(b)]. Rather, the Motion to 
Dismiss is based upon the "failure of the plaintiff to . . . comply with 
the [] rules [of civil procedure]." (Id.) Specifically, the Motion to 
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Dismiss is based upon Plaintiffs failure to "file a motion for 
substitution of the parties within the required time frame" under Rule 
25. (See Defendant's Support Memo, p.2) Consequently, the Court 
finds that the dismissal should be with prejudice. 
See Court Ruling at 8. The Court's ruling was appropriate and the Plaintiffs motion should be 
denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has presented no compelling arguments for the Court to amend its prior 
ruling. Therefore, defendant respectfully requests that the Court deny Plaintiffs Rule 59(e) Motion. 
DATED this 2$ day of June, 1999. 




Attorneys for Defendant, Seth Albert Smith 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was mailed, 
first-class, postage prepaid, on this 'Zt day of -Jkjunu , 1999, to the following: 
Craig M. Snyder 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 
120 East 300 North St. 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
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TK THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR BEAVER. COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN KEITH DONAHUE, 
Fhinttff; 
vs. 
SFTH ALBERT SMITH, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PHYLLIS MYERS 
Civil No. 98CV102 
Judge Philip Eves 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
as. 
COUNTY OF TkE^u C/L ) 
Phyllis Myers, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. My father was the defendant in the above-entitled matter at the time of his 
death in December 1998. 
2. Although I have ftot teen anylegal document to the effect, I understand that 
the Court recently appointed me Personal Representative of my father's estate. 
3. As Personal Representative of my father's estate, I approved and consented 
to 5. Baird Morgan and the law firm of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson representing the interest 
of the estate in thia matter. 
4. At the time of ray father'* death, I was aware that he u d my mother had 
created a trust. However, I had not seen a complete copy of the Trust document. Additionally, 
neither my brothers nor I knew whether my father left a will 
5. My mother is incapacitated and is incapable of participating in any aspect of 
the legal proceedings involving my father's estate. 
6. My brothers and I knew that we were co-trustees of my father and mother's 
trusts. However, we did not know whether my father bad also appointed a personal representative 
of his estate. 
7. In December 1998,1 called Mr. Morgan and informed him of my father's 
death. At the time of my father's passing, my brothers and I knew and consented to Mr. Morgan 
notifying the Court and parties of his death, We understood and agreed that Mr. Morgan would 
continue to represent the interest of my father's estate and me as Personal Representative with 
respect to the two lawsuits. 
DATED this < g £ . day of Cjy^a „ 1999. 
2 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF fe&droc/L. ) 
ss. 
.U On the -2.y^-day of T f i L^-^os^ , 1999, personally appeared before me, 
Phyllis Myers, whose identity has been proven an the basis of satisfactory evidence, being first 
duty sworn, acknowledges that she excepted the foregoing instrument, for the purposes stated 
therein, of her own voluntary act 
MICHAEL F OALTON 
neTWUBJC'SnittttlTAh 
B60 NORTH f 00 WEST 
•BMVtfl UT B4713 
COMM EXP 10-10-2001 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
ySy Commission Expires: 
Lo-io-aoo) 
OFSEttVTCr 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was 
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this day of June, 1999 to the following: 
Craig M. Snyder 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 
120 East 300 North St. 
P.O. Box 1241 
Provo, Utah 84603 





BRENT D. YOUNG (3S84) CI I E 
TVTE&. YOUNG r | f c > c 
Attorney for Petitioner Seth Atben Smith JUN 0 2 1999 
226 West 2230 North 
P.O. Box 6:7 FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
Provo,UT 84603 
Telephone (801) 375-3000 
ES THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BEAVER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DC THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF: 
SETII ALBERT SMITH, 
Deceased. 
APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE 
Probate No.-983^0591 913f**oof 
Judge: zrP^^f &* 
Upon consideration of the Appointment of Personal Representative filed by 
CLAIR JAUSSI, on May 12,1999, the Court finds, upon hearing, that a qualified person 
has petitioned for appointment of personal representative, that venue is proper, that 
required notices were given or waived, that all requirements for appointment under the 
Utah Uniform Probate Code have been met, and that the best interest of&e estate of Seth 
Albert Smith will be served by the appointment of CLAIR. JAUSSI, as personal 
representative. ^ ^ 
THEREFORE, CLi\m JAUSSI is hereby appointed personal representative, to act 
without bond and upon' qualification and acceptance, letters of administration shall be 
issued, to tlic said pcibuual rcprc^cuUiLivc. 
DatedC^X^g. Z. 1771 BY THE COURT 
25 &<*€+ 
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WEST'S UTAH RULES OF 
COURT 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 
PART IV PARTIES 
Current with amendments received 
through 11-1-1999 
RULE 25 SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES 
(a) Death 
(1) If a party dies and the claim is not thereby 
extinguished, the court may order substitution of 
the proper parties The motion for substitution 
may be made by any party or by the successors or 
representatives of the deceased party and, together 
with the notice of hearing, shall be served on the 
parties as provided m Rule 5 and upon persons 
not parties m the manner provided m Rule 4 for 
the service of a summons Unless the motion for 
substitution is made not later than ninety days 
after the death is suggested upon the record by 
service of a statement of the fact of the death as 
provided herein for the service of the motion, the 
action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party 
(2) In the event of the death of one or more of 
the plaintiffs or of one or more of the defendants 
m an action m which the right sought to be 
enforced survives only to the surviving plaintiffs 
or only against the surviving defendants, the 
action does not abate The death shall be 
suggested upon the record and the action shall 
proceed m favor of or against the sur\i\ing 
parties 
(b) Incompetency If a party becomes 
incompetent, the court upon motion served as 
provided in Subdivision (a) of this rule ma\ allou 
the action to be continued b> or against his 
representative 
(c) Transfer of Interest In case of am transfer 
of mterest, the action ma\ be continued b\ or 
against the original party, unless the court upon 
motion directs the person to whom the mterest is 
transferred to be substituted m the action or jomed 
with the original party Service of the motion 
shall be made as provided m Subdivision (a) of 
this rule 
(d) Public Officers, Death or Separation From 
Office When a public officer is a party to an 
action and during its pendency dies, resigns, or 
otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be 
contmued and maintained by or against his 
successor, if within 6 months after the successor 
takes office, it is satisfactorily shown to the court 
that there is a substantial need for so continuing 
and maintaining it Substitution pursuant to this 
rule may be made when it is shown by 
supplemental pleading that the successor of an 
officer adopts or contmues or threatens to adopt or 
contmue the action of his predecessor Before a 
substitution is made, the party or officer to be 
affected, unless expressly assentmg thereto, shall 
be given reasonable notice of the application 
therefor and accorded an opportunity to object 
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WEST'S UTAH RULES OF 
COURT 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 
PART II. COMMENCEMENT 
OF ACTION; SERVICE OF 
PROCESS, PLEADINGS, 
MOTIONS AND ORDERS 
Current with amendments received 
through 11-1-1999 
RULE 4. PROCESS 
(a) Signing of Summons. The summons shall 
be signed and issued by the plaintiff or the 
plaintiffs attorney. Separate summonses may be 
signed and served. 
(b) Time of Service. In an action commenced 
under Rule 3(a)(1), the summons together with a 
copy of the complaint shall be served no later than 
120 days after the filing of the complaint unless 
the court allows a longer period of time for good 
cause shown. If the summons and complaint are 
not timely served, the action shall be dismissed, 
without prejudice on application of any party or 
upon the court's own initiative. In any action 
brought against two or more defendants on which 
service has been obtained upon one of them within 
the 120 days or such longer period as may be 
allowed by the court, the other or others may be 
served or appear at any time prior to trial. 
(c)(1) The summons shall contain the name of 
the court, the address of the court, the names of 
the parties to the action, and the county in which it 
is brought. It shall be directed to the defendant, 
state the name, address and telephone number of 
the plaintiffs attorney, if any, and otherwise the 
plaintiffs address and telephone number. It shall 
state the time within which the defendant is 
required to answer the complaint in writing, and 
shall notify the defendant that in case of failure to 
do so, judgment by default will be rendered 
against the defendant. It shall state either that the 
complaint is on file with the court or that the 
complaint will be filed with the court within ten 
days of service. 
(2) If the action is commenced under Rule 
3(a)(2), the summons shall state that the 
defendant need not answer if the complaint is not 
filed within 10 days after service and shall state 
the telephone number of the clerk of the court 
where the defendant may call at least 13 days after 
service to determine if the complaint has been 
filed. 
(3) If service is made by publication, the 
summons shall briefly state the subject matter and 
the sum of money or other relief demanded, and 
that the complaint is on file. 
*6 (d) By Whom Served. The summons and 
complaint may be served in this state or any other 
state or territory of the United States, by the 
sheriff or constable, or by the deputy of either, by 
a United States Marshal or by the marshal's 
deputy, or by any other person 18 years of age or 
older at the time of service, and not a party to the 
action or a party's attorney. 
(e) Personal Service. Personal service shall be 
made as follows: 
(1) Upon any individual other than one covered 
by subparagraphs (2), (3) or (4) below, by 
delivering a copy of the summons and/or the 
complaint to the individual personally, or by 
leaving a copy at the individual's dwelling house 
or usual place of abode with some person of 
suitable age and discretion there residing, or by 
delivering a copy of the summons and/or the 
complaint to an agent authorized by appointment 
or by law to receive service of process; 
(2) Upon an infant (being a person under 14 
years) by delivering a copy to the infant and also 
to the infant's father, mother or guardian or, if 
none can be found within the state, then to any 
person having the care and control of the infant, or 
with whom the infant resides, or in whose service 
the infant is employed; 
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(3) Upon a natural person judicially declared to 
be of unsound mind or incapable of conducting his 
own affairs, b> delivering a copy to the person and 
to the person's legal representative if one has been 
appointed and in the absence of such 
representative, to the individual, if any, who has 
care, custody or control of the person, 
(4) Upon an individual incarcerated or 
committed at a facility operated by the state or any 
of its political subdivisions, by delivering a copy 
to the person who has the care, custody, or control 
of the individual to be served, or to that person's 
designee or to the guardian or conservator of the 
individual to be served if one has been appomted, 
who shall, in any case, promptly deliver the 
process to the individual served, 
(5) Upon any corporation, not herem otherwise 
provided for, upon a partnership or other 
unincorporated association which is subject to suit 
under a common name, by delivering a copy 
thereof to an officer, a managing or general agent, 
or other agent authorized by appointment or by 
law to receive service of process and, if the agent 
is one authorized by statute to receive service and 
the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to 
the defendant If no such officer or agent can be 
found within the state, and the defendant has, or 
advertises or holds itself out as havmg, an office 
or place of business within the state or elsewhere, 
or does business within this state or elsewhere, 
then upon the person m charge of such office or 
place of business, 
*7 (6) Upon an incorporated city or town, by 
delivering a copy thereof to the recorder, 
(7) Upon a county, by delivering a copy to the 
county clerk of such county, 
(8) Upon a school district or board of education, 
by delivering a copy to the superintendent or 
business administrator of the board, 
(9) Upon an irrigation or drainage district, by 
delivermk a copy to the president or secretary of 
its board, 
(10) Upon the state of Utah, in such cases as b\ 
law are authorized to be brought against the state, 
by delivering a copy to the attorney general and 
any other person or agency required b> statute to 
be served, and 
(11) Upon a department or agency of the state 
of Utah, or upon any public board, commission or 
body, subject to suit, b> delivering a copv to am 
member of its governing board, or to its executive 
employee or secretary 
(f) Service and Proof of Service in a Foreign 
Countrv Service in a foreign countrv shall be 
made as follows 
(1) In the manner prescribed b> the law of the 
foreign countrv for service m an action in an> of 
its courts of general jurisdiction, or 
(2) Upon an individual, by personal delivery, 
and upon a corporation, partnership or 
association, by delivering a copy to an officer or a 
managing general agent, provided that such 
service be made by a person who is not a party to 
the action, not a party's attorney, and is not less 
than 18 years of age, or who is designated by 
order of the court or by the foreign court, or 
(3) By any form of mail, requiring a signed 
receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the 
clerk of the court to the party to be served as 
ordered by the court Proof of service in a foreign 
country shall be made as prescribed in these rules 
for service within this state, or by the law of the 
foreign country, or by order of the court When 
service is made pursuant to subpart (3) of this 
subdivision, proof of service shall include a 
receipt signed by the addressee or other evidence 
of delivery to the addressee satisfactory to the 
court 
(g) Other Service Where the identity or 
whereabouts of the person to be served are 
unknown and cannot be ascertained through 
reasonable diligence, where service upon all of the 
individual parties is impracticable under the 
circumstances, or where there exists good cause to 
believe that the person to be served is avoiding 
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service of process, the party seeking service of 
process may file a motion supported by affidavit 
requesting an order allowing service by 
publication, by mail, or by some other means 
The supporting affidavit shall set forth the efforts 
made to identify, locate or serve the party to be 
served, or the circumstances which make it 
impracticable to serve all of the individual parties 
If the motion is granted, the court shall order 
service of process by publication, by mail from the 
clerk of the court, by other means, or by some 
combination of the above, provided that the means 
of notice employed shall be reasonably calculated, 
under all the circumstances, to apprise the 
interested parties of the pendency of the action to 
the extent reasonably possible or practicable The 
court's order shall also specify the content of the 
process to be served and the event or events as of 
which service shall be deemed complete A copy 
of the court's order shall be served upon the 
defendant with the process specified by the court 
*8 (h) Manner of Proof In a case commenced 
under Rule 3(a)(1), the party serving the process 
shall file proof of service with the court promptly, 
and m any event within the tune during which the 
person served must respond to the process, and 
proof of service must be made within ten days 
after such service Failure to file proof of service 
does not affect the validity of the service In all 
cases commenced under Rule 3(a)(1) or Rule 
3(a)(2), the proof of service shall be made as 
follows 
(1) If served by a sheriff, constable, Umted 
States Marshal, or the deputy of any of them, by 
certificate with a statement as to the date, place, 
and manner of service, 
(2) If served by any other person, by affidavit 
with a statement as to the date, place, and manner 
of service, together with the affiant's age at the 
tune of service, 
(3) If served by publication, by the affidavit of 
the publisher or printer or that person's designated 
agent, showing publication, and specifying the 
date of the first and last publications, and an 
affidavit by the clerk of the court of a deposit of a 
copy of the summons and complaint in the Umted 
States mail, if such mailing shall be required under 
this rule or by court order, 
(4) If served by Umted States mail, by the 
affidavit of the clerk of the court showing a 
deposit of a copy of the summons and complaint 
in the Umted States mail, as may be ordered by 
the court, together with any proof of receipt, 
(5) By the written admission or wai\er of 
service by the person to be served, duly 
acknowledged, or otherwise proved 
(I) Amendment At any time in its discretion 
and upon such terms as it deems just, the court 
may allow any process or proof of service thereof 
to be amended, unless it clearly appears that 
material prejudice would result to the substantial 
rights of the party against whom the process 
issued 
(j) Refusal of Copy If the person to be served 
refuses to accept a copy of the process, service 
shall be sufficient if the person serving the same 
shall state the name of the process and offer to 
deliver a copy thereof 
(k) Date of Service to Be Endorsed on Copy 
At the time of service, the person making such 
service shall endorse upon the copy of the 
summons left for the person bemg served, the date 
upon which the same was served, and shall sign 
his or her name thereto, and, if an officer, add his 
or her official title 
*9 (1) Designation of Newspaper for 
Publication of Notice In any proceeding where 
summons or other notice is required to be 
published, the court shall, upon the request of the 
party applying for such publication, designate the 
newspaper and authorize and direct that such 
publication shall be made therein, provided, that 
the newspaper selected shall be a newspaper of 
general circulation m the county where such 
publication is required to be made and shall be 
published m the English language 
[Amended effective April 1,1996 ] 
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WEST'S UTAH RULES OF COURT 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 
PART II. COMMENCEMENT OF 
ACTION; SERVICE OF PROCESS, 
PLEADINGS, MOTIONS AND 
ORDERS 
Current with amendments received through 
11-1-1999 
RULE 6. TIME 
(a) Computation. In computing any period of 
time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the 
local rules of any district court, by order of 
court, or by any applicable statute, the day of 
the act, event, or default from which the 
designated period of time begins to run shall not 
be included. The last day of the period so 
computed shall be included, unless it is a 
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which 
event the period runs until the end of the next 
day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal 
holiday. When the period of time prescribed or 
allowed, after including any additional time 
under subsection (e), is less than 11 days, 
intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal 
holidays shall be excluded in the computation. 
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a 
notice given thereunder or by order of the court 
an act is required or allowed to be done at or 
within a specified time, the court for cause 
shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with 
or without motion or notice order the period 
enlarged if request therefor is made before the 
expiration of the period originally prescribed or 
as extended by a previous order or (2) upon 
motion made after the expiration of the 
specified period permit the act to be done where 
the failure to act was the result of excusable 
neglect; but it may not extend the time for 
taking any action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 
59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g), 
except to the extent and under the conditions 
stated in them. 
(c) Unaffected by Expiration of Term. The 
period of time provided for the doing of any act 
or the taking of any proceeding is not affected 
or limited by the continued existence or 
expiration of a term of court. The continued 
existence or expiration of a term of court in no 
way affects the power of a court to do any act or 
take any proceeding in any civil action which 
has been pending before it. 
(d) For Motions-Affidavits. A written motion, 
other than one which may be heard ex parte, and 
notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not 
later than 5 days before the time specified for 
the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by 
these rules, by CJA 4-501, or by order of the 
court. Such an order may for cause shown be 
made on ex parte application. When a motion is 
supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be 
served with the motion; and, except as 
otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing 
affidavits may be served not later than 1 day 
before the hearing, unless the court permits 
them to be served at some other time. 
*15 (e) Additional Time After Service by Mail. 
Whenever a party has the right or is required to 
do some act or take some proceedings within a 
prescribed period after the service of a notice or 
other paper upon him and the notice or paper is 
served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added 
to the prescribed period. 
[Amended effective November 1, 1997; April 
1, 1999.] 
Advisory Committee Note 
The 1999 amendment to subdivision (a) 
conforms the state rule to the federal rule. The 
amendment also makes it clear that weekends 
and holidays will be included in the 
computation of time only if the relevant period, 
including the three-day mailing period under 
subsection (e), is 11 days or more. 
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WEST'S UTAH RULES OF 
COURT 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 
PART IV PARTIES 
Current with amendments received 
through 11-1-1999 
RULE 17 PARTIES PLAINTIFF AND 
DEFENDANT 
(a) Real Party in Interest Every action shall be 
prosecuted in the name of the real party m mterest 
An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, 
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or 
m whose name a contract has been made for the 
benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute 
may sue in that person's name without joining the 
party for whose benefit the action is brought, and 
when a statute so provides, an action for the use 01 
benefit of another shall be brought m the name of 
the state of Utah No action shall be dismissed on 
the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of 
the real party m mterest until a reasonable time 
has been allowed after objection for ratification of 
commencement of the action by, or jomder or 
substitution of, the real party in mterest, and such 
ratification, jomder, or substitution shall have the 
same effect as if the action had been commenced 
m the name of the real party in mterest 
(b) Mmors or Incompetent Persons A minor or 
an insane or mcompetent person who is a part/ 
must appear either by a general guardian or by a 
guardian ad litem appointed m the particular case 
by the court m which the action is pending A 
guardian ad litem may be appomted m any case 
when it is deemed by the court m which the action 
or proceeding is prosecuted expedient to represent 
the minor, insane or mcompetent person in the 
action or proceeding, notwithstanding that the 
person may have a general guardian and may have 
appeared by the guardian In an action m rem it 
shall not be necessary to appomt a guardian ad 
litem for any unknown party who might be a 
minor or an mcompetent person 
(c) Guardian Ad Litem, How Appomted A 
guardian ad litem appomted by a court must be 
appomted as follows 
(1) When the minor is plaintiff, upon the 
application of the minor, if the minor is of the age 
of fourteen years, or if under that age, upon the 
application of a relative or friend of the minor 
(2) When the minor is defendant, upon the 
application of the minor if the minor is of the age 
of fourteen years and applies within 20 days after 
the service of the summons, or if under that age or 
if the minor neglects so to appl>, then upon the 
application of a relative or friend of the minor, or 
of any other party to the action 
*39 (3) When a minor defendant resides out of 
this state, the plaintiff, upon motion therefor, shall 
be entitled to an order designating some suitable 
person to be guardian ad litem for the minor 
defendant, unless the defendant or someone m 
behalf of the defendant within 20 days after 
service of notice of such motion shall cause to be 
appomted a guardian for such minor Service of 
such notice may be made upon the defendant's 
general or testamentary guardian located in the 
defendant's state, if there is none, such notice, 
together with the summons m the action, shall be 
served m the manner provided for publication of 
summons upon such minor, if over fourteen years 
of age, or, if under fourteen years of age, by such 
service on the person with whom the minor 
resides The guardian ad litem for such 
nonresident minor defendant shall have 20 days 
after appointment m which to plead to the action 
(4) When an insane or mcompetent person is a 
party to an action or proceeding, upon the 
application of a relative or friend of such insane or 
mcompetent person, or of any other party to the 
action or proceeding 
(d) Associates May Sue or Be Sued by 
Common Name When two or more persons 
associated m any business either as a joint-stock 
company, a partnership or other association, not a 
corporation, transact such business under a 
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common name, whether it comprises the names of 
such associates or not, they may sue or be sued b> 
such common name Any judgment obtained 
against the association shall bind the jomt 
property of all the associates m the same manner 
as if all had been named parties and had been sued 
upon their jomt liability The separate property of 
an individual member of the association may not 
be bound by the judgment unless the member is 
named as a party and the court acquires 
jurisdiction over the member 
(e) Action Against a Nonresident Doing 
Business in This State When a nonresident 
person is associated m and conducts business 
within the state of Utah in one or more places m 
that person's own name or a common trade name, 
and the business is conducted under the 
supervision of a manager, superintendent or agent 
the person may be sued m the person's name in 
any action arising out of the conduct of the 
business 
(f) As used m these rules, the term plaintiff 
shall mclude a petitioner, and the term defendant 
shall mclude a respondent 
[Amended effective April 1,1998 ] 
*40 Advisory Committee Note 
Paragraph (d) has been changed to conform to 
the holding in Cottonwood Mall Co \ Sine, 767 
P2d 499 (Utah 1988), which allows an 
unincorporated association to sue m its own name 
The rule continues to allow an unincorporated 
association to be sued m its own name The final 
sentence of paragraph (d) was added to confirm 
that the separate property of an individual member 
of an association may not be bound b\ the 
judgment unless the member is made a party 
Technical changes in all paragraphs of the rule 
make the terminology gender neutral In part (c) 
the word "minor" has replaced the word "infant," 
m order to maintain consistency with recent 
changes made m Rule 4(e)(2) In Rule 4 an infant 
is defined as a person under the age of 14 years, 
whereas the mtent of Rule 17(c) is to mclude 
persons under the age of 18 years 
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other grounds, 158 F.2d 435 (3d Cir.1946), cert, denied, Senderowitz v Fleming, 330 
U.S. 848, 67 S.Ct. 1091. 91 L.Ed 1292 (1947); cf LaSalle Nat. Bank v 222 East 
Chestnut St. Corp., 267 F.2d 247 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 361 U.S. 836, 80 S.Ct. 88, 4 
L.Ed.2d 77 (1959). But see Camilla Cotton Oil Co. v. Spencer Kellogg & Sons, 257 
F.2d 162 (5th Cir 1958); Genuth v National Biscuit Co., 81 F.Supp 213 (S.D.N.Y. 
1948), app. dism., 177 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1949); 3 Moore's Federal Practice 115.01[5] 
(Supp.1960); 1A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice & Procedure 820-21 (Wright 
ed 1960). Thus plaintiffs have sometimes been needlessly remitted to the difficul-
ties of commencing a new action even though events occurring after the commence-
ment of the original action have made clear the nght to relief 
Under the amendment the court has discretion to permit a supplemental 
pleading despite the fact that the original pleading is defective As m other 
situations where a supplemental pleading is offered, the court is to determine in the 
light of the particular circumstances whether filing should be permitted, and if so, 
upon what terms. The amendment does not attempt to deal with such questions as 
the relation of the statute of hmitations to supplemental pleadings, the operation of 
the doctrine of laches, or the availability of other defenses All these questions are 
for decision in accordance with the principles applicable to supplemental pleadings 
generally Cf. Blau v. Lamb, 191 F.Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y.1961); Lendonsol Amuse-
ment Corp. v. B. & Q. Assoc., Inc., 23 F.R.Serv. 15d.3, Case 1 (D.Mass.1957). 
Rule 24. Intervention 
(c) Procedure. A person desiring to intervene shall serve a 
motion to intervene upon all the parties affected thereby as provid-
ed in Rule 5. The motion shall state the grounds therefor and shall 
be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or defense for 
which intervention is sought. The same procedure shall be fol-
lowed when a statute of the United States gives a right to inter-
vene. When the constitutionality of an act of Congress affecting 
the public interest is drawn in question in any action to which the 
United States or an officer, agency, or employee thereof is not a 
party, the court shall notify the Attorney General of the United 
States as provided in Title 28, U.S.C., § 2403. 
Advisory Committee's Note 
This amendment conforms to the amendment of Rule 5(a). See the Advisory 
Committee's Note to that amendment. 
Rule 25. Substitution of Parties 
(a) Death. 
(1) If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extin-
guished, the court within 2 years after the death may order 
substitution of the proper parties. If substitution is not BO 
made, the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party. 
The motion for substitution my be made by any party or by the 
successors or representatives of the deceased party or by any 
New matter is shown in italics; matter to be omitted is lined through 
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party and, together with the notice of hearing; shall be served 
on the parties as provided in Rule 5 and upon persons not 
parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of a 
summons, and may be served in any judicial district. Unless 
the motion for substitution is made not later than 90 days after 
the death is suggested upon the record by service of a statement 
of the fact of the death as provided herein for the service of the 
motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party. 
Advisory Committee's Note 
Present Rule 25(a)(1), together with present Rule 6(b), results in an inflexible 
requirement that an action be dismissed as to a deceased party if substitution is not 
carried out within a fixed period measured from the time of the death. The 
hardships and inequities of this unyielding requirement plainly appear from the 
cases. See, e. g., Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 67 S.Ct. 428, 91 L.Ed. 436 
(1947); lovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41 (1959). cert, denied, Carlin v. Sovino, 362 
U.S. 949, 80 S.Ct. 860, 4 L.Ed.2d 867 (1960): Perry v. Allen, 239 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 
1956); Starnes v. Pennsylvania R. R., 26 F.R.D. 625 (E.D.N.Y.), affd per curiam, 
295 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1961), cert, denied, 369 U.S. 813, 82 S.Ct. 688, 7 L.Ed.2d 612 
(1962); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 28 F.R.D. 346 (S.D.N.Y.1961). See also 4 Moore's 
Federal Practice % 25.01[9] (Supp.1960); 2 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice & 
Procedure, § 621, at 420-21 (Wright ed. 1961). 
The amended rule establishes a time limit for the motion to substitute based not 
upon the time of the death, but rather upon the time information of the death is 
provided by means of a suggestion of death upon the record, i. e. service of a 
statement of the fact of the death. Cf. IU.Ann.Stat., c. 110, § 54(2) (Smith-Hurd 
1956). The motion may not be made later than 90 days after the service of the 
statement unless the period is extended pursuant to Rule 6(b), as amended. See the 
Advisory Committee's Note to amended Rule 6(b). See also the new Official Form 
30. 
A motion to substitute may be made by any party or by the representative of the 
deceased party without awaiting the suggestion of death. Indeed, the motion will 
usually be so made. If a party or the representative of the deceased party desires to 
limit the time within which another may make the motion, he may do so by 
suggesting the death upon the record. 
A motion to substitute made within the prescribed time will ordinarily be 
granted, but under the permissive language of the first sentence of the amended rule 
("the court may order") it may be denied by the court in the exercise of a sound 
discretion if made long after the death—as can occur if the suggestion of death is not 
made or is delayed—and circumstances have arisen rendering it unfair to allow 
substitution. Cf Anderson v. Yungkau, supra, 329 U.S. at 485, 486, 67 S.Ct. at 430, 
431, 91 L.Ed. 436, where it was noted under the present rule that settlement and 
distribution of the estate of a deceased defendant might be so far advanced as to 
warrant denial of a motion for substitution even though made within the time limit 
prescribed by that rule. Accordingly, a party interested in securing substitution 
under the amended rule should not assume that he can rest indefinitely awaiting the 
suggestion of death before he makes his motion to substitute. 
Rule 26. Depositions Pending Action 
(e) Objections to Admissibility. Subject to the provisions 
of Rules 28(b) and 32(c), objection may be made at the trial or 
New matter is shown in italics; matter to be omitted is lined through 
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John E. GRANDBOUCHE; John Voss, 
Personal Representative of the Estate 
of John Grandbouche, Plaintiffs-Appel-
lants, 
v. 
Larry LOVELL; Kenneth Batson; Ver-
non Pixley; Kathleen Budd; Alan 
Dougan; Dave Black; Tim Fortune; 
Nick Difalco; John Ottinger; Bob Ely, 
all special agents for the Internal Reve-
nue Service; Steve Simmer; Bob Glenn, 
Inspectors for the Internal Revenue 
Service; Larry Hyatt, Chief of Internal 
Revenue Service, Criminal Investiga-
tion Division, Defendants-Appellees. 
No. 89-1359. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Tenth Circuit. 
Sept. 6, 1990. 
Action was brought against officials of 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), alleg-
ing violation of constitutional rights. Fol-
lowing remand, 825 F.2d 1463, defendants 
moved to dismiss for failure to file timely 
motion to substitute proper party for de-
ceased plaintiff, and personal representa-
tive of decedent's estate filed motion to 
substitute. Motion for substitution was de-
n
*ed and motion to dismiss was granted by 
toe United States District Court for the 
District of Colorado, Jim R. Carrigan, J., 
ai>d plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals held that: (1) request during prior 
aPPeal that parties file supplemental briefs 
^dressing the effect of the death of the 
Plaintiff did not constitute a sufficient sug-
gestion of death to trigger 90-day limita-
tions period for filing motion to substitute, 
ano (2) service of such suggestion on non-
parties, such as representative of deceased 
Pontiffs estate, had to be pursuant to 
ule 4, relating to process, and thus limita-
10ns
 period did not begin to run where 
^sonal representative did not receive no-
Ce
 °f any purported suggestion of death. 
Reversed and remanded. 
GRANDBOUCHE v. LOVELL 835 
Cite as 913 F-2d 835 (10th Clr. 1990) 
1. Federal Civil Procedure <s=*363 
Sufficient suggestion of death to trig-
ger limitations period on filing motion for 
substitution was not made when Court of 
Appeals, during prior appeal, requested the 
parties to file supplemental briefs address-
ing the effect of the death of the plaintiff. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 25<aXD, 28 U.S. 
C.A. 
2. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>363 
Running of 90-day limitations period 
on filing motion for substitution is not trig-
gered unless formal suggestion of death is 
made on the record, regardless of whether 
parties have knowledge of a party's death, 
and mere reference to a party's death in 
court proceedings or pleadings is not suffi-
cient to trigger the limitations period for 
filing motion for substitution. Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 25(a)(1), 28 U.S.C.A. 
3. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>365 
While service of suggestion of death 
on counsel will satisfy requirement of rule 
for service of parties to the litigation, ser-
vice required on nonparties, specifically the 
successors or representatives of the de-
ceased party's estate, must be service pur-
suant to Rule 4, relating to process. Fed. 
Rules Civ.ProcRules 4, 25(a)(1), 28 U.S. 
C.A. 
4. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>363 
Ninety-day limitations period for filing 
motion for substitution did not begin to run 
where personal representative of dece-
dent's estate did not receive service of any 
purported suggestion of death. Fed.Rules 
Civ.ProcRules 4, 25(a)(1), 28 U.S.C.A. 
Jennifer A. Greene and William A. Co-
han, Cohan & Greene, Denver, Colo., for 
plaintiffs-appellants. 
Shirley D. Peterson, Asst. Atty. Gen., 
Gary R. Allen, Kenneth L. Greene, and 
Howard M. Soloman, Tax Div., Dept. of 
Justice, Washington, D.C. (Michael J. Nor-
ton, U.S. Atty., Denver, Colo., of Counsel), 
for defendants-appellees. 
Before SEYMOUR, BRORBY and 
EBEL, Circuit Judges. 
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PER CURIAM. 
Plaintiffs appeal the district court's order 
dismissing this action for failure to file a 
timely motion for substitution pursuant to 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a)(1).1 The district court 
initially dismissed this action when plaintiff 
Grandbouche failed to comply with a dis-
covery order. See Grandbouche v. Clan-
cy, 825 F.2d 1463, 1464 (10th Cir.1987). 
While the appeal of that decision was be-
fore this court, plaintiff Grandbouche died. 
See id. at 1465. This court, after request-
ing that the parties file supplemental briefs 
addressing the effect of the death of plain-
tiff Grandbouche on the instant action, ulti-
mately determined that the action survived 
plaintiffs death, vacated the district 
court's order of dismissal, and remanded 
the action to the district court. Id. at 1465, 
1467. 
Or, September 5, 1989, defendants filed 
with the district court a motion to dismiss 
this action for failure to file a timely mo-
tion to substitute a proper party for the 
deceased plaintiff. Immediately thereafter 
the personal representative of decedent's 
estate filed a motion to substitute himself 
as a party-plaintiff in this action. The dis-
trict court denied the motion for substitu-
tion and granted defendants' motion to dis-
miss. Plaintiffs appeal. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1) 
provides that 
[i]f a party dies and the claim is not 
thereby extinguished, the court may or-
der substitution of the proper parties. 
The motion for substitution may be made 
by any party or by the successors or 
representatives of the deceased party 
and, together with the notice of hearing, 
shall be served on the parties as provided 
in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in 
the manner provided in Rule 4 for the 
service of a summons, and may be served 
in any judicial district. Unless the mo-
tion for substitution is made not later 
than 90 days after the death is suggested 
upon the record by service of a state-
1. After examining the briefs and appellate 
record, this panel has determined unanimously 
that oral argument would not materially assist 
the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R. 
ment of the fact of the death as provided 
herein for the service of the motion, the 
action shall be dismissed as to the de-
ceased party. 
Prior to its amendment in 1963, RU]e 
25(a)(1) required a court to dismiss an ac-
tion if no motion for substitution had been 
filed within two years of the death of a 
party. See, e.g., Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 
983, 984 (D.C.Cir.1969). In order to allevi-
ate the inequities caused by the inflexibility 
of this rule, see id. at 984, Rule 25(a)(1) was 
amended to require a motion for substitu-
tion to be filed within ninety days from the 
time a suggestion of death is filed in the 
district court and properly served. See 
United States v. Miller Bros. Constr. Co., 
505 F.2d 1031, 1034-35 (10th Cir.1974); see 
also 7C Wright & Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 1955 (2d ed. 1986). 
[1] Defendants assert that a sufficient 
suggestion of death was made under Rule 
25(a)(1) in the appellate proceedings ad-
dressing the effect of plaintiffs death on 
this action. 
The suggestion of the decedent's death 
was spread on the record approximately 
two years earlier by this Court's order 
requiring supplemental briefs, the sup-
plemental brief of the defendants, this 
Court's decision in Grandbouche I, [825 
F.2d 1463], and the docket entry thereof. 
Each of these documents was entered in 
the record of the case and was served on 
counsel for the estate. Under these cir-
cumstances, the purpose of requiring 
that a party's death be suggested on the 
record was clearly satisfied. 
Appellees' Brief at 9. We disagree. 
[2] The running of the ninety-day limi-
tations period under Rule 25(a)(1) is not 
triggered unless a formal suggestion of 
death is made on the record, regardless of 
whether the parties have knowledge of a 
party's death. See Miller Bros., 505 F.2d 
at 1034-35. Mere reference to a party's 
death in court proceedings or pleadings is 
not sufficient to trigger the limitations pe 
App.P. 34(a); 10th Cir.R. 34.1.9. The case i$ 
therefore ordered submitted without oral argu-
ment. 
SCHMIDT v. KING 
Cite as 913 R2d S37 (lOthCir. 1990) 
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nod for filing a motion for substitution. 
See, e.g., Kaldawy v. Gold Serv. Movers, 
Inc., 129 F.R.D. 475, 477 (S.D.N.Y.1990) 
(court's order noting plaintiffs death and 
placing case on suspended calendar, which 
was mailed to counsel for all parties, in-
cluding decedent's counsel, insufficient to 
trigger the ninety-day limitations period); 
Tolliver v. Leach, 126 F.R.D. 529, 530-31 
(W.D.Mich.1989) (defense counsel's state 
ment concerning defendant's death, made 
on record during discovery conference, in-
sufficient to trigger limitations period); 
Gronowicz v. Leonard, 109 F.R.D. 624, 
626-27 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (letter from party's 
attorney to court notifying court of party's 
death insufficient suggestion of death to 
trigger limitations period). 
[3] Further, a suggestion of death must 
be served in accordance with Rule 25(a)(1). 
See Miller Bros., 505 F.2d at 1034-35. De-
fendants argue that the requirement of 
service was satisfied in the instant case 
during the initial appellate proceedings be-
cause the supplemental briefs and this 
court's order were served on the attorneys 
for the parties, including decedent's attor-
ney who is also the attorney for decedent's 
estate. While service of a suggestion of 
death on counsel will satisfy the require-
ment of Rule 25(a)(1) for service of parties 
to the litigation, the service required by 
Rule 25(a)(1) on nonparties, specifically the 
successors or representatives of the de-
ceased party's estate, must be service pur-
suant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4. See Fariss v. 
Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 961 
(4th Cir.1985) (to satisfy Rule 25(a)(1), mo-
tion for substitution or suggestion of death 
must be personally served on nonparty rep-
resentative of deceased, rather than de-
ceased's attorney); see also 7C Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 1955 (2d ed. 1986). 
f4] In the instant case, because the per-
s
°nal representative of decedent's estate 
did not receive service of any purported 
Suggestion of death, the ninety-day limita-
tions period did not begin to run. See 
filler Bros., 505 F.2d at 1034-35. Plain-
tiffs' motion for substitution was thus 
timely filed. 
The order of the United States District 
Court for the District of Colorado denying 
plaintiffs' motion for substitution and 
granting defendants' motion to dismiss is 
REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED 
to the district court for proceedings consist-
ent with this opinion. 
( O | KEY NUMBER SYST£M> 
Esley E. SCHMIDT and Mildred R. 
Schmidt, Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
Clarence M. KING, Jr., District Director, 
Max J. Kennedy, Revenue Officer, In-
ternal Revenue Service, Commissioner 
of the Internal Revenue Service, United 
States of America, Does I Through X 
Inclusive, Defendants-Appellees. 
No. 89-3240. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Tenth Circuit. 
Sept. 6, 1990. 
Rehearing Denied Nov. 16, 1990. 
Taxpayers brought action which they 
characterized as an action to quiet title 
under statute providing for action affecting 
property on which United States has a lien. 
The United States District Court for the 
District of Kansas, Dale E. Saffels, J., held 
that government's levy on taxpayers' prop-
erty was procedurally proper. Taxpayers 
appealed. The Court of Appeals held that 
taxpayer's action characterized as one to 
quiet title was actually challenging a defi-
ciency assessment and collection of taxes 
by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and 
thus the district court lacked jurisdiction 
over the action. 
Vacated and remanded. 
1. Internal Revenue <s»4804 
If a taxpayer seeks to quiet title to 
property upon which the United States has 
UNITED STATES v. MILLER BROTHERS CONSTR. CO. 1031 
Cite as 505 F.2d 1031 (1974) 
er's death. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rules 5, 
25, 25(a)(1), 28U.S.C.A. UNITED STATES of America, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
MILLER BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY et al., Defendants, 
Rapidways, Inc., Defendant-Appellant 
No. 74-1028. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Tenth Circuit. 
Argued Sept. 10, 1974. 
Decided Nov. 13, 1974. 
United States brought action to fore-
close federal tax liens against certain real 
property, the ownership of which was 
m dispute. The United States District 
Court for the District of Kansas, Earl 
E. O'Connor, J., ordered tax liens fore-
closed, and holder of legal title to real 
property appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, Hill, Circuit Judge, held that evi-
dence which included, inter alia, tax-
payer's deposition to effect that land 
was conveyed as a security interest and 
not as an absolute sale and testimony 
of an employee of the holder of legal title 
who stated that his employer acquired 
the land as a means of making a loan to 
the taxpayer was sufficient to sustain 
district court's finding that taxpayer 
was the equitable owner of the land 
ar
*d that legal title thereto was held by 
others only as a security interest subject 
to the tax liens. 
Affirmed. 
*• Federal Civil Procedure <S=*364 
The trial court properly dismissed 
Arty's motion to dismiss pursuant to 
rule governing substitution of parties 
which required Government to substitute 
taxpayer's administrator within 90 days 
after suggestion of taxpayer's death 
where party failed to comply with serv-
lce and filing requirements for sugges-
tion of death of taxpayer notwithstand-
ln£ party's contention that formal sug-
gestion of death was not required be-
muse Government was aware of taxpay-
2. Federal Civil Procedure <S=>363 
A discretionary extension of time 
for the filing of motion of substitution 
of parties should be liberally granted ab-
sent a showing of bad faith on the part 
of movant or undue prejudice to other 
parties to the action. Fed.Rules Civ. 
Proc. rules 5, 6, 28 U.S.C.A. 
3. Federal Civil Procedure @=>363 
The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion granting Government a 15-
day extension of time for filing substi-
tution of taxpayer's administrator as 
party to tax lien foreclosure proceeding 
in absence of showing of bad faith at-
tributable to the Government or preju-
dice to other parties, despite delay in 
initiation of probate proceedings to ap-
point an administrator. Fed.Rules Civ. 
Proc. rules 5, 6, 25, 28 U.S.C.A. 
4. Internal Revenue @»1721.6 
Although court must determine 
merits of all claims to property subjected 
to tax liability, district court committed 
no error in refraining to rule on re-
spective rights of parties to any surplus 
proceeds from tax forclosure sale where 
none of parties made any claims to sur-
plus proceeds and matter was not raised 
at trial. 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C.1954) § 
7403(c). 
5. Judgment ^=>251(1) 
Parties to action are entitled only 
to a determination of issues raised before 
the court. 
6. Federal Civil Procedure 0=»366 
Where taxpayer died during pend-
ency of action, not after rendition of 
judgment, and administrator of taxpay-
er's estate was substituted as a party, 
there was a continuance of the original 
action foreclosing tax lien on real prop-
erty and a separate proceeding against 
the substituted party was not necessary 
notwithstanding contention of holder of 
legal title to such property that Govern-
ment's judgment must be revived against 
administrator before the tax liens could 
be foreclosed. K.S.A. 60-2405; Fed. 
Rules Civ.Proc. rule 25, 28 U.S.C.A. 
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7. Evidence C=>222(10) 
Entire deposition of taxpayer in 
which he stated that land was conveyed 
as a security interest and not as an ab-
solute sale was admissible into evidence 
in tax lien foreclosure action against 
land in which taxpayer, since deceased, 
allegedly retained equitable ownership 
on ground that deposition tended to show 
fraud in taxpayer's conveyances of such 
land notwithstanding contention of hold-
er of legal title that portions of depo-
sition concerning it should have been ex-
cluded because there was no evidence that 
it was involved in or had knowledge of 
the fraud. 
8. Evidence 0=265(7) 
Mortgages C=>38(1) 
Evidence which included, inter alia, 
taxpayer's deposition to effect that land 
was conveyed as a security interest and 
not as an absolute sale and testimony of 
an officer of the holder of legal title who 
stated that his employer acquired the 
land as a means of making a loan to the 
taxpayer was sufficient to sustain dis-
trict court's finding that taxpayer was 
the equitable owner of the land and that 
legal title thereto was held by others 
only as a security interest subject to tax 
liens. 
9. Internal Revenue 0=>1721.5 
Evidence was sufficient to establish 
that legal titleholder, in which legal title 
was placed by previous titleholder at di-
rection of taxpayer when legal titleholder 
made loan to taxpayer and paid off loan 
made by previous titleholder and which 
then entered into rental and purchase 
option agreement with taxpayer, had 
actual knowledge of taxpayer's equitable 
interest in land for purpose of tax lien 
foreclosure proceedings against taxpay-
er's interest in such land. 
Robert L. Boyce, Jr., Kansas City, 
Kan. (Howard Washburn, Kansas City, 
Kan., on the brief), for defendant-appel-
lant. 
Daniel F. Ross, Washington, D. C 
(Scott P. Crampton, Asst. Atty. Gen. 
Meyer Rothwacks, Michael L. Paup 
Dept. of Justice, Robert J. Roth, U. S 
Atty., James A. Pusateri, Asst. U. S 
Atty., Washington, D. C, on the brief) 
for plaintiff-appellee. 
Before LEWIS and HILL, Circui 
Judges, and CHRISTENSEN,* Distric 
Judge. 
HILL, Circuit Judge. 
This is an appeal from a judgment o 
the United States District Court for th 
District of Kansas ordering foreclosur 
of federal tax liens against certain rea 
property, the ownership of which is i 
dispute. 
The facts leading up to this appeal ar 
complex and may be summarized as fol 
lows. Anthony Sielman owned certai 
land in Kansas City, Kansas. In 1952 
Wilmer Miller (taxpayer) purchased thi 
land but directed Sielman to deed it t 
Edward and Nellie Schmidt. Th 
Schmidts, taxpayer's brother-in-law an 
sister-in-law, had no interest in the Ian 
but held it solely as taxpayer's nomine 
Taxpayer, in 1959, negotiated a morl 
gage of the land to Anchor Savings < 
Loan Company (Anchor) as security fc 
a note evidencing the loan. The mori 
gage was arranged by taxpayer for hi 
benefit and the Schmidts executed th 
mortgage at his request. 
During this period of time taxpayc 
and his brother were partners in Milk 
Brothers Construction Company (Milk 
Brothers). The partnership failed 1 
pay certain income and FICA taxes i 
1959. Deficiencies were assessed again! 
it and notice of tax liens was filed i 
1959 and 1960. 
Taxpayer became delinquent in h 
payments to Anchor and refinanced tl 
loan through Investments, Inc. (Inves 
ments) in 1961. Investments paid o 
the delinquent note held by Anchor, to< 
title to the land from the Schmidts, ai 
gave taxpayer an option to purchas 
Taxpayer again refinanced the loan 
* Of the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 
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1962 through Union Mortgage & Invest-
ment Company (Union). Union paid off 
Investments, took title to the land, and 
gave taxpayer an option to purchase. 
Sometime before May, 1963, Miller 
Brothers, already burdened with tax 
problems, encountered several financial 
setbacks culminating in foreclosure of 
its Small Business Administration loan 
and liquidation. 
In May, 1963, taxpayer organized Fair-
fax Hauling, Inc. (Fairfax) to take over 
a hauling contract from the defunct Mil-
ler Brothers. Taxpayer was not^an of-
ficer, director or stockholder in Fair-
fax, but he nevertheless exercised man-
agerial control over the corporation. 
At around the same time, taxpayer 
contacted Wilford Sublett, an officer of 
Rapidways, Inc. (Rapidways), a leasing 
corporation. Rapidways had previously 
leased trucks and heavy equipment to 
Miller Brothers and taxpayer wanted it 
to do the same for Fairfax. After mesne 
negotiations it was decided that Rapid-
ways would lease trucks and equipment 
to Fairfax and loan it $5,000 for operat-
ing capital. Rapidways was to acquire 
legal title to the land in question and 
lease it to Fairfax with an option to pur-
chase. 
On June 7, 1963, Rapidways paid 
Union approximately $10,400, which 
amount Union used to close out taxpay-
er's option contract. Taxpayer was pres-
ent at the closing and directed Union to 
place legal title in Rapidways* name. 
That same day Rapidways and Fairfax 
entered into a rental and option to pur-
chase agreement which provided, inter 
alia, that Fairfax would receive legal title 
to the land after eleven months if it made 
all lease rental payments and paid Rapid-
ways $10,400 plus interest. 
Fairfax never used the land. It en-
countered financial problems after a few 
months of operation and became unable 
to fulfill its agreement with Rapidways. 
Rapidways took possession of the leased 
equipment, but not of the land. Al-
1- Several other parties were also named as 
defendants but all of the government's claims 
against them were determined by judgments 
505 F 2d—65Va 
though it pays taxes and insurance on 
the land, it has never used it or tried to 
sell it. 
Since its purchase in 1952, taxpayer 
has exercised the rights of ownership 
over the land. He built improvements 
on it, occasionally rented the house to 
others, and his family used the land for 
recreation purposes. Taxpayer began 
using the land as a permanent residence 
in 1963. 
On May 26, 1965, the government filed 
this suit against Miller Brothers and 
taxpayer.1 The complaint stated, inter 
alia, that Miller Brothers was defunct 
and without assets and requested that 
taxpayer's real and personal property be 
sold to satisfy the tax liens. An amended 
complaint was filed on October 26, 1969, 
adding Rapidways as a defendant and the 
land to which it held legal title as prop-
erty subject to the tax liens. The gov-
ernment claimed taxpayer was the equi-
table owner of the land and that Rapid-
ways' interest therein was subject and 
inferior to the tax liens. Rapidways an-
swered and asserted it acquired the land 
free and clear of any federal tax liens 
On May 5, 1971, taxpayer died. On 
November 23, 1971, Rapidways filed a 
motion to dismiss the action for lack of 
jurisdiction on the grounds the govern-
ment had failed to move for substitution 
of taxpayer's representative as a party 
to the action within 90 days after sug-
gestion of death, as required by Rule 25 
F.R.Civ.P. The district court denied the 
motion because a formal suggestion of 
taxpayer's death had not been made. 
Rapidways filed a formal suggestion of 
death on March 13,1973. 
The government, on June 5, 1972, 
successfully moved for a fifteen day ex-
tension of time to file its Rule 25 motion 
for substitution for the reason that a 
hearing for the appointment of taxpay-
er's administrator was not to be held un-
til June 13, 1972. On June 9, 1972, 
Rapidways again filed a motion to dis-
miss on the grounds the government had 
rendered February 0, 
1970. 
1967, and March 30, 
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failed to comply with Rule 25. There-
after, on June 26, 1972, the government 
moved to substitute taxpayer's adminis-
trator as a party to the action. Follow-
ing a hearing, the district court denied 
Rapidways' motion and granted the gov-
ernment's motion. 
Subsequent to trial the district court 
made findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, including the following: (1) the 
conveyances in issue were methods of 
loaning taxpayer money and taking title 
to the land as a security interest; (2) 
taxpayer possessed the equitable owner-
ship of the laid; (3) Rapidways was 
aware tax* er's tax problems and of 
his ownership in the land, and took title 
thereto as security for the cash advance 
and equipment lease; (4) Rapidways 
took legal title to the land subject to the 
2. Rule 25(a) (1) provides : 
If a party dies and the claim is not there-
by extinguished, the court may order substi-
tution of the proper parties. The motion for 
substitution may be made by any party or by 
the successors or representatives of the de-
ceased party and, together with the notice of 
hearing, shall be served on the parties as pro-
vided in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties 
in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the serv-
ice of summons, and may be served in any ju-
dicial district. Unless the motion for substitu-
tion is made not later than 90 days after the 
death is suggested upon the record by service 
of a statement of the fact of death as provided 
herein for the service of the motion, the action 
shall be dismissed as to the deceased party. 
3. Rule 5: 
(a) Service: When required. Except as 
otherwise provided in these rules, every order 
required by its terms to be served, every 
pleading subsequent to the original complaint 
unless the court otherwise orders because of 
numerous defendants, every paper relating 
to discovery required to be served upon a 
party unless the court otherwise orders, every 
written motion other than one which may be 
heard ex parte, and every written notice, 
appearance, demand, offer of judgment, desig-
nation of record on appeal, and similar paper 
shall be served upon each of the parties. 
No service need be made on parties in de-
fault for failure to appear except that plead-
ings asserting new or additional claims for 
relief against them shall be served upon them 
in the manner provided for service of sum-
mons in Rule 4. 
tax liens. Accordingly, the district court 
ordered the tax liens foreclosed on the 
land. Rapidways* subsequent motions 
for a new trial and for amendment or 
alteration of the judgment were denied, 
and it appeals. 
[1] Rapidways first contends its 
February 23, 1972, motion to dismiss 
pursuant to Rule 25, F.R.Civ.P., should 
have been sustained.2 Specifically, it 
contends a formal suggestion of death 
was not necessary for the Rule's 90 day 
time limitation to take effect because the 
government was fully aware of tax-
payer's death. 
Rule 25 provides that suggestion of 
death on the record is made by service 
of a statement of the fact of the death 
on the parties as provided in Rule 5t 
F.R.Civ.P.3 3B Moore, Federal Practice 
In an action begun by seizure of property, 
in which no person need be or is named 
as defendant, any service required to be made 
prior to the filing of an answer, claim, or 
appearance shall be made upon the per-
son having custody or possession of the prop-
erty at the time of its seizure. 
(b) Same: How made. Whenever under 
these rules service is required or permitted 
to be made upon a party represented by an at-
torney the service shall be made upon the at-
torney unless the service upon the party him-
self is ordered by the court. Service upon the 
attorney or upon a party shall be made by de-
livering a copy to him or by mailing it to 
him at his last known address or, if no ad-
dress is known, by leaving it with the clerk of 
the court. Delivery of a copy within this rule 
means: handing it to the attorney or to the 
party; or leaving it at his office with his 
clerk or other person in charge thereof; or, 
if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a 
conspicuous' place therein; or, if the of-
fice is closed or the person to be served has 
no office, leaving it at his dwelling house 
or usual place of abode with some person of 
suitable age and discretion then residing there-
in. Service by mail is complete upon mailing. 
(c) Same: Numerous Defendants. In any 
action in which there are unusually large 
numbers of defendants, the court, upon motion 
or of its own initiative, may order that service 
of the pleadings of the defendants and re-
plies thereto need not be made as between 
the defendants and that any cross-claim, coun-
terclaim, or matter constituting an avoidance 
or affirmative defense contained therein shall 
be deemed to be denied or avoided by all other 
UNITED STATES v. MILLER BROTHERS CONSTR. CO. 1035 
Cite as 505 F.2d 1031 (1974) 
f 25.06[2.-l] and [3] (2nd ed. 1974). the respective rights of the parties to 
The 90 day time limitation does not any surplus proceeds from the fore-
commence until this has been done. Id. closure sale. Although a court must de-
Since Rapidways failed to comply with termine the merits of all claims to the 
the service and filing requirements of property subjected to tax liability,4 none 
Rule 5, there was no suggestion of death of the parties to the instant action made 
on the record and the district court prop- any claims to surplus proceeds. The mal-
erly denied the motion to dismiss. ter was never raised, the sole issue be-
ing whether, in view of the competing 
[2,3] Rapidways next contends the claims of the government and Rapidways, 
district court abused its discretion in the property was subject to tax liability. 
granting the government an extension since parties are entitled only to a de-
of time to file a motion for substitu- termination of issues raised before the 
tion because the government, aware of court,5 the district court committed no 
taxpayer's death in 1971 delayed initia-
 e r r o r i n refraining to rule on the matter. 
tion of probate proceedings to appoint 
an administrator for his estate until May, [6] Relying upon First Federal Sav-
1972. We disagree. A discretionary ex- ings & Loan Ass'n v. Liebert, 195 Kan. 
tension should be liberally granted absent 100, 403 P.2d 183 (1965), and Kan.Stet. 
a showing of bad faith on the part of Ann. § 60-2405,6 Rapidways argues the 
the movant for substitution or undue government's judgment must be revived 
prejudice to other parties to the action, against taxpayer's representative before 
See Rule 6, F.R.Civ.P.; 3B Moore, Fed- the tax liens can be foreclosed. We dis-
eral Practice fl 25.06[3] (2nd ed. 1974). agree. Liebert concerns revival of a dor-
We find no bad faith attributable to the mant judgment against a deceased debt-
government and Rapidways has not or's personal representative and § 60-
shown that it was unduly prejudiced. 2405 concerns substitution of a deceased 
or incompetent judgment holder's per-
[4, 5] Rapidways next contends the sonal representative as a successor in in-
district court was required to determine terest. 
parties and that the filing of any such plead-
ing and service thereof ui>on the plaintiff 
constitutes due notice of it to the parties. 
A copy of every such order shall be served 
upon the parties in such manner and form as 
the court directs. 
(d) Filing. All papers after the complaint 
required to be served upon a party shall be 
filed with the court either before service or 
within a reasonable time thereafter. 
(e) Filing With the Court Defined. The 
filing of pleadings and other papers with the 
court as required by these rules shall be made 
by filing them with the clerk of the court, 
except that the judge may permit the papers 
to be filed with him, in which event he shall 
note thereon the filing date and forthwith 
transmit them to the office of the clerk. 
L
 26 U.S.C. § 7403(c) provides in part: 
The court shall, after the parties have been 
duly notifjed of the action, proceed to adjudi-
cate all matters involved therein and finally 
determine the mer:t<j of all claims to and liens 
upon the properrv. and, in all cases where a 
claim or interest o. the United States therein 
is established, may decree a sale upon such 
Property and a distribution of 
the proceeds of such sale according to the 
findings of the court 
5. See, c. g., Armstrong Cork Co. v. Lyons, 
366 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1966) ; Daniels v. 
Thomas, 225 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1955), 
cert, den'd. 347 U.S. 1139, 70 S.Ct. 867, 
98 L.Ed. 1139; 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 
42. 49 (1947). 
6. Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60^-2405 (1964) states: 
Any person who claims to have succeeded to 
the interest of the holder of a judgment by ap-
l>ointment as personal representative for a 
deceased or incompetent judgment holder, by 
assignment, by operation of law, or otherwise, 
shall file with the clerk a copy of his letters 
as personal representative, assignment, or pro-
ceedings effecting such transfer, and there-
after such successor in interest shall be en-
titled to all the rights and remedies available 
to his predecessor and may proceed to enforce 
the same in his own name as such succes-
sor. If the validity of any such transfer be 
controverted by any party affected thereby, 
the court shall, on reasonable notice to all in-
terested parties whose whereabouts are 
known, determine the respective rights and lia-
bilities of all the parties. 
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In the instant case taxpayer died dur-
ing pendency of the action, not after ren-
dition of a judgment, and the administra-
tor of his estate was substituted as a 
party pursuant to Rule 25. Since a sub-
stituted party steps into the same posi-
tion as the original party there is a con-
tinuance of the original action and a 
separate proceeding against the substi-
tuted party is not necessary. Seet e. g.t 
Ransom v. Brennan, 437 F.2d 513 (5th 
Cir. 1971), cert, den'd, 403 U.S. 904, 91 
S.Ct. 2205, 29 L.Ed.2d 680; 3B Moore, 
Federal Practice ff 25.05 (2nd ed. 1974). 
[7] The next issue concerns the ad-
mission into evidence of taxpayer's depo-
sition. It was admitted on the grounds 
it showed fraud, an exception to the 
parol evidence rule. Rapidways now con-
tends those portions of the deposition 
not concerning it should have been ex-
cluded, because there was no evidence it 
had knowledge of or was involved in the 
fraud. Because testimony may take a 
wide range where fraud is alleged we be-
lieve the entire deposition was admis-
sible. See, e. g.t 3 Jones on Evidence 
§ 16:2 (6th ed. 1972). Those portions of 
the deposition objectionable to Rapid-
ways showed the extent and purpose of 
taxpayer's scheme. 
The paramount issue on appeal con-
cerns taxpayer's interest in the land in 
question. The government contended, 
and the district court found, that tax-
payer was the equitable owner of the land 
and that legal title thereto was held by 
others, including Rapidways, only as a 
security interest. Rapidways asserts 
that taxpayer never had an interest in 
the land that could be reached by the gov-
ernment. It takes the position that the 
conveyances were merely option to pur-
chase agreements under which a pur-
chaser who makes negligible or no pay-
ments acquires no interest therein. Since 
the government's interest in the land can 
rise no higher than taxpayer's, Rapid-
ways contends the government acquired 
no interest in the land whatsoever. 
[8] We find no merit in Rapidwayj 
position. It is clear that the option cor 
tracts given to taxpayer were part c 
more complex refinancing arrangement 
in which he remained the equitable owr 
er of the land. Taxpayer stated, in hi 
deposition, that the land was conveyed a 
a security interest and not as an absc 
lute sale. This is supported by the tes 
timony of a Union employee who state 
Union acquired the land as a means c 
making a loan to taxpayer. And, th 
president of Fairfax testified that ta: 
payer "put his farm up" to get the coi 
poration going. 
The option contracts themselves a] 
pear to have been given in recognition c 
taxpayer's interest in the land. Sublet 
for example, testified he thought th 
land was worth about $15,000 but Y 
nevertheless gave taxpayer an option t 
purchase for $10,400 plus interest, a] 
proximately the same amount Rapic 
ways paid to Union for the land. Fina 
ly, the fact taxpayer exerted dominio 
and control over the land from 195 
until his death in 1971 is indicative < 
his ownership. The record does not di 
close that Rapidways or any prior legi 
title holder used the land or interfere 
with taxpayer's use of the land,, 
[9] The government, Rapidways ai 
serts, failed to prove it had actual know 
edge of taxpayer's interest in the Ian 
We do not agree. Taxpayer's son, pre, 
ent at a May, 1963, meeting betwee 
Sublett and taxpayer, testified that Sul 
lett agreed to take legal title to the Ian 
as collateral. And taxpayer stated, i 
his deposition, that Rapidways was awai 
of his interest in the land. Furthermor 
Rapidways did not purchase the lar 
directly from Union as such but acquire 
it by paying off taxpayer's option coi 
tract with Union. Taxpayer then d 
rected that legal title be placed in Rapi< 
ways' name. These facts are incoi 
sistent with Rapidways' contention thj 
it was unaware of taxpayer's intere 
in the land. 
Affirmed in all respects. 
BARLOW v. 
Cite as 39 F3d 231 
mentary to § 1B1.2 provides "[wjhen a par-
ticular statute proscribes a variety of conduct 
that might constitute the subject of different 
offense guidelines, the court will determine 
which guideline section applies based upon 
the nature of the offense charged in the 
count of which the defendant was convicted." 
U.S.S.G. § IB12 cmt The district judge is 
therefore not precluded from concluding that 
a guideline other than § 2T1.5 is more appli-
cable to the offense conduct in this case. 
Specifically, the district judge determined 
that § 2J1.2, Obstruction of Justice, was the 
most analogous guideline to the offense con-
duct The commentary to the Guideline indi-
cates that obstructing a civil or administra-
tive proceeding or evading legal process is 
considered obstruction of justice under the 
Guideline. Unlike Hanson, Van Krieken's 
behavior of filing false Forms 1099, filing 
false returns and seeking a tax levy on inno-
cent taxpayers, as well as filing a groundless 
lawsuit and police theft report could be con-
sidered on par with obstruction of justice. 
Accordingly, we hold that the district court 
correctly concluded that in this instance the 
most applicable guideline to the offense con-
duct was obstruction of justice.2 
IV 
Van Krieken's waiver of his Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel was knowing, intelli-
gent and voluntary. The district judge cor-
^rtty applied the applicable guideline when 
sentence was imposed on count four. 
AFFIRMED. 
GROUND 
(9th Cir. 1994) 
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[ O I «Y NUMBER SYSTEM/ 
s "
e
 district court also correctly noted that the 
fctutory Index to the Guidelines was amended 
^sequent to Van Krieken's offense conduct, 
°ugh pnor to sentencing, to cross reference 
e
 sentencing judge to Guideline §§ 2J1.2 or 
dm f° r v l o l a t l o n s o f § 7212(a) Generally, a 
time J U d g e a p p l i e s t h e G u i d e l m e s m e f f e c t a t 
the r s e n t e n c i ng unless amended versions of 
Guidelines are ex post facto United States v 
ck?J' 9 8 ° F 2 d 1 3 0 0 ' 1 3 0 4 <9th Cir.1992). cert 
3 44U9— U S ' U 4 S C t 3 9 ? ' 1 2 6 L E c L 2 d 
ever *T ^S ^ l s c o u r t n a s recognized, how-
ctan A * m e r e fact ^ a t t n e G u i d e l m e s have 8ed will not cause their application to vio-
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On remand after appeal of civil rights 
action, 943 F.2d 1132, city moved for dismiss-
al based on failure to file timely motion to 
substitute plaintiffs estate as party after 
plaintiff died. The United States District 
Court for the Southern District of California, 
Earl B. Gilliam, J., granted motion, and es-
tate appealed. The Court of Appeals, Wal-
lace, Chief Judge, held that service by mail of 
suggestion of death was insufficient to trig-
ger running of 90-day period for moving to 
substitute estate as party. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Federal Civil Procedure ®=>363.1 
Formal suggestion of death must be 
served by suggesting party in same manner 
as that required for service of summons, in 
order to trigger running of 90-day period in 
which to file motion to substitute estate for 
late the Ex Post Facto Clause " United States v 
Johns, 5 F.3d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir 1993) Rather, 
"there can be no ex post facto problem if an 
amendment to the Guidelines merely clarifies its 
existing substance as opposed to changing its 
substance " Id at 1269 (citations omitted) 
The Statutory Index is characterized "as an 
interpretative aid " United States v Cambra, 933 
F.2d 752, 755 (9th Cir 1991) Specifically, 
"[r]ather than establishing immutably the exclu-
sive list of available offenses for given offenses, 
the Index merely points the court in the right 
direction " Id at 755 Considered in that light, 
the amendment to the Index can be considered 
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deceased party. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 
25(a)(1), 28 U.S.CA 
2. Federal Civil Procedure <s»363.1 
Service by mail of suggestion of death 
was ineffective to trigger 90-day period for 
plaintiffs estate to move to substitute itself 
for plaintiff as party; such service did not 
comply with Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure or, absent acknowledgement of service, 
with applicable state law governing effective 
service of summons. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 
Rules 4(e), 25(a)(1), 28 U.S.CA.; West's Ann. 
Cal.C.C.P. § 1016. 
George Weingarten, San Diego, CA, for 
plaintiff-appellant. 
James M. Chapin, Deputy City Atty., San 
Diego, CA, for defendants-appellees. 
Appeal from the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of California. 
Before: WALLACE, Chief Judge, 
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge, and 
TANNER,* District Judge. 
WALLACE, Chief Judge: 
[1] The estate of Brian Barlow appeals 
from an order of the district court dismissing 
Barlow's civil rights action for failure to sub-
stitute the estate within the 90 day period 
provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
25(a)(1). The district court had jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and we 
have jurisdiction over this timely appeal pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse and 
remand. 
I 
Barlow was the plaintiff in a civil rights 
action against the City of San Diego and five 
of its police officers (City). In an earlier 
appeal, we held that the warrantless seizure 
of Barlow's blood violated the Fourth 
Amendment, and remanded the case to the 
merely clarifying and therefore applicable to Van 
Krieken. The Statutory Index, however, still re-
quires the district judge to determine the most 
applicable guideline to the offense conduct 
where more than one guideline is identified. 
district court. Barlow v. Ground 943 F26 
1132,1137-39 (9th Cir.1991), cert, denied —-
U.S. , 112 S.Ct 2995, 120 L.Ed^d 872 
(1992). 
While the case was on appeal, Barlow died 
Thereafter, his attorney, Weingarten, contin-
ued to pursue settlement with the City. The 
City alleges Weingarten made statements 
that indicate he had secured authorization tc 
settle from the personal representative ol 
Barlow's estate. Weingarten disputes this, 
After the prior appeal was final and the 
City's writ of certiorari was denied, the City 
suggested Barlow's death on the record and 
served the suggestion on Weingarten by first 
class mail. The suggestion of death, along 
with notice of service by mail, was filed on 
June 25, 1992. On October 2, the City 
moved to dismiss the case for failure to sub-
stitute the proper party within the 90 day 
period established by Rule 25(a)(1). Wein-
garten, now representing Barlow's father and 
acting as legal representative of Barlow's 
estate, moved on October 8 to have Barlow's 
father substituted as plaintiff. The district 
court denied the motion to substitute and 
dismissed the action pursuant to Rule 
25(a)(1). 
II 
Barlow's estate asserts that the suggestion 
of death was not properly served upon Bar-
low's estate and, therefore, that the 90 day 
period under Rule 25(a)(1) was never trig-
gered. The estate also maintains that even if 
service of the suggestion was proper, the 
district court nevertheless should have al-
lowed substitution pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 60(b) on the ground that 
the estate's failure to file timely the motion 
to substitute constituted "excusable neglect'1 
Because we dispose of this appeal on the first 
issue, we do not reach the question of excusa-
ble neglect. 
The district judge properly did so in this in-
stance. 
* Honorable Jack E. Tanner, United States District 
Judge, Western District of Washington, sitting by 
designation. 
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He proper interpretation of Rule 25(a) is 
, question of law that we review de novo. 
Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 785 F.2d 720, 
7S6 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 918, 107 
S.O. 324, 93 L.Ed.2d 296 (1986). Factual 
finding? relevant to the application of Rule 
25(») are reviewed for clear error. Fed. 
R.CTV.P. 52(a); Insurance Co. of Penn. v. 
Anociated Ml Ins. Co., 922 F.2d 516, 520 
(9th Cir.1991). 
Rule 25(a)(1) provides that: 
If a party dies and the claim is not thereby 
extinguished, the court may order substi-
tuuon of the proper parties. The motion 
for substitution may be made by any party 
or by the successors or representatives of 
the deceased party and, together with the 
notice of hearing, shall be served on the 
parties as provided in Rule 5 and upon 
prions not parties in the manner provid-
ed in Rvk k for the service of a summons, 
and may be served in any judicial district. 
Inless the motion for substitution is made 
not later than 90 days after the death is 
suggested upon the record by service of a 
tatentent of the fact of death as provided 
ker
^n for the service of the motion, the 
•ttion shall be dismissed as to the de-
ceased party. 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
Although Rule 25(a)(1) could be clearer, a 
owul reading of the rule coupled with an 
Z*rstanding °f i t s ^ ^ ^ lea<k to the 
^ u s l o n that the rule requires two affirma-
the <*I? W ° rde r to t r i g^e r t h e "«""«£ of 
„J; 'v P^od- First, a party must for-
th* reeSor¥eVhe d e & t h o f t h e ^ar^ u P° n 
9->7 ^,LAluknon v- Aurotek, 774 F.2d 
Wi 9lVroC i r-1 9 8 5 ) ; Grandbouche v. Lo-
bouclvt %p ^ ( 1 0 t h Cir.1990) {Grand-
'Sof i i i /o^ M o o r e ' s Federal Practice 
of
 deTlhJ [^ *d- !99D ("a formal suggestion 









 S e r v e o t h e r p a r
' 
ttves
 of thpn'!frty s u c c e s s o r j o r representa-
^ in
 lh
 e c e a s e d
 with a suggestion of 
8ervice 0f t) S a m e m a n n e r as requ -ed for 
RCK.p g / * mot»on to substitute Fed. 
! ^ *e S J « ! \ . Thus* a P ^ y may be 
^ o r h e r a 7 r U ° n o f d e a t h b y 
service on 
wrney, Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b), while 
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non-party successors or representatives of 
the deceased party must be served the sug-
gestion of death in the manner provided by 
Rule 4 for the service of a summons. Grand-
bouche, 913 F.2d at 837 ("the service re-
quired by Rule 25(a)(1) on non-parties, spe-
cifically the successors or representatives of 
the deceased party's estate, must be served 
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4"); Fariss v. 
Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 961-^2 
(4th Cir.1985) (Fariss) (successors and rep-
resentatives of the deceased party must be 
personally served the suggestion of death); 
3B Moore's Federal Practice H25.06[3] (2d 
ed. 1991) ("service of the suggestion of death 
upon parties is to be effected in accordance 
with Rule 5, and upon non-parties as provid-
ed in Rule 4"). 
An important function is fulfilled by re-
quiring different methods of service upon 
parties and nonparties. Rule 5 permits ser-
vice upon a party by ordinary mail addressed 
to his or her attorney. Since the notice can 
be addressed to the attorney, there is no 
guarantee that the party personally will re-
ceive notice. It can generally be presumed, 
however, that a party's attorney will notify 
the party of important developments and 
take appropriate action to protect the party's 
interests. Non-party successors or repre-
sentatives of the deceased party, however, 
may not be protected by the attorney of the 
deceased party. It is entirely possible that 
no relationship will exist between them, and 
that the successor or representative will be 
represented by other counsel or by no coun-
sel at all. Because of the nonparty's distance 
from the litigation, it may be that a nonparty 
will be unaware of the need to act to pre-
serve the claim. As the court in Fariss 
explained, "[pjersonal service of the sugges-
tion of death alerts the nonparty to the con-
sequences of death to a pending suit, signal-
ing the need for action to preserve the claim 
if so desired." Fariss, 769 F.2d at 962. 
Indeed, the present Rule 25 was designed "to 
inform all interested persons of the death so 
that they may take appropriate action." 3B 
Moore's Federal Practice H25.06[2] (2d ed. 
1991) (discussing the 1963 amendments to 
Rule 25). Thus, we hold that the 90 day 
period provided by Rule 25(a)(1) will not be 
triggered against Barlow's estate until the 
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appropriate representative of the estate is 
served a suggestion of death in the manner 
provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
4. 
The City points to Yonofsky v. Wernick, 
362 F.Supp. 1005, 1011-12 (S.D.NT.1973), in 
which the district court held that the sugges-
tion of death need not be served upon the 
nonparty successors or representatives of the 
estate when the appropriate persons could 
not be ascertained at the time the suggestion 
of death was made. But see Kaldawy v. 
Gold Service Movers, 129 F.R.D. 475, 477 
(S.D.N.Y.1990) (the 90 day period cannot be 
triggered until a representative of the estate 
is appointed and served the suggestion of 
death). We need not reach this question 
because clearly the City knew the identity of 
the executor of Barlow's estate. Weingarten 
provided the City with a copy of Barlow's will 
that identified the name and address of Bar-
low's executor. 
I l l 
[2] Barlow's estate asserts that the 90 
day period was not triggered because the 
estate was never served with the suggestion 
of death in the manner provided by Rule 4. 
The City maintains, however, that Weingar-
ten was acting as attorney for the estate, and 
that service upon him satisfied the require-
ment that the nonparty successors or repre-
sentatives of the estate be served the sugges-
tion of death. We need not reach the ques-
tion whether service on the attorney for the 
nonparty estate satisfies Rule 25(a)(1). Even 
if Weingarten was acting as attorney for the 
estate and service upon the executor of the 
estate was not also required by Rule 25(a)(1), 
the service made upon Weingarten by mail 
clearly did not comply with Rule 4. 
The relevant sections of Rule 4(e) provide 
that service may be effected: 
(1) pursuant to the law of the state in 
which the district court is located, or in 
which service is effected, for the service of 
a summons upon the defendant in an ac-
tion brought m the courts of general juris-
diction of the State; or 
(2) by delivering a copy of the summons 
. . . to the individual personally or by leav-
ing copies thereof at the individual's dwell-
ing house or usual place of abode with 
some person of suitable age and discretion 
then residing therein or by delivering
 a 
copy of the summons . . . to an agent 
authorized by appointment or by law to 
receive service of process. 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e) (emphasis added). Service 
was neither personally delivered nor left at 
Weingarten's dwelling. Likewise, no waiver 
of service was obtained pursuant to Ruie 
4(d). Thus, service would have been valid 
only if it complied with "the law of the state 
in which the district court is located, or in 
which service is effected, for the service ofa 
summons.'1 Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e)(1) (emphasis 
added). Because the district court was locat-
ed in California and service was attempted in 
California, service will be valid under Ru]e 
4(e)(1) only if it complies with California law 
governing the service of a summons. 
The service made upon Weingarten did not 
comply with California law governing service 
of a summons. The City filed a "Declaration 
Of Service By Mail" which recites that the 
suggestion of death was mailed to Weingar-
ten. Although service of the suggestion of 
death on Weingarten may have complied 
with California Code of Civil Procedure 
§ 1013(a), this provision of California law 
applies not to service of a summons, but only 
to service of a notice or other paper. Cal. 
Civ.Proc.Code § 1016 (Deering 1994) ("The 
foregoing provisions of this Chapter do not 
apply to the service of a summons or other 
process/'); Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior 
Court, 33 Cal.App.3d 808, 821, 109 CaLRptr. 
402 (1973) (Cal.Civ.Proc.Code §§ 1013 and 
1013(a) do not apply to the service of a 
summons). Although California law does 
permit service of a summons by mail, such 
service is valid only if a signed acknowledg-
ment is returned and other requirements are 
complied with, Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 415.30 
(Deering 1994); Tandy Corp. v. Superior 
Court, 117 CaLApp.3d 911, 913,173 CaLRptr. 
81 (1981) (service by certified mail does not 
constitute constructive service where ac-
knowledgment not executed and returned 
pursuant to California Code of Civil Proce-
dure § 415.30), or a copy is also left at the 
person's office or dwelling. Cal.Civ.Proc. 
Code § 415.20. That did not occur here. 
Thus, service of the suggestion of death was 
not made "pursuant to the law of the state 
DELAYE v. AGRIPAC, INC. 
Cite i s 39 F3d 235 (9th Ctr. 1994) 
for the service of a summons." Fed. erned by ERISA, 
R.CIV.P. 4(e)(1). 
Because service of the suggestion of death 
vis not made pursuant to Rule 4, as provid-
ed for in Rule 25(a)(1), the 90 day period was 
not triggered. Therefore, the order of the 
district court dismissing the action is re-
ined and the case is remanded to the dis-
trict court. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
235 
and (2) district court 
lacked jurisdiction over dispute. 
Appeal dismissed; cause remanded. 
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1. Pensions <8=»139 
Employer did not waive argument that 
president and chief executive officer's 
(CEO's) contract was not "plan" under 
ERISA since it did not involve ongoing ad-
ministrative scheme, even though district 
court focused on whether one-person con-
tract could be "plan" under ERISA, where 
employer raised issue whether presi-
dent/CEO's employment contract was 
ERISA plan. Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974, §§ 2^*402, as amended, 
29 U.&CA §§ 1001-1461. 
2. Pensions @=>23 
ERISA is designed to protect employees 
from losing their pensions and benefits due 
to employer mismanagement. Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974, §§ 2-
4022, as amended, 29 U.S.CA §§ 1001-1461. 
3. Pensions @=»28 
Provisions for severance pay may consti-
tute employee welfare benefit plan within 
meaning of ERISA. Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974, §§ 2-4022, as 
amended, 29 U.S.CJL §§ 1001-1461. 
4. Pensions @=>28 
Employment contract of president and 
chief executive officer (CEO) of company did 
not implicate ongoing administrative scheme, 
and thus was not "plan" under ERISA, 
where once company decided to terminate 
president/CEO, severance calculation became 
straightforward computation of one-time obli-
gation. Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act of 1974, §§ 2-4022, as amended, 29 
U.S.CA §§ 1001-1461. 
5. Federal Courts @=>205 
Employment contract of president and 
chief executive officer (CEO) of company was 
not "plan" governed by ERISA, and thus his 
claim that his contract was breached did not 
present federal question and district court 
lacked jurisdiction to resolve dispute. 28 
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interpreted to require such corroboration in 
future cases not before me. 
I am satisfied to join the district court 
which held that, considering the record as a 
whole, there were insufficient "particular-
ized guarantees of trustworthiness," as re-
quired by Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 
S.Ct 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), to ensure 
that the hearsay statements were reliable, 
and I would affirm solely on that ground. 
Marguerite FARISS, Administratrix of 
the Estate of Ewell W. 
Fariss, Appellant, 
v. 
LYNCHBURG FOUNDRY, a Mead 
Corporation, Appellee. 
Ewell W. FARISS, Appellee, 
v. 
LYNCHBURG FOUNDRY, a Mead 
Corporation, Appellant 
Nos. 84-2137, 84-2169. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Fourth Circuit 
Argued April 1, 1985. 
Decided Aug. 5, 1985. 
In action under the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act, administratrix of em-
ployee's estate was substituted for employ-
ee upon his death, and employer moved for 
summary judgment The United States 
District Court for the Western District of 
Virginia, at Lynchburg, 588 F.Supp. 1369, 
James C. Turk, Chief Judge, granted mo-
tion for summary judgment, and adminis-
tratrix appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Wilkinson, Circuit Judge, held that; (1) 
substitution of administratrix for employee 
was properly allowed; (2) damages for loss 
of life insurance coverage would be limited 
to amount employer would have paid had 
employee not been terminated, rather than 
proceeds of policy; (3) lump-sum pension 
benefits received by employee would be 
offset against claimed damages; (4) liqui-
dated damages would be assessed only 
upon net loss after offsets; and (5) offset 
for lump-sum pension benefit exceeded 
claimed damages, and thus, no relief could 
be awarded. 
1. Federal Courts <s=>18 
Where district courts dismissed federal 
claim prior to trial, dismissal of pendent 
state law contract claim was proper. 
2. Federal Civil Procedure <s=»363 
Service of suggestion of death on coun-
sel for decedent in age discrimination ac-
tion was inadequate to commence running 
of 90-day substitution period allowed by 
Rule 25(aXl), and thus, substitution of de-
cedent's personal representative, who nev-
er received such service, was timely. Fed. 
Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 25(aXD, 28 U.S.C.A. 
3. Federal Civil Procedure «=»365 
Where personal representative has 
been appointed following death of party in 
civil action, suggestion of death must be 
personally served on such representative in 
order to commence running of 90-day sub-
stitution period allowed by Rule 25(aXl). 
FedRules Civ.Proc. Rule 25(aXl), 28 U.S. 
C.A. 
4. Federal Civil Procedure e»365 
Under Rule 25(aXl), which governs sub-
stitution of proper successor or representa-
tive of deceased party, suggestion of death 
may be served upon party through his at-
torney, but nonparties must be personally 
served. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. Rules 4(dXl), 
5(b), 25(aXD, 28 U.S.C.A. 
5. Abatement and Revival «=>52, 72(2) 
Claim under the Age Discrimination 
and Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 
29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq., survives death of 
original plaintiff and is subject to revival 
| KEY NUMBII SYSTEM > 
Affirmed. 
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by legal representative as a matter of fed- have been in but for unlawful discrimina-
eral law. tion. 
S. Federal Courts <&=»401 
Where federal question is presented, 
federal law, rather than state law, governs 
survival of action after death of plaintiff. 
7. Attorney and Client <3=>76(2) 
Attorney's agency to act ceases with 
death of client, and he has no power to 
continue or terminate an action on his ini-
tiative. 
8. Civil Rights <s=>46(18) 
"Amounts owing" which are recovera-
ble by employee under the Age Discrimina-
tion and Employment Act of 1967, § 7(b), 
29 U.S.C.A. § 626(b), are legal damages, 
unlike equitable remedies directing employ-
ment, reinstatement and promotion, and 
such amounts include both items of pecuni-
ary or economic loss such as wages, fringe 
and other job-related benefits, and liqui-
dated damages for nonpecuniary losses. 
9. Abatement and Revival e=>60 
Age discrimination claim for lost-
fringe benefits survives death of employee 
who originally brought action. Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 
et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
10. Civil Rights «=>46(18) 
Employers guilty of age discrimination 
are liable for fringe benefits they would 
have provided to employee, as well as back 
wages, under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
11. Civil Rights ^46(18) 
Value of health or life insurance pro-
vided by employer is recoverable by em-
ployee under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
12. Civil Rights <3»46(17) 
The Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967, § 2 et sea., 29 U.S.C.A. 
§ 621 et seq. demands most complete relief 
possible towards putting victim of age dis-
crimination back into position he would 
13. Civil Rights e»46(18) 
Proceeds of employer-provided life in-
surance policy may not be claimed as dam-
ages for termination in violation of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 
§ 2 et seq , 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.; rath-
er, only the premiums that employer would 
have paid to maintain coverage had employ-
ment continued are recoverable; declining 
to follow Merkel v. Scoville, Inc., 570 
F.Supp. 141; Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool 
Corp., 550 F.Supp. 432; aff d in part, rev'd 
in part on other grounds 717 F.2d 114; 
Willet v. Emory & Henry College, A21 
F.Supp. 631, affd, 569 F.2d 212. 
14. Civil Rights <s=>46(18) 
Where employee elects to obtain sub-
stitute insurance following termination, the 
"make whole" concept underlying damages 
pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S. 
C.A. § 621 et seq., would permit full recov-
ery of any additional premiums for compa-
rable individual policy beyond what employ-
er would have paid for group insurance. 
15. Civil Rights G=>46(18) 
Employee bringing action under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
has general duty to mitigate his damages 
by seeking other available employment 
with reasonable diligence; it is equally ap-
propriate to require employee to purchase 
substitute insurance, if he wishes to claim 
any damages for loss of coverage above 
employer-paid premiums. 
16. Civil Rights <3»46(18) 
In age discrimination action brought 
by administratrix of estate of terminated 
employee, who died two years after termi-
nation, employer was not liable for pro-
ceeds of employee life insurance policy 
which was cancelled upon termination, ab-
sent any evidence that employee attempted 
to obtain substitute coverage; therefore, 
recovery would be limited to $1,337.70 that 
employer would have paid in premiums had 
termination not occurred. Age Discrimina-
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tion in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et 
seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
17. Civil Rights <s=>46(18) 
If an employer's payment to employee 
would not have been made had employee 
not been terminated and such payment ex-
ceeds damages necessary, under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 
§ 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq., to 
make employee whole, failure to offset 
payment would lead to unjustified windfall. 
18. Civil Rights <s=>46(18) 
Payment made entirely by employer 
directly to employee is not a "collateral 
benefit" so as to be exempt from offset 
against damages in action under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 
§ 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.; rath-
er, collateral benefits are those received 
from a source distinct from employer which 
are not offset because they do not dis-
charge an obligation of employer, but serve 
an independent social policy. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
19. Civil Rights <s=»46(18) 
Lump-sum pension payment employee 
received upon termination would be offset 
from damages claimed in action brought 
under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. 
§ 621 et seq., where payment would not 
have been made at all if employee had 
continued working until his death two 
years following termination, because he 
had declined survivorship option offered by 
employer. 
20. Civil Rights <s=>46(18) 
Where pension benefits are wrongly 
withheld due to termination, benefits may 
be claimed as damages in an action under 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et 
seq., and if such benefits would not have 
been granted but for termination, it is 
equally appropriate to offset them from an 
award for back pay and benefits, because 
employee would otherwise enjoy rewards 
from employer both of working and not 
working. 
21. Civil Rights *=>46(18) 
Liquidated damages awarded under 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
of 1967, § 7(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(b), for 
nonpecuniary loss in an amount equal to 
the pecuniary loss should be assessed only 
upon plaintiffs net loss after offsets, rath-
er than in relation to damages claimed be-
fore any offset 
22. Civil Rights <s=»46(18) 
Punitive damages are not available un-
der the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 
et seq. 
23. Civil Rights <3=>46(18) 
Administratrix of estate of terminated 
employee could recover no liquidated dam-
ages under the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1967, § 7(b), 29 U.S.C.A. 
§ 626(b), where benefit employee received 
as result of termination, in form of lump-
sum pension payment he would not other-
wise have received, exceeded claimed pecu-
niary damages as a result of termination. 
24. Civil Rights **46(17) 
Even if employer's termination of em-
ployee violated the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq., administratrix of 
employee's estate was not entitled to relief, 
where damages claimed were more than 
offset by lump-sum pension benefit employ-
ee received as a result of his termination, 
which would not have been paid had he 
died while employed. 
Nate L. Adams, III, Roanoke, Va. (Don-
ald W. Huffman, Bird, Kinder & Huffman, 
Roanoke, Va., on brief), for appellant 
Edmund M. Kneisel, Atlanta, Ga. 
(Charles M. Rice, Kilpatrick & Cody, Atlan-
ta, Ga., Robert C. Wood, III, Edmunds & 
Williams, Lynchburg, Va., on brief), for 
appellee. 
Before HALL, WILKINSON and SNEE-
DEN, Circuit Judges. 
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge: 
Ewell W. Fariss, the original plaintiff in 
this action under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 
(1982) et seq.j brought suit against defend-
ant Lynchburg Foundry Company, alleging 
he had been terminated from employment 
because of his age. He sought reinstate-
ment, back pay and punitive damages. 
Mr. Fariss died and his widow, Marguer-
ite S. Fariss, was appointed administratrix 
of his estate. Defendant thereafter filed a 
Suggestion of Death Upon the Record, 
serving a copy on the deceased plaintiffs 
attorney. Mrs. Fariss was never personal-
ly served. After obtaining new counsel, 
Mrs. Fariss moved to substitute herself as 
plaintiff, which the district court permitted 
over defendant's objection. As amended, 
her complaint alleged a "willful" violation 
of the ADEA, and sought only monetary 
relief, with a pendent state law contract 
claim. 
The district court, 588 F.Supp. 1369, 
granted summary judgment for defendant. 
It held that plaintiff lacked a claim for 
monetary relief because pension benefits 
Mr. Fariss received from defendant after 
his termination exceeded defendant's liabili-
ty for back wages and life insurance premi-
ums. Plaintiff appeals from the summary 
judgment for defendant, while defendant 
cross-appeals from the substitution of Mrs. 
Fariss as plaintiff. 
[1] We affirm. Mrs. Fariss was proper-
ly substituted as plaintiff under Fed.R. 
Civ.P. 25(a). Plaintiff, however, would be 
entitled to no monetary relief even if she 
were to prevail on the merits. The pro-
ceeds of an employer-provided life insur-
ance policy may not be claimed as the dam-
ages from a wrongful termination, but only 
the premiums that would have been paid to 
maintain coverage had the plaintiff re-
mained employed. These premiums, to-
gether with back pay, are more than offset 
by the pension benefits Mr. Fariss received 
as a result of his termination, which must 
1. Because the district court dismissed the feder-
al claim prior to trial, it also correctly dismissed 
the pendent state law contract claim. United 
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be deducted from any possible damages 
award.1 
I 
Before addressing the damages issues, 
we must determine whether Mrs. Fariss 
was substituted as plaintiff for her de-
ceased husband in a timely fashion. De-
fendant contends that because Mrs. Fariss 
did not move for substitution until more 
than 90 days after service of the sugges-
tion of death on Mr. Fariss's original coun-
sel, and no "excusable neglect" has been 
shown, Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(bX2), this suit must 
be dismissed. 
[2,3] We hold that service on dece-
dent's counsel alone was inadequate to 
commence running of the 90-day substitu-
tion period allowed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a)(1). 
Where, as here, a personal representative 
has been appointed following the death of a 
party, the suggestion of death must be 
personally served on that representative. 
Because Mrs. Fariss never received such 
service, the substitution was timely. 
[4] Rule 25(a)(1) governs substitution of 
the proper successor or representative of a 
deceased party: 
If a party dies and the claim is not 
thereby extinguished, the court may or-
der substitution of the proper parties. 
The motion for substitution may be made 
by any party or by the successors or 
representatives of the deceased party 
and, together with the notice of hearing, 
shall be served on the parties as provided 
in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in 
the manner provided in Rule 4 for the 
service of a summons, and may be served 
in any judicial district. Unless the mo-
tion for substitution is made not later 
than 90 days after the death is suggested 
upon the record by service of a state-
ment of the fact of the death as provided 
here for the service of the motion, the 
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 VS. 715, 726. 86 
S.Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). 
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action shall be dismissed as to the de-
ceased party. 
The rule imposes no time limit for the 
substitution other than that commenced by 
proper service of a suggestion of death 
upon the record.2 3B J. Moore & J. Kenne-
dy, Moore's Federal Practice II 25.06 [2.-1] 
(2d ed. 1982). As the suggestion of death 
is served in the same manner as the motion 
to substitute, a party may be served 
through his attorney, Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b), but 
nonparties must be personally served. 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(1). 
[5,6] The nonparties for whom Rules 
25(a)(1) and 4(d)(1) mandate personal ser-
vice are evidently the "successors or repre-
sentatives of the deceased party." This 
conclusion follows both from the language 
of Rule 25(a)(1), which refers to no other 
nonparties, and from the rule's underlying 
policies. Rule 25(a)(1) directs that both 
parties and appropriate nonparties be 
served with the suggestion of death to 
commence the 90-day substitution period, 
for the rule seeks "to assure the parties to 
the action and other concerned persons of 
notice of the death so that they may take 
appropriate action to make substitution for 
the deceased party." 3B J. Moore & J. 
Kennedy, supra. The "successors or rep-
resentatives of the deceased party" con-
templated by the rule are those empowered 
to assert any legal claims of the decedent 
not extinguished by death,3 or to defend 
the estate against others' claims. Personal 
service of the suggestion of death alerts 
the nonparty to the consequences of death 
for a pending suit, signaling the need for 
action to preserve the claim if so desired. 
[7] Service on decedent's attorney alone 
was inadequate. The attorney's agency to 
act ceases with the death of his client, see 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 120(1) 
(1958), and he has no power to continue or 
2. The 1963 amendment to Rule 25(a)(1) abol-
ished the prior inflexible time limit of two years 
after the death for substitution. 3B J. Moore & 
J. Kennedy, Moore's Federal Practice H 25.-
01[14], [15] (2d ed. 1982). 
3. It is clear that an ADEA claim survives death 
of the original plaintiff and is subject to revival 
terminate an action on his own initiative. 
Because the attorney is neither a party, nor 
a legal successor or representative of the 
estate, he has no authority to move for 
substitution under Rule 25(a)(1), as the 
courts have repeatedly recognized. See, 
e.g., Boggs v. Dravo Corp., 532 F.2d 897, 
900 (3d Cir.1976); Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 
983, 985 (D.C.Cir.1969); AUJundi v. Rocke-
feller, 88 F.R.D. 244, 246 (W.D.N.Y.1980). 
But see Yonofsky v. Wernick, 362 F.Supp. 
1005, 1011-12 (S.D.N.Y.1973) (suggestion 
of death held properly served on decedent's 
attorney where successor or representative 
unknown only two days after death). 
Personal service on the successor or rep-
resentative is hardly an onerous burden 
where, as here, the administratrix had al-
ready been appointed when service oc-
curred. In some instances, it may prove 
more difficult to determine whom to serve, 
see Rende, 415 F.2d at 986; Yonofsky, 362 
F.Supp. at 1011-12, but it is generally ap-
propriate to require the serving party to 
shoulder that burden, rather than permit-
ting the absence of notice to decedent's 
representative to lead to forfeiture of the 
action. Absent personal service, there is 
no reason to presume that the successor or 
representative, who must decide whether to 
pursue the claim, is aware of the substitu-
tion requirement The administratrix may 
well, as here, be represented by different 
counsel. Either a motion to substitute, see 
Ransom v. Brennan, 437 F.2d 513, 518-19 
(5th Cir.), cert denied, 403 U.S. 904, 91 
S.Ct. 2205, 29 L.Ed.2d 680 (1971), or the 
suggestion of death should have been 
served on the nonparty representative of 
the deceased, not merely on the deceased's 
attorney, to satisfy Rule 25(a)(1). Because 
Mrs. Fariss was never personally served, 
the 90-day substitution period never began, 
by his legal representative as a matter of federal 
law. Asklar v. Honeywell Inc., 95 F.R.D. 419, 
424 (D.Conn.1982). Where a federal question is 
presented, federal law, rather than state law, 
governs survival. 7A C. Wright & A Miller, 
Federal Practice & Procedure § 1952 at 642 
(1972). 
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and the district court properly allowed the 
substitution. 
II 
The principal question before us is 
whether plaintiff could recover anything if 
she were to prove age discrimination. 
Thus, the substantive issue of discrimina-
tion, which the district court did not re 
solve, is not relevant to this appeal, and we 
consider only what damages may be 
claimed. 
Mr. Fariss worked for Lynchburg Found-
ry from August 23, 1941 until his termi-
nation on April 30, 1981 at the age of 61. 
He continued to receive full salary and 
benefits from his employer until September 
1, 1981, enabling him to retire at age 62 
with no reduction in pension benefits. Had 
Mr. Fariss remained employed from Sep-
tember 1, 1981 until his death on Septem-
ber 13, 1983, he would have earned, accord-
ing to plaintiff, approximately $42,000 in 
salary including projected increases.4 This 
amount may be claimed as back pay. 
Upon his retirement, however, Mr. Fariss 
received a lump sum pension payment of 
$64,742.85 from the employer-funded com-
pany retirement plan. Because Mr. Fariss 
declined a survivor benefit option in July 
1981 in favor of the lump sum, no pension 
benefits would have been paid had he re-
mained employed until his death. If the 
lump sum pension payment is offset from 
back wages, plaintiff falls $22,742.85 short 
of having a claim for monetary relief. To 
maintain this action, she must thus identify 
4. Defendant contends that Mr. Fariss's back 
wages would be only $39,500, based upon his 
monthly salary of $1,580. For summary judg-
ment purposes, we accept plaintiffs calculation, 
as did the district court. 
5. After Mr. Fariss's termination, defendant of-
fered in late 1981 and 1982 an enhanced pack-
age of retirement benefits as an incentive to 
early retirement. Mr. Fariss would have been 
eligible for these benefits had he remained em-
ployed and chosen to retire rather than contin-
ue working until his death. Whether Mr. Fariss 
would have elected early retirement, however, is 
necessarily speculative, and accordingly we do 
not consider these benefits in determining 
whether plaintiff has a claim for monetary re-
potential damages from other sources ex-
ceeding that sum.5 
Plaintiff attempts to identify such dam-
ages by reference to employer-provided life 
insurance coverage. Mr. Fariss was enti-
tled to fringe benefits of employer-paid 
group medical and life insurance. Full 
medical coverage continued after retire-
ment. Life insurance would have paid 
twice Mr. Fariss's annual salary, or $42,000 
by plaintiffs estimate, had he died while 
employed, but declined to only $2,000 after 
retirement. Plaintiff seeks to recover the 
difference as damages. Defendant expend-
ed $5,085.28 in premiums to continue full 
medical and reduced life insurance cover-
age from September 1, 1981 until Mr. Far-
iss's death. Had Mr. Fariss remained em-
ployed, defendant would have paid 
$6,422.98 in premiums, an additional 
$1,337.70, to insure him for the same peri-
od. In defendant's view, accepted by the 
district court, plaintiff is at most allowed to 
recover the cost of these additional premi-
ums, which are insufficient to create a 
claim for monetary relief. 
Lynchburg Foundry employees could 
elect to convert their group life insurance 
to an individual policy, thereby preserving 
full coverage after retirement by paying 
the additional premium costs. No evidence 
has been presented that Mr. Fariss ever 
sought to purchase any substitute life in-
surance.6 
Ill 
To avoid summary judgment, plaintiff 
must offer some evidence that, were she to 
lief. A similar refusal to indulge in speculation 
about discretionary promotions underlay this 
circuit's decision in Curl v. Reavis, 740 F.2d 
1323, 1330 & n. 6 (4th Cir.1984). 
6. Mary A. Dodgion, Lynchburg Foundry's Man-
ager of Compensation and Benefits, offered in 
her affidavit the following undisputed evidence: 
"All employees are advised of their conversion 
options in the life insurance portion of their 
benefits booklets. I had several meetings 
with Mr. Fariss and his wife about his retire-
ment; however, he never asked about life 
insurance and never expressed any desire to 
convert his life insurance coverage after ter-
minaition of his employment." 
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establish discrimination, monetary relief 
would be due. Three damages issues are 
thus presented: 1) whether plaintiff may 
recover the proceeds of the life insurance 
policy that Mr. Fariss would have received 
had he died while employed, or only the 
premiums the employer would have paid 
for full coverage up to Mr. Fariss's death; 
2) whether pension benefits received as a 
result of the termination should be offset 
from plaintiffs losses; and 3) whether 
plaintiff could recover liquidated damages 
under the ADEA. We hold that only the 
premiums may be claimed as damages and 
that no liquidated damages are available, 
while the pension benefits must be offset 
from back pay and other fringe benefits 
due. Thus, no claim for monetary relief 
exists. 
A. We first consider what damages are 
due in an ADEA case for loss of a life 
insurance policy provided to employees by 
the employer as a fringe benefit. 
[8] Congress clearly intended that 
fringe benefits be available as monetary 
damages under the ADEA, along with back 
pay. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982) provides 
that "[i]n any action brought to enforce 
this chapter the court shall have jurisdic-
tion to grant such legal or equitable relief 
as may be appropriate to effectuate the 
purposes of this chapter, including without 
limitation judgments compelling employ-
7. Because the ADEA incorporates the enforce-
ment "powers, remedies, and procedures" of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 211(b), 216 (except subsection (a)), and 217, 
the "amounts owing" under the ADEA are 
deemed to be the "unpaid minimum wages" or 
"unpaid overtime compensation" referred to in 
§ 216(b) of the FLSA, as 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) 
indicates. Of course, the "amounts owing" un-
der the ADEA and the relief available under the 
FLSA are not the same, but Congress's decision 
to link the two statutes is nonetheless relevant. 
This court has held that Congress intended to 
preclude any award of general damages for pain 
and suffering under the ADEA, and that reim-
bursement and reinstatement are sufficient to 
alleviate any injury from age discrimination. 
Slatin v. Stanford Research Institute, 590 F.2d 
1292, 1295-96 (4th Cir.1979). 
8. Even if fringe benefits were to be character-
ized as equitable in the sense of being discre-
ment, reinstatement or promotion, or en-
forcing the liability for amounts deemed to 
be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid over-
time compensation under this section."7 
The "amounts owing" under the ADEA, 
§ 626(b), are legal damages, unlike the eq-
uitable remedies directing employment, re-
instatement and promotion. Lorillard v. 
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583 n. 11, 98 S.Ct 866, 
871 n. 11, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978). These 
"amounts owing" include both "items of 
pecuniary or economic loss such as wages, 
fringe, and other job-related benefits," and 
liquidated damages for nonpecuniary loss-
es. H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 13, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. 
& Ad.News 504, 528, 535. 
[9-11] It follows that a claim for lost 
fringe benefits survives the death of an 
employee and is proper here.8 Overwhelm-
ing judicial authority recognizes that em-
ployers guilty of discrimination are liable 
for fringe benefits they would have provid-
ed to employees as well as back wages 
under the ADEA. See, e.g. Kelly v. Amer-
ican Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 978 (9th 
Cir.1981); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 
1003, 1021 (1st Cir.1979); Koyen v. Consol-
idated Edison Co., 560 F.Supp. 1161, 1164 
(S.D.N.Y.1983); Kovalesky v. A.M.C. Asso-
ciated Merchandising Corp., 551 F.Supp. 
544, 549 (S.D.N.Y.1982); Loubrido v. Hull 
Dobbs Co., 526 F.Supp. 1055, 1059 (D.P.R. 
tionary, as the Eighth and Second Circuits have 
indicated in dealing with pension benefits under 
the ADEA, see Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Print-
ers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276. 279 n. 2 (8th Cir.1983); 
Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 
1100 (8th Cir.1982); Geller v. Markham, 635 
F.2d 1027, 1036 (2d Cir.1980), cert, denied, 451 
VS. 945, 101 S.Ct. 2028, 68 L.Ed.2d 332 (1981); 
Cleverly v. Western Electric Co., 594 F.2d 638, 
640 (8th Cir.1979), there is no reason to suppose 
that a monetary claim for fringe benefits would 
not survive death. Defendant, arguing that eq-
uitable claims do not survive, misleadingly cites 
authorities dealing only with injunctive relief. 
See Hamilton v. Rogers, 573 F.Supp. 452, 454 
(S.D.Tex.1983); Mixon v. Grey Drug Stores, Inc., 
81 F.R.D. 413. 414 (N.D.Ohio 1978). By con-
trast, monetary claims are ordinarily not moot-
ed by death. See, e.g., Yablonski v. United Mine 
Workers, 459 F.2d 1201, 1202-03 (D.CCir.1972). 
1981); Monroe v. 
Corp., 335 F.Supp. 231, 234-35 (N.D.Ga. 
1971). Thus, the value of health or life 
insurance provided by the employer, see 
Coates v. National Cask Register Co., 433 
F.Supp. 655, 663 (W.D.Va.1977); Combes v. 
Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F.Supp. 841, 
844 (W.D.Okla.1976), is recoverable where 
age discrimination has occurred. 
The question, of course, concerns the 
proper measure of value. We reject plain-
tiffs contention that the proceeds of the 
insurance are the appropriate measure of 
value here. Typically, as in this case, the 
insurance proceeds are paid not by the 
employer but by a third party insurer with 
whom the employer contracts.9 By elect-
ing this method of protecting its employ-
ees, the employer manifests an intent to 
limit its own expenditures to definite and 
regular premiums, which ordinarily provide 
the basis for a damages calculation. See 
Combes, 421 F.Supp. at 844. But see 
Merkel v. Scoville, Inc., 570 F.Supp. 141, 
146 (S.D.Ohio 1983) (refusing recovery of 
premiums paid by employer but allowing 
insured medical expenses). 
We do not think Congress intended, as a 
general rule, to transform employers into 
insurers merely because an insurance poli-
cy is part of the compensation for employ-
ment. Although the insurance policy is the 
benefit an employee contracts to receive, 
the employer does not undertake to cover 
personally risks of loss of life or illness by 
purchasing a policy for employees. A 
large disparity exists between what the 
employer would actually have paid as pre-
miums had Mr. Fariss remained on the job, 
$1,337.70, and the liability for the entire 
face value of the policy arising upon his 
death, an additional $40,000. In many in-
stances, an obligation to pay the full pro-
ceeds of a life or health insurance policy 
could be staggering, amounting to many 
hundreds of thousands of dollars. The di-
sincentives to providing employees insur-
ance as a fringe benefit are evident; faced 
9. Where an employer chooses to act as insurer 
for its employees, as certain businesses do rath-
er than paying increasing premiums, a different 
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Penn-Dixie Cement with such enormous potential liability, em-
ployers could be expected to consider com-
pensating employees entirely in cash. 
[12,13] We decline to follow those deci-
sions plaintiff cites favoring recovery of 
insurance proceeds or covered expenses. 
See Merkel, 570 F.Supp. at 146; Spagnuo-
lo v. Whirlpool Corp., 550 F.Supp. 432, 433 
(W.D.N.C.1982), ajfd in part, rev'd in 
part on other grounds, 717 F.2d 114 (4th 
Cir.1983); Willett v. Emory & Henry Col-
lege, 427 F.Supp. 631, 633 (W.D.Va.1977), 
affd, 569 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.1978) (Title 
VII). Those courts prepared to place on 
the employer the risk that an employee will 
have an insured loss after termination mis-
construe the "make whole" function of the 
ADEA. As this court has stated, the 
ADEA demands " 'the most complete relief 
possible' toward putting the victim of age 
discrimination back into the position he 
would have been in but for the unlawful 
discrimination." Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool 
Corp., 717 F.2d 114, 118 (4th Cir.1983), 
quoting Franks v. Bowman Transporta-
tion Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 
1264, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976). Had Mr. Far-
iss not been terminated, he would have 
been covered by a life insurance policy with 
a $42,000 face value for the two years 
before his death. This insurance coverage, 
not the proceeds, is the benefit for which 
the employer must be held liable. Here the 
employer would in no event have been lia-
ble to the employee for the $42,000, but 
only for the continuing payment of premi-
ums. The value of being insured for a 
given period is precisely the amount of the 
premiums paid. To require the employer 
to pay the face value of the policy would be 
to compel assumption of a risk not under-
taken on behalf of any other employee. 
[14,15] Nor is it sufficient to respond 
that an employer who discriminates in vio-
lation of the ADEA deserves to bear such a 
sizable and unanticipated penalty, for in 
most instances, the employee can easily 
avoid the risk of being uninsured by pur-
case may be presented. We need not and do 
not decide that question here. 
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chasing an individual policy of comparable 
value. Where the employee elects to ob-
tain substitute insurance, the "make 
whole" concept underlying ADEA dam-
ages, see Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc., 
689 F.2d 481, 490 (4th Cir.1982), would per-
mit full recovery of any additional premi-
ums for the comparable individual policy 
beyond what the employer would have paid 
for group insurance. Merkel, 570 F.Supp. 
at 146; Pedreyra v. Cornell Prescription 
Pharmacies, Inc., 465 F.Supp. 936, 951 
(D.Colo.1979) (Title VII). An ADEA plain-
tiff has a general duty to mitigate his 
damages "by seeking other available em-
ployment with reasonable diligence." 
Cline, 689 F.2d at 488. It is equally appro-
priate to require a plaintiff to purchase 
substitute insurance, if he wishes to claim 
any damages for loss of coverage above 
the employer-paid premiums. See Syvojck 
v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 
149, 161 (7th Cir.1981); Buchholz v. Sym-
ons Manufacturing Co., 445 F.Supp. 706, 
713 (E.D.Wis. 1978) (cases denying recovery 
of lost insurance benefits where alternate 
coverage not purchased by plaintiff.) This 
rule of mitigation both assures a plaintiff 
that he will recover the full cost of pur-
chasing comparable insurance should he 
prevail on his substantive claim, and serves 
to reveal whether the employee actually 
desired insurance protection, thereby avoid-
ing a windfall recovery. Because there is 
no evidence here that Mr. Fariss attempted 
to obtain any substitute coverage, plaintiff 
can recover only the premiums the employ-
er would have paid. We need not consider 
the measure of damages had he earnestly 
attempted to procure substitute individual 
coverage and found insurance unavailable 
for a person of his age and health. 
[16] We thus reject any employer liabil-
ity for the proceeds of the employee life 
insurance policy here. Plaintiffs recovery 
10. A payment made entirely by the employer 
directly to the employee is not a "collateral 
benefit" within the meaning of NLRB v. Gullett 
Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 364, 71 S.Ct. 337, 339, 95 
L.£d. 337 (1951) (holding unemployment com-
pensation benefits collateral and exempt from 
offset in labor case). Collateral benefits are 
could only encompass the $1,337.70 that 
defendant would have paid in premiums 
had the termination not occurred. These 
premiums, added to the $42,000 claimed in 
back wages, do not exceed the $64,742.85 
lump sum pension Mr. Fariss received. 
[17,18] B. We agree with the district 
court that the pension benefits received in 
a $64,742.85 lump sum by Mr. Fariss fol-
lowing his termination should be offset 
from the damages plaintiff claims. An 
ADEA damages award "should only make 
the wrongly discharged employee monetari-
ly whole under his employment contract; it 
should not provide a windfall.,, Cline, 689 
F.2d at 490. If an employer's payment 
would not have been made had the employ-
ee continued working, it exceeds the dam-
ages necessary to make the plaintiff whole, 
and failure to offset it would necessarily 
lead to a windfall. EEOC v. Sandia 
Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 626 (10th Cir.1980) 
(severance pay).10 
[19,20] Such is the case here. Had Mr. 
Fariss continued working until he died, the 
pension would not have been paid at all, 
since he had declined the survivorship op-
tion offered by the employer. Therefore, 
he received the full benefit in direct conse-
quence of his termination. Employer-pro-
vided pensions received as a result of ter-
mination have been generally offset from 
back pay claims under the ADEA. See e.g. 
Hagelthorn v. Kennecott Corp., 710 F.2d 
76, 87 (2d Cir.1983); Orzel v. City of Wau-
watosa Fire Dept, 697 F.2d 743, 756 (7th 
Cir.), cert denied, — U.S. , 104 S.Ct 
484, 78 L.E<L2d 680 (1983); Wise v. Olan 
Mills, Inc., 495 F.Supp. 257, 260 (D.Colo. 
1980). But see McDowell v. Avtex Fibers, 
Inc., 740 F.2d 214, 217-18 (3d Cir.1984), 
vacated on other grounds, — U.S. , 
105 S.Ct. 1159, 84 L.Ed.2d 312 (1985). 
When pension benefits are wrongfully 
withheld due to termination, they may be 
those received from a source distinct from the 
employer, they are not offset because they do 
not discharge an obligation of the employer, but 
serve an independent social policy. See Gullett 
Gin, 340 US. a: 364, 71 S.Ct. at 339; EEOC v. 
Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 624-26 (10th Cir. 
1980). 
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claimed as damages in an ADEA action. 
Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1021. If such benefits 
would not have been granted but for the 
termination, it is equally appropriate to off-
set them from an award for back pay and 
benefits. Otherwise, plaintiff would enjoy 
the rewards from the employer both of 
working and not working. Similarly, in 
NLRB v. Baltimore News American Divi-
sion, 590 F.2d 554, 556 (4th Cir.1979), this 
court held that employees improperly re-
tired in violation of labor laws who elected 
to return to work should have pension ben-
efits received deducted from back wages 
due. In this case, Mr. Fariss had a sub-
stantial financial gain from his termination. 
Whether or not he suffered discrimination, 
he was more than $20,000 ahead at the 
time of his death. We cannot ignore the 
reality of his position in resolving plain-
tiffs claim. 
C. Liquidated damages are available 
under the ADEA in an amount equal to 
other damages where the employer is 
guilty of "willful violations." 29 U.S.C. 
§ 626(b). As recently interpreted by the 
Supreme Court, this standard requires at 
least a "reckless disregard" by the employ-
er of whether his conduct is prohibited by 
the ADEA. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. 
Thurston, — U.S. , 105 S.Ct. 613, 624, 
83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985). Here plaintiff al-
leged a "willful" violation in her amended 
complaint, and accordingly has grounds for 
claiming liquidated damages if the Trans 
World test is satisfied. The district court 
did not address this issue. 
We are concerned, however, not with 
substantive liability but with a question of 
calculation. Liquidated damages under the 
ADEA for nonpecuniary losses are to be 
"calculated as an amount equal to the pecu-
niary loss." H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 950, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1978 U.S. 
Code Cong. & Ad.News 528, 535. The 
question is whether the liquidated damages 
should be assessed only with relation to 
damages claimed before any offset, or in an 
11. Punitive damages are not available under the 
ADEA. Walker v. Pettit Construction Co., 605 
F.2d 128, 130, modified on reh'g on other 
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amount equal to the net loss after offset. 
Under the former view, plaintiffs claim for 
$43,337.70 in back wages and insurance 
premiums would be doubled bef ore deduct-
ing the $64,742.85 lump sum pension, creat-
ing a monetary claim for relief; under the 
latter, nothing would exist to be doubled. 
[21] We hold that liquidated damages 
should be assessed only upon the net loss 
after offsets. Losses arising from a termi-
nation ought not to be artificially segregat-
ed from gains. Where there has been no 
overall pecuniary loss, we do not believe 
that Congress intended plaintiffs to receive 
a windfall liquidated damages award. 
[22,231 Our method of calculation does 
not "unfairly penalize" plaintiffs under a 
duty to mitigate, as asserted in EEOC v. 
United Air Lines, Inc., 511 F.Supp. 309, 
31^-12 (N.D.I11.1983), modified and dis-
missed, 755 F.2d 94 (7th Cir.1985). Rather, 
it is just to withhold liquidated damages for 
presumed nonpecuniary losses where a 
plaintiff has fortuitously had a financial 
gain from termination. Liquidated dam-
ages are not punitive in nature but compen-
satory. H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 950 at 14, su-
pra. Unlike punitive damages, they are 
not designed to serve the independent pur-
pose of deterring employer misconduct,11 
and we see no reason to provide a compen-
satory award where there is no injury to 
compensate. We therefore determine that 
plaintiff could recover no liquidated dam-
ages here. 
IV 
[24] Plaintiffs damages claim for $42,-
000 in back wages and $1,337.70 in life 
insurance premiums arising from Mr. Far-
iss's termination in 1981 is more than off-
set by the $64,742.85 lump sum pension 
benefit he received as a result of that ter-
mination, and which would not have been 
paid had he died while employed in 1983. 
Thus, there has occurred no injury even if 
plaintiff should prevail on the substantive 
grounds sub nom. Frith v. Eastern Air Lines, 
Inc., 611 F.2d 950 (4th Cir.1979). 
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merits, and no relief can be awarded. We 
accordingly affirm the district court's sum-
mary judgment for defendant 
AFFIRMED. 
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, 
v. 
Jesus Amaya QUINTEROS, Appellant. 
No. 84-5219. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Fourth Circuit. t 
Argued April 5, 1985. 
Decided Aug. 7, 1985. 
Defendant was convicted in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia, James C. Cacheris, J., of 
possession and knowing transfer of false 
identification documents, and he appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Sprouse, Circuit 
Judge, held that: (1) Social Security cards 
were "identification documents" under fed-
eral criminal statute prohibiting knowing 
transfer of stolen or false identification 
documents, and (2) neither statutory nor 
constitutional speedy trial right was violat-
ed by 33-day delay between arrest and 
indictment. 
Affirmed. 
1. Forgery $=>7(1) 
Receiving Stolen Goods e»l 
Social Security cards were "identifica-
tion documents" under federal criminal 
statute prohibiting knowing transfer of sto-
len or false identification documents; evi-
dence showed that Social Security cards 
were commonly used for identification pur-
poses. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1028(a)(2, 6), (dXl). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Forgery «=*2 
Receiving Stolen Goods ^ l 
For purposes of crime of knowing 
transfer of stolen or false identification 
documents, statute defining "identification 
document" as "document made or issued 
by or under the authority of the United 
States Government • • • which, when com-
pleted with information concerning a par-
ticular individual, is of a type intended or 
commonly accepted for the purpose of iden-
tification of individuals" was not unconsti-
tutionally overbroad or vague. 18 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 1028, 1028(d)(1). 
3. Indictment and Information $=»7 
Where initial complaint against defend-
ant is dismissed within 30 days of original 
arrest, statutory 30-day period within 
which to bring indictment runs anew from 
date of second complaint against defend-
ant. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(b), (d)(1). 
4. Indictment and Information «=>7 
Statute providing that, after dismissal 
of initial complaint, 30-day period in which 
to bring indictment was to run anew from 
filing of second complaint effectively ex-
cluded from 30-day limitation any period of 
delay during which charges were not pend-
ing against defendant; thus, where initial 
complaint against defendant had been dis-
missed within 30 days of original arrest, 
and no subsequent complaint was ever 
filed, indictment of defendant 33 days after 
he was arrested and charged did not violate 
his statutory speedy trial right, absent any 
bad faith on part of Government 18 U.S. 
C.A. § 3161(b), (dXl). 
5. Indictment and Information «=»7 
Delay of 33 days between arrest and 
indictment did not violate defendant's con-
stitutional right to speedy trial, absent any 
showing of prejudice caused by delay. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
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Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and 
BURGER and LEVENTHAJL, Circuit Judges. 
LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge: . 
The District Court held that Rule 
25(a) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure required dismissal of the 
plaintiffs' tort action because defend-
ant's counsel had filed a suggestion of 
death of the defendant yet plaintiff had 
not made any substitution of parties 
within 90 days. We reverse on the 
ground that the suggestion of death, 
which was neither filed by nor identi-
fied a successor or representative of the 
deceased, such as an executor or admin-
istrator, was ineffective to trigger the 
running of the 90-day period provided 
by the Rule. 
Mr. and Mrs. John Rende filed an ac-
tion in the District Court individually 
and on behalf of their infant son who 
had been struck and injured by Alfred 
S. Kay while driving his car. On Au-
gust 27, 1967, defendant Kay died. On 
September 1, 1967, the defendant's at-
torney, a term used here to identify the 
lawyer who had been retained by de-
ceased to defend the action, and who had 
duly entered an appearance as attorney 
for defendant, filed a suggestion of 
death in the District Court, giving no-
tice to plaintiffs' attorney. That same 
day there was filed in the Orphans 
Court for Montgomery County, Mary-
land, residence of the deceased, his will 
naming his widow as executrix, but the 
will had not been probated, nor any legal 
representative appointed for the estate 
at the time of the filing of this appeal. 
Plaintiffs' attorney was injured on 
October 14, 1967. On returning to prac-
tice early in 1968, he learned that no 
successor to defendant Kay had yet been 
appointed, and he moved to certify the 
1. See, e. g.f Anderson v. Yungkaut 329 U.S. 
482, 67 S.Ct. 428, 91 L.Ed. 436 (1947). 
2. 4 Moore's Federal Practice, 1 25.01 [7], 
510 (2a ed. 1950). 
3. Rule 6. TIME * * * 
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules 
or by a notice given thereunder or by order 
case to the ready calendar. The defend-
ant's attorney opposed this on grounds 
that discovery procedures had not been 
completed. The case was delayed and 
placed on the ready calendar as of June 
7, 1968. 
However, in April 1968, the defend-
ant's attorney moved in his own name to 
dismiss the action on the ground that 
Rule 25(a) (1) required plaintiffs to 
move to substitute a proper party for 
the deceased within 90 days of the sug-
gestion of death. Plaintiffs filed an op-
position and motion for substitution of 
the proper party, and sought an exten-
sion of the time for substitution as al-
lowed by Rule 6(b). At argument, 
plaintiffs' counsel asserted the "sugges-
tion of death was defective in that it did 
not list the name of the proper party; 
that is the legal representative of the 
defendant." The court responded: 
"That would not be his burden." The 
court dismissed the action with preju-
dice. 
Prior to its amendment in 1963, Rule 
25(a) (1) required the court to dismiss 
a case if no motion for substitution was 
filed within two years after date of 
death, and no extensions of this period 
were allowed under Rule 6(b). The rule 
was rigorously applied, often with harsh 
results,1 and was called "easily the poor-
est rule of all the Federal Rules."2 In 
1955 the Advisory Committee on Rules 
for Civil Procedure recommended that 
the two-year period be changed to a 
"reasonable time" standard. In 1961 
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 
again suggested the Rule be made more 
flexible. In 1963 the Supreme Court 
made changes in Rule 25(a) (1) and in 
Rule 6(b) so as to provide a 90-day time 
limit from the filing of a suggestion of 
death, and to give the court discretion to 
extend that time.3 
of court an act is required or allowed to 
be done at or within a specified time, the 
court for cause shown may at any time 
in its discretion (1) with or without mo-
tion or notice order the period enlarged 
if request therefor is made before the ex-
piration of the period originally prescribed 
or as extended by a previous order, or 
BENDS v. EAT 
Cite as 415 F.2d 963 (1000) 983 
ported by these salient considerations: 
(1) Applicant is seeking a patent on the 
basis of tests viewed solely by him and 
his consultants. (2) The testing which 
took place was limited in extent—nec-
essarily limited, says the applicant, in 
view of the shortage of "sensitives," but 
limited none the less. (3) The data show 
the subjects performed substantially bet-
ter simply by entering the cage, without 
the benefit of the electrical charge, 
which appellant posits as the crucial con-
tribution of his invention—a point be-
yond applicant's power to explain. 
The judgment of the District Court re-
flects application of principles that are 
sound and fair, and it must be 
Affirmed. 
Denis RENDE et aL, Appellants, 
v. 
Alfred S. KAY, Appellee. 
No. 22110. 
United States Court of Appeals 
District of Columbia Circuit. 
Argued Feb. 11, 1969. 
Decided June 4, 1969. 
Action for injuries sustained by mi-
nor who was struck by an automobile 
driven by defendant. The District 
Court for the District of Columbia, Ed-
ward M. Curran, J., dismissed the action 
because defendant's counsel had filed a 
suggestion of death of defendant yet 
plaintiff had not made any substitution 
rf parties within 90 days, and the plain-
tiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Leventhal, Circuit Judge, held that at-
torney retained to "represent" defendant 
as this counsel was not a "representative 
rf the deceased party" within rule pro-
dding that motion for substitution may 
be made by representative of the de-
ceased party, and hence suggestion of 
ieath made by attorney, which sugges-
tion was neither filed by nor identified 
a successor representative of deceased 
defendant, such as an executor or ad-
ministrator, was ineffective to trigger 
the running of the 90-day period pro-
vided by the rule. 
Reversed and remanded with direc-
tions. 
L Federal Civil Procedure G=>364 
Attorney retained to "represent" 
defendant as his counsel was not a "re-
presentative of the deceased party" 
within rule providing that motion for 
substitution may be made by representa-
tive of the deceased party, and hence 
suggestion of death made by attorney, 
which suggestion was neither filed by 
nor identified a successor representative 
of deceased defendant, such as an execu-
tor or administrator, was ineffective to 
trigger the running of the 90-day period 
provided by the rule. Fed.Rules Civ. 
Proc. rule 25(a) (1), 28U.S.C.A. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Federal Civil Procedure €=»364 
Amendment to effect that unless 
motion for substitution is made not later 
than 90 days after death is suggested, 
action shall be dismissed as to deceased 
party was intended to be given liberal 
effect. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 25(a) 
(1),28U.S.C.A. 
8. Federal Civil Procedure G=>364 
Rule providing for dismissal of ac-
tion as to deceased party unless motion 
for substitution is made not later than 
90 days after death is suggested upon 
record is not intended to act as a bar to 
otherwise meritorious actions. Fed. 
Rules Civ.Proc. rule 25(a) (1), 28 U.S. 
C.A. 
Mr. Arthur M. Wagman, Washington, 
D.C., for appellants. 
Mr. Edward J. Gorman, Jr., Washing-
ton, D. C, with whom Mr. Arthur V. 
Butler, Wheaton, Md., was on the brief, 
for appellee. 
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fendant's attorney argues, to make his 
suggestion of death operative to trigger 
the 90-day period even though he was 
neither a successor nor representative of 
the deceased, and gave no indication of 
what person was available to be named 
in substitution as a representative of the 
deceased.4 Counsel's construction would 
open the door to a tactical maneuver to 
place upon the plaintiff the burden of 
locating the representative of the estate 
within 90 days. 
We can conceive of cases wherein even 
the lawyer retained to represent a de-
fendant might know the defendant had 
died, yet not readily know where his es-
tate would be administered. In the 
present case, plaintiffs attorney did 
know the court of probate, but he did 
not know whether probate of the will 
might be contested, or who would be ap-
pointed representative of the estate. 
The tactic of the defendant's attorney 
would place on plaintiff the burden, 
where no conventional representative 
was appointed for the estate in probate 
court, of instituting machinery in order 
to produce some representative of the 
estate ad litem, pending appointment of 
the representative contemplated by law 
of the domicile of the deceased. 
[2,3] The amendment to Rule 25(a) 
(1) was intended to dispel unwarranted 
rigidity and allow more flexibility in 
substitution. "It was intended that lib-
eral effect be given to the 1963 amend-
ment." Roscoe v. Roscoe, 126 U.S.App. 
D.C. 317, 322, 379 F.2d 94, 99 (1967). 
"[T]he 90 day period was not intended 
to act as a bar to otherwise meritorious 
actions." Staggers v. Otto Gerdau Co., 
359 F.2d 292, 296 (2d Cir. 1966). 
No injustice results from the require-
ment that a suggestion of death identify 
the representative or successor of an es-
tate who may be substituted as a party 
for the deceased before Rule 25(a) (1) 
may be invoked by those who represent 
or inherit from the deceased. If the 
heirs or counsel fear that delay may 
prejudice the litigation they may move 
promptly for appointment of a repre-
sentative, perhaps a temporary repre-
sentative, either under the law of the 
domicile or by special order in the court 
wherein the litigation is pending. 
The judgment is reversed and remand-
ed to the District Court with directions 
that plaintiffs' action be reinstated. 
So ordered. 
O I KIT HUMIft STSTEM 
TRUCK DRIVERS AND HELPERS LO 
CAL NO. 728, affiliated with the In-
ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Help-
ers of America, Petitioner, 
v. 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 
BOARD, Respondent, 
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 
Intervenor. 
GEORGIA HIGHWAY EXPRESS, INC., 
Petitioner, 
v. 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 
BOARD, Respondent, 
Truck Drivers and Helpers Local No. 728, 
Intervenor. 
Nos. 21969, 22095. 
United States Court of Appeals 
District of Columbia Circuit. 
Argued Feb. 24, 1969. 
Decided June 23,1969. 
Petition for Rehearing Denied 
Oct. 10, 1969. 
Proceeding on petition for review 
and cross petition for enforcement of 
order of National Labor Relations Board 
upholding certification of union as bar-
gaining agent, directing employer to bar-
4. Different considerations would be in-
volved if the movant were a "party" in-
stead of someone acting for a deceased 
defendant. 
RENDE v. EAT 
Cite as 415 F.2d 963 (1969) 985 
The Committee Notes explaining the 
amendments state: 
Present Rule 25(a) (1), together with 
present Rule 6(b), results in an in-
flexible requirement that an action be 
dismissed as to a deceased party if 
substitution is not carried out within 
a fixed period measured from the time 
of death. The hardships and inequi-
ties of this unyielding requirement 
plainly appear from the cases. 
* * * The amended rule establish-
es a time limit for the motion to sub-
stitute based not upon the time of the 
death, but rather upon the time infor-
mation of the death is provided by 
means of a suggestion of death upon 
the record. * * * A motion to 
substitute may be made by any party 
or by the representative of the de-
ceased party without awaiting the 
suggestion of death. Indeed, the mo-
tion will usually be so made. / / a 
party or the representative of the de-
ceased party desires to limit the time 
within which another may make the 
motion, he may do so by suggesting 
the death upon the record. (Empha-
sis added.) 
Under the amended Rule either a par-
y or "the successors or representatives 
)f the deceased party" may avoid delay 
n effecting substitution for the de-
ceased party either by filing a motion 
or substitution or by suggesting death 
>n the record and thus triggering the 
K)-day period which begins with sugges-
ion of death. 
(2) upon motion made after the expira-
tion of the specified period permit the 
act to be done where the failure to act 
was the result of excusable neglect; but 
it may not extend the time for taking any 
action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), 
(d) and (e), and 60(b), except to the ex-
tent and under the conditions stated in 
them. 
Rule 25. SUBSTITUTION OF PAR-
TIES 
(a) Death. 
(1) If a party dies and the claim is not 
thereby extinguished, the court may order 
substitution of the proper parties. The 
motion for substitution may be made by 
any party or by the successors or repre-
415 F.2d—62V2 
[1] The Advisory Committee, in out-
lining that suggestion of death could be 
made by "the representative of the de-
ceased party" plainly contemplated that 
the suggestion emanating from the side 
of the deceased would identify a repre-
sentative of the estate, such as an execu-
tor or administrator, who could be sub-
stituted for the deceased as a party, 
with the action continued in the name of 
the representative. The addition of 
"successor" in the Rule would take care 
of the case of, say, the distributee of an 
estate that had been distributed, but 
would not make a material difference in 
the aspect under consideration. Form 
30, for suggestion of death, which was 
provided in order to expedite and facili-
tate implementation of the amendment, 
provides: 
A.B. [described as a party, or as 
executor, administrator, or other rep-
resentative or successor of CD., the de-
ceased party] suggests upon the record, 
pursuant to Rule 25(a) (1), the death 
of CD. [describe as party] during the 
pendency of this action. Added Jan. 21, 
1963, eff. July 1, 1963. [Emphasis 
added.] 
Although the attorney for the defendant 
was retained to "represent" the deceased 
as his counsel, he is not a person who 
could be made a party, and is not a "re-
presentative of the deceased party" in 
the sense contemplated by Rule 25(a) 
(1). 
In our opinion the Rule, as amended, 
cannot fairly be construed, as the de-
sentatives of the deceased party and, to-
gether with the notice of hearing, shall be 
served on the parties as provided in Rule 
5 and upon persons not parties in the man-
ner provided in Rule 4 for the service of a 
summons, and may be served in any ju-
dicial district. Unless the motion for sub-
stitution is made not later than 90 days 
after the death is suggested upon the rec-
ord by service of a statement of the fact 
of the death ns provided herein for the 
service of the motion, the action shall be 
dismissed as to the deceased party. 
Prior to the amendment, Rule 6(b) 
provided it could not be used to extend 
time under Rule 25. 
McSURELY v. McCLELLAN 
Cite a* 753 Fid 88 (1985) 
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4. United States $=>50 
Doctrine of qualified immunity re-
quired dismissal of plaintiffs' Fourth 
Amendment claims for damages against 
United States Senator, general counsel of 
Senate subcommittee, and subcommittee in-
vestigator, arising from defendants' inves-
tigative use of private papers seized by 
Kentucky authorities in connection with se-
dition charges, because the state of the law 
as to whether such use trespassed on a 
constitutional right was not "clearly estab-
lished" at the time, as evidenced by fact 
that, nine years later, five members of 
Court of Appeals felt that the investigative 
activity remained wholly within the law. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
5. Civil Rights ®=>13.13(3) 
In action for damages against United 
States Senator and two members of his 
staff, arising out of their investigative use 
of private papers seized by Kentucky au-
thorities in connection with sedition 
charges, plaintiffs failed to prove allega-
tions that defendants violated their First 
Amendment rights by using subcommittee 
investigation to harass, intimidate and stig-
matize them in order to prevent them from 
continuing political and civil rights activity 
in eastern Kentucky, as evidence plaintiffs 
introduced tended to show that senator's 
interest in investigating them related to 
private feud senator had with newspaper 
columnist, and they produced no evidence 
suggesting that real purpose of subcommit-
tee investigation was curtailment of their 
political activities. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 
1. 
6. United States <s=>12 
Speech or debate clause extends abso-
lute immunity to members of Congress for 
voting, conduct at committee hearings, 
preparation of committee reports, authori-
zation of committee publications and their 
internal distribution, and issuance of sub-
poenas concerning a subject on which legis-
lation could be had. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, 
§ 6, cl. 1. 
7. United States <3=>12 
Speech or debate clause immunity shel-
ters field investigations by a senator or his 
staff. U.S.C.A. Const. Art 1, § 6, cl. 1. 
8. United States e=>12 
Even if plaintiffs had proved allega-
tions that Senator and members of his staff 
used instrumentality of subcommittee in-
vestigation to harass, intimidate and stig-
matize them in order to prevent them from 
continuing their political activity, in connec-
tion with subcommittee's use of private 
papers seized from their home by Kentucky 
authorities in connection with sedition 
charges, recovery was precluded by immu-
nity conferred by speech or debate clause. 
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 6, cl. 1; Amend. 1. 
9. Torts G=>2 
Under District of Columbia choice of 
law rules, Kentucky law governed common-
law violation of privacy claim against Sen-
ate investigator arising from investigator's 
use of plaintiffs' private papers taken from 
their home by Kentucky law enforcement 
agents in connection with sedition charges, 
as Kentucky was the place from which 
documents were taken and to which they 
were returned, it was plaintiffs' domicile, 
and place where wrong was done and harm 
was initially felt. 
10. Torts <3=»8.5(4, 5) 
Conduct of Senate subcommittee inves-
tigator in forcing husband of owner of cer-
tain personal papers seized by Subcommit-
tee to read through each and every 
document page-by-page as investigator 
watched, thereby compelling husband to 
discover intimate details of owner-wife's 
premarital relationships, was actionable un-
der Kentucky law, whether construed as an 
invasion of each spouse's seclusion or, in 
wife's case, as publication of embarrassing 
private facts. 
11. Torts <3=>27 
Evidence was such that reasonable jury 
couid find Senate subcommittee investiga-
tor liable for invasion of privacy in connec-
tion with his conduct in forcing husband of 
owner private papers appropriated by sub-
committee to go through documents individ-
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Alan McSURELY and 
Margaret McSurely 
v. 
John K. McCLELLAN, et al., 
Appellants, 
Thomas Ratliff, Individually and as 
sometime Commonwealth Attorney 
For Pike County Kentucky. 
No. 83-1444. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
District of Columbia Circuit. 
Argued May 9, 1984. 
Decided Jan. 18, 1985. 
Husband and wife brought action 
against state prosecutor, United States sen-
ator, former general counsel of senate sub-
committee, and former subcommittee inves-
tigator, alleging violations of constitutional 
rights arising from seizure of private docu-
ments by Kentucky authorities in connec-
tion with sedition charges and their later 
use by the federal defendants in connection 
with a congressional investigation. All 
three federal defendants died while case 
was pending, and parties were substituted. 
Order staying all proceedings in suit until 
final disposition of a contempt prosecution 
initiated by Senate against plaintiffs was 
reversed and case was remanded, 426 F.2d 
664. Denial of motion of federal defend-
ants to dismiss for summary judgment was 
affirmed in part and reversed in part, 553 
F.2d 1277, on rehearing of 521 F.2d 1024. 
Denial of motion of state prosecutor for 
dismissal or for summary judgment was 
affirmed, 697 F.2d 309. On remand, the 
United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, William B. Bryant, J., 
entered judgment on jury verdicts in favor 
of plaintiffs. All four defendants appeal-
ed, but following a settlement agreement, 
state prosecutor's appeal was dismissed. 
The Court of Appeals held that: (1) party 
substitution was properly effected; (2) doc-
trine of qualified immunity required dis-
missal of plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment 
claims; (3) there was insufficient evidence 
to support jury verdicts against defendants 
on First Amendment claims; (4) there was 
sufficient evidence to support finding that 
senate investigator unlawfully interfered 
with plaintiffs' right to privacy, but there 
was insufficient evidence to connect gener-
al counsel and senator to investigator's 
conduct; and (5) no immunity doctrine 
barred verdict against investigator for in-
vasion of privacy. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
1. Federal Civil Procedure <s=*363 
Defendants' petition for certiorari 
which made reference to deaths of two of 
the defendants, but which did not identify 
any "representative" or "successor" plain-
tiffs could substitute did not start running 
of 90-day time period within which motion 
for substitution must be made, and thus 
motion for substitution which was filed 
within two weeks after defendants in-
formed plaintiffs of whereabouts of surviv-
ing widows was timely. Fed.Rules Civ. 
ProcRule 25(a)(1), 28 U.S.C.A. 
2. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>363 
Limitation period of 90 days within 
which one must file motion for substitution 
may be subject to extensions or exemptions 
when good cause is shown therefor and 
party opposing substitution has not been 
prejudiced by the delay. Fed.Rules Civ. 
ProcRule 25(a)(1), 28 U.S.C.A. 
3. Federal Civil Procedure e=>362 
Widows of deceased defendants were 
"proper parties" within meaning of rule 
providing that if a party dies and claim is 
not thereby extinguished, court may order 
substitution of proper parties, notwith-
standing that neither widow was ever des-
ignated "legal representative" of her hus-
band's estate, since they were distributees 
of the unprobated estates. Fed.Rules Civ. 
ProcRule 25(a)(1), 28 U.S.C.A. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
McSURELY v, 
Cite mi 753 F 
Opinion for the Court PER CURIAM. 
PER CURIAM: 
INTRODUCTION 
On the evening of August 11, 1967, local 
law enforcement officials of Pike County, 
Kentucky, entered Alan and Margaret 
McSurely's home and seized a huge quanti-
ty of books, papers, and other personal 
effects. The officials arrested the McSure-
lys and charged them with violation of 
Kentucky's anti-sedition statute. Thus be-
gan the McSurelys' seventeen-year odyssey 
through the courts. They have been in-
volved in four lawsuits here and in the 
Sixth Circuit, all of which arose from the 
events of August 11. This court alone has 
rendered five decisions involving the 
McSurelys and has issued nine separate 
opinions filling nearly one hundred and fif-
ty pages of the Federal Reporter. Today 
we seek to end another episode in the 
McSurelys' quest for judicial relief and 
compensation stemming from the events 
that began on that night seventeen years 
ago. 
At issue in this appeal are the McSure-
lys' claims for damages against three fed-
eral government officials—a Senator and 
two members of his staff—for alleged vio-
lations of certain of the McSurelys' consti-
tutional and common law rights. Those 
officials are Senator John McClellan, for-
mer chairman of the Permanent Subcom-
mittee on Investigations of the Senate 
Government Operations Committee (the 
Subcommittee), Jerome Adlerman, former 
general counsel of the Subcommittee, and 
John Brick, a former Subcommittee investi-
gator. (All three defendants died while 
this case was pending. 'Although parties 
were substituted when deaths occurred, for 
convenience we will refer to the three offi-
cials collectively as the Senate defendants 
and discuss them as if they were still the 
named defendants here.) The Senate de-
fendants became embroiled in this contro-
versy when John Brick went to Kentucky 
in October 1967 to inspect the material 
seized from the McSurelys' home. Without 
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the McSurelys' knowledge or consent, 
Brick looked through the material and took 
back to Washington copies of over two 
hundred items, including papers of a highly 
personal nature. 
The McSurelys also named Thomas Rat-
liff as a defendant in this suit Ratliff was 
the Kentucky official who gave Brick ac-
cess to the McSurelys' papers. Because of 
a recent settlement agreement between 
him and the McSurelys, however, Ratliff 
has been removed as a party defendant on 
appeal. 
The jury returned verdicts against each 
Senate defendant for violating the McSure-
lys' first and fourth amendment rights un-
der the United States Constitution and 
their right to privacy under the common 
law. The Senate defendants appeal from 
those verdicts. The allegedly unlawful 
conduct that underlay the verdicts against 
all three defendants was Brick's inspection 
and transportation of the documents back 
to Washington, and the manner in which he 
ultimately returned personal papers to the 
McSurelys. The McSurelys alleged that 
Senator McClellan and General Counsel 
Adlerman entered into a conspiracy with 
Brick to violate the McSurelys' rights and 
that, as coconspirators, they are liable for 
Brick's conduct. 
Although the McSurelys' factual allega-
tions are fairly straightforward, the legal 
issues surrounding their claims are ex-
tremely complex, as this opinion and prior 
decisions of this court indicate. For the 
reasons stated below, we affirm the verdict 
against the investigator, John Brick, for 
violation of the McSurelys' right to privacy 
under the common law. We reverse, how-
ever, all of the other verdicts. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
We have narrated the factual back-
ground of this case on numerous occasions. 
The appendix to this opinion sets forth a 
list and brief description of the federal 
court decisions that have affected the 
* While this opinion is per curiam, Judge Gins- and III, and Judge Mikva was primarily respon-
burg was primarily responsible for Parts I, II, sible for the remaining parts. 
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ually and in detail prior to their return, thus 
compelling him to discover intimate details 
of owner-wife's premarital relationships; 
moreover, jury could reasonably conclude 
that investigator's actions hanmed husband 
and wife seriously both as individuals and 
as a family unit, given subjective testimony 
about emotional injury and objective evi-
dence of subsequent divorce. 
12. Torts <s=»27 
Evidence in action seeking damages 
from Senator, general counsel of senate 
subcommittee, and subcommittee investiga-
tor in connection with their investigative 
use of private papers seized in state prose 
cution was insufficient to sustain finding 
that Senator and general counsel actually 
or impliedly ordered, directed, authorized 
or otherwise approved tortious manner in 
which investigator carried out assignment 
to return documents to their owners. 
13. United States e=>12 
"Absolute immunity" of the speech or 
debate clause cannot be used as a talisman 
to insulate all conduct of all legislative 
branch personnel at all times, and thus it 
only protects conduct necessary to perform 
duties within the sphere of legitimate legis-
lative activity. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 6, 
cl. 1. 
14. United States e=»12 
Employment of unlawful means to im-
plement an otherwise proper legislative ob-
jective is not "essential to legislating," and 
thus is not protected by the speech or de-
bate clause. U.S.C.A. Const. Art 1, § 6, cl. 
1. 
15. United States e»12 
Senate subcommittee investigator was 
not protected by the absolute iimnunity af-
forded by the speech or debate clause from 
common-law violation of privacy claim aris-
ing from his conduct in forcing husband of 
owner of private papers appropriated for 
investigative use to go through the docu-
ments individually and in detail, prior to 
returning papers, thus compelling husband 
to discover information about the premari-
tal relationships of owner-wife, since con-
verting what should have been a simple phy-
sical return of documents into a sadistic and 
voyeuristic exercise did not fall under man-
tle of necessary legislative conduct. U.S. 
C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 6, cl. 1. 
16. United States <s=>50 
Doctrine of qualified immunity did not 
provide any protection for Senate subcom-
mittee investigator with regard to his viola-
tion of common-law right to privacy arising 
from his conduct in forcing husband of own-
er of private papers appropriated for inves-
tigative use to go through the documents in-
dividually and in detail, prior to their return, 
thus compelling husband to discover infor-
mation about premarital relationships of 
owner-wife, since doctrine does not shelter 
from common-law tort liability behavior 
that plainly steps beyond even extreme 
edge of an official's authority. 
Appeal from the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia (Civil 
Action No. 516-39). 
Marc Johnston, Atty. U.S. Dept. of Jus-
tice, Washington, D.C., with whom J. Paul 
McGrath, Asst. Atty. Gen., U.S. Dept. of 
Justice, Joseph E. diGenova, U.S. Atty. and 
Barbara L. Herwig, Atty., U.S. Dept. of 
Justice, Washington, D.C., were on brief, 
for appellants. 
Morton Stavis, Hoboken, NJ., with 
whom Randolph M. Scott-McLaughlin, 
Charles N. Mason, Jr., Washington, D.C., 
was on brief, for appellees, Alan and Mar-
garet McSurely. 
Philip A. Lacovara, Thomas D. Goldberg 
and John D. Echeverria, Washington, D.C., 
were on brief, for appellee, Thomas Ratliff. 
Before MIKVA, GINSBURG and 
STARR, Circuit Judges. 
to organize young people 
violence and demonstrations/' Trial Tran-
script (Tr.) of Dec. 2, 1982, at 79, reprinted 
in J.A. 825, Lavern Duffy, a Subcommittee 
staff member, contacted Ratliff by tele-
phone on September 25. During that con-
versation, Duffy (who is not a party to this 
suit) set up an appointment to come to 
Kentucky to inspect the documents. The 
next day, Duffy wrote a memorandum to 
defendant Adlerman stating that Ratliff 
"would arrange to have the [ ] records 
turned over to the subcommittee upon re-
ceipt of a subpoena " Plaintiffs' Ex-
hibit No. 35, reprinted in J.A. 1843. 
On October 8, pursuant to directions 
from Adlerman, defendant Brick, a Sub-
committee investigator, went to Kentucky 
in place of Duffy. Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 
36, reprinted in J.A. 1844. Brick inspect-
ed the material being held in Ratliff s cus-
tody at the Pike County courthouse and 
took copies of 234 documents back to 
Washington with him. There is conflicting 
evidence in the record concerning how 
Brick ultimately came to possess those par-
ticular documents. The jury could have 
found either that he was given them by one 
of Ratliff s assistants or that he selected 
them himself while at the courthouse. 
Among the documents were numerous per-
sonal letters and notes, including a love 
letter from columnist Drew Pearson to 
Margaret McSurely that was addressed 
"Dearest Cucumber." 
Upon his return to Washington, Brick 
conferred with Adlerman and with Senator 
McClellan, then-chairman of the Subcom-
mittee. Brick showed McClellan only one 
of the documents—the "Dearest Cucum-
ber" letter. Both McClellan and Adlerman 
agreed to Brick's suggestion that Brick go 
back and inspect more of the seized materi-
al. On October 12-13, Brick inspected the 
material in Kentucky and took notes on 
what he found. He then returned to Wash-
ington and prepared subpoenas for Senator 
McClellan's signature. 
On October 18, Brick personally served 
congressional subpoenas on the McSurelys 
for numerous documents that had been 
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to engage in seized from their home in August Be-
cause the documents were not in the 
McSurelys' possession, Brick also served 
subpoenas on Ratliff and the U.S. Marshal. 
Upon service of the subpoenas, the 
McSurelys learned, for the first time, that 
the Subcommittee was interested in their 
material. They immediately filed a motion 
in the district court to prevent Ratliff and 
the U.S. Marshal from complying with the 
subpoenas. 
The McSurelys' effort to block Ratliff 
and the U.S. Marshal from complying with 
the subpoenas lasted several months and 
included two trips to the United States 
Supreme Court The history of that litiga-
tion is chronicled in more detail in the ap-
pendix. The three-judge court ordered 
Ratliff and the U.S. Marshal to comply 
with the subpoenas, but the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and 
ordered instead that the material be re-
turned to the McSurelys. McSurely v. 
Ratliff, 398 F.2d 817 (6th Cir.1968). The 
court held that the documents must be 
returned because the district court's right 
to retain the material had expired once the 
time for taking an appeal had elapsed. The 
court, however, declined to rule on the va-
lidity of the subpoenas. It reversed "with-
out prejudice to the right of the Senate 
Committee to proceed with the enforce-
ment of the subpoenas against Mr. and 
Mrs. McSurely." Id at 818. 
The documents were finally returned to 
the McSurelys on November 8, 1968, over 
three months after the Court of Appeals 
decision. Pursuant to a request by Adler-
man, Ratliff arranged to coordinate return 
of the documents with issuance of new 
subpoenas on the McSurelys. 
Alan McSurely testified as to the manner 
in which he ultimately received the docu-
ments: he stated that Brick handed the 234 
copies to him, one by one, and asked him to 
read through them to verify that the copies 
were, in fact, identical to the originals. 
This was the first time the McSurelys 
learned which documents had been in the 
Subcommittee's possession. Those docu-
ments included the "Dearest Cucumber" 
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McSurelys over the last seventeen years. 
We summarize that history only briefly 
here. 
In 1967, Alan and Margaret McSurely 
were field organizers in Pike County, Ken-
tucky, for a civil rights organization known 
as the Southern Conference Educational 
Fund, Inc. On August 11 of that year 
(unless otherwise stated, all dates refer to 
1967), county officials obtained an arrest 
warrant charging Alan McSurely with sedi-
tion against the state under Ky.Rev.Stat. 
§ 432.040. They also obtained a warrant 
to search the McSurelys' home for "sedi-
tious matter.'' Pursuant to that warrant, 
over a dozen men, many of them armed, 
came to the McSurelys* home and seized all 
of their papers, several hundred books, and 
some of their clothing. Both Alan and 
Margaret McSurely were arrested and 
charged with sedition. 
The Pike County prosecutor at the time, 
Thomas Ratliff, helped to organize the 
search and arrests. Ratliff had responsi-
bility for prosecuting the McSurelys under 
the sedition statute. His involvement in 
this case is chronicled in more detail in 
McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309 (D.C. 
Cir.1982). The day after the search, Ratliff 
stated publicly that he intended to make 
the McSurelys1 materials available to con-
gressional committees. 
Five days after their arrest, and while 
they were still in jail, the McSurelys filed 
suit in federal court to have the Kentucky 
statute declared unconstitutional and to en-
join the threatened prosecution. Because 
the suit sought to enjoin enforcement of a 
state statute, a three-judge district court 
was convened to consider the McSurelys* 
claims. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 
§ 1, 62 Stat. 968 (repealed 1976). At a 
hearing on September 1, the McSurelys* 
attorney asked the court, either to seal the 
seized material or to place it in the exclu-
sive custody of the U.S. Marshal. Plain-
tiffs' Exhibit No. 44, reprinted in Joint 
Appendix (J.A.) 1863. Following this re-
quest, the attorneys for both sides met 
with the judges in chambers. There was 
no record entry as to what took place in 
chambers, except as was indicated ten days 
later in a court order. In that order, the 
court stated, in relevant part, that "[t]he 
parties having agreed thereto . . . the mate-
rial, literature and all objects seized herein 
shall be kept in the custody of . . . Thomas 
B. Ratliff, and that same shall be made 
available to the United States Marshal 
. . . . " Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 7, reprinted 
in J.A. 1782-83. The court further ordered 
the U.S. Marshal and Ratliff to make an 
inventory of the material, and ordered Rat-
liff to return "such personal articles and 
property as he does not deem material to 
the investigation and prosecution herein." 
Id, at 1783. Ratliff prepared the invento-
ry, but never returned any of the property 
Three days later, on September 14, the 
three-judge court, one judge dissenting, is-
sued an order declaring the Kentucky sedi 
tion statute unconstitutional. The fina 
paragraph of that order directed Ratliff tc 
retain custody of the seized material pend 
ing appeal of the judgment. That para 
graph, referred to throughout these pro 
ceedings as the "safekeeping order," stat 
ed: 
It is further ordered that all books, pa 
pers, documents and other material nov 
in the custody of the Commonwealth At 
torney of Pike County, Ratliff, reflects 
by the Inventory filed in this action cor 
tinue to be held by him in safe keepinj 
until final disposition of this case by aj 
peal or otherwise. 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 9, reprinted in J.A 
1796. One month later, the court issued a 
opinion setting forth its rationale for d« 
daring the sedition statute unconstitutioi 
al. The opinion made no mention of th 
"safekeeping ordfer." McSurely v. Ratlij% 
282 F.Supp. 848 (E.D.Ky.1967). 
The Senate defendants first became ii 
volved with the McSurely material som< 
time in September, over a month after tt 
McSurelys' home was searched. The Sul 
committee was conducting a wide-rangir 
investigation into civil and criminal diso 
ders throughout the country. After beir 
notified by a Washington attorney th 
Ratliff had information regarding effor 
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The Senate defendants filed a motion for 
summary judgment claiming that the 
Speech or Debate Clause of the United 
States Constitution, art. I, § 6, cl. 1, im-
munized them from liability, but the dis-
trict court denied their motion. Following 
the Supreme Court's decision in Doe v. 
McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 93 S.Ct 2018, 36 
L.Ed.2d 912 (1973), the Senate defendants 
moved for reconsideration or certification 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) of the issue of 
legislative immunity. After the district 
court denied this motion, the Senate de-
fendants filed the second interlocutory ap-
peal in this case. The district court stayed 
all pretrial discovery pending resolution of 
those claims on appeal. 
A divided panel of this court agreed with 
the Senate defendants that the Speech or 
Debate Clause immunized them from liabil-
ity for most of the McSurelys' claims. 
McSurely v. McClellan, 521 F.2d 1024 
(D.C.Cir.1975). The full court vacated the 
panel decision and agreed to rehear the 
case en banc. The court's en banc decision 
established the framework for the subse-
quent trial against the Senate defendants 
and for the issues raised on this appeal. 
McSurely v. McClellan, 553 F.2d 1277 
(D.C.Cir.1976) (en banc) (McSurely II) 
B. The En Banc Opinions 
The ten judges sitting en banc in 
McSurely II agreed on several issues. The 
court unanimously agreed to dismiss four 
of the seven claims against the Senate de-
fendants. First, because there was no fac-
tual allegation in the amended complaint 
that the Senate defendants were involved 
in any way in the raid of the McSurelys' 
home, the court dismissed all claims based 
on the initial search and seizure in August 
1967. Id. at 1288, 1303 n. 2. Second, the 
full court also agreed that three claims 
were based on protected legislative conduct 
and, therefore, had to be dismissed. Those 
claims involved the inspection of the 234 
documents by the Subcommittee staff in 
Washington, the use of the documents as 
the basis for issuing the subpoenas, and 
the use of the documents to procure the 
contempt citations against the McSurelys. 
Id. at 1296-98, 1303 n. 2. 
The court, however, denied the Senate 
defendants' motion for summary judgment 
as to the remaining three claims. The 
court unanimously agreed that dissemina-
tion of the documents outside the Congress 
would not be protected by the doctrine of 
legislative immunity. Id. at 1285-86, 1303. 
The court was equally divided, however, 
over whether Brick's inspection of the 
seized material and transportation of the 
234 copies to Washington was protected 
activity. Because the judges split five-five 
over the availability of Speech or Debate 
immunity for Brick's conduct, the district 
court's denial of the defendants' summary 
judgment motion was given effect insofar 
as it pertained to the claims arising from 
Brick's inspection and transportation of the 
documents. 
With regard to those claims, all ten 
judges agreed that immunity is not avail-
able under the Speech or Debate Clause 
when illegal means are used to achieve an 
otherwise legitimate legislative purpose. 
Id. at 1287-88, 1303 n. 3. The issue that 
divided the court was whether, under any 
conceivable set of facts, the Subcommittee 
violated the McSurelys' fourth amendment 
rights. Specifically, the court was divided 
over the question of whether Brick's in-
spection and transportation of the docu-
ments constituted a violation of the fourth 
amendment, independent of the initial sei-
zure by Kentucky officials. 
C. Proceedings Subsequent to the En 
Banc Rulings 
Following issuance of the en banc opin-
ions, the defendants filed a petition for writ 
of certiorari which the Supreme Court 
granted. McClellan v. McSurely, 434 U.S. 
888, 98 S.Ct. 260, 54 L.Ed.2d 173 (1977). 
Following briefing and oral argument, how-
ever, the writ was dismissed. McAdams v. 
McSurely, 438 U.S. 189, 98 S.Ct. 3116, 57 
L.Ed.2d 704 (1978). 
On remand a question arose concerning 
substitution of parties for Brick and Adler-
man. Both men had died while the Speech 
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letter and Margaret McSurely's personal 
diary, neither of which Alan McSurely had 
seen before. The papers revealed the de-
tails of a love affair between Drew Pearson 
and Margaret McSurely several years earli-
er, before the McSurelys had met. Alan 
McSurely learned of that affair for the 
first time when he read the documents 
handed to him by Brick. Alan McSurely 
testified: "Brick got, he kept pushing me 
to keep on reading this stuff. He would 
give me these letters and say, 'Make sure 
they are the same now, read them all the 
way through/ " Tr. of Nov. 23, 1982, at 
107, reprinted in J.A. 612. 
Once the documents had been returned 
to the McSurelys, Brick had new subpoenas 
served on them. That night, after prepar-
ing their own inventory of the 234 docu-
ments, the McSurelys destroyed the docu-
ments without notifying the Subcommittee. 
After the McSurelys appeared before the 
Subcommittee on March 4, 1969, and refus-
ed to produce the subpoenaed documents, 
the full Senate approved a resolution au-
thorizing the Justice Department to prose-
cute the McSurelys for contempt of Con-
gress. S.Res. 191, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1969). 
Jury verdicts were returned against the 
McSurelys on the contempt charges, but 
this court reversed those convictions. 
United States v. McSurely, 473 F.2d 1178 
(D.C.Cir.1972). A majority of the panel 
held that the exclusionary rule barred ad-
mission of the subpoenas at trial because 
they were based on information derived 
from an unconstitutional search and sei-
zure by the Kentucky officials and by 
Brick. Id. at 1194. Judge Wilkey con-
curred in the result, but disagreed with the 
majority's reliance upon the exclusionary 
rule and its fourth amendment analysis. 
He would have reversed the convictions on 
the ground that the government had failed 
"to establish one of the necessary elements 
of its case: pertinency of its demands to 
the valid subject of the legislative inquiry." 
Id. at 1203. 
THE SUIT FOR DAMAGES 
A. The Initial Proceedings 
The initial complaint in this action was 
filed on March 4, 1969, the same day the 
McSurelys appeared before the Subcommit-
tee. The suit was initially brought by the 
McSurelys and four organizations against 
all members of the Subcommittee, the Sub-
committee^ chief counsel, and the Subcom-
mittee's general counsel. The complaint 
was based on various first and fourth 
amendment claims. The plaintiffs sought a 
declaration that the McSurelys did not have 
to comply with the subpoenas, an injunc-
tion to restrain the institution of any crimi-
nal proceedings against the McSurelys for 
failing to comply with the subpoenas, and 
damages. The district court stayed all pro-
ceedings in the suit until thirty days after 
final resolution of the criminal case against 
the McSurelys. In the first of three inter-
locutory appeals in this case, we reversed 
that order as overbroad and remanded for 
further proceedings McSurely v. McClel-
lan, 426 F.2d 664 (D.C.Cir.1970) (McSurely 
/ ) . 
The district court granted the McSurelys 
leave to file an amended and supplemental 
complaint in 1971. See R. 33, reprinted in 
J.A. 143. In the amended complaint, the 
four organizations were dropped as plain-
tiffs and all Subcommittee members, ex-
cept for McClellan, were dropped as de-
fendants. The amended complaint added 
Ratliff and Brick as defendants who, along 
with Adlerman, McClellan and Donald 
O'Donnell, chief counsel of the Subcommit-
tee, were sued individually and in their 
official capacities. The McSurelys dropped 
their claims for injunctive and declaratory 
relief but retained their claims for dam-
ages. They sought compensatory and pu-
nitive damages against each defendant for 
violation of their constitutional rights un-
der the first, fourth, fifth, and fourteenth 
amendments. The theory of the case was 
that the unlawful actions of the defend-
ants, both individually and collectively, re-
sulted in the McSurelys* loss of employ-
ment, invasion of privacy, and humiliation 
and embarrassment. 
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U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 
(1982), requires dismissal of the McSurelys' 
fourth amendment claims. In Part III, we 
hold that there is insufficient evidence—ad-
missible within the limitations imposed by 
the Speech or Debate Clause—to support 
the jury verdicts against the Senate defend-
ants on the first amendment claims. In 
Part IV, we hold that there was sufficient 
evidence to support a finding that Bnck 
unlawfully interfered with Alan McSurely's 
and Margaret McSurely's right to privacy 
under established common law precedents, 
but that there was insufficient-evidence to 
connect Adlerman and McClellan to Brick's 
conduct. We also conclude that no immuni-
ty doctrine bars the verdict against Brick. 
PART I: Substitution of Parties 
The Senate defendants preliminarily con-
tend that the district court should have 
dismissed the McSurelys' claims against 
Brick and Adlerman "because plaintiffs did 
not seasonably effect substitutions of 
'proper parties' after Brick's and Adler-
man's deaths," as required by FED.R.CIVP. 
25(a)(1).1 Brief for the Senate Appellants 
at 65 (section heading).2 The district court, 
relying on our decision in Rende v. Kay, 
415 F.2d 983 (D.C.Cir.1969), granted the 
McSurelys' motion to substitute parties and 
rejected the Senate defendants' request to 
dismiss plaintiffs' claims for failure to com-
ply with Rule 25(a)(1). McSurely v. Mc-
Adams, No. 516-69 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 1979) 
("Memorandum and Order"), reprinted in 
J.A. 209. We affirm this aspect of the 
district court's decision. 
Defendant Brick died on October 15, 
1973; defendant Adlerman, on October 1, 
1. The text of Rule 25(a)(1) is set out infra p. 
97. 
2. Senator McClellan also died during the pend-
ency of this case. His death occurred after the 
Senate defendants filed their certiorari petition, 
however, and they substituted a proper party in 
his place pursuant to Supreme Court rule. See 
Brief for the Senate Appellants at 65 n. 47. 
Thus, appellants' Rule 25(a)(1) contention per-
tains only to Brick and Adlerman. We note that 
Rule 25(a)(1) permits the successors or repre-
sentatives of any deceased party to effect substi-
tution without awaiting a motion by the adverse 
Part}. 
1975. Each had named his surviving 
spouse executor of his estate and provided 
for her to receive all his assets. The Brick 
and Adlerman wills were not probated, 
however. Therefore, neither widow was 
ever designated "legal representative" of 
her husband's estate. See J.A. 207-08 (af-
fidavits of Mary Brick and Evelyn Adler-
man). 
Rule 25(aXD of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure governs substitution of parties 
on death; it reads: 
If a party dies and the claim is not there 
by extinguished, the court may order 
substitution of the proper parties. The 
motion for substitution may be made by 
any party or by the successors or repre-
sentatives of the deceased party and, to-
gether with the notice of hearing, shall 
be served on the parties as provided in 
Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in 
the manner provided in Rule 4 for the 
service of a summons, and may be served 
in any judicial district. Unless the mo-
tion for substitution is made not later 
than 90 days after the death is suggested 
upon the record by service of a state-
ment of the fact of the death as provided 
herein for the service of the motion, the 
action shall be dismissed as to the de-
ceased party. 
Appellants assert that the McSurelys did 
not satisfy Rule 25(a)(l)'s terms in two 
principal respects: they contend that the 
substitution motion was untimely and that 
the parties substituted—decedents' wid-
ows—were improper because they were not 
"legal representatives." Neither conten-
tion has merit.3 
3. Appellants conceded, in response to this 
court's December 4, 1974, inquiry, that the 
McSurelys' claim against Bnck (and presumably 
Adlerman as well) survived his death and was 
maintainable against representatives of his es-
tate. See McSurely 11 553 F.2d at 1280 n. 1. 
Appellants withdrew the concession on remand, 
but the district court rejected their survivability 
contention on the merits. See Memorandum 
and Order, reprinted in J.A. 209. On return to 
this court, appellants do not press the claim 
survival issue with any vigor, see Brief for the 
Senate Appellants at 65 & n. 46, and we find no 
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or Debate appeal was pending in this court 
See McSurely II, 553 F.2d at 1280 n. 1. In 
their petition for writ of certiorari, the de-
fendants noted that Brick and Adlerman 
had died and that their estates had not 
been probated, but that the assets of 
those estates had been distributed to their 
respective widows. The McSurelys subse-
quently filed a motion with the district 
court requesting that the widows be sub-
stituted as parties defendant in place of 
their late husbands. Over the govern-
ment's vigorous objections, the district 
court granted that motion. The govern-
ment here appeals from that order, claim-
ing that the widows are not proper parties 
to this suit and that, in any event, any 
claims that the McSurelys may have had 
against the widows have long since abated. 
(Adlerman's widow died while this case was 
pending and her estate was named as a 
party defendant in her place.) 
Following the Supreme Court's dismissal 
of the writ of certiorari, the McSurelys 
amended their complaint to include, inter 
alia, a claim for violation of their common 
law right of privacy and a request for 
reasonable attorneys' fees. R. 341, re-
printed in J.A. 311. At the close of dis-
covery, Ratliff moved for dismissal or, in 
the alternative, for summary judgment on 
grounds of absolute and qualified prosecu-
torial immunity. The district court denied 
his motions and, in the third interlocutory 
appeal taken in this case, we affirmed that 
denial. McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 
309 (D.C.Cir.1982) (per curiam) (McSurely 
III). 
The McSurelys' case finally went to trial 
in the fall of 1982 and lasted for two 
months. During the course of the trial, the 
district court entered directed verdicts elim-
inating the McSurelys' claim against 
O'Donnell and their claim regarding the 
defendants' alleged dissemination of docu-
ments outside the Subcommittee. The 
McSurelys have not appealed from those 
directed verdicts. 
The verdict forms submitted to the jury 
required separate findings of liability 
against Ratliff, McClellan, Adlerman, and 
Brick as to each plaintiff under three sepa-
rate theories: violation of the McSurelys' 
first amendment rights; violation of the 
McSurelys' fourth amendment rights; and 
violation of the McSurelys' common law 
right to privacy. The jury returned ver-
dicts and assessed damages in favor of the 
plaintiffs on each count, and awarded the 
McSurelys approximately $1.6 million in 
damages, most of it against Ratliff. The 
total damages assessed against the Senate 
defendants were approximately $200,000 
against McClellan, $84,000 against Adler-
man, and $105,000 against Brick. All four 
defendants appealed. Following the settle-
ment agreement, however, see supra p. 91, 
we dismissed Ratliff s appeal. 
D. Issues on Appeal 
Defendants have raised numerous issues 
on appeal. Those not discussed in this 
opinion have been considered by the court 
and rejected. We also have rejected the 
defendants' request to reconsider the legal 
issues resolved by the en banc court in 
1976. Although the opinions of an equally 
divided court may not be cited for prece-
dential value in this circuit, Judge Leven-
thal's opinion for the prevailing judges con-
stitutes law of the case. His opinion was 
considered to be the "majority" opinion for 
the court and, significantly, it established 
the framework for the conduct of the trial. 
We refuse to remand now on the basis of a 
new theory of Speech or Debate immunity 
or fourth .amendment law, for "[a]s mat-
ters wend closer to final disposition, stabili-
ty takes on increased importance." 18 C. 
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 4478, at 792 
(1981). 
Our opinion is divided into four parts. In 
Part I, we hold that party substitution was 
properly effected in this case. In the re-
maining sections, we deal with each of the 
substantive claims against the defendants. 
In Part II, we hold that, because the state 
of the law was unclear at the time in ques-
tion, the doctrine of qualified immunity 
enunciated in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 
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alize the Rule and to allow flexibility in Judge Leventhal's McSurely II opinion, 
substitution of parties"); Kilpo v. Bowman representing the views of five members of 
Transportation, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 26, 27 this court, declared that a congressional 
(N.D.Ga.1980) (same); National Equip- investigation utilizing means prohibited by 
ment Rental, Ltd. v. Whitecrafi Unlimit- the fourth amendment warrants no Speech 
ed, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 507, 509 (E.D.N.Y.1977) or Debate Clause protection. See 553 F.2d 
(same). Several courts, including our own, at 1287-88. In holding that the McSurelys' 
have stated that the distributee of a distrib- fourth amendment claims were subject to 
uted estate is a "proper party" for substi- further proceedings, Judge Leventhal stat-
tution under Rule 25(a)(1). See, e.g., Rende e d that the record afforded "more than 
v. Kay, 415 F.2d at 985; Ashley v. Illinois merely colorable substance" to the McSure-
Central Gulf Railroad Co., 98 F.R.D. 722, &' charge that Brick "did indeed violate 
724 (S.D.Miss.1983); cf. Kilgo v. Bowman t h e F o u r t h Amendment by his inspection 
Transportation, Inc., 87-F.R.D. 26, 27 and transportation back to Washington of 
(N.D.Ga.1980) (person named as executor documents that were under a court-im-
in plaintiffs will, but who does not become P°Sed 'safekeeping order.' " Id at 1289. 
executor because he elects statutory share Furthermore, Judge Leventhal said that 
rather than probating will, is a substitute ™e McSurelys had made a prima facie 
ble "proper party").8 Sensibly construing showing that Brick's investigative activity 
Rule 25(a)(1), we hold that Mary Brick and ™b*e& the three-judge court's safekeep-
Evelyn Adlerman were "proper parties" llig arder- /d a t 129L 
for the McSurelys to substitute. On the other hand, Judge Wilkey's opin-
PART II: Fourth Amendment Claims i o n ' presenting the views of five different 
members of the court, stated that Brick s 
[4] In 1976, in McSurely II, this court, actions "could never, on all logic and prece-
sitting en banc, divided evenly (five-five) on dent, be held an 'unreasonable search and 
the question whether, under any conceiva- secure' within the [meaning of the] Fourth 
ble set of facts, the Senate defendants Amendment." Id at 1305 <Wilkey, J., dis-
could be found to have violated the senting). Judge Wilkey preliminarily at-
McSurelys' fourth amendment rights. The tempted, in great detail, to demonstrate 
even division resulted in a remand for trial, that Brick's conduct did not violate the 
The trial of the fourth amendment claims three-judge court's safekeeping order. See 
yielded jury verdicts in favor of the id. at 1310-15. But even a violation of the 
McSurelys against all three Senate defend- safekeeping order, in Judge Wilkey's view, 
ants.7 Guided by the Supreme Court's at most would have rendered Brick subject 
1982 restatement of the qualified immunity to a contempt of court citation; under 
defense sheltering government officials Judge Wilkey's analysis, the asserted viola-
from civil liability, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, tion would not have exposed Brick to liabili-
457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 ty in damages for a fourth amendment 
(1982), we overturn those verdicts and di- violation. Id. at 1311 n. 41. Judge Wilkey 
rect dismissal of the claims. questioned most insistently "how the in-
6. Appellants cite Mallonee v. Fahey, 200 F.2d 
918, 919 (9th Cir.1952) (Douglas, Circuit Justice) 
as support for their claim that a "proper party" 
under Rule 25(a)(1) must be a decedent's "legal 
representative." Brief for the Senate Appellants 
at 67. That decision, however, held only that 
Rule 25(a)(1) requires substitution of a "legal 
representative" as opposed to a mere 
"successor!] in office" 200 F.2d at 919 (empha-
sis added); the court was not attempting any 
distinction between legal representatives and 
distributees of unprobated estates. 
7. Recovery from the Senate defendants on 
fourth amendment grounds was premised on 
the charge that Brick violated the three-judge 
court's safekeeping order by inspecting, select-
ing, and retrieving 234 xerox copies of docu-
ments seized in the August 11, 1967, raid of the 
McSurely home and held by Ratliff. 
The jury awards against all defendants for 
fourth amendment violations were as follows: 
Ratliff McClellan Adlerman Brick 
Alan McSurclv $61,720 $39,280 $19,846 $23,320 
Margaret McSurely $51,280 $53,360 $14,000 $18,800 
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We turn first to the timeliness question. 
The deaths of Brick and Adlerman were 
noted for the first time in litigation papers 
submitted in this case in the McSurely II 
petition for certiorari, filed May 20, 1977. 
The reference to the deaths made in the 
certiorari petition, however, did not identify 
the decedents' "successors" or "representa-
tives." By letter dated July 29, 1977, the 
McSurelys asked the Department of Justice 
for the surviving widows' "whereabouts". 
See Letter from Morton Stavis to Daniel M. 
Friedman, Acting Solicitor General (July 
29, 1977), reprinted in J.A. 194. On Au-
gust 17, 1977, after the plaintiffs moved 
for an order directing disclosure, appellants 
supplied the requested information. See 
J.A. 191-200. Within two weeks there-
after, the McSurelys moved, successfully, 
to substitute widows Mary Brick and Eve-
lyn Adlerman as parties defendant. See 
Motion for Substitution (Aug. 30, 1977), 
reprinted in J.A. 201.4 
[1,2] Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983 (D.C. 
Cir.1969), as the district court recognized, 
instructs that a suggestion of death does 
not set in motion Rule 25(aXl),s ninety-day 
limitation unless the suggestion "iden-
tifies] the representative or successor . . . 
who may be substituted as a party." 415 
F.2d at 986. It would hardly be consistent 
with "the just, speedy, and inexpensive de-
termination" of civil actions, FED.R.CIV.P. 1, 
Rende v. Kay makes plain, "to place upon 
the plaintiff the burden of locating the 
representative of the estate within 90 
days." 415 F.2d at 986; accord Al-Jundi 
v. Rockefeller, 88 F.R.D. 244, 247 (W.D.N. 
Y.1980). Appellants' argument that the 
May 20, 1977, petition for certiorari, al-
though it did not identify any "representa-
tive" or "successor" plaintiffs could substi-
tute, nonetheless started the running of 
warrant for disturbing the district court's dispo-
sition of it. 
4. Evelyn Alderman died on June 22, 1980. The 
district court thereafter substituted representa-
tives of her estate as parties defendant. See 
McSurely v. McAdams, No. 78-1916 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 8, 1980) (Memorandum and Order grant-
ing motion for substitution), reprinted in J.A. 
216. 
Rule 25(aXl)'s ninety-day time period, is 
impossible to reconcile with Rende i\ Kay. 
We follow that pathmarking precedent, and 
accordingly hold that no time ran against 
the McSurelys under Rule 25(a)(1) before 
August 17; their August 30 motion, there 
fore, was well within the Rule's time 
frame.5 
[3] Nor is there greater weight in ap-
pellants' alternative objection, their claim 
that the widows of Brick and Adlerman 
could not be "proper parties" within the 
meaning of Rule 25(a)(1) because no court 
with "jurisdiction over the decedent's es-
tate" had ever named them the deceased 
party's "legal representative." Brief for 
the Senate Appellants at 67. This argu-
ment too is incompatible with our Rende v. 
Kay decision. In essence, appellants say 
that no "proper party" could exist to be 
substituted for Brick and Adlerman unless 
the McSurelys themselves assumed the 
burden of qualifying such a party. Id. at 
68. This the McSurelys could have done, 
appellants maintain, by "securfing] the ap-
pointment of representatives ad litem for 
the estates of Brick and Adlerman." Id. at 
69. But in Rende v. Kay, we stated that 
compelling a plaintiff to "institute] ma-
chinery in order to produce some represent-
ative of the estate ad litem" would contra-
vene the purpose of amended Rule 25(a)(1) 
"to dispel unwarranted rigidity and allow 
more flexibility in substitution." 415 F.2d 
at 986. 
Appellants, in short, urge an inequitable 
application of Rule 25(a)(1) that finds no 
support in the rulemakers' design. See, 
e.g., Boggs v. Dravo Corp., 532 F.2d 897, 
900 (3d Cir.1976) (purpose of the 1963 
amendments to Rule 25(a)(1) was "to liber-
5. The 90-day limitation, we note, may be subject 
to extensions or exemptions when good cause is 
shown therefor and the party opposing substitu-
tion has not been prejudiced by the delay. See, 
e.g.. Staggers v. Otto Gerdau Co., 359 F.2d 292, 
296 (2d Cir.1966); AUJundi v. Rockefeller, 88 
F.R.D. 244, 247 (W.D.N.Y.1980); Yonofsky v. 
Wernick, 362 F.Supp. 1005, 1014-15 (S.D.N.Y. 
1973). 
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The McSurelys first emphasize the depo-
sition testimony of Judge Moynahan (one 
of the members of the three-judge court 
convened to consider the McSurelys' consti-
tutional attack upon Kentucky's sedition 
statute). They claim the judge's testimony 
renders "very doubtful" "Ratliffs version" 
of events "upon which the dissenters re 
lied," id.; according to that version, Ratliff 
contacted Judge Moynahan before afford-
ing Brick access to the documents, and the 
judge gave Ratliff permission to make the 
papers available to Brick. But Judge Wil-
key twice stated that his interpretation of 
the safekeeping order did not depend upon 
the Moynahan-Ratliff interchange. See 
553 F.2d at 1308 n. 27, 1312. We note, 
furthermore, that Judge Moynahan's trial 
testimony did not contradict Ratliffs view 
of the timing sf their conversation. See 
Tr. of Dec. 10, 1982, at 141, reprinted in 
J.A. 1099. 
The McSurelys next contend that the en 
banc dissenters would have altered their 
construction of the September 14 safekeep-
ing order in light of Judge Combs' trial 
testimony. Judge Combs (another member 
of the three-judge court), the McSurelys 
insist, refused to express an opinion as to 
whether the safekeeping order required 
Ratliff at least to notify the McSurelys 
before permitting third party access to 
their papers. See Brief for Appellees at 87 
(referring to Tr. of Dec. 10, 1982, at 104, 
reprinted in J.A. 1087). Judge Combs' 
hesitancy in this regard is significant, the 
McSurelys suggest, because it undercuts 
Judge Wilkey's reliance on the three-judge 
court's October 30 and December 13, 1967, 
rulings that the safekeeping order did not 
inhibit Senate Subcommittee access to the 
McSurely materials.10 
A complete reading of Judge Combs' tes-
timony, however, reinforces the McSurely 
II dissenters' view that the safekeeping 
principally relating to the meaning of the three-
judge court's safekeeping order, would affect 
the conclusions of Judge Wilkey and his col-
leagues, who contemplated no fourth amend-
ment transgression even if they could agree that 
there had been a violation of the three-judge 
court's command. See id. at 1311 n. 41. 
order permitted Brick's examination and 
copying of the McSurely documents. 
Judge Combs repeatedly stated at trial his 
view that "the [safekeeping] order would 
permit and did permit the Commonwealth's 
Attorney to permit an authorized agent of 
the Sentate [sic] Subcommittee to look at 
these documents, and to make copies of 
them." Tr. of Dec. 10, 1982, at 102, re-
printed in J.A. 1085; accord id. at 49, 
51-52, 55-56, 85, partially reprinted in 
J.A. 1065, 1067-68, 1071-72. He said spe-
cifically that he would have ruled Ratliff in 
contempt had any violation of the safekeep-
ing order occurred. Id. at 107, reprinted 
in J.A. 1089. Judge Moynahan's testimony 
further confirmed the McSurely II dissen-
ters' interpretation of the three-judge 
court's order. See id. at 139-40, 171, re-
printed in J.A. 1097-98, 1111. Indeed, he 
stated unequivocally that, as he read the 
safekeeping order, it did not entitle the 
McSurelys even to notice prior to third 
party inspection of the documents in Rat-
liffs possession. See id. at 174-76, re-
printed in J.A. 1114-16. 
The McSurelys also contend that "the 
dissenters [did not] have the benefit of the 
September 1, 1967 transcript . . . explaining 
the origin of the orders of September 11 
and 14, 1967." Brief for Appellees at 88. 
Since they stipulated to the September 11 
order only after expressing concern about 
widespread distribution of their personal 
papers, the McSurelys argue, "it could 
hardly be presumed that [they] were agree-
ing to an order which authorized exactly 
what they were seeking to prevent." Id. at 
50 (emphasis in original). This is uncon-
vincing argument. 
The McSurelys plainly requested a seal-
ing order at the September 1 hearing, see 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 44, at 87, reprinted 
in J.A. 1863; they did not receive one. The 
three-judge court knew the difference be-
10. The McSurelys sought at trial to establish a 
difference between subpoenaed access, chal-
lengeable in court, and informal, ex parte ac-
cess, unchallengeable because unknowable. See 
Tr. of Jan. 3, 1983, at 39-42 (closing argument). 
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spection by one authorized government 
agent of documents in the custody of an-
other can be characterized as an unconsti-
tutional search/' Id. at 1318-19; accord 
id. at 1316-17, 1321-24. 
Six years after our McSurely II en banc 
opinions, the Supreme Court, restated the 
standard governing public officials' quali-
fied "good faith" immunity from civil dam-
ages actions: 
[Government officials performing discre-
tionary functions generally are shielded 
from liability for civil damages insofar as 
their conduct does not violate clearly es-
tablished statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known. 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 
S.Ct. at 2738 (citations omitted); see also 
Davis v. Scherer, — U.S. , 104 S.Ct. 
3012, 3018, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984). By bar-
ring claims that do not involve "clearly 
established" statutory or constitutional 
rights, even if the defendant official acted 
with malice, see 457 U.S. at 817-18, 102 
S.Ct. at 2738, Harlow substantially broad-
ened the qualified immunity defense. 
It is irrelevant at this juncture that 
Judge Leventhal's opinion for five mem-
bers of the court in McSurely II qualifies 
as law of the case (albeit not law of the 
circuit) on whether the Senate defendants 
independently violated the McSurelys' 
fourth amendment rights. The inquiry 
Harlow makes critical is whether in 1967, 
at the time Brick inspected the documents 
and transported them to Washington, D.C., 
one could fairly describe that conduct as 
trespassing on a "clearly established" con-
8. Our recent decision in Zweibon v. Mitchell 
720 F.2d 162 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert, denied, — 
U.S. , 105 S.Ct. 244, 83 L.Ed.2d 182 (1984), 
reinforces the Senate defendants' claim to quali-
fied immunity. In Zweibon, this court, after 
several preliminary rounds, affirmed the dis-
missal, on qualified immunity grounds, of a 
civil action for damages against a former Attor-
ney General alleging electronic surveillance 
conducted in violation of the fourth amend-
ment. Our initial foray into the case produced 
six separate opinions, all finding the Attorney 
General's actions illegal, but disagreeing on the 
rationale. Our latest Zweibon decision ruled 
the former Attorney General entitled to summa-
ry judgment on the issue of qualified immunity. 
stitutional right. The answer must be 
"No" when, nine years later, in 1976, five 
members of this court thought it manifest 
that the Senate defendants' investigative 
activity remained wholly within the law. 
It would be flatly inconsistent with Har-
low to strip away the Senate defendants' 
immunity in this case simply because 
"[they were] not more perceptive of consti-
tutional principles . . . than [five] federal 
judges of this Circuit.,, Ward v. Johnson, 
690 F.2d 1098, 1112 (4th Cir.1982) (en banc). 
Public officials, Harlow and Davis under-
line, "must not be held to act at [their] 
peril" when maneuvering in legal realms 
governed by rules "that even learned and 
experienced jurists have had difficulty in 
defining." Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1348 (2d Cir. 
1972) (on remand); accord id. at 1349 
(Lumbard, J., concurring) ("[F]ederal offi-
cers cannot be expected to predict what 
federal judges frequently have considera-
ble difficulty in deciding and about which 
they frequently differ among them-
selves.").8 
In a desperate effort to preserve their 
fourth amendment jury verdicts, the 
McSurelys identify purportedly "serious 
differences between the record now and 
that available at the time of the 1976 deci-
sion," Brief for Appellees at 87 (emphasis 
added); they suggest that Judge Wilkey 
and his colleagues, if confronted with the 
trial record, would not have rejected the 
fourth amendment claims. The suggestion 
does not withstand close inspection.9 
Central to that holding was the confusion evi-
dent in the en banc decision—confusion indicat-
ing "that the Court [had not been] confronted 
with a simple issue automatically controlled by 
earlier decisions." Id. at 169 (quoting appellee 
Mitchell's brief). 
9. We note that the McSurelys fail, initially, to 
explain how additional factual evidence ad-
duced at trial could alter Judge Wilkey's conclu-
sion "as a matter of law that [Brick's] inspection 
and copying [of the McSurelys' documents] did 
not violate the custody order." 553 F.2d at 1304 
(emphasis added). Nor do appellees demon-
strate how their latest additions to the record, 
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show that Senator McClelland interest in investigation of 
investigating the McSurelys related to a 
private feud McClellan had with newspa-
per columnist Drew Pearson; the McSure-
lys produced no evidence suggesting that 
the real purpose of the Subcommittee in-
vestigation was curtailment of their politi-
cal activities. 
Plaintiffs introduced considerable evi-
dence indicating that Commonwealth Attor-
ney Ratliff s August 11, 1967, arrest of the 
McSurelys, his search of their home, his 
seizure of their books and papers, and his 
attempt to prosecute them under Ken-
tucky's sedition statute, stemmed from 
Ratliff s opposition to the McSurelys* politi-
cal activities and his wish to drive them out 
of Pikeville. See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
No. 26 at 2-3, reprinted in J.A. 2081-82; 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 56 at 3, reprinted in 
J.A. 2090; Tr. of Nov. 23, 1982, at 161, 
reprinted in J.A. 547; Tr. of Nov. 30,1982, 
at 80-81, reprinted in J.A. at 741-42; Tr. 
of Dec. 6, 1982, at 98, reprinted in J.A. 
974; cf McSurely v. Ratliff 282 F.Supp. 
848, 852 (E.D.Ky.1967) (three-judge court) 
("[TJhe conclusion is inescapable that the 
criminal prosecutions were instituted, at 
least in part, in order to stop plaintiffs' 
organizing activities in Pike County."). 
The McSurelys have not, however, alleged 
any involvement by the Senate defendants 
in the August 11, 1967, ransacking of the 
McSurely home or in Ratliff s subsequent 
attempt to prosecute plaintiffs. See 
McSurely II, 553 F.2d at 1299; Tr. of Jan. 
5, 1983, at 38-39, reprinted in J.A. 1702-
03 (jury instructions); id. at 105, reprinted 
in J.A. 1744 (same); Tr. of Jan. 6, 1983, at 
10-11, reprinted in J.A. 1747-48 (same). 
Thus, evidence suggesting that Ratliff vio-
lated the McSurelys' first amendment 
rights provides no support for the jury's 
first amendment verdicts against the Sen-
ate defendants. 
Plaintiffs did seek to demonstrate at trial 
an improper motive for the Subcommittee's 
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the McSurelys. The 
McSurelys presented evidence of a long 
time feud between Senator McClellan and 
newspaper columnist Drew Pearson. See 
Tr. of Dec. 3, 1982, at 37-62, partially 
reprinted in J.A. 910-33 (Margaret 
McSurely's testimony and court-counsel 
colloquy); id. at 119-20 (Margaret McSure-
ly's testimony); Tr. of Dec. 6, 1982, at 
27-29, reprinted in J.A. 968-70 (Jack An-
derson's testimony); see also Plaintiffs' Re-
sponse to Senate Defendants' Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict at 
32-33 (Feb. 8, 1983). Senator McClellan's 
principal objective in investigating the 
McSurelys, plaintiffs contended at trial, 
was to discover intimate correspondence 
between Drew Pearson and Margaret 
McSurely which could be used to embar-
rass, indeed to blackmail, Pearson. See, 
e.g.f Tr. of Jan. 3, 1983, at 48-50 (closing 
argument); see also Amended and Supple-
mental Complaint at 12 (No. 28(bXii)), re-
printed in J.A. 154.14 
We need not determine whether plain-
tiffs presented sufficient evidence to sub-
stantiate their blackmail contention or 
whether the Speech or Debate Clause per-
mits this sort of motive-based inquiry.15 It 
suffices for the purpose at hand to point 
out that the McSurelys' proof concerning 
an illicit investigatory motive on Senator 
McClellan's part—his alleged wish to em-
barrass or blackmail Drew Pearson—is ir-
relevant to the plaintiffs' charge, as ten-
dered in their complaint, of first amend-
ment violations by the Senate defendants. 
The McSurelys' complaint-tendered first 
amendment claims against the Senate de-
fendants, we repeat, rested on allegations 
that the Subcommittee's purpose in investi-
gating plaintiffs was to harass and stigma-
tize them to deter their political activities. 
The evidence of Senate defendant motiva-
tion presented by the McSurelys at trial, 
however, was unrelated to that charge. 
Cf United States v. Ross, 719 F.2d 615, 
14. On the Drew Pearson-Margaret McSurely re-
lationship, see, e.g., Tr. of Dec. 2, 1982, at 143-
46, 150-52, reprinted in J.A. 846-49, 853-55 
(Margaret McSurely's testimony). 
15. For discussion of the limitations the Speech 
or Debate Clause places on a first amendment 
motive-based inquiry, see infra p. 106. 
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tween a sealing and a safekeeping order. 
See Tr. of Dec. 10, 1982, at 47, 50-51, 55, 
reprinted in J.A, 1063, 1066-67, 1071 
(Judge Combs' testimony); id. at 140, 171, 
reprinted in J.A. 1098, 1111 (Judge Moy-
nahan's testimony). The September 11 or-
der agreed to by all parties gave the 
McSurelys less protection than they de-
sired, but more than they would have had 
without any order in place. Litigants not 
uncommonly settle for something in be-
tween where they are and where they 
would like to be.11 
In sum, we hold only that public officials 
performing discretionary functions need 
not be "more perceptive of constitutional 
principles" than half the judges of this 
circuit The Senate defendants did not vio-
late any "clearly established" fourth 
amendment rights and thus are immune 
from civil liability for their investigative 
activity. We reverse the district court's 
judgment against the Senate defendants on 
the fourth amendment claims, and order 
those aspects of the McSurelys' complaint 
dismissed. 
PART III: First Amendment Claims 
[5] The McSurelys' first amendment 
claims against the Senate defendants, as 
stated in the complaint, rested on allega-
tions that these defendants "[u]se[d] the 
instrumentality of the Subcommittee inves-
tigation" "to harass, intimidate and stigma-
tize the plaintiffs in order to prevent plain-
tiffs from continuing their political, poverty 
and civil rights activity in Eastern Ken-
tucky." Amended and Supplemental Com-
plaint at 6 (Nos. 18(a), (c)) (Sept. 7, 1971), 
11. We find insignificant the other allegedly "se-
rious differences" between the post-trial and 
1976 records highlighted by the McSurleys. For 
example, the McSurelys point to trial testimony 
contradicting Judge Wilke/s statement that 
Brick "played no part" in the selection of docu-
ments he transported from Pikeville to Wash-
ington, D.C. See Brief for Appellees at 88 (quot-
ing 553 F.2d at 1328). Judge Wilkey, however, 
mentioned Brick's role as document selector 
only in his discussion of plaintiffs' privacy 
claim. See 553 F.2d at 1326 (section introduc-
tion). 
12. Recovery from Ratliff on first amendment 
grounds was premised on the charge that he 
"acted for the unlawful purpose of disrupting 
reprinted in J.A. 148; accord id. at 11 
(No. 28(bXi)), reprinted in J.A. 153; Com-
plaint at 12-13 (So. 34), 13-14 (No. 35), 17 
(No. 37(i)) (Mar. 4, 1969), reprinted in J.A. 
6&-S7, 67-68, 71. The jury returned ver-
dicts for the McSurelys against both Rat-
liff and the Senate defendants on the first 
amendment claims.12 For two reasons, 
each independently sufficient, we overturn 
the verdicts against the Senate defendants 
and direct dismissal of the McSurelys' first 
amendment claims against them. First, re-
view of the record reveals that the McSure-
lys failed to prove the first amendment 
contentions their complaint put forward re-
garding the Senate defendants. Second, 
even if the evidence had borne out those 
contentions, the Speech or Debate Clause 15 
would preclude recovery. 
Plaintiffs' original and amended com-
plaints plainly charge the Senate defend-
ants with conduct outlawed by the first 
amendment. See, e.g., Hobson v. Wilson, 
737 F.2d 1, 27 (D.C.Cir.1984) ("[I]t is never 
permissible [under the first amendment for 
Government] to impede or deter lawful civil 
rights/political organization, expression or 
protest with no other direct purpose and no 
other immediate objective than to counter 
the influence of the target associations.") 
(emphasis in original);^  id. at 29. Plaintiffs' 
proof at trial, however, did not bear out the 
McSurelys' allegations that the Senate de-
fendants acted, as the McSurelys claimed 
Ratliff did, to chill plaintiffs' expression, 
organizational endeavors, or associations. 
Instead, the evidence plaintiffs introduced 
concerning the Senate defendants tended to 
and intimidating [plaintiffs] in the exercise of 
their freedom of speech and association when 
he allegedly planned and arranged for an un-
lawful search of their home, and the arrest of 
their person.** Tr. of Jan. 5, 1983, at 35, reprint-
ed in J A. 1699 (jury instructions). 
The jury awards for first amendment viola-
tions were as. follows: 
Ratliff McClellan Adlerman Brick 
Alan McSurely $61,720 $39,280 $19,846 $23,320 
Margaret McSurely $51,280 $53360 $14,000 $18,800 
13. The text of the Speech or Debate Clause is set 
out infra note 16. 
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11, 1967, do constitute violations of their 
rights under the amendment 
Tr. of Jan. 6, 1983, at 11, reprinted in J.A. 
1748 (emphasis added). The Senate defend-
ants objected to this ambiguous instruction. 
Id. at 12-14, partially reprinted in J.A. 
2069. On two prior occasions the court had 
delivered the identical instruction; at those 
times, it expressly referred to the "fourth" 
amendment. See Tr. of Jan. 5, 1983, at 39, 
105-06, reprinted in J.A. 1703, 1744-45. 
Acknowledging that plaintiffs* first amend-
ment claim against the Senate defendants 
was less *'clearly delineated* - than their 
fourth amendment theory, the district 
judge nonetheless determined that the jury 
should consider the first amendment theory 
of liability. Tr. of Jan. 6, 1983, at 19, 
reprinted in J.A. 2074. 
We do not cite the confusing instructions 
and counsel-court colloquies relating to the 
first amendment as indicators of the Senate 
defendants' entitlement to a new trial. 
Rather, we point them out as illustrative of 
the fog generated at trial concerning the 
nature of plaintiffs* first amendment case 
against the Senate defendants. The root 
problem, more readily perceived with the 
entire record at hand for close review, is 
that plaintiffs set out on one track, then 
switched to another. With the first amend-
ment in mind, they asserted in their plead-
ings that the Senate defendants sought to 
silence their political expression. When tri-
al time came, they attempted to prove 
something else—Senator McClelland inter-
est in pursuing a private feud with a news-
paper columnist. The proof adduced, how-
ever, was unrelated to the first amendment 
theory of their pleading and did not sup-
port any recovery for the constitutional 
violations alleged in their complaint. 
16. The Clause provides: 
The Senators and Representatives shall . . . 
for any Speech or Debate in either House . . . 
not be questioned in any other Place. 
U.S.CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
17. The en banc court explained: 
The Senate Resolution of August 11, 1967 au-
thorized an investigation into the causes of 
civil and criminal disorder that were racking 
the nation during this period. And there was 
reason for investigative focus on the McSure-
[6,7] But even if plaintiffs had proved 
the first amendment claims their complaint 
stated against the Senate defendants, they 
could not have gained relief; the Speech or 
Debate Clausel6 would bar the way. That 
separation of powers safeguard "secure[s] 
against executive or judicial interference 
the processes of the nation's elected repre-
sentatives leading up to the formulation of 
legislative policy and the enactment of 
laws." Walker v. Jones, 733 F.2d 923, 928 
(D.C.Cir.1984) (citation omitted), cert de-
nied, — U.S. , 105 S.Ct 512, 83 
L.Ed.2d 402 (1984). The Clause, as inter-
preted in court decisions, extends absolute 
immunity to members of Congress for 
"voting, conduct at committee hearings, 
preparation of committee reports, authori-
zation of committee publications and their 
internal distribution, and issuance of sub-
poenas concerning a subject 'on which "leg-
islation could be had"/ " McSurely II, 553 
F.2d at 1284-85 (footnotes omitted) (quot-
ing Eastland v. United States Service-
men's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 506, 95 S.Ct. 
1813, 1823, 44 L.Ed.2d 324 (1975)). It is 
specifically the law of this case, established 
by our 1976 en banc decision, that Speech 
or Debate Clause immunity shelters "field 
investigations by a Senator or his staff/' 
McSurely II, 553 F.2d at 1286. 
Senator McClellan's Subcommittee un-
questionably had authority to investigate 
the causes of civil and criminal disorder 
throughout the country in general and the 
McSurelys' involvement in the 1967 Nash-
ville riots in particular. See id. at 1287; n 
cf Eastland, 421 U.S. at 506, 95 S.Ct. at 
1823 ("The propriety of making [plaintiff) a 
subject of the investigation . . . is a subject 
lys. A riot had occurred on April 8-9, 1967, 
in Nashville, Tennessee. The McSurelys have 
stipulated that they attended a meeting of the 
Southern Conference Educational Fund in 
Nashville immediately before the April, 1967, 
riot. Commonwealth Attorney Ratliff advised 
Brick in Pikeville on October 8 that some of 
the materials seized from the McSurelys' 
home contained reference to that meeting. 
McSurely II, 553 F.2d at 1287 (footnotes omit-
ted). 
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620 (2d Cir.1983) (allegation that plaintiffs 
criminal prosecution was partially motivat-
ed by his refusal to become a government 
informant states no constitutional claim be-
cause "selection was [not] based on 
grounds generally forbidden to government 
such as race, religion, or the exercise of a 
constitutionally protected right"); see also 
Tr. of Dec. 29, 1982, at 232, reprinted in 
J.A. 1645 (concession by McSurelys' coun-
sel that seizure of McSurelys' private pa-
pers does not violate first amendment). 
The mismatch between the first amend-
ment claims plaintiffs pleaded against the 
Senate defendants and the proof offered at 
trial resulted in confused discussion be-
tween counsel and court concerning pro-
posed jury instructions. The Senate de-
fendants consistently and emphatically ob-
jected to any proposed first amendment 
jury instruction implicating them; they 
maintained repeatedly that "there is no evi-
dence in the record that the Senate Defend-
ants did anything in any way to involve or 
infringe upon the McSurelys' First Amend-
ment rights." Tr. of Dec. 29, 1982, at 230, 
reprinted in J.A. 1643; accord id. at 231, 
reprinted in J.A. 1644; Tr. of Jan. 5, 1983, 
at 73; Tr. of Jan. 6, 1983, at 18, reprinted 
in J.A. 2073. 
The district court, several times, sig-
nalled agreement with the Senate defend-
ants. At one point, the court stated it saw 
"some basis" in the Senate defendants' 
contention that Ratliffs first amendment 
violation was a fait accompli by the time 
"they [the Senate defendants] came into 
the picture," Tr. of Dec. 29, 1982, at 232, 
reprinted in J.A. 1645; the court, at that 
time, declined "to give [the first amend-
ment] instruction as to the Senate Defend-
ants." Id. Later, when the Senate defend-
ants objected to a proposed instruction that 
"lump[ed] all of the defendants together," 
the district judge remarked that "of course, 
there is no First Amendment claim against 
some defendants." Tr. of Jan. 3, 1983, at 
177-78. The following day the court indi-
cated it intended to give a first amendment 
instruction regarding Ratliff only, and not 
the Senate defendants. Tr. of Jan. 4, 1983, 
at 82, reprinted in J.A. 1675. Subsequent-
ly, plaintiffs9 counsel, in response to a 
question from the bench, stated his belief 
that plaintiffs' first amendment allegations 
applied only to Ratliff, Tr. of Jan. 5, 1983, 
at 14, reprinted in J.A. 1679; he quickly 
recanted, however. Id. at 15, reprinted in 
J.A. 1680. 
The court's jury instructions on the sta-
tus of plaintiffs' first amendment claims 
against the Senate defendants were far 
from clear. The initial first amendment 
charge referred clearly to Ratliff, not oth-
ers, see Tr. of Jan. 5, 1983, at 35, reprinted 
in J.A. 1699; that charge was followed by 
fourth amendment instructions unequivo-
cally including both Ratliff and the Senate 
defendants. See id. at 35-39, reprinted in 
J.A. 1699-1703. No instructions delivered 
before the jury began deliberations explicit-
ly mentioned any first amendment claim 
against the Senate defendants. 
When the jury requested clarification of 
the standards applicable in determining a 
first amendment violation, the district court 
again described the first amendment 
branch of the case as pertinent to Ratliff 
alone. See Tr. of Jan. 5,1983, at 102. And 
again, the court followed up first amend-
ment instructions spotlighting Ratliff with 
fourth amendment instructions encompass-
ing both Ratliff and the Senate defendants. 
See id. at 102-06, partially reprinted in 
J.A. 1744-45. When the court reminded 
the jury that plaintiffs made "separate and 
distinct claims against the Senate defend-
ants," it discussed only the fourth amend-
ment aspect of the case. Id. at 115-16. 
Only one instruction even arguably con-
nected the Senate defendants with plain-
tiffs' charges of first amendment viola-
tions. On January 6, 1983, in response to a 
jury request, the court read aloud the por-
tions of the first amendment relevant to 
the McSurelys' claims. Four paragraphs 
later, the Court instructed: 
Plaintiffs [sic] do claim . . . that the ac-
tivities between Ratliff and [Brick] and 
the other Senate defendants insofar as 
they affected their private papers which 
were in Ratliff s custody after August 
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harassment, intimidation, and stigmatiza-
tion of the plaintiffs in order to squelch 
exercise of their first amendment rights. 
PART IV: The Privacy Claims 
Following the decision of the en banc 
court in 1976, the McSurelys amended their 
complaint to include a claim that their right 
to privacy under the common law had been 
violated. See McSurely II, 553 F.2d at 
1294-96, 1302-03. At trial, testimony was 
taken on the manner in which Brick gave 
Margaret McSurely's diary, letters and oth-
er highly personal papers, not to her, but to 
Alan McSurely and on the effect that this 
had on the McSurelys* marriage. We hold 
that there was more than sufficient evi-
dence to sustain the jury verdicts against 
Brick for interfering with the McSurelys' 
right to privacy and that neither the Speech 
or Debate Clause nor the doctrine of quali-
fied immunity shields Brick from liability 
for his conduct. The McSurelys, however, 
did not produce any evidence that could 
sustain the jury verdicts against McClellan 
and Adlerman for invasion of privacy. We 
uphold the privacy verdicts as to Brick, but 
reverse as to the other Senate defend-
ants.19 
A. Invasion of the McSurelys9 Right to 
Privacy Under the Common Law. 
1. The Return of the McSurelys' Pa-
pers 
In July 1968, the Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit decided that Ratliff and 
the U.S. Marshal had to return the docu-
ments seized from the McSurelys. After 
several unsuccessful attempts to secure 
Ratliff s compliance with the decision, the 
McSurelys obtained a court order directing 
Ratliff to turn over the documents to them 
at the U.S. Marshal's office in Pikeville on 
November 8,1968. Adlerman sent a memo 
to Ratliff requesting that Ratliff coordi-
nate return of the documents with the Sub-
committee's efforts to serve new subpoe-
nas on the McSurelys. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
No. 38, reprinted in J.A. 1851. On the 
19. The jury awards for violations of the right of 
privacy under common law were as follows: 
753 F.2d—5 
appointed day, the McSurelys—accompa-
nied by Joe and Karen Mulloy, another 
couple whose home had been searched and 
whose effects had been seized—brought a 
van to the federal building to pick up their 
papers. The materials had been deposited 
in two jail cells located inside the building. 
Alan McSurely testified about what hap-
pened when the McSurelys and the Mulloys 
proceeded down the hall toward the cells: 
Just as we were starting down there, 
this guy, John Brick, said to me, "Hey, 
Alan, come here, I want to say some-
thing to you." So I went over to one 
side with him and he said, "I have this 
box here full of your documents, and I 
want to go over them with you and have 
you check it off to make sure you re-
ceived them." 
Tr. of Nov. 23, 1982, at 95, reprinted in 
J.A. 601. Alan McSurely then followed 
Brick over to an area in front of a large 
window and, in accordance with Brick's in-
structions, began going through the con-
tents of the box piece by piece. 
The documents that had been in the Sub-
committee's possession included both Alan 
and Margaret McSurely's personal corre-
spondence with friends and relatives. 
Among the papers were a diary written by 
Margaret McSurely and personal letters 
written to her by men with whom she had 
been intimately involved. Brick pressed 
Alan McSurely to read through each and 
every document and verify that the xerox 
copies were the same as the originals. It 
was this incident which provides the evi-
dence on which the jury verdict for the 
McSurelys properly rests. We quote from 
Alan McSurely's testimony at length con-
cerning the manner in which the docu-
ments—including the items that clearly be-
longed solely to Margaret McSurely—were 
shown to him: 
When I got down to number six on the 
list, . . . it was a series of notes that 
Margaret had made back in 1963 and '64 
Ratliff McClellan Adlerman Brick 
Alan McSurely $30,860 $19,640 $9,923 $11,660 
Margaret McSurely $25,640 $13,340 $7,000 $ 9,400 
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on which the scope of our inquiry is nar-
row.") (citations omitted). Court review, it 
is true, encompasses "the manner and 
methods [by which a congressional commit-
tee] obtainfs] certain information." United 
States v. Dowdy, 479 F.2cl 213, 225 n. 20 
(4th Cir.) (emphasis added), cert denied, 
414 U.S. 823, 866, 94 S.Ct. 124, 132, 38 
L.Ed.2d 56, 118 (1973); see McSurely II, 
553 F.2d at 1287 ("[A] Member of Congress 
or congressional employee is not free to 
use every conceivable means to obtain in-
vestigatory materials, without fear of crim-
inal prosecution or civil suit.") (emphasis 
added). But plaintiffs' first amendment 
complaint here heads into tightly protected 
territory. 
[8] The McSurelys contend that the 
Subcommittee's investigation of them was 
not "bona fide "; the Subcommittee, the 
McSurelys allege, was merely "using the 
instrumentality of an investigation to ha-
rass those whose views [were] at variance 
with views of the members of the Senate 
Subcommittee." Complaint at 17 (No. 
37(i)), reprinted in J.A. 71. Allegations of 
improperly motivated legislative action, 
however, are "precisely what the Speech or 
Debate Clause generally forecloses from 
executive and judicial inquiry." United 
States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180, 86 
S.Ct. 749, 755, 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966); see 
also Eastland, 421 U.S. at 508-09, 95 S.Ct. 
at 1824; Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 
606, 629, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2629, 33 L.Ed.2d 
583 (1972); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 
367, 377, 71 S.Ct. 783, 788, 95 L.Ed. 1019 
(1951). Once a court determines, as we 
have, that a congressional committee was 
"apparently" performing a legitimate in-
vestigative function, the court may not 
press on and inquire into "the propriety 
and the motivation for the action taken." 
United States v. Dowdy, 479 F.2d at 226 
(emphasis in original). A "claim of an un-
worthy purpose," in short, "does not de-
stroy the privilege." Tenney, 341 U.S. at 
18. The Tenney Court ruled that the 1871 Civil 
Rights Act did not abrogate the immunity tradi-
tionally extended to state lawmakers acting 
377, 71 S.Ct. at 788; accord Eastland, 421 
U.S. at 508, 95 S.Ct. at 1824. 
Two Supreme Court precedents plainly 
indicate Speech or Debate Clause coverage 
of the claims plaintiffs stated (but failed to 
prove) against the Senate defendants: Ten-
ney, supra and Eastland, supra. In Ten-
ney, plaintiff sued members of a state leg-
islative committee,18 alleging they had de-
prived him of constitutional rights by sum-
moning him to appear at a hearing con-
vened, not for any legislative purpose, but 
rather to intimidate him and deter his exer-
cise of first amendment rights. 341 U.S. at 
370-71, 71 S.Ct. at 785. The Court ordered 
the complaint dismissed; judicial examina-
tion of the committee's motives for ques-
tioning plaintiff, the Court declared, was 
not "consonant with our scheme of govern-
ment." Id. at 377, 71 S.Ct. at 788. The 
judiciary's proper role in a case such as 
Tenney, the Court wrote, is limited to "de-
termining that a committee's inquiry may 
fairly be deemed within its province." Id. 
at 378, 71 S.Ct. at 789. 
In Eastland, a congressional subcommit-
tee had subpoenaed the United States Ser-
vicemen's Fund's (USSF) bank records. On 
first amendment grounds, the USSF 
sought an injunction against release of the 
subpoenaed records;- the USSF charged 
that the purpose of the subpoena was to 
chill the organization's free speech. The 
Court declared first that congressional in-
vestigation generally is sheltered by the 
Speech or Debate Clause and next deter-
mined that the USSF was a proper subject 
for subcommittee investigation. See 421 
U.S. at 505-06, 95 S.Ct. at 1822-23. The 
Court then stated that "in determining the 
legitimacy of a congressional act we do not 
look to the motives alleged to have prompt-
ed it." Id. at 508, 95 S.Ct. at 1824 (cita-
tions omitted). Instructed by Tenney and 
Eastland, we must disallow pursuit it 
court of the charge that the McClellan Sub 
committee's investigation, in targeting th« 
McSurelys, in fact had as its objective 
within the sphere of legislative activity. See 34 
U.S. at 376, 71 S.Ct. at 788. 
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looked out the window, and I remember 
Karen came up and put her arm around 
me. And I would go back and see what 
else they had taken and I saw him give 
back an address list, and it was like my 
worst fears, my worst, worst fear. 
Tr. of Dec. 3, 1982, at 11-12, reprinted in 
J.A. 890-91. Margaret McSurely testified 
that she was conscious of the impact the 
revelation was having on her husband and 
feared for the future of their relationship. 
I noticed he was trying to control his 
anger, and that frightened me because I 
didn't know what effect all of this stuff 
was going to have, what it was going to 
mean to him. It was like all these things 
were happening at once and it was al-
most more than I could take in. I have 
never been so humiliated. 
Tr. of Dec. 3,1982, at 12, reprinted in J.A. 
891. Margaret McSurely testified that af-
ter the couple got home with their papers, 
Joe and Karen, Al and I sat down and 
he took the stuff out of the box and put 
my things in one pile and gave it to me, 
and said, "Here, these are yours, is what 
Brick took to Washington." 
And I took my stuff in another room 
because I didn't want anybody else to see 
me and I ran through and saw what they 
had taken, and I was devastated. 
Tr. of Dec. 3,1982, at 15, reprinted in J.A. 
at 894. After the return of the papers, she 
continued to feel "very frightened," Tr. of 
Dec. 3, 1982, at 63, reprinted in J.A. at 
934, and was plagued by "a sense of fore-
boding, a sense of doom." Id. She 
"couldn't sleep" and "looked over [her] 
shoulder all the time." Id. While her hus-
band was at work, she stayed home alone 
and "cried just about every day." Tr. of 
Dec. 3, 1982, at 64, reprinted in J.A. 935. 
Alan McSurely asserted that he believed 
there had been "an assault on the trust and 
love between Margaret and me, which I am 
not sure we ever overcame." Tr. of Nov. 
23, 1982, at 137, reprinted in J.A. 640. 
Margaret McSurely testified that the 
feelings of injury and embarrassment per-
sisted and eventually poisoned the McSure-
lys' marital relationship. Even at the trial, 
years later, she found the matter painful 
and difficult to articulate: 
If I could find the words, I will try to 
tell you [TJhere were some seeds of 
mistrust that came between Al and me, 
. . . and ultimately our marriage broke 
up. 
. . . [I]t was an insidious thing that . . . 
faded away our relationship. 
Tr. of Dec. 3, 1982, at 16-17, reprinted in 
J.A. 937-40. Pressed again to describe the 
emotional damage she had suffered, Mrs. 
McSurely testified 
I have not been able to develop any 
other relationships with men since Al 
left. 
And the worse thing is the marriage 
breaking up, the affect it had on the 
family. 
Tr. of Dec. 3, 1982, at 18, reprinted in J.A. 
941. 
The district judge gave the jury a gener-
al instruction concerning invasion of priva-
cy under the common law. He told them: 
Now, the right of privacy is generally 
recognized as the right to be left alone. 
That is to say, the right of a person to be 
free from unwarranted publicity, or the 
right to live without unwarranted inter-
ference by the public about matters with 
which the public is not necessarily con-
cerned. A person who unreasonably and 
seriously interferes with another's inter-
est in not having his affairs known to 
others, is liable to that person. Disclo-
sure to the general public is not neces-
sary to complete the wrong of invasion 
of privacy. 
Jury Instructions, Tr. of Jan. 5, 1983, at 
24-25, reprinted in J.A. 1703-04. The 
jury returned verdicts against all three de-
fendants for invading Alan and Margaret 
McSurely's right to privacy under the com-
mon law. 
2. Choice of Law 
[9] The people and events involved in 
the McSurelys' privacy claim were affiliat-
ed with two jurisdictions: the District of 
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when she was working for Drew Pear-
son. 
As I was reading it, I realized that this 
was the famous diary that we heard 
about. I had never seen it before. I 
never looked at it before. I was, you 
know, just totally stunned by what I saw 
there. It was the most intimate details 
of her relationship with Mr. Pearson, and 
I wasn't stunned by what I was reading, 
but I was stunned by the fact that, you 
know, it just dropped on me like a pipe, a 
lead pipe right on my shoulders, that 
these guys, this guy standing right here 
in front of me, I mean, we were only 
standing maybe a foot apart, had taken 
this stuff, taken it up to the Senate and 
kept it up there for a year, and said that 
they were investigating the riots. 
I couldn't hardly think or feel, I was 
just totally numb by that. I looked at 
him, and he, I mean, he was watching 
and he knew which thing I was reading 
and he wouldn't look at me, he would 
look out the window and look down, and 
then—so I put those aside and I started 
reading a couple more and got to number 
II and 12, I think it was, somewhere in 
the 11, 12, 13, and these were very ro-
mantic, beautifully-written love letters 
that Margaret had gotten from a guy 
that I knew, he was a friend of mine, 
that she was going with when she went 
south and worked with SNEC. 
And I had never known that, about 
this affair. I didn't have any right to 
know about it, it happened a long time 
before I met her, but I felt, you know, 
like an intruder, like I was getting into 
reading something that I had no business 
to read about Margaret and her past life. 
If she wanted to tell me about that, it 
was her business, but she apparently 
hadn't wanted to tell me about it up till 
then. 
Brick got, he kept pushing me to keep 
on reading this stuff. He would give me 
these letters and say, "Make sure they 
are the same now, read them all the way 
through." . . . But the thing I remember 
the most was when we got to 201, and 
this was the, this was another letter that 
Pearson had written to Margaret when 
she was in Mississippi, in October of '64, 
and it was addressed, "Dearest Cucum-
ber," which I had never heard or called 
that before. 
It made me sick. I was so furious that 
I really couldn't concentrate on looking 
at that stuff. My basic thought was to 
smash him in his face. That was the 
way I felt I have been trained as a 
psychologist and be cool and to help peo-
ple figure out ways of expressing their 
hostility in a constructive manner, et cet-
era, but at that time the only thing I 
could think about was to hit this guy. 
This guy—in the back of my mind, it 
wasn't just him, it was like a gang rape, 
he had raped my wife right there while, 
right in front of me— 
Id. at 104-08, reprinted in J.A. 609-13. 
Joe Mulloy also testified about the ex-
change of documents between Brick and 
Alan McSurely: "Mr. Brick—I remember 
him being—it seemed like to me that he 
knew something that Alan didn't know, and 
he appeared smug and he would grin from 
time to time, and Alan was having to read 
these documents, and this was—it was a 
tense day, certainly, for all of us." Tr. of 
Dec. 2, 1982, at 46, reprinted in J.A. 810. 
Alan McSurely, Mulloy recalled, "was hold-
ing some of [the documents] in his hands 
like this . . . and just like he was getting 
rigid . . . this was his first opportunity to 
see the things." Id. at 46-47, reprinted in 
J.A. 810-11. 
Margaret McSurely herself testified to 
her feelings of violation and mortification, 
and to her belief that the treatment given 
her personal papers, including the display 
of each and every one of them to her 
husband, had undermined and ultimately 
destroyed her marriage. 
Yes. I watched and . . . I saw they 
had taken some love letters of mine. 
And I was really embarassed. I couldn't 
believe that they would do anything that 
dirty, and I kind of walked away and 
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the right of privacy actually comprised 
four distinct torts: 
1) intrusion into an individual's seclusion 
or private affairs; 
2) publication of embarrassing private 
facts about an individual; 
3) publications that place an individual in 
a false light in the public eye, but do not 
constitute defamatory statements; and 
4) appropriation of an individual's name 
or likeness for commercial advantage. 
Id. at 389. The Restatement has adopted 
Prosser's four-pronged delineation of the 
invasion of privacy tort. See Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 652A (1977). 
Kentucky was among the first states to 
hold invasion of privacy an actionable tort. 
See Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 770-
74, 299 S.W. 967, 969-71 (1927); see also 
Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 
432, 120 S.W. 364, 366 (1909) (citing Pave-
sich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 
122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905)); see general-
ly Bunch, Kentucky's Invasion of Privacy 
Tort—A Reappraisal, 56 Ky.LJ. 261 
(1968). 
In Brents, the defendant placed a notice 
in the show window of his place of business 
announcing that the plaintiff owed the de-
fendant money, had promised often to pay, 
but had failed to do so. The court held 
that the plaintiffs claim of mental pain, 
humiliation, and exposure to public ridicule 
resulting from the notice was actionable. 
In so holding, the court explained that the 
right of privacy 
has not been concretely defined, and 
probably is not subject to a concrete defi-
nition, but it is generally recognized as 
the right to be let alone, that is, the right 
of a person to be free from unwarranted 
publicity, or the right to live without 
unwarranted interference by the public 
about matters with which the public is 
not necessarily concerned. 
Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. at 770, 290 S.W. 
at 969-70. The court made clear that the 
plaintiff "is entitled to recover substantial 
damages, although the only damages suf-
fered by him resulted from mental an-
guish." Id. at 774, 290 S.W. at 971. 
Four years later, Kentucky held wiretap-
ping actionable as an invasion of privacy. 
Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 
46 (1931). The court there concluded: 
A person is entitled to the privacy of his 
home as against the unwarranted inva-
sion of others, and a violation thereof 
will give rise to an action. It is the legal 
right of every man to enjoy social and 
business relations with his friends, neigh-
bors, and acquaintances, and he is enti-
tled to converse with them without mo-
lestation by intruders. 
Id. at 228, 37 S.W.2d at 47. 
Kentucky has continued to adhere to the 
principles set forth in these early opinions. 
For example, in 1967, the year that the 
McSurelys' papers were seized, the court 
again reviewed the development of the pri-
vacy tort, describing the doctrine as "well 
established" despite the paucity of cases 
and asserting that the privacy tort's pur-
pose is "primarily to recover for a hurt to 
the feelings of the individual." Wheeler v. 
P. Sorenson Mfg. Co., Ky., 415 S.W.2d 582, 
584 (1967). The court stated that the doc-
trine was an evolving one, not wedded to 
rigid rules or standards: "[T]he right of 
privacy is relative to the customs of the 
time and place, and it is determined by the 
norm of the ordinary man." Id. at 585. 
Three years ago, Kentucky adopted the 
privacy tort analysis set forth in the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts as a means of 
furthering the principles enunciated in its 
prior opinions. See McCall v. Courier-
Journal & Louisville Times Co., Ky., 623 
S.W.2d 882, 887 (1981); Ausness, Ken-
tucky Tort Laws: Defamation and the 
Right to Privacy (Book Review), 72 Ky.LJ. 
199, 205 (1983-84); see generally D. Elder, 
Kentucky Tort Law: Defamation and The 
Right to Privacy § 3.01 (1983). In McCall, 
the court quoted the Restatement's four-
part breakdown of the privacy tort, but 
also repeated its statement in Brents that 
the tort of invasion of privacy is "not sub-
ject to precise definition." McCall, 623 
S.W.2d at 887. 
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Columbia and the State of Kentucky. The 
suit was brought in the District and several 
of the defendants were associated with the 
United States Senate when the alleged tort 
occurred. On the other hand, most of the 
allegedly tortious conduct occurred in Ken-
tucky at a time when both plaintiffs were 
Kentucky residents. 
The privacy claim has been pursued in 
this case under the wing of the federal 
court's pendent jurisdiction. McSurely II, 
553 F.2d at 1303. In such cases, by analo-
gy to cases entertained under diversity jur-
isdiction, federal courts have applied the 
rule of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. 
Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 
1477 (1941). See Rohm and Haas Co. v. 
Adco Chemical Co., 689 F.2d 424, 428-29 
(3d Cir.1982); Systems Operations, Inc. v. 
Scientific Games Development Corp., 555 
F.2d 1131, 1136 (3d Cir.1977). Klaxon di-
rects us in this case initially to District of 
Columbia choice of law rules. 
We believe that in the situation at hand, 
the District's choice of lav/ analysis would 
identify Kentucky as the state most con-
cerned with the claim and best equipped to 
provide the regulating substantive rule. 
Cf Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216, 222 
(D.C.Cir.1968); McCrossin v. Hicks Chev-
rolet, Inc., 248 A.2d 917, 920-21 (D.C.Ct. 
App.1969); see also Loge v. United States, 
662 F.2d 1268, 1273 (8th Cir.1981); Semler 
v. Psychiatric Institute of Washington, 
D.C., Inc., 575 F.2d 922, 924 (D.C.Cir.1978). 
Both the nature of each jurisdiction's inter-
est in the claim and the state of develop-
ment of privacy law lead us to this conclu-
sion. 
As we have noted, Kentucky was the 
place from which the documents were tak-
en and to which they were returnad. It 
was also the McSurelys' domicile atn more 
to the point, the place where the wrong 
was done and the harm was initially felt. 
Furthermore, we held in McSurely II that 
any use of the documents by Subcommittee 
members and their staffs while the papers 
were in the District came within the shelter 
of the Speech or Debate Clause. 
We discern no substantial disparity in the 
premises underlying privacy tort law in the 
two jurisdictions. Delineation of an inva-
sion of privacy tort is a fairly recent devel-
opment at common law. Elaborative case 
law is sparse in both jurisdictions. Ken-
tucky, however, recognized the tort approx-
imately forty years before its existence 
was acknowledged in the District. Com-
pare Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 773-
74, 299 S.W. 967, 971 (Ky.1927) with Afro-
American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 
F.2d 649, 653 (D.C.Cir.1966) (en banc). 
Kentucky, therefore, has had longer experi-
ence in this evolving area. We turn, there-
fore, as we think local courts in the District 
would, to Kentucky law to govern our anal-
ysis of the privacy invasion asserted by the 
McSurelys. 
3. The Right to Privacy under Ken-
tucky Law 
In a seminal Harvard Law Review arti-
cle, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Bran-
deis laid the groundwork in 1890 for the 
development of a "new" tort designed to 
protect individuals from unwarranted inter-
ference in their personal affairs. Warren 
& Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. 
L.Rev. 193 (1890). Their theory was predi-
cated on recognition that the scope of legal 
protection available to individuals had al-
ready expanded to cover not only batteries 
on persons and trespasses to property, but 
also intangible injuries to feelings and sen-
sibilities. Warren and Brandeis urged that 
the law go further and respond to "modern 
enterprise and invention [which] have, 
through invasions upon [an individual's] 
privacy, subjected him to mental pain and 
distress, far greater than could be inflicted 
by mere bodily injury." Id. at 196. 
Beginning with Pavesich v. New Eng-
land Life Insurance Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 
S.E. 68 (1905), state courts gradually recog-
nized the new tort, and, by 1960, the major-
ity of jurisdictions acknowledged the right 
of privacy, "in one form or another." 
Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif.L.Rev. 383, 386 
(1960). In 1960, William Prosser analyzed 
evolving privacy law and concluded that 
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instructions presented to the jury in this 
case. 
4. Liability of Brick 
Although the trial court might have giv-
en a more detailed privacy charge, we can-
not say that the formulation given was not 
an adequate statement of Kentucky law. 
The jury had more than sufficient evidence 
from which it could conclude that John 
Brick "unreasonably and seriously inter-
fere^] with [the McSurelys'] interest in not 
having tfheir] affairs known to others." 
Alan McSurely's right to be "let alone"— 
to not have John Brick stand by his side 
and pressure him to read about the inti-
mate details of his wife's premarital rela-
tionships and to not have his marriage ma-
liciously disrupted—is the type of privacy 
interest protected by the tort of intrusion. 
Brick's conduct, which indisputably was 
"highly offensive to a reasonable person," 
constituted an intrusion into Alan McSure-
ly's "private affairs and concerns"—in this 
case, his marital relationship. 
Margaret McSurely's right to be let 
alone was at least as invaded when Brick 
intruded into her marriage, dredging up 
her past, directing her husband's attention 
to matters about which he neither needed 
nor wanted to know, and creating problems 
in a relationship which had up until then 
been satisfactory. 
The drafters of the Restatement noted 
that it is "possible and not infrequent" for 
a particular act to constitute more than one 
of the four types of privacy torts. Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 652A comment d. 
Such is the case here. As to Margaret 
McSurely, Brick's conduct also constituted 
a tortious publication of private facts. By 
giving Margaret McSurely's private papers 
to Alan McSurely and pressing him to read 
them, Brick published to the most signifi-
cant possible audience embarrassing facts 
about Margaret McSurely's private life be-
fore her marriage. A rational jury could 
very readily find that Brick's conduct 
served no legitimate public interest and 
was highly offensive by the standards of 
ordinary people. 
[10,11] Given the nature of Margaret 
McSurely's papers, Brick's conduct in giv-
ing them to Alan McSurely and—under the 
guise of conducting official business— 
pushing Alan to read each and every one 
through, page by page, as Brick watched in-
vaded both Alan and Margaret McSurely's 
privacy. Whether construed as an invasion 
of a "private seclusion that [the McSurelys] 
ha[d] thrown about [their] person or af-
fairs" under the "intrusion" tort, Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 652B comment c 
(1977), or, in Margaret McSurely's case, as 
the publication of embarrassing private 
facts, see id. § 652D, we believe that 
Brick's conduct would be actionable under 
Kentucky law. In light of the content of 
the papers and of Alan and Margaret 
McSurely's relationship as husband and 
wife, the evidence at trial was such that a 
reasonable jury could find Brick liable for 
invasion of privacy. 
Finally, the jury could conclude reason-
ably that Brick's actions had harmed the 
McSurelys seriously both as individuals and 
as a family unit. For this latter point, the 
jury had not only the subjective testimony 
about emotional injury but also the objec-
tive evidence of the McSurelys' divorce. 
5. Liability of McClellan and Adler-
man 
[12] Since no one contends that either 
McClellan or Adlerman personally took 
part in the return of the documents, they 
must be liable vicariously if at all. The 
district judge gave the jury general instruc-
tions on vicarious liability: if McClellan or 
Adlerman had "ordered or directed or au-
thorized or approved" Brick's conduct, they 
could be liable for that conduct "the same 
as if [they] had done those acts personal-
ly." Jury Instructions, Tr. of Jan. 5, 1983, 
at 29, reprinted in J.A. 1708. Although 
McClellan and Adlerman apparently in-
structed Brick to return the documents to 
the McSurelys, there is no evidence that 
McClellan or Adlerman ordered, directed, 
authorized, or approved the manner in 
which he performed that task. 
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Under the Restatement, an intrusion is 
tortious when it involves intentional inter-
ference with the "solitude or seclusion of 
another or his private affairs or concerns" 
and "would be highly offensive to a rea-
sonable person." Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 652B. The intrusion tort "does not 
depend on any publicity given to the person 
whose interest is invaded or to his affairs." 
Id. comment a; see, e.g., Pearson v. Dodd, 
410 F.2d 701, 704 (D.C.Cir.1969); Fowler v. 
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph 
Co., 343 F.2d 150, 156 (5th Cir.1965). The 
defendant is subject to liability "when he 
has intruded into a private place, or has 
otherwise invaded a private seclusion 
that the plaintiff has thrown about his 
person or affairs.'1 Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, § 652B comment c (emphasis add-
ed). 
The Restatement defines the publication 
of private facts tort as follows: 
One who gives publicity to a matter con-
cerning the private life of another is sub-
ject to liability to the other for invasion 
of his privacy, if the matter publicized is 
of a kind that 
(a) would be highly offensive to a rea-
sonable person, and 
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the 
public. 
Id. § 652D. The publication of private 
facts doctrine usually applies to communi-
cations made to the public at large, rather 
than a few individuals. See id. comment a. 
However, the publication requirement also 
may be satisfied by proof of disclosure to a 
very limited number of people when a spe-
cial relationship exists between the plain-
tiff and the "public" to whom the informa-
tion has been disclosed. 
In Beaumont v. Brown, 401 Mich. 80, 
257 N.W.2d 522 (1977), for example, the 
court emphasized the nature of the rela-
tionship between the plaintiff and the recip-
ient of the communication: 
Communication of embarrassing facts 
about an individual to a public not con-
cerned with that individual and with 
whom the individual is not concerned ob-
viously is not a "serious interference" 
with plaintiffs right to privacy, although 
it might be "unnecessary" or "unreason-
able". An invasion of a plaintiffs right 
to privacy is important if it exposes pri-
vate facts to a public whose knowledge 
of those facts would be embarrassing to 
the plaintiff. Such a public might be the 
general public, if the person were a pub-
lic figure, or a particular public such 
as fellow employees, club members, 
church members, family, or neighbors, 
if the person were not a public figure. 
Id. at 104-05, 257 N.W.2d at 531 (emphasis 
added). Declining to place a numerical re-
quirement on the "publication" element of 
the tort, the court, simply noted that "[h]ere 
we have developed the criterion of a partic-
ular public, whose knowledge of the private 
facts would be embarrassing to the plain-
tiff . . . . " Id. at 105, 257 N.W.2d at 531. 
Moreover, the court observed that there 
was respectable opinion supporting the idea 
that "publication of the embarrassing facts 
to only one person alone was unlawful pub-
lication." Id. at 100, 257 N.W.2d at 529. 
The closest Kentucky has come to an 
analysis of the publication requirement oc-
curred in Voneye v. Turner, Ky., 240 
S.W.2d 588 (1951). The court held that, 
given the particular facts of the case, Vo-
neye's privacy had not been violated but 
made it clear that the size of the "public" 
was not relevant to whether a disclosure of 
embarrassing facts was tortious. 
Two other Kentucky cases, Gregory v. 
Bryan-Hunt Co., 295 Ky. 345, 174 S.W.2d 
510 (1943), and Sellers v. Henry, Ky., 329 
S.W.2d 214 (1959), also indicate that the 
size of the public is irrelevant, and such is 
the conclusion of the most recent treatise 
on Kentucky tort law, see D. Elder, supra, 
§ 3.04. 
In sum, Kentucky has adopted the Re-
statement's articulation of privacy tort 
principles but has continued to emphasize 
the need for flexibility in the application of 
theory to conduct. Egregious conduct has 
been found actionable even where the fit to 
the recognized privacy tort categories has 
not been exact. It is with these points in 
mind that we look at the evidence and 
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ristic exercise described at trial cannot fall 
under the mantle of necessary legislative 
conduct. In sum, Brick's behavior—the 
manifestly excessive means he used when 
he returned the McSurelys' private papers 
—"offend[s] even hardened sensibilities." 
Cf Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 
172, 72 S.Ct 205, 209, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952). 
It surely constitutes the kind of interfer-
ence that the highest court of Kentucky 
would consider "unwarranted" and "highly 
offensive." It is not even arguably within 
the outer perimeter of a public official's 
line of duty. See McKinney v. Whitfield, 
supra. 
116] Nor does Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 
(1982), provide any protection for Brick's 
violation of the McSurelys' right to privacy 
under the common law. That case defined 
"qualified immunity" for various federal 
officials in situations in which they could 
not lay claim to absolute immunity. While 
this court has said that qualified immunity 
may apply to legislative branch personnel, 
Walker v. Jones, 733 F.2d at 932, that 
doctrine has never been held to shelter 
from common law tort liability conduct of 
the kind at issue here—behavior that plain-
ly steps beyond even the extreme edge of 
an official's authority. 
PART V: Conclusion 
If hard cases make the law bad, then 
ancient cases make the law confusing. 
This ancient controversy first saw the light 
of a courtroom in Kentucky in 1967. Since 
then the McSurelys have litigated in the 
district courts of the Eastern District of 
Kentucky and the District of Columbia, the 
Courts of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit and 
the District of Columbia Circuit, and in the 
United States Supreme Court. The 
McSurely matter has occasioned seven 
Court of Appeals decisions, including one 
en banc opinion. In addition the various 
litigants have made four motions before 
the Supreme Court and filed a petition for 
certiorari, which was ultimately dismissed 
as improvidently granted. 
Every source of law, from the United 
States Constitution to Kentucky common 
law, has been probed and pressed for solu-
tions to the questions presented. The divi-
sions among judges have been substan-
tial—this court divided six to four, and 
even five to five, on some of the most 
fundamental legal questions raised by the 
disputants. Three of the defendants have 
died during the long pendency of this law-
suit, and, in one instance, the party substi-
tuted for a deceased defendant has also 
died. 
The curtain ought to be drawn. The 
legal world will little note nor long remem-
ber the fine lines that have been drawn in 
this opinion or in any of the four previous 
opinions rendered by this court It will be 
enough if our opinion finally ends this sor-
ry chapter of investigative excess. The 
McSurelys cannot be made whole, nor can 
they be vindicated. Those parts of the 
district court's judgment that we uphold 
today can only stand as a small reaffirma-
tion of the proposition that there are 
bounds to the interference that citizens 
must tolerate from the agents of their 
government—even when such agents in-
voke the mighty shield of the Constitution 
and claim official purpose to their conduct. 
APPENDIX 
The McSurelys were involved in the fol-
lowing related lawsuits: 
1) Challenge to the Validity of the Ken-
tucky Sedition Statute. Shortly after 
they were arrested, the McSurelys brought 
suit in federal district court to prevent the 
Kentucky prosecutor, Thomas Ratliff, from 
proceeding with any prosecution of the 
McSurelys under the state sedition statute, 
Ky.Rev.Stat. § 432.040. A three-judge 
panel, one judge dissenting, found the stat-
ute unconstitutional on its face. McSurely 
v. Ratliff 282 F.Supp. 848 (E.D.Ky.1967). 
The court ordered Ratliff and the U.S. Mar-
shal to retain possession of the seized ma-
terial pending appeal. No appeal was ever 
taken. 
2) Suit to Enjoin Ratliff and the U.S. 
Marshal from Complying with the Senate 
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An instruction to return documents nor-
mally means restoring the documents to 
their rightful owner, not giving them to a 
third party. From the testimony, the jury 
could reasonably have inferred that McClsl-
lan had a grudge against Drew Pearson, 
desired to place Pearson in a compromising 
position, and attempted to exploit the 
McSurelys for that purpose. But evidence 
of McClellan's motivation, even if the 
Speech or Debate Clause did not bar its 
admission, see supra p. 103 n. 15, p. 106, 
would serve only to connect McClellan with 
the wrongs alleged by the McSurelys under 
the first and fourth amendments and, we 
have held, supra pp. 99-106, that those 
claims cannot be sustained. Because we 
here find liability only for the manner in 
which the documents were returned, the evi-
dence is insufficient to sustain a finding 
that McClellan actually or impliedly or-
dered, directed, authorized, or otherwise ap-
proved the tortious manner in which Brick 
carried out his assignment. The evidence 
similarly fails to connect Adlerman to the 
tort. 
6. The Immunity Defense as to Brick 
In Barr v. Matteot 360 U.S. 564, 575, ?9 
S.Ct. 1335, 1341, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959), the 
Supreme Court held that federal officials 
have absolute immunity from common law 
tort liability for actions taken "within the 
outer perimeter of [their] line of duty/' 
Barr v. Matteo sets forth a judge-macfe 
immunity doctrine that applies to executive 
branch officials acting within the scope of 
their employment. Our recent decision in 
McKinney v. Whitfield, 736 F.2d 766 (D.C. 
Cir.1984), indicates the doctrine's continu-
ing vitaffty. Protection sunifar to that af-
forded executive officials by Barr is sup-
plied to members of Congress and their 
staffs through the Speech or Debate 
Clause of the Constitution. While Barr v. 
Matteo establishes absolute immunity few-
executive branch activity "within the out^r 
perimeter" of an executive official's line of 
duty, the Speech or Debate Clause provides 
absolute immunity for conduct that is "part 
and parcel of the legislative process," 
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 626, 
92 S.Ct 2614, 2627, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972). 
Gravel applied this protection to legislative 
staff as well as members of Congress, and 
thus the question of absolute immunity is 
appropriately raised by Brick who was, at 
the time, a member of Senator McClellan's 
staff and a Subcommittee investigator. 
[13] The "absolute immunity" of the 
Speech or Debate clause, however, cannot 
be used as a talisman to insulate all con-
duct of all legislative branch personnel at 
all times. The Supreme Court has instruct-
ed that absolute immunity for members of 
Congress only protects "conduct necessary 
to perform their duties within the sphere of 
legitimate legislative activity." Davis v. 
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 235 n. 11, 99 S.Ct. 
2264, 2271 n. 11, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979). 
[14,15] We recently outlined the limita-
tions of the immunity secured by the 
Speech or Debate Clause in Walker v. 
Jones, 733 F.2d 923 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert 
denied, — U.S. , 105 S.Ct. 512, 83 
L.Ed.2d 402 (1984). In determining wheth-
er an activity is protected by Speech or 
Debate immunity: 
The key consideration, Supreme Court 
decisions teach, its the act presented for 
examination, not the actor. Activities in-
tegral to the legislative process may not 
be examined, but peripheral activities not 
closely connected to the business of legis-
lating do not enjoy Speech or Debate 
shelter. 
Id. at 929 (citation omitted). Acts " 'casu-
ally or incidentally related to legislative 
affairs' but'not 'part and parcel of the 
legislative process' are outside the realm of 
Speech or Debate protection." Id. (quoting 
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. at 626, 
92 S.Ct. at 2627). As Judge Leventhal said 
in his opinion in McSurely II, "[t;]he em-
ployment of unlawful means to implement 
an otherwise proper legislative objective is 
simply not 'essential to legislating'" and, 
therefore, is not protected by the Speech or 
Debate Clause. 553 F.2d at 1288. Con-
verting what should have been the simple 
physical return of documents to their re-
spective owners into the sadistic and voyeu-
WILLIAMS v. E.F. 
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the Court dismissed the writ 438 U.S. 189, 
98 S.Ct. 3116, 57 L.Ed.2d 704 (1978). 
McSurely III: On remand, Thomas Rat-
liff filed his own motion for summary judg-
ment, which the district court denied. We 
affirmed the denial of Ratliffs summary 
judgment motion in a per curiam opinion. 
697 F.2d 309 (D.C.Cir.1982). 
McSurely IV: Following a trial and jury 
verdicts in favor of the McSurelys, the 
defendants brought this appeal. After 
Thomas Ratliff entered into a settlement 
agreement with the McSurelys, we dis-
missed his appeal. 
( O | IEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
Clarence WILLIAMS, Jr., Appellant 
v. 
E.F. HUTTON & COMPANY, INC. 
No. 84-5244. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
District of Columbia Circuit 
Argued Oct. 18, 1984. 
Decided Jan. 22, 1985. 
Investor brought action against bro-
kerage firm, alleging various violations of 
federal securities laws in the handling of 
his account. The United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia, John 
Garrett Penn, J., dismissed the complaint, 
and investor appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, Mikva, Circuit Judge, held that the 
district courts dismissal of investor's com-
plaint solely on the basis of prior arbitra-
tion of claims under securities laws could 
be sustained only if the claims were clearly 
identical or if they were clearly such that 
they necessarily would have been decided 
in the course of resolving other claims 
properly submitted to arbitration; crucial 
inquiry in determining whether bar existed 
HUTTON & CO., INC. 117 
FJd 117 (1965) 
was whether the claims should have been 
considered by the arbitrators, not simply 
whether they could have been dealt with in 
arbitration. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Arbitration G=»7 
Arbitration agreement is a contract, 
and the court will not rewrite it for the 
parties. 
2. Arbitration $»82(5) 
Although courts recognize strong fed-
eral policy in favor of voluntary commer-
cial arbitration and will generally bar 
claims falling under an arbitration clause 
even if those claims were not actually 
raised in the arbitration proceeding, arbi-
tration cannot be raised as a bar to claims 
falling outside the arbitration agreement. 
3. Arbitration <e=>82(3) 
Arbitrators' decision would not be enti-
tled to any deference if they were found to 
have exceeded their authority by reaching 
out to decide matters not consigned to their 
discretion by the arbitration agreement. 
4. Arbitration e=>l.l, 29 
There is no duty to arbitrate matters 
not subject to the arbitration agreement 
and no authority on the part of arbitrators 
to consider matters not necessary to resolu-
tion of disputes actually submitted. 
5. Exchanges <s=»ll(ll) 
District court's dismissal of investor's 
complaint solely on the basis of prior arbi-
tration of claims under securities laws 
could be sustained only if the claims were 
clearly identical or if they were clearly 
such that they necessarily would have been 
decided in the course of resolving other 
claims properly submitted to arbitration; 
crucial inquiry in determining whether bar 
existed was whether the claims should 
have been considered by the arbitrators, 
not simply whether they could have been 
dealt with in arbitration. Fed.Rules Civ. 
ProcRule 12(bXl, 5, 6), 28 U.S.C.A.; Secu-
rities Act of 1933, §§ 22(a), 322, as amend-
ed, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77v(a), 77vw; Public 
116 753 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
APPENDIX—Continued 
Subpoenas. As soon as the McSurelys re-
ceived the Senate subpoenas for documents 
held in Ratliffs custody, they asked the 
three-judge district court to issue a tempo-
rary restraining order to prevent compli-
ance with the subpoenas. This is the chro-
nology of their effort to block compliance 
with the subpoenas: 
October 18, 1967: The McSurelys filed 
their motion for a temporary restraining 
order in the district court. 
October 23, 1967: The three-judge court 
denied the motion and ordered all parties to 
cooperate with the Subcommittee. 
November 10, 1967: The Supreme Court 
stayed the district court order on condition 
that the McSurelys obtain a ruling on the 
validity of the subpoenas. 389 U.S. 949, 88 
S.Ct. 313, 19 L.Ed.2d 358 (1967). 
December 5, 1967: A hearing was held 
before the district court on the validity of 
the subpoenas. At that hearing, the 
McSurelys learned, for the first time, that 
John Brick, a Subcommittee investigator, 
had taken copies of 234 documents to 
Washington and that those copies were still 
in the Subcommittee's possession. Brick 
refused to tell the McSurelys which docu-
ments the Subcommittee had. 
December 13, 1967: The district court 
again ordered compliance with the subpoe-
nas. 
January 29, 1968: The Supreme Court 
granted another stay, reserving for future 
determination whether it had jurisdiction of 
the appeal from the district court. 390 
U.S. 914 (1968). 
March 18, 1968: The Supreme Court dis-
missed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, 
but continued the stay so that the McSure-
lys could seek review in the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit. 390 U.S. 412 
(1968). 
July 29, 1968: The Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit reversed the district 
court's order that Ratliff comply with cne 
subpoenas. In a short per curiam opinion, 
the court held that the material mu^ * be 
returned to the McSurelys because th. dis-
trict court's right to retain the material 
expired once the time for appeal had 
elapsed. McSurely v. Ratliff, 398 F.2d 817 
(6th Cir.1968). 
3) Contempt Proceedings. After the 
McSurelys refused to comply with the sub-
poenas, the Senate approved a resolution 
authorizing the Justice Department to pros-
ecute them for contempt of Congress. 
S.Res. 191, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 
They were convicted in district court, but 
this court reversed their convictions on ap-
peal. United States v. McSurely, 473 F.2d 
1178 (D.C.Cir.1972). 
4) Suit for Damages. The McSurelys and 
several other plaintiffs initially brought the 
instant suit against various Senate defend-
ants to prevent them from proceeding with 
the criminal contempt prosecution and to 
seek damages. This court considered three 
interlocutory appeals arising from this law-
suit. 
McSurely I, 426 F.2d 664 (D.C.Cir.1970): 
The district court stayed all proceedings in 
the suit until final disposition of the con-
tempt prosecution. We reversed that order 
as overbroad and remanded for further 
proceedings. 
McSurely II: Following this court's deci-
sion in McSurely I, the McSurelys amended 
their complaint to proceed on the damages 
claims against various Senate defendants 
and Thomas Ratliff. The Senate defend-
ants sought dismissal of the complaint on 
the ground that they were immune from 
liability under the Speech or Debate 
Clause. The district court denied their mo-
tion. A panel of this court reversed in part 
and affirmed in part. That panel decision, 
which is reported at 521 F.2d 1024, was 
vacated by the en banc court. This court, 
sitting en banc, unanimously agreed to dis-
miss most of the claims against the Senate 
defendants, but was equally divided over 
certain other claims. Those claims were 
remanded to the district court. 553 F.2d 
1277 (D.C.Cir.1976) (en banc). The Senate 
defendants petitioned for a writ of certiora-
ri, which the Supreme Cour granted. 434 
U.S. 888, 98 S.Ct. 260, 54 L.Ed.2d 173 
(1977). Following oral argument, however, 
FEHRENBACHER 
Cite as 759 RSupp. 
served upon physician's representatives. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 4, 25, 28 U.S.C.A. 
4. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>2515 
Genuine issue of material fact existed 
as to whether patient's injuries were rea-
sonably ascertainable and whether medical 
malpractice action was brought within two 
years of date at which injuries were rea-
sonably ascertainable, precluding summary 
judgment on issue of whether action was 
barred by Kansas two-year statute of limi-
tations. *K.S.A. 60-513, 60-513(a)(7), (c). 
5. Damages <s=>93 
Claim for punitive damages does not 
survive wrongdoer's death under Kansas 
law. 
Jerry K. Levy, Topeka, Kan., for plain-
tiff. 
William Tinker, Jr., McDonald, Tinker, 
Skaer, Quinn & Herrington, Wichita, Kan., 
for defendant. 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
CROW, District Judge. 
This is a diversity of citizenship medical 
malpractice case arising out of treatment 
provided by Robert Quackenbush, M.D., to 
Wayne Fehrenbacher, from mid-1973 
through mid-1982, in St. John, Kansas. 
Fehrenbacher claims that Quackenbush's 
negligent prescribing of drugs has injured 
him and caused him to become addicted to 
various medications. Fehrenbacher also 
claims that Quackenbush was negligent in 
failing to refer him to other medical physi-
cians. Fehrenbacher also alleges that 
Quackenbush committed fraud. Fehren-
bacher seeks both compensatory and puni-
tive damages. 
This matter comes before the court upon 
Quackenbush's motion to dismiss based 
upon Fehrenbacher's failure to move to 
substitute, as a defendant, a representative 
of the decedent or his estate within 90 days 
of the filing of the suggestion of death as 
required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a). In the al-
ternative, Quackenbush moves for summa-
ry judgment. Fehrenbacher requests an 
order allowing the substitution of Quacken-
bush's estate as a defendant. The court, 
having considered the briefs of counsel and 
v. QUACKENBUSH 1517 
1516 (D.Kan. 1991) 
applicable law is now prepared to rule on 
the pending motions. 
Motion to Dismiss 
[1] Robert Quackenbush died during 
the pendency of this action. On June 15, 
1990, the firm representing Quackenbush 
in this case filed a suggestion of death 
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a). On Novem-
ber 1, 1990, the firm representing Quacken-
bush in this case filed a motion to dismiss 
based upon Fehrenbacher's failure to file a 
motion to substitute a representative of the 
decedent or his estate. On November 13, 
1990, Fehrenbacher responded to Quacken-
bush's motion to dismiss. In that response, 
Fehrenbacher argues that Quackenbush 
has failed to make a valid suggestion of 
death due to the fact that the pleading does 
not identify the representative of the suc-
cessor who could be properly substituted. 
In the alternative, Fehrenbacher asks the 
court to extend the period of substitution 
and allow Fehrenbacher to file a substitut-
ed party out of time based upon his "excus-
able neglect." 
Quackenbush responds that Rule 25 does 
not require the party filing the suggestion 
of death to indicate the identity of the 
substituted party. Quackenbush states 
that "[i]n this case, defendant's counsel 
could not have identified the person or per-
sons to be substituted parties because such 
persons have not been made known to de-
fense counsel. No one claiming to be an 
executor or administrator of Dr. Quacken-
bush's estate has contacted this counsel." 
Quackenbush also contends that Fehren-
bacher has not demonstrated excusable ne-
glect. 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a)(1) provides: 
If a party dies and the claim is not there 
by extinguished, the court may order 
substitution of the proper parties. The 
motion for substitution may be made by 
any party or by the successors or repre-
sentatives of the deceased party and, to-
gether with the notice of hearing, shall 
be served on the parties as provided in 
Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in 
the manner provided in Rule 4 for the 
service of a summons, and may be served 
in any judicial district. Unless the mo-
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Likewise here, if as determined in VE 
Holding, Congress intended § 1391(c) to 
apply to § 1400(b) corporate defendants, it 
is not unreasonable to assume that Con-
gress was aware that the concept of part-
nership residence would be similarly con-
strued. 
I conclude that the first test for venue 
under § 1400(b) with respect to a partner-
ship defendant is whether it was subject to 
personal jurisdiction in the district of suit 
at the time the action was commenced.9 
Polaris concedes that this court "has the 
authority to exercise personal jurisdiction." 
(See Polaris' additional briefing, p. 1, n. 1.) 
Therefore, Colorado is an appropriate ven-
ue for the action. 
//. Case Transfer under 28 
U.S.C. § 1406(a). 
Polaris has moved to transfer the case to 
Minnesota pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). 
Under that statute, a court may dismiss a 
case when venue is improper, or may trans-
fer it to a district where it could have been 
filed originally. Because venue is proper in 
Colorado, and there are no other persuasive 
reasons for transfer, Polaris' motion to 
transfer is denied. 
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that: 
(1) the defendant's motion to dismiss for 
improper venue or to transfer the 
case is denied; and 
(2) the parties are ordered to meet and 
confer within eleven days of this or-
der in a good faith effort to settle 
this matter and thereby avoid further 
costly and time consuming litigation. 
The parties shall consider alternate 
dispute resolution. They shall report 
the results of their negotiations in 
writing to this court within fifteen 
days, and shall state whether they 
are pursuing alternate dispute resolu-
tion and whether a settlement confer-
ence before a Magistrate Judge 
would facilitate settlement. 
9. While this holding effectively moots 
§ 1400(b)'s second test with respect to partner-
Wayne FEHRENBACHER, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Robert QUACKENBUSH, Defendant. 
No. 89-1348-C. 
United States District Court, 
D. Kansas. 
March 6, 1991. 
Patient brought medical malpractice 
action against physician. The District 
Court, Crow, J., held that: (1) suggestion 
of death filed following death of physician 
was invalid; (2) patient's motion for substi-
tution of parties was invalid; and (3) issues 
of fact existed precluding summary judg-
ment on issue of whether action was 
barred by limitations. 
Ordered accordingly. 
1. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>365 
Suggestion of death filed in diversity 
medical malpractice action following death 
of defendant physician was invalid where 
suggestion was made by attorney who rep-
resented physician in defense of medical 
malpractice action but who did not repre-
sent his estate and suggestion was not 
properly served on physician's estate. Fed. 
Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 4, 25, 28 U.S.C.A. 
2. Federal Civil Procedure <£»362 
Rules governing substitution of proper 
parties upon death of party implicitly im-
poses a requirement that to be valid, sug-
gestion of death identify representative or 
successor who may be substituted as a 
party. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 25, 28 U.S. 
C.A. 
3. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>365 
Medical malpractice plaintiffs motion 
for substitution for defendant physician 
who died was; deficient where motion did 
not name representative of physician's es-
tate nor did it appear that motion for sub-
stitution and notice of hearing had been 
ships, that test remains operative as to defen-
dants who are individuals. 
FEHRENBACHER 
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substitution of the proper parties in place 
of the deceased party. However, 25(a)(1) 
provides that the action is to be dis-
missed as to the deceased party, unless 
substitution is made not later than ninety 
days after the death is suggested upon 
the record. Thus it is only when the 
suggestion of the death upon the record 
has been made that Rule 25(a)(1) now 
provides a time limit upon substitution. 
Moreover, the Rule provides for the ser-
vice of suggestion of the death upon both 
parties and non-parties to the action, at-
tempting to assure the parties to the 
action and other concerned persons of 
notice of the death so that they may take 
appropriate action to make substitution 
for the deceased party. Thus, though a 
time limit is still required for making this 
substitution, it is measured from the 
time the suggestion of the death has 
been served upon the parties to the ac-
tion and other interested persons, not 
from the time the deceased party died. 
3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, Moore's Feder-
al Practice 1125.06 (2d ed. 1990). In 
Quackenbush's brief, counsel states: "At 
this point, the administrator or executor of 
Dr. Quackenbush's estate has no informa-
tion, at least to defense counsel's knowl-
edge, regarding this action." Therefore it 
is clear, in this unusual factual scenario, 
that Quackenbush's own estate has not 
been given proper notice of this pending 
action, and in this court's opinion the ninety 
day limitation has not yet started to run. 
[2] As a final comment on this issue, 
the court notes that Rule 25 does not ex-
plicitly require the party making the sug-
gestion of death to identify the decedent's 
representative. As the parties note, some 
jurisdictions hold that a valid suggestion of 
death must identify the representative or 
successor who may be substituted as a 
party. See McSurely v. McClellan, 753 
F.2d 88, 98 (D.C.Cir.1985). In reality, Rule 
25 implicitly imposes such a requirement. 
By requiring service of the suggestion of 
death on parties and non-parties, the rule 
implicitly allocates the burden of identify-
ing the substitute party to the party mak-
ing the suggestion of death. 
Quackenbush's motion to dismiss is de-
nied. 
v. QUACKENBUSH 1519 
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Fehrenbacher's Motion for Substitution 
[3] On November 15, 1990, Fehrenbach-
er filed a motion for substitution request-
ing the court to "enter an order substitut-
ing the estate of Robert Quackenbush as 
the property [sic] party defendant." Feh-
renbacher's motion for substitution is defi-
cient under Rule 25 because the motion for 
substitution does not name the representa-
tive of Quackenbush's estate nor does it 
appear that the motion for substitution and 
notice of hearing have been served upon 
Quackenbush's representatives in compli-
ance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 4. 
A motion for substitution for a deceased 
party may be made by any party or by 
the successors or representatives of the 
deceased party. It is not necessary that 
a suggestion of death be made on the 
record before a motion for substitution 
can be made. 
The motion for substitution, together 
with the notice of hearing on the motion, 
must be served on all the parties to the 
action, not just the opposing party, as 
provided in Rule 5. It must be served on 
persons not parties in the manner provid-
ed in Rule 4 for the service of a sum-
mons. Thus the procedures of Rule 4 
must be followed in serving the motion 
on the representative or successor of a 
deceased party. 
7C Wright & Miller & Kane, Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure, Civil § 1956 at 550-
551. Therefore, Fehrenbacher's motion for 
substitution is denied. The court will con-
sider a new motion for substitution if that 
motion is made in compliance with Rule 25. 
Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment is appropriate when 
the movant can demonstrate that there is 
no genuine issue of material fact and is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 
242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Summary judgment 
procedure is properly regarded not as a 
disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather 
as an integral part of the Federal Rules as 
a whole, which are designed 'to secure the 
just, speedy and inexpensive determination 
of every action.'" Celotex Corp. v. Ca-
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tion for substitution is made not later 
than 90 days after the death is suggested 
upon the record by service of a state-
ment of the fact of the death as provided 
herein for the service of the motion, the 
action shall be dismissed as to the de-
ceased party. 
Because it is a fairly infrequent occurrence 
that one of the litigants to a case dies 
during its pendency, Rule 25 has not been 
the subject of much discussion in reported 
cases. 
Prior to its amendment in 1963, Rule 
25(a)(1) required a court to dismiss an 
action if no motion for substitution had 
been filed within two years of the death 
of a party. See, e.g., Rende v. Kay, 415 
F.2d 983, 984 (D.C.Cir.1969). In order to 
alleviate the inequities caused by the in-
flexibility of this rule, see id. at 984, Rule 
25(a)(1) was amended to require a motion 
for substitution to be filed within ninety 
days from the time a suggestion of death 
is filed in the district court and properly 
served. 
Grandebouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 836 
(10th Cir.1990). See United States v. Mil-
ler Bros. Constr. Co., 505 F.2d 1031 (10th 
Cir.1974). See also 7C C. Wright & A. 
Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and 
Procedure, Civil § 1955, at 542 (1986). In 
In re McClay, slip no. 88-1069-C, 1990 WL 
66605 (D.Kan. April 26, 1990), this court 
had occasion to discuss and consider Rule 
25 in the context of an appeal from the 
bankruptcy court. 
The court concludes that on the record 
before it no valid suggestion of death has 
yet been filed with the court. Two reasons 
support this conclusion. First, the sugges-
tion of death was made by the attorney 
representing Quackenbush in defense of 
this action. "[T]he attorney for the de-
ceased party may not make the suggestion 
of death since he is not himself a party to 
the action and, since his authority to repre-
sent the deceased terminated on the death, 
he is not a 'representative of the deceased 
party' of the sort contemplated by the 
rule." 7C C. Wright & A. Miller & M. 
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, 
Civil §1955, at 545. See Faris*
 v r L 
burg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958 Z Cir f S " 
It is apparent from Quackenh,,«,k-
 L . 
of tins acton does not represent Quacker! 
bush's estate. Therefore, the sL^Z 
of death was not made by a party
 o r ^ 
sentative as required by the rule. In fact* 
is not entirely clear to the court how the 
firm representing Quackenbush in this ac 
tion continues to represent the decedent 
It is possible that the firm representing 
Quackenbush in this action was retained bv 
Quackenbush^ insurer. However, even if 
that assumption is correct, the insurance 
company in this case is not a named party 
While the insurance company may be con-
tractually obligated to continue represent-
ing Quackenbush in this action, it is not 
clear from the record as it exists that the 
firm who made the suggestion of death 
was in fact a "representative of the de-
ceased party" within the meaning of Rule 
25. 
In any event, while the suggestion of 
death in this case is written in conformity 
with Form 30 found in the Appendix of 
Forms to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure,1 it is clear that Rule 25 has not been 
satisfied as the suggestion of death has not 
been served in compliance with Fed.R. 
Civ.P. 4 on Quackenbush's representatives. 
See Grandebouche, 913 F.2d at 837 (non-
parties, specifically the successors or repre-
sentatives of the deceased party's estate, 
must be served pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4). 
[Rule 25] provides that the suggestion of 
the death upon the record is made "by 
service of a statement of the fact of 
death as provide herein for the service of 
the motion [for substitution]," i.e. by ser-
vice upon parties to the action as provid-
ed in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties 
in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the 
service of a summons; and such service 
may be made in any judicial district. No 
time limit is placed by the amended Rule 
upon when the death must be so suggest-
ed. Nor is the suggestion of the death 
upon the record a prerequisite to the 
motion under amended Rule 25(a) for 
1. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 84. 
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of action for medical malpractice is deemed 
to have accrued under K.S.A. 60-513(c), the 
matter becomes an issue for determination 
by the trier of fact" 237 Kan. 410, Syl. 
112, 701 P.2d 1301. The court also com-
mented: "The symptoms of the injury were 
known to the plaintiff, but the fact of inju-
ry was not reasonably or immediately as-
certainable." 237 Kan. at 415, 701 P.2d 
1301. The court concluded that the plain-
tiffs cause of action was timely filed. 
The sole issue presented by this portion 
of Quackenbush's motion for summary 
judgment is whether Fehrenbacher 
brought his cause of action within two 
years of the date at which his injuries were 
reasonably ascertainable. The court, hav-
ing reviewed the submitted portions of the 
depositions, concludes that the issue of 
whether Fehrenbacher's injuries were rea-
sonably ascertainable is a question of fact 
and is not amenable to summary adjudica-
tion. 
Quackenbush's motion for summary 
judgment based on the statute of limita-
tions is denied. 
Punitive Damages 
[5] Fehrenbacher alleges that Quacken-
bush committed fraud and seeks both com-
pensatory and punitive damages. Quack-
enbush moves for summary judgment on 
the issue of punitive damages. Quacken-
bush contends that the purpose of punitive 
damages is to punish the wrongdoer. 
Quackenbush contends that because he is 
dead, he cannot be punished. Quacken-
bush contends that as a matter of law, 
punitive damages cannot be entered 
against a dead tortfeasor. 
Fehrenbacher acknowledges that one of 
the purposes of punitive damages is to 
punish the wrongdoer. Fehrenbacher also 
acknowledges that because Quackenbush is 
dead, he cannot be punished by an award 
of punitive damages. Fehrenbacher does 
contend, however, that the ultimate pur-
pose of punitive damages is to deter and 
restrain others from the commission of like 
wrongs and that an award of punitive dam-
ages in this case, albeit that the alleged 
tortfeasor is dead, would serve that pur-
pose. 
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Neither party has identified any case ap-
plying Kansas law that directly addresses 
this issue. The majority rule is that a 
claim for punitive damages does not sur-
vive the death of the wrongdoer. Barnes 
v. Smith, 305 F.2d 226, 231 (10th Cir.1962); 
see Annotation, Survival of Punitive Dam-
ages Claim, 30 A.L.R. 4th 707 (1984). A 
minority of states allow a claim for puni-
tive damages to survive the death of the 
wrongdoer. See, e.g., Ellis v. Zuck, 546 
F.2d 643 (5th Cir.1977) (applying Alabama 
law). 
Recently, this court, applying Kansas 
law, was presented with the issue of 
whether a claim for punitive damages sur-
vives the wrongdoer's death. In Elam v. 
Williams, 753 F.Supp. 1530, 1541 (D.Kan. 
1990), the alleged wrongdoer died and his 
representative moved for summary judg-
ment on the issue of punitive damages, 
making the same arguments that Quacken-
bush presents in this case. The plaintiff in 
Elam did not respond to the defendant's 
argument. This court concluded: "Since 
the case law in defendants' brief supports 
the propositions for which they were cited 
and plaintiffs do not counter with any ar-
guments or authority, the court grants this 
motion as uncontested/' Id. at 1541. 
In Wisker v. Hart, 244 Kan. 36, 766 P.2d 
168 (1988), the Supreme Court of Kansas 
restated the law governing the award of 
punitive in Kansas. 
Punitive damages may be awarded when-
ever the elements of fraud, malice, gross 
negligence, or oppression mingle in the 
controversy. Tetuan v. A.H. Robins 
Co., 241 Kan. [441] at 481 [738 P.2d 1210 
(1987) ]. Punitive damages are awarded 
to punish the wrongdoer for his mali-
cious, vindictive, or willful and wanton 
invasion of another's rights, with the ulti-
mate purpose being to restrain and deter 
others from the commission of similar 
wrongs. 
244 Kan. at 41, 766 P.2d 168. 
The court concludes that Kansas would 
follow the majority rule and not allow an 
award of punitive damages against the es-
tate of the wrongdoer. Awarding punitive 
damages would vicariously punish the heirs 
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trett, All U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 
2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R. 
Civ.P. 1). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). 
Statute of Limitations 
[4] The parties stipulate that the law 
governing all issues of this case is the law 
of the State of Kansas. 
Fehrenbacher commenced his first 
screening panel review on May 15, 1984. 
Quackenbush moves for summary judg-
ment, contending that Fehrenbacher did 
not bring this cause of action within the 
two-year statute of limitations governing 
medical malpractice actions in Kansas. 
Quackenbush contends that the uncontro-
verted facts indicate Fehrenbacher failed to 
bring this cause of action within two years 
following the date he was aware of his 
drug addiction. Quackenbush contends 
that Fehrenbacher was aware of his injury 
in the early spring of 1982. 
Fehrenbacher responds that summary 
judgment is inappropriate for several rea-
sons. Fehrenbacher contends that Quack-
enbush is, at most, only entitled to partial 
summary judgment. Fehrenbacher con-
tends that he is seeking compensation for 
injuries beyond those suffered due to drug 
addiction, and therefore even if he was 
aware of his injury before May 15, 1984, he 
is still entitled to proceed with his other 
claims. Fehrenbacher also contends that 
he has brought his cause of action for drug 
addiction within the two-year statute of 
limitations. 
Generally, a medical malpractice action 
must be brought within the two-year stat-
ute of limitations under K.S.A. 60-513(a)(7) 
and (c).2 White v. VinZant, 13 Kan.App.2d 
467, Syl. 1!1, 773 P.2d 1169 (1989). K.S.A. 
60-513 provides in pertinent part: 
(a) The following actions shall be 
brought within two (2) years: 
(7) An action arising out of the rendering 
of or failure to render professional ser-
vices by a health care provider, not aris-
ing on contract. 
2. K.S.A. 60-513 was amended on July 1, 1987. 
See L.1987, ch. 222, § 1. The amendment ef-
fected no substantive change in the relevant 
(c) A cause of action arising out of th 
rendering of or the failure to render pro* 
fessional services by a health care pro-
vider shall be deemed to have accrued at 
the time of the occurrence of the
 a,* 
giving rise to the cause of action, unless 
the fact of injury is not reasonably ascer-
tainable until some time after the initial 
act, then the period of limitation shall not 
commence until the fact of injury be-
comes reasonably ascertainable to the in-
jured party, but in no event shall such an 
action be commenced more than four (4) 
years beyond the time of the act giving 
rise to the cause of action. 
In Cleveland v. Wong, 237 Kan. 410, 701 
P.2d 1301 (1985), the plaintiff sued the de-
fendant, Dr. Wong, alleging that Dr. Wong 
had negligently performed surgery result-
ing in incontinence and impotency. The 
jury returned a verdict in plaintiffs favor. 
On appeal, Dr. Wong contended that the 
plaintiffs cause of action was barred by 
the statute of limitations. 
Dr. Wong contended that the plaintiff 
was aware of his injuries more than two 
years before commencing his suit. The 
initial surgery was performed on May 19, 
1978; the plaintiff filed his cause of action 
on August 14, 1980. The issue of whether 
the plaintiffs cause of action was barred 
by the statute of limitations was submitted 
to the jury. Dr. Wong contended that be-
cause the plaintiff knew he was incontinent 
and impotent immediately after surgery, 
the fact of injury was reasonably ascertain-
able to him. The evidence also indicated, 
however, that incontinence and impotence 
were normal immediately following TUR 
surgery. "Thus, while plaintiff knew that 
he was both incontinent and impotent im-
mediately after surgery, he had no reason 
to suspect that those conditions were per-
manent or that those conditions were the 
result of any negligence or malpractice on 
the part of the defendant." 237 Kan. at 
414, 701 P.2d 1301. 
The court concluded that "[wjhere there 
is conflicting evidence as to when a cause 
portions of the statute, and in any event the 
amendment is not relevant to this case. 
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of the wrongdoer and would not serve to 
deter potential tortfeasors. See Thompson 
v. Estate ofPetroff, 319 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 
1982) (court rejects argument that potential 
tortfeasor will be deterred from commit-
ting an intentional tort by fear that his 
heirs will be deprived of part of his estate 
as a result of estate's liability for punitive 
damages). 
Quackenbush's motion for summary 
judgment on the issue of punitive damages 
is granted. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that 
Quackenbush's motion to dismiss (Dk. 65) 
is denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that 
Quackenbush's motion for summary judg-
ment (Dk. 51) based on the statute of limi-
tations is denied. Quackenbush's motion 
for partial summary judgment (Dk. 51) on 
the issue of punitive damages is granted. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Feh-
renbacher's motion for substitution (Dk. 
67) is denied. 
Louis A. WHITTEN, Larry J. Warren, 





Civ. A. No. 88-2637-0. 
United States District Court, 
D. Kansas. 
March 19, 1991. 
Discharged employees brought action 
against former employer alleging age dis-
crimination, breach of contract, and fraudu-
lent misrepresentation. Employer moved 
for summary judgment. The District 
Court, Earl E. O'Connor, Chief Judge, held 
that: (1) discharged employees established 
prima facie case of age discrimination; (2) 
genuine issue of material fact existed as to 
whether employer's stated reason for pre-
ferring to keep younger employees over 
discharged employees during reduction-in-
force was a mere pretext for age discrimi-
nation, precluding judgment; (3) genuine 
issue of material fact existed as to whether 
employer's stated reason for failing to re-
hire discharged employees was a pretext 
for age discrimination, precluding summa-
ry judgment; and (4) genuine issue of ma-
terial fact existed as to whether there was 
an implied contract of employment which 
was violated by termination of employees, 
precluding summary judgment. 
Motion granted in part and denied in 
part. 
1. Federal Civil Procedure <3=>2544 
If party moving for summary judg-
ment does not bear burden of proof, he 
must show that there is absence of evi-
dence to support nonmoving party's case 
and that burden is met when moving party 
identifies those portions of record which 
demonstrate absence of material fact. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.C.A. 
2. Federal Civil Procedure <s=*2544 
Once party moving for summary judg-
ment shows that no genuine issue of mate-
rial fact exists, burden shifts to party re-
sisting motion who must set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial, and it is not enough for party 
opposing properly supported motion to rest 
on mere allegations or denials of his plead-
ing. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56(c), 28 U.S. 
C.A. 
3. Federal Civil Procedure <8=>2470.1 
To preclude summary judgment, genu-
ine factual issues must exist that can be 
resolved only by finder of fact because 
they may reasonably be resolved in favor 
of either party. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 
56(c), 28 U.S.C.A. 
4. Civil Rights <s=>168 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) is remedial and humanitarian legis-
lation and should be liberally interpreted to 
effectuate congressional purpose of ending 
age discrimination in employment. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 
§ 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
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David P. Madden, Fisher, Patterson, Say-
ler & Smith. Overland Park, KS, Richard F. 
Kane, Blakeney & Alexander, Charlotte, NC, 
for defendant Lane Company Inc. 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
VAN BE3BER, Chief Judge. 
This case is before the court upon the 
plaintiffs motion to dismiss without prejudice 
(Doc. 9) and upon the defendant's motion to 
dismiss with prejudice (Doc. 10). For the 
reasons stated below, both motions are de-
nied. 
This wrongful discharge, breach of con-
tract, and retaliatory discharge case was nied 
in October 1995 and removed to federal 
court. On March 13. 1996. counsel for plain-
tiff fled a suggestion of death, notifying the 
court of the plaintiffs death. 
Cross-motions for dismissal have been 
nied. Counsel for the deceased plaintiff ar-
gues that the dismissal should be without 
prejudice to be fair to the plaintiffs heirs. 
The defendant argues that dismissal should 
be with prejudice because no motion for sub-
stitution of party was filed within 90 days of 
the filing of the suggestion of death and 
because the plaintiffs claims should not sur-
vive him. 
[1] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
25(a)(1), which governs substitution of parties 
in the event of death, provides: 
If a party dies and the claim is not 
thereby extinguished, the court may order 
substitution of the proper parties. The 
motion for substitution may be made by 
any party or by the successors or repre-
sentatives of the deceased party and, to-
gether with the notice of hearing, shall be 
served on the parties as provided in Rule 5 
and upon persons not parties in the man-
ner provided in Rule 4 for the service of a 
summons, and may be served in any judi-
cial district. Unless the motion for substi-
tution is made not later than 90 days after 
the death is suggested upon the record by 
1. In Fehrenbacher. 739 F.Supp. at 1519, Judge 
Crow noted: "Rule 25 does not explicitly require 
the party making the suggestion of death to iden-
tify the decedent's representative— In reality. 
Rule 25 Lrnplicidy imposes such a requirement. 
service of a statement of the fact 
death as provided herein for the se-^ ?^ 
the motion, the action shall be aismisLjr,f 
to the deceased party. '4 •* 
The 90-day time limit for Sling a mot: 
substitute begins to run after a valid s u ^ 
tion of death has been made. Gmndta^ 
v. LovelL 913 F.2d S35, S36-37 (lOflTj* 
1990); Enfingerv. WolfCreek Nuclear•(>!"*' 
azing Corp., No. 95-4071. 1996 WL *>?^ 
•3, n. 3 (D.Kam Apr. 12, 1996); Hi^*' 
Griffiths, No. 90-2024.1991 WL 132333 "•* \ 
(D.Kan. Jul. 9, 1991). '' "2 
[2] For purposes of the pending rr.0Kf . 
the suggestion of death on record. 
t^iic.*: 
counsel for the deceased plaintiff 2eti. is» 
valid. Counsel did not purport to inake * 
suggestion of death on behalf of the dec* 
dent's heirs or successors or as a repress--
tive of his estate. * 4[77ne attorney for ^  
deceased party may not make the suggest 
of death since he is not himself a parr.* to ^ 
action and, since his authority to repress 
the deceased terminated on the death, he •• 
not a "representative of the deceased parr.-' 
of the sort contemplated by the role.'" f & 
renbacherv. Quackenbusk, 759 F.Supp. 15^ 
1518 (D.Kan.1991) (quoting 7C Charles JL 
Wright et aL, Federal Practice & Procedun 
§ 1955, at 545 (2d ed. 1986)); see Emngn. 
1996 WL 254609 at *3, n. 3; Hipperi 1991 
WL 152S33 at •!. Additionally, the sugg* 
tion of death does not appear to have bes 
served on the successors or representative 
of Steve Hiisabeck who are not parties u 
this action in the manner provided by Fed 
R.Ch\P. 4, as Rule 25(a)(1) requires. See 
GmTidbouche, 913 F.2d at 837; Fehmbath-
er, 759 F.Supp. at 1518. Accordingly, the 
time for filing a motion to substitute a proper 
party has not run.1 
[3] The defendant also argues that the 
plaintiff's causes of action should not sunt* 
him because they are personal in nature and 
because the plaintiff had not testified prior a 
his death. See Carter v. City of Emp<m 
Kan., 543 F5upp. 354, 356 (Diani92) 
By requiring service of the suggestion of doffl 
on parties and non-parties, the rule impuea? 
allocates the burden of identifying the subsao* 
party to the party making the suggesnon * 
death." 
BDDLSABECK v. LANE CO- INC. 
ClicatlM FJU>. 313 (DJCaa. 1M*) 
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Ha?) 
li A party seeking attorneys' fees must 
comply with the requirements of D.Kan Rule 
5t2 and FedJl.Civi>. 54(d)(2) in order to be 
entitled to a fee award. Law v. National 
Coikcicte Athletic Assyru No. 94-2Q53-KHV, 
1956 WL 10432S, at "5 (D.Kan. Jan. 5,1996). 
[3] On July 19. 1996, the court directed 
Lie defendants to show cause by July 29t 
1996. why their morion should not be dis-
cussed for failure to file a statement of con-
suitanon and memorandum in support of 
tneir motion. As of this date, the defendants 
have not responded. 
IT IS THEREFORE B Y THE COURT 
ORDERED that the defendants' Motion for 
ATOU of Attorneys' Fees and Expenses 
(Doc. 69) is denied. 
Co |trr»«UMBL?SYSTlM> 
Steve ffiLSABECK, Plaint i f f 
v. 
LANE COMPANY, INC., Defendant 
Civil Action No. 95-2516-GTV. 
United States District Court, 
D.Kansas. 
Aug. 19, 1996. 
tour. 
F
°nner employee brought suit in state 
^ against employer, alleging wrongful 
T / ^ e , breach of contract, and retaliatory 
^ ^ under Title VII and the Kansas 
^ gainst Discrimination. After removal, 
^ j ^ l for plaintiff Sled suggestion of death. 
£ m°ved to dismiss -without prejudice. 
^Plover 
Tb» moved to dismiss -with prejudice. 
M , m c t Court, Van Bebber, Chief 
I j 3 ^eld that: (1) suggestion of death 
^ -
v
 counsel for deceased plaintiff was not 
Vy*^ ^ n o t trigger running of 90-day 
^ ^
l
 for filing motion to substitute; (2) 
Hw Kansas law, plaintiffs causes of action 
^
e d
 his death; and (3) motion to dismiss 
ut
 Prejudice filed by counsel for plain-
tiff would be denied, where there was noth-
ing in the record to establish the authority of 
or authorization for counsel to file any plead-
ings in case. 
Motions denied. 
1. Federal Civil Procedure <5=>363.1 
Ninety-day time limit for filing a motion 
to substitute for deceased pany beg^-ns to 
run after valid suggestion of death has been 
made. Fedituies Civ.Proc.Ruie 25(a)(1), 28* 
U.S.CA. 
2. Federal CMl Procedure c=»363.1 
Suggestion of death filed by counsel for 
deceased plaintiff was not vaiic. and thus 
time for filing motion to substitute had not 
run, where counsel did not purport to make 
suggestion on behalf of decedent's heirs or 
successors or as representative of his estate; 
moreover, suggestion of death was not 
served on successors or representatives of 
deceased plaintiff, who were not parties to 
actior. in manner required by evil procedure 
rule. Fed.?vules CivProcRuies 4, 25(a)(1), 
28 U.S.CA. 
3. Abatement and Revival <s=>58(.5) 
Under Kansas law, causes of action for 
wrongful discharge, breach of contract, and 
retaliatory discharge brought under the Kan-
sas Act Against Discrimination and Title VII 
survived death of plaintiff. Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. § 701 et seq.. 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e e t 
seq.; 1LSA. 44-1001 et seq., 60-1801. 
4. Attorney and Client o=>63, 76(2) 
Attorney-client relationship is one of 
agency and terminates upon client's death. 
5. Federal Civil Procedure <3>1825 
Motion to dismiss without prejudice filed 
by counsel for deceased plaintiff would be 
denied, where there was nothing in the rec-
ord to establish authority of or authorization 
for counsel to file any pleadings in case. 
Rodney K. Murrow, Herron & Lewis, Kan-
sas City, MO, Donald P. Herron, Herron & 
Lewis, Kansas City, MO, for plaintiff Steve 
HQsabeck. 
WALCO INVESTMENTS, INC T. THENEN 
Cite u 168 FJLD. 315 (S.DJ^IJL 1996) 
(§ 19S1 claim is personal in nature and does 
no: survive plamuffs death under K.S-A. 
§ 60-1801, statute for survival of actions in 
Kansas; 
315 
WALCO INVESTMENTS, INC. 
et aJL Plaintiffs, 
The court finds the argument unpersua-
sive In his complaint, the plamnff alleged 
wrongful discharge, breach of contract, and 
rerahatory discharge under the Kansas Act 
Agamst Discnrr.inanon, K.SA. § 44-1001 et 
sec and Title VIL 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. 
See, eg., Anspach v. Tomkins Indus., /TIC, 
817 F.Supp. 1499, 1510 (DJian.1993) (Title 
VII ^um survives plaintiffs death under 
Kansas survival of acuons^ statute, KS.A. 
§ 60-1801), afd. 51 F.3d 2S5 (lOtn Cir.1995) 
(Taoie;, Price v Holmes. 198 Kan. 100, SyL 
6.422 P.2d 976 (1967) ("At common law, and 
U2 tms state, a cause of acnon sounding in 
contract survives the death of either part}* 
*r.ere uie breach thereof results in loss or 
injury to a property right."); Pntman v. 
McDowell Rice & Smith, Chartered 12 Kan. 
App.2d 603, 611, 752 PJ2d 711 (contract claim 
survives plaintiffs death), rev. denied, 243 
Kan. 780 (198S). 
The defendant's motion 
prejudice is denied. 
to dismiss with 
&5] There is nothing in the record to 
establisn the authority of or authonzation for 
u^nse! for the deceased plaintiff to file any 
Pleadings in this case, including the pending 
Motion to dismiss. The attorney-client rela-
onsnip is one of agency and terminates 
upon the client's death. State v. Dickens, 
4 4
 Kan. 98, 102, 519 PJ>d 750 (1974). Ac-
fQingiy, counsel for the decedent s motion 
^nuss without prejudice is denied. 
0]|T IS, THEREFORE, BY THE COURT 
,
 ERED that the plaintiffs and the de-
10, 
v. 
Kenneth THENEN, et al„ Defendants. 
No. 93-25S4-Ch\ 
United States District Court, 
S.D. Florida. 
June 27, 1996. 
Representatives of putanve class of in-
vestor's brouent action against promoters, 
law firm, and numerous other parnes related 
to operation of alleged Ponza scneme for se-
curines fraud. Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizacons (RICO) violations, 
and common-! "v fraud. On plaintiffs* monon 
for class cer-iication, the District Court, 
Moreno, J., held that: (1) plaintiffs estab-
lished numerosity requirement for global 
class; (2) plaintiffs established commonality 
requirement for global class; (3) plaintiffs 
met typicality requirement for global class; 
(4) plaintiffs met requirement of adequate 
representauon for global class; (5) plaintiffs 
were enntled to presumpnon of reliance on 
securities fraud claims; (6) common issues 
regarding securities fraud, RICO, and com-
mon-law fraud rflflfms predominated action; 
(7) plaintiff's established superiority require-
ment for global class; and (8) representa-
tives met certification requirements for five 
subclasses to litigate secunnes registration 
and prospectus violations. 
Monon granted. 
c
*nt's cross-motions to dismiss (Doc. 9 & 1. Federal Civil Procedure o»l72 
j
 ^e denied. 
^ ^ SO ORDERED. 
( O | W NU*B!F SYSTEM > 
Party seeking to certify class bears bur-
den of proof on all certificanon issues. Fed. 
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23, 28 U.S.CJL 
2. Federal Civil Procedure C=>176 
Each putative subclass must indepen-
dently meet requirements for certification of 
class. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23, 28 
TLS.CJL 
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Michael McCarthy, Buffalo, N.Y., Eliza-
beth Fink, Brooklyn, N.Y., Michael 
Deutsch, Chicago, 111., for plaintiffs. 
Jerome Rosenberg, Napanoch, N.Y., pro 
se. 
Herbert Blyden, Buffalo, N.Y., pro se. 
John Stenger, Buffalo, N.Y., Joshua Ef-
fron, Delmar, N.Y., Richard Moot, Irving 
Maghran, Jr., Buffalo, N.Y., Donald Ber-
ens, Jr., Albany, N.Y., for defendants. 
MEMORANDUM and ORDER 
ELFVIN, District Judge. 
On August 2, 1990 this Court by Memo-
randum and Order granted the plaintiffs' 
motion to substitute John S. Keller, Com-
missioner of Finance of Orange County, as 
the Administrator of the Estate of John 
Monahan, Deceased, in the place and stead 
of defendant John Monahan. Sub silentio 
but by necessary implication, said Order 
denied the motion made on behalf of defen-
dant Monahan to dismiss the action as to 
him on the ground that the plaintiffs had 
failed to observe the temporal parameters 
of Rule 25(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Mr. Keller, represented by the attorney 
who had represented Monahan during his 
lifetime and Monahan's daughter in her 
opposition to the appointment of an admin-
istrator ad litem, now has asked this Court 
to state that said Order involves a control-
ling 
question or questions of law as to 
which there is substantial ground for dif-
ference of opinion and that an immediate 
aPPeal therefrom may materially advance 
toe ultimate disposition of this long-pend-
^g litigation. 
ll] Although the rule contemplates that 
Such statements by a court shall be writ-
ten—that is, embodied—in the order from 
which an immediate appeal is sought, it 
long has been settled in the Second Cir-
^it-Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 
(196l); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Bell Tele-
P^one Laboratories, Inc., 272 F.2d 29 
U959); Mueller v. Rayon Consultants, In-
corporated, 271 F.2d 591 (1959)—and since 
1967 generally that the 10-day period for 
aPP!ying to the appellate court for the en-
tertainment of an appeal from an interlocu-
tory order may run from the date of the 
amendment or resettlement of a district 
court's order so as to include therein the 
requested 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) statements. 
See, Rule 5(a) of the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Thus, while section 1292(b) 
still requires that such statement be "in 
writing in such order"—viz., the order 
from which the appeal is sought to be 
taken—, it can be embodied in an amended 
or resettled version thereof. 
That an immediate appeal from this 
Court's granting of the plaintiffs' motion 
and denying of defendant Keller's motion 
may materially advance this litigation is 
patent given the current status of this law-
suit. The litigation has been ongoing for 
an exceedingly and unduly long time and 
had finally reached the point where this 
Court on December 14, 1989 set June 5, 
1990 as the day certain for the start of 
what is projected as a jury trial of three or 
four months. Three of the four remaining 
defendants then—sequentially—moved to 
dismiss on the basis of each's qualified 
immunity. Due to such motions this Court 
on May 10, 1990 changed the trial-com-
mencement date to July 10, 1990. Quali-
fied immunity having been denied June 26, 
1990 copies of such three defendants' no-
tices of appeal were received July 3rd. On 
July 10th the trial date was tentatively 
shifted to August 7th although an earlier 
order (on July 5th) had stayed the trial 
pending dispositions of the appeals. 
The order now sought to be appealed 
kept defendant Monahan's estate in the 
case but the litigation could not proceed 
due to the pending appeals. For the appel-
late court to consider also whether this 
Court's decision of August 2nd can be up-
held would work no hurt to the progressing 
of the lawsuit. If such decision should be 
overturned and qualified immunity be ac-
corded one or two or all three of the re-
maining defendants there will have been 
no wasting of this Court's time or efforts; 
only the plaintiffs (who have not been free 
of fault for the lengthy delays in bringing 
this case to trial) are damaged and, even 
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versity of citizenship is absent (see 3A 
Moore's Federal Practice fl20.07[5.-2] [2d 
ed. 1990]). Accordingly, even apart from 
the new section 1367, pendent-party juris-
diction was held inapplicable to diversity 
actions under section 1332. As such, it 
appears that the Court does not have the 
power to exercise discretion in entertaining 
the claim asserted against Ticor. 
The Court also notes that the claim 
against Ticor for the $36,000 in this case is 
wholly separate and apart from any of the 
other claims. The only claim asserted 
against Ticor is the seventh cause of action. 
Liability as to the other causes of action is 
not joint and several with Ticor. Thus, 
even if this Court had the power to exercise 
pendent-party jurisdiction over this claim, 
in its discretion, the Court would decline to 
do so under the circumstances presented in 
this case. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the mo-
tion of the defendant Ticor Title Insurance 
Company to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R. 
Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (h)(3), is granted. The 
complaint is therefore dismissed as against 
the defendant Ticor Title Insurance Compa-
ny. 
SO ORDERED. 
Akil AL-JUNDI, a/k/a Herbert Scott De-
ane, et al., on behalf of themselves and 
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
The ESTATE OF Nelson A. 
ROCKEFELLER, et al., 
Defendants. 
No. CIV-75-L32E. 
United States District Court, 
W.D. New York. 
Sept. 4, 1990. 
Defendant substituted for original de-
ceased defendant moved to have interlocu-
tory order certified for immediate appellate 
review. The District Court, Elfvin, J., held 
that interlocutory determination that plain-
tiffs' motion to substitute, following defen-
dant's death, was timely or, if untimely, 
was delayed as result of excusable neglect 
without any undue prejudice to defendant's 
heirs or distributees, would be certified for 
immediate appellate review. 
Motion granted. 
1. Federal Courts <s=>660.30 
Ten-day period for applying to appel-
late court for entertainment of appeal from 
interlocutory order may run from date of 
amendment or resettlement of district 
court's order so as to include therein state-
ments, embodied in amended or resettled 
order, certifying interlocutory order for im-
mediate appeal. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b); 
F.R.A.P.Rule 5(a), 28 U.S.C.A. 
2. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>365 
Deceased defendant's attorney's state-
ment of defendant's death was a nullity, 
and thus did not start running of clock for 
plaintiffs' motion to substitute; attorney's 
representation of defendant ceased upon 
defendant's death, and attorney's state-
ment failed to identify person who had 
been named as representative of decedent's 
estate. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 25(a)(1), 
28 U.S.C.A. 
3. Federal Courts <3=>660.5 
Interlocutory determination that plain-
tiffs' motion to substitute, following defen-
dant's death, was timely or, if untimely, 
was delayed as result of excusable neglect 
without any undue prejudice to defendant's 
heirs or distributees, would be certified for 
immediate appellate review; correctness of 
decision to allow substitution was of vital 
importance to progress of lawsuit, and 
there was substantial ground for differ-
ence of opinion as to court's interpretation 
of substitution rule. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b); 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 25(a)(1), 28 U.S. 
C.A.; F.R.A.P.Rule 5(a), 28 U.S.C.A. 
AL-JUNDI v. ESTATE OF ROCKEFELLER 
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209 
to the plaintiffs' non-compliance with Rule 
25(a)(1). Al-Jundx v. Rockefeller, supra, 
at 246-247. Rende v. Kay, supra, was 
cited and relied upon. In that case, 
brought to recover for personal injuries 
caused by an automobile accident, the de-
fendant driver had died after the action had 
commenced. The defendant's attorney of 
record made the suggestion of death in 
court and with notice. Subsequently and in 
his own name he moved to dismiss the case 
as to the decedent because the plaintiffs 
had not moved to substitute. Thereupon, 
the plaintiffs moved to substitute and for a 
Rule 6(b) enlargement, asserting that the 
suggestion of death was defective in that it 
did not name the decedent's legal repre-
sentative. The plaintiffs appealed from the 
trial court's dismissal of the lawsuit and 
the appellate court reversed and ordered 
the action's reinstatement. In support 
thereof the Court said: 
"The Advisory Committee [on Civil 
Rules], in outlining that suggestion of 
death could be made by 'the representa-
tive of the deceased party' plainly con-
templated that the suggestion emanating 
from the side of the deceased would iden-
tify a representative of the estate, such 
as an executor or administrator, who 
could be substituted for the deceased as 
a party, with the action continued in the 
name of the representative. * * * 
* * * * * * 
"In our opinion the Rule, as amended, 
cannot fairly be construed * * * to make 
[the defendant's attorney's] suggestion 
°f death operative to trigger the 90-day 
Period even though he was neither a 
successor nor [a] representative of the 
deceased, and gave no indication of what 
Person was available to be named in sub-
stitution as a representative of the de-
ceased. * * * 
* The tactic of the defendant's 
attorney would place on plaintiff the bur-
*
e&, where no conventional representa-
tive was appointed for the estate in pro-
bate court, of instituting machinery in 
0r<ter to produce some representative of 
th
* estate ad litem * * * 
"No injustice results from the require-
ment that a suggestion of death identify 
the representative or successor of an es-
tate who may be substituted as a party 
for the deceased before Rule 25(aXl) may 
be invoked by those who represent or 
inherit from the deceased. If the heirs 
or counsel fear that delay may prejudice 
the litigation they may move promptly 
for appointment of a representative, per-
haps a temporary representative, either 
under the law of the domicile or by spe-
cial order in the court wherein the litiga-
tion is pending." Id., at 985-986. 
This Court's canvassing of the myriad 
judicial decisions which have had concern 
with rule 25(a)(1) yielded what at first ap-
peared to be rulings made without rhyme 
or reason. However, further analysis 
shows such not to be true and that, while 
there are aberrations, the disparate results 
are explained by observing who is asking 
for what relief and for what purpose in the 
various litigative positions. One can gain 
relief from the 90-day restriction via a 
motion for enlargement made even after 
the expiration of the allotted time if one 
satisfies the court that the delay was the 
result of excusable neglect and the oppo-
nent fails to demonstrate that such relief 
would work undue prejudice. While most 
of the decisions involve lapses of time 
much shorter than that which occurred 
here, the greater lapse in this case is ex-
plained to a substantial degree by the oppo-
sition put forth by Monahan's family and 
his attorney to the plaintiffs' efforts to 
have an administrator ad litem appointed. 
Monahan's daughter, the Surrogate noted, 
opposed the plaintiffs' efforts to have the 
representative appointed while declining to 
be appointed herself. She acted the role of 
the "dog in the manger." 
Similar obstructive efforts appeared. 
Monahan's attorney tried to establish a 
roadblock at the outset by alleging that 
there isn't any estate and there is and will 
not be anyone who can be substituted in 
the decedent's place. As an important 
aside, what is established clearly by such 
assertion is that there is no prejudice to 
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then, only if the trial proves their cause to 
be meritorious. If this Court's ruling as to 
defendant Monahan's estate is overturned 
and its rulings as to all three of the other 
defendants similarly treated, doing so now 
rather than after a lengthy trial would be 
most saving of the time and efforts of all. 
Further, this Court opines that its Order 
of August 2nd does involve controlling 
questions of law as to which there is sub-
stantial ground for difference of opinion. 
The ruling "strays" from the literality of 
Rule 25(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure—albeit, along a path indicated 
by various judicial signposts. 
The pertinent portion of Rule 25(a)(1) 
reads as follows: 
"Unless the motion for substitution [of 
the proper parties] is made not later than 
90 days after the death [of a party] is 
suggested upon the record by service of 
a statement of the fact of death as pro-
vided herein for the service of the motion 
[to wit, as provided in Rules 4 and 5], the 
action shall be dismissed as to the de-
ceased party." 
The present rule stems from a 1963 amend-
ment. Theretofore it had provided a rigid 
two-year post-death period during which— 
and only during which—the substitution 
could be made despite excusable neglect on 
the party wishing to bring it about. See 
Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 67 
S.Ct. 428, 91 L.Ed. 436 (1947); Starnes v. 
Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 295 
F.2d 704 (2d Cir.1961), cert denied, 369 
U.S. 813, 82 S.Ct. 688, 7 L.Ed.2d 612 (1962); 
Report of Judicial Conference, 31 F.R.D. 
638-639. The pre-1963 inflexibility had 
been emphasized by the express exception 
of the time for moving to substitute from 
the enlargements allowed to be granted 
under Rule 6(b). This exception also was 
deleted in 1963. This Court noted in an 
earlier decision in this case the following: 
"It has been repeatedly stated and held 
that the reason rule 25(a) was amended 
to its current form in 1963 was to avoid 
the harsh and unfair results that the 
former inflexible version of rule 25 occa-
sionally mandated. See, e.g., Advisory 
Committee Note to rule 25; Roscoe v. 
Roscoe, 379 F.2d 94, 99 (D.C.Cir.1967) 
'[T]he 90-day period was not intended to 
act as a bar to otherwise meritorious 
actions/ Staggers v. Otto Gerdau Com 
pany, 359 F.2d 292, 296 (2d Cir.1966) 
Adoption of the Rende [v. Kay, 415 F.2c 
983 (D.C.Cir.1969)] rule would, on the 
facts of this case, promote this remedia 
flexibility. See, National Equipment 
Rental v. Whitecraft Unlimited, 7J 
F.R.D. 507 (E.D.N.Y.1977)." Al-Jund\ 
v. Rockefeller, 88 F.R.D. 244, 247 (W.D 
N.Y.1980). 
Rockefeller's estate's motion to dismiss foi 
failure to substitute timely was denied 
Id., at 248. Subsequently, this Court 
granted a motion by the substituted Estate 
of Rockefeller to dismiss the lawsuit as tc 
it because Rockefeller as the Governor oi 
the State of New York was clothed witl 
qualified immunity and such dismissal was 
upheld on appeal. Al-Jundi v. Estate Oj 
Rockefeller, 885 F.2d 1060 (2d Cir.1989) 
The appellate court merely noted in passing 
that, "[d]uring the pendency of the action 
the Estate was substituted 'in the place anc 
stead of defendant Rockefeller.' Al-Jund 
v. Rockefeller, 88 F.R.D. 244, 245 (W.D.N 
Y.1980)." 
This Court in the 1980 decision was pri 
marily concerned with whether the motioi 
to substitute the estate had been timel; 
made and, if it had not been, whether ex 
cusable neglect justified an enlargemen 
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. rule 6(b). Whil< 
it was found that there had been sue! 
neglect, it had been found that there hat 
not been any showing of prejudice in or U 
the administration of the estate or the dis 
tribution of its assets. See Anderson v 
Yungkau, supra, 329 U.S. at 485-486, 6' 
S.Ct. at 430-431. 
The equally-relied upon support for th< 
1980 decision was that the suggestion o 
statement of the fact of death was insuffi 
cient in that it "did not list the names o 
the executors of Rockefeller's estate, a 
though this information should have beei 
readily available to Stewart," the attorne 
who had represented defendant Rockefelle 
during his lifetime and who filed the mc 
tion to dismiss as to him and his estate du 
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any heir, grantee, legatee, devisee or any 
other type of distributee of defendant Mon-
ahan because there is no detriment to the 
estate's assets by paying legal fees or sat-
isfying any judgment because the well is 
dry. There are no assets which can be 
dissipated or detrimented by the action be 
ing carried forward against Monahan's rep-
resentative. Monahan's attorney, when 
braced by this Court with such proposition 
in a recorded oral argument on August 24, 
1990, staunchly asserted that this claimed 
lack of prejudice to the estate was not true. 
Pointedly, he did not say that there could 
be any monetary or other detriment to the 
estate or any holding-up of the estate's 
distribution of assets. He only proclaimed, 
vehemently, that what was involved was 
the honor of "Major Monahan," his long-
time friend. He, the attorney, was going 
to do his best to see that it remained unsul-
lied. As laudatory as such aim is, it does 
not present any quantum of undue preju-
dice such as should bar the plaintiffs' pro-
ceeding with their claims.1 
[2] A firm and conscionable rule that is 
distilled from the judicial decisions is that, 
when it is a defendant who has died and it 
is his heirs or distributees who wish to put 
an end to litigation which does not abate 
because of death, the various facets of rule 
25(a)(1) must be satisfied. The statement 
of the fact of death must be made by a 
party or by the decedent's appointed repre-
sentative. Monahan's attorney was neither 
and, in fact, no longer was Monahan's at-
torney because Monahan's death cut the 
umbilical cord. Death withdrew from the 
attorney every iota of authorization he had 
to act for or in Monahan's behalf. The 
statement must identify the person who 
has been named as the representative of 
the decedent's estate. The instant state-
ment did not do so and, in fact, made it 
seem that there would not and could not be 
any such representative. As the required 
suggestion of death the statement by Mon-
ahan's attorney was a nullity. It could not 
and did not start the 90-day clock to run-
ning. Consequently, the plaintiffs' motion 
1. If the attorney truly has such purpose, it 
would not be out-of-line to suggest that one best 
protects one's honor and reputation by remain-
to substitute, delayed as it was, was timely. 
To the extent that it might be viewed as 
untimely, it is readily seen that the delav 
flowed from excusable neglect and without 
any undue prejudice to Monahan's heirs or 
distributees. 
[3] Because the correctness vel non of 
the decisions to deny dismissal and to allow 
substitution are of vital importance to the 
progressing of this lawsuit and its resolu-
tion may well advance the ultimate disposi-
tion thereof and because there admittedly 
is a substantial ground for a difference of 
opinion as to the rule which has been found 
to be the bottoming for its Order of August 
2, 1990, it is hereby 
ORDERED that the whole of said Order 
is incorporated herein by reference and as 
if it were fully here reproduced and that 
there is added thereto the findings and 
statements set forth in the immediately 
preceding paragraph. 
UNITED STATES of America ex rel. 
Charles BUTLER, Petitioner, 
v. 
Raymond R. BARA, Jr., Superintendent 
of Arthur Kill Correctional Facility 
Robert Abrams, Attorney General oi 
the State of New York and Robert Mor 
genthau, District Attorney of New Yorl 
County, Respondents. 
No. 88 Civ. 7632(SWK). 
United States District Court, 
S.D. New York. 
Oct. 31, 1990. 
In habeas corpus proceeding, the Di 
trict Court, Kram, J., held that: (1) petitioi 
ing to fight and not by turning tail and fleeii 
the battleground. 
548 151 FEDERAL RULES DECISIONS 
fendant's estate had not yet been appointed. 
Fed.Rules Civ.ProcRule 25(a), 28 U.S.C.A. 
3. Federal Civil Procedure <S»363.1 
For suggestion of death to be valid and 
invoke 90-day limit for filing of motion for 
substitution, it must identify successor or 
representative who may be substituted for 
decedent FedRules Civ.ProcRule 25(a), 28 
U.S.C.A. 
4. Federal Civil Procedure e»365 
Representative of estate of party who 
dies while action is pending, rather than at-
torney who represented that party, must 
make suggestion of death; attorney is not 
party to action and attorney's authority to 
represent party terminates upon party's 
death. Fed.Rules Civ.ProcRule 25(a), 28 
U.S.C.A. 
5. Federal Civil Procedure <8=»363.1 
Suggestion of death filed by attorney 
who represented defendant, who died while 
action was pending, was not valid, so that 
suggestion of death did not trigger 90-day 
period for filing of motion for substitution; 
suggestion failed to identify representative 
who could be substituted for defendant, and, 
after defendant's death, attorney had no au-
thority to represent defendant Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 25(a), 28 U.S.C.A-
6. Federal Civil Procedure e=»849 
In order to satisfy prerequisite of partic-
ularity in motion to amend, complete copy of 
proposed amended complaint must accompa-
ny motion so that both court and opposing 
parties can understand exact changes sought 
Fed.Rules CivJProcRules 7(b), 15, 28 
U.S.C.A. 
7. Federal Civil Procedure e»849 
Where proposed amended complaint 
does not accompany motion to amend, court 
may hold motion in abeyance pending filing 
of that proposed complaint or deny motion 
without prejudice. Fed.Rules Civ.ProcRules 
7(b), 15, 28 U.S.CA 
8. Federal Civil Procedure e»392 
District court would hold plaintiffs mo-
tion to amend complaint to add defendant in 
abeyance, even though no party opposed 
naming of additional defendant; copy
 0f 
tire proposed amended complaint was 
filed with motion and, therefore, neith 
court nor any of parties was aware of exa 
nature of proposed amendments. Fed.Rui 
Civ.ProcRules 7(b), 15, 28 U.S.C.A. 
Putney, Twombly, Hall & Hirson, New 
York City by Michael T. McGrath, for defen-
dants. 
Ronnie Smith, plaintiff pro se. 
OPINION AND ORDER 
LOWE, District Judge. 
Before the Court is a motion for reargu-
ment of this Court's Order filed July 20 
1993, pursuant to Local Civil Rule 3(j) of this 
Court The motion has been made by Mi-
chael T. McGrath ("McGrath") of the law 
firm of Putney, Twombly, Hall & Hirson, 
who acted as counsel on behalf of defendant 
Barbara Thompson ("Thompson"). Also be-
fore the Court is a motion by pro se plaintiff 
Ronnie Smith ("Plaintiff) to amend his com-
plaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15. For the 
reasons below, McGrath's motion is granted 
in part. Consideration of Plaintiffs motion 
to amend is held in abeyance as stated below. 
BACKGROUND 
Thompson, one of several defendants to 
this Title VII action, died on August 16,1992. 
A document entitled "Suggestion on Record 
of Party's Death" was filed by McGrath on 
October 14,1992. Subsequent to the filing of 
this suggestion, McGrath moved to dismiss 
the action against Thompson pursuant to 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a). McGrath's motion ar-
gued that Plaintiffs cause of action did not 
survive Thompson's death, and that, in any 
case, if no motion to substitute was timely 
made under Rule 25(a) then the action 
against Thompson must be dismissed. Plain-
tiff timely moved for substitution of Thomp-
son pursuant to Rule 25(a). 
By Order filed July 20, 1993 (the "July 
Order"), McGrath's motion to dismiss was 
denied, and Plaintiff's motion to substitute 
was granted. The action against Thompson 
was found to survive her death, and the 
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tiff banks' contention that deposition should 
last more than ten days or be deferred pend-
ing possible addition of parties, that they 
should not pay their own costs, and that 
depositions were unduly burdensome were 
insufficient to establish abuse of discretion. 
are insufficient to suggest that the Magis-
trate Judge abused her discretion. 
SO ORDERED. 
(o |«YNUM|«SYSTIM> 
Michael S. Davis, Zalkin Rodin & Good-
man, New York City, for Chemical Bank. 
John M. Toriello, Glenn J. Winuk, Haight, 
Gardner et al., New York City, for Banque 
Paribas, European American Bank. 
Robert S. Fischler, Winston & Strawn, 
New York City, for National Westminster 
Bank USA. 
Paul J. Giacomo, Tenzer, Greenblatt et al., 
New York City, for Andina Coffee, Inc., An-
dina Trading Corp. 
David G. Keyko, Maurice W. Heller, Win-
throp Simpson et al., New York City, for 
American Express Bank. 
Franklin M. Sachs, Podvey, Sachs et al., 
New York City, for defendant. 
MEMORANDUM ORDER 
BRIEANT, District Judge. 
The plaintiff banks in this case involving 
bills of lading covering nonexistent coffee as 
described in Chemical Bank v. Affiliated FM 
***. Co., 815 F.Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y.1993), 
tave filed objections to a decision of United 
States Magistrate Judge Kathleen A- Rob-
erts dated October 22,1993 authorizing depo-
8Itions of two witnesses in London for ten 
%s in December 1993, and directing each 
Party to pay its own expenses. Oral argu-
ment was not requested. In the interests of 
T^e. I overrule the objections without await-
^ a response. 
The banks' contentions that depositions of 
**° witnesses should last more than ten days 
°
r
 be deferred pending possible addition of 
IUrther parties, that major banks should not 
1
 'east initially pay their own costs, ana that 
ePo8itions in London are unduly burden-
me to the substantial institutional litigants, 
Ronnie SMITH, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Sam PLANAS, Melody Hotley, Donna 
King, Barbara Thompson, and 
Ray Sumaya, Defendants. 
No. 90 Civ. 1732 (MJL). 
United States District Court, 
S.D. New York. 
Dec. 2, 1993. 
Plaintiff in Title VII action moved for 
substitution of defendant's estate for defen-
dant who died while action was pending and 
to amend complaint. On reargument follow-
ing granting of substitution motion, the Dis-
trict Court, Lowe, J., held that: (1) plaintiff 
was not entitled to substitute estate as no 
representative had yet been appointed for 
estate; (2) suggestion of death filed by attor-
ney who had represented deceased defendant 
was not valid and, thus, did not trigger 90-
day period for filing motion for substitution; 
and (3) plaintiffs motion would be held in 
abeyance pending filing of entire proposed 
amended complaint. 
Ordered accordingly. 
1. Federal Civil Procedure <&»362 
Representative of estate of party who 
dies while litigation is pending must be 
named as proper party for substitution be-
fore motion for substitution may be granted. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 25(a), 28 U.S.C.A. 
2. Federal Civil Procedure e»362 
Plaintiff was not entitled to substitute 
estate of defendant who died while action 
was pending as party; representative of de-
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attorney is not a party to the action and the 
attorney's authority to represent the dece-
dent terminated upon death. A representa-
tive of the deceased party, and not that 
party's attorney, must make the suggestion 
of death. In re Klein, 36 B.R. at 393; Ah-
Jundi, 88 F.R.D. at 246; Rende, 415 F.2d at 
985; Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1955 (1986). 
[5] The "suggestion of death" filed in the 
instant action is defective for two reasons. 
First, it fails to identify a representative who 
may be substituted on Thompson's behalf. 
Second, it was filed by McGrath who signed 
it as attorney for Thompson. Prior to his 
retention by the yet to be determined estate 
representative, McGrath may not suggest 
Thompson's death upon the record. No valid 
suggestion of death has been filed upon the 
record and the 90 period in which to make a 
motion to substitute has not commenced. 
II. Motion to Amend Complaint. 
Plaintiff previously requested substitution 
of Thompson with her estate or her employ-
er, Grade Square Hospital. In the July 
Order, the Court made clear that joining an 
employer is a matter of amendment and not 
substitution. Plaintiff now moves for an or-
der granting leave to file a third amended 
complaint While Plaintiffs motion papers 
do not set forth clearly the type of amend-
ment sought, he apparently seeks to name 
Grade Square Hospital as a defendant. 
[6,7] Rule 7(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure requires that motions "state 
with particularity the grounds therefor, and 
shall set forth the relief or order sought." 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(b). In order to satisfy the 
prerequisite of particularity in a motion to 
amend, a complete copy of the proposed 
amended complaint must accompany the mo-
tion so that both the Court and opposing 
parties can understand the exact changes 
sought Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1485 
(1990). Where the proposed amended com-
plaint does not accompany the motion to 
amend, the Court may hold the motion in 
abeyance pending the filing of that proposed 
complaint, see Schwab v. Nathan, 8 F.R.D. 
227, 228 (S.D.N.Y.1948), or the Court may 
deny the motion without prejudice. See LiL 
ly v. United States Lines Co., 42 F.Supp. 314 
(S.D.N.Y.1941). But see Christiana Gen 
Ins. Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 745 F.SUDD 
150, 164 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (amendment aUo^d 
where defendant was not unduly prejudiced) 
Plaintiffs motion to amend must include a 
copy of the proposed amended complaint be-
fore it will be considered. 
[8] Although no parties have opposed the 
naming of Grade Square Hospital as an addi-
tional defendant, neither the Court nor anv 
party is aware of the exact nature of the 
proposed amendments to Plaintiffs com-
plaint Consideration of Plaintiffs motion to 
amend will be held in abeyance. Plaintiff is 
directed to file a copy of the c:::re proposed 
third amended complaint—including the 
charges against all defendants—with the 
Court and to serve the same upon all parties 
on or before January 10, 1994. Proof of 
service must be filed. Papers in opposition 
to the motion to amend must be served and 
filed on or before January 18, 1994. Plain-
tiff's reply papers, if any, must be served and 
filed on or before January 24, 1994. The 
proposed amended portion of the complaint 
is limited to the joinder of Gracie Square 
Hospital as a defendant and to the charges 
against this proposed defendant No other 
changes will be permitted pursuant to the 
instant motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The motion for reargument filed by 
McGrath is granted in part, without costs. 
The portion of the Court's Order filed July 
20, 1993 which granted Plaintiffs motion to 
substitute is vacated. Plaintiffs motion to 
substitute is dismissed without prejudice as 
stated above. Plaintiff may renew this mo-
tion by following the procedure set forth 
above. 
Plaintiffs motion to amend is held in abey-
ance as stated above. The return date of 
Plaintiffs motion to amend is reset to Janu-
ary 26, 1994. 
It is SO ORDERED. 
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motion for substitution was found to be time-
ly served. Thompson's estate was substitut-
ed as a defendant in Thompson's place. 
McGrath now moves for reargument of the 
portion of the July Order which substitutes 
the estate in place of Thompson. The 
grounds for reargument are that (1) Plain-
tiff failed to serve his motion for substitution 
upon him as required by Rules 25 and 5 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and 
(2) the Court erred in substituting the estate 
as a party. 
DISCUSSION 
I. Motion for Reargument 
McGrath contends that Plaintiff never 
served him with a copy of the motion for 
substitution. Motions for substitution must 
be "served on the parties" in accordance with 
Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a). McGrath states 
that a "review of the papers filed by the pro 
se plaintiff indicates that there is no certifica-
tion or other proof of service as required by 
FRCP Rule 5 and Local Civil Rule 3(c)(3)."x 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion 
for Reargument, p. 5. Appendix 1 of 
McGrath's memorandum of law contains an 
incomplete copy of the papers filed by Plain-
tiff in support of his motion to substitute. 
Plaintiff actually filed a signed, sworn affir-
mation of service dated November 25, 1992. 
This affirmation is appended to the back of 
his notice of motion and attached affidavit 
McGrath's unsworn statement regarding an 
absence of proof of service is patently incor-
rect 
[1,2] Thompson's true successor to this 
action is, as previously stated by the Court, 
her estate. However, before a motion to 
substitute may be granted, a representative 
°f Thompson's estate must be named as the 
proper party for substitution. See Matter of 
Estate of Garfinkle, 119 A.D.2d 911, 500 
N
«Y.S.2d 863, 865 (3 Deptl986) (citing Mat-
*• Local Civil Rule 3(c)(3) provides that improper-
ly served motion papers will not be accepted for 
filing except upon special permission for good 
^use shown. 
• Thompson's husband also swears that the es-
tate contains no assets. This contention is con-
ter of Estate of Smith, 49 Misc^d 897, 268 
N.Y.S.2d 773, 774 (Sur.1966)). Paul Ottens, 
Thompson's husband, swears in an affidavit 
dated October 4,1993 that there is no repre-
sentative of Thompson's estate.2 As there is 
not yet a party to be substituted on behalf of 
Thompson, Plaintiffs motion is denied and 
dismissed without prejudice pending appoint-
ment of a representative of Thompson's es-
tate who may properly defend against this 
action. Plaintiff may renew his motion after 
a representative is appointed by following the 
procedures set forth in Fe&R.Civ.P. 25(a) 
and Fed.R.Civ.P. 5. Plaintiff may also con-
tact the Pro Se Office of this Court for 
assistance in seeking appointment of an exec-
utor or administrator to represent the estate 
of Thompson. See SCPA §§ 1002(1), 
1402(l)(c). 
[3] It must be noted that Plaintiff is not 
estopped from filing a renewed motion for 
substitution because of the prior filing of the 
"suggestion of death" by McGrath. Rule 
25(a) provides that if a motion for substitu-
tion is not made within 90 days after death is 
suggested, the action shall be dismissed as to 
the decedent The Court finds the "sugges-
tion of death" filed by McGrath insufficient 
to start the running of this 90 day clock,, It 
is well settled that for a suggestion of death 
to be valid and invoke the 90 day limit, it 
must identify the successor or representative 
who may be substituted for the decedent 
Young v. Patrice, 832 F.Supp. 721 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993); Gronouncz v. Leonard, 109 F.R.D. 
624, 627 (S.D.N.Y.1986); In re Klein, 36 B.R. 
390, 392-93 (Bkrtcy.E.D.N.Y.1984); AUJun-
di v. Rockefeller, 88 F.R.D. 244, 246-47 
(W.D.N.Y.1980); Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983, 
985-86 (D.C.Cir.1969). See also Form 30, 
Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
[4] Furthermore, the attorney for the de-
cedent has no authority to suggest the death 
of his or her client upon the record. The 
tained in McGrath's motion. However, this does 
not warrant denial of a motion to substitute 
where a debt is claimed. See EPTL 11-4.5 
("Want of assets not to be pleaded by personal 
representative"); Matter of Estate of Smith, 49 
Misc.2d 897, 268 N.Y.S.2d 773, 774 (Sur.1966). 
TROPICANA HOTEL CORP. v. 
Cite as 692 P.2d 499 (Nev. 1985) 
SPEER 
tained in NRCP 25(a)(1). We agree, and 
therefore we reverse the district court's 
order. 
Whether the suggestion of death must 
be made by, or identify, the successor or 
representative of the deceased is an issue 
which we have not previously addressed. 
In a similar case, the federal appellate 
court in Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983 (D.C. 
Cir.1969), interpreted the identical federal 
rule, FRCP 25(a)(1), and held that a sugges-
tion of death "which was neither filed by 
nor identified a successor or representative 
of the deceased . . . was ineffective to trig-
ger the running of the 90-day period pro-
vided by [FRCP 25(a)(1) ]." Id. at 984. In 
examining the history of FRCP 25(a)(1), the 
court noted that the Advisory Committee 
on the Rules of Civil Procedure "plainly 
contemplated that the suggestion [of 
death] emanating from the side of the de-
ceased would identify a representative of 
the estate, such as an executor or adminis-
trator, who could be substituted for the 
deceased as a party . . ." 2 Id. at 985. The 
court also reasoned that any other con-
struction ' 'would open the door to a tactical 
maneuver to place upon the plaintiff the 
burden of locating the representative of the 
estate within 90 days." Id. at 986. The 
court concluded that no injustice would be-
fall a defendant as a result of this require-
ment. 
We agree with the reasoning in Rende, 
and therefore reject the contrary approach 
urged by respondent and followed by the 
Colorado Court in Farmers Insurance Gr. 
v. District Court of Sec. J.D., 181 Colo. 85, 
507 P.2d 865 (Colo.1973). Because the sug-
gestion of death in the present case was 
neither filed by nor identified a successor 
or representative of the deceased, we hold 
that the ninety-day limitation in NRCP 
25(a)(1) was never triggered, and, there-
2. The federal court of appeals also referred to 
federal form 30 which provides: 
A.B. [describe as a party, or as executor, 
administrator, or other representative or suc-
cessor of CD., the deceased party] suggests 
upon the record, pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1), 
the death of CD. [describe as party] during 
the pendency of this action. 
fore, the district court 
missed appellant's action. 
Reversed and remanded.3 
Nev. 499 
improperly dis-
« Y NUMBER SYSTEM 
• * ^ ^ * ^ ^ ^ i V 
TROPICANA HOTEL CORPORATION, a 
dissolved Nevada Corporation; Mitzi 
Stauffer Briggs, as Trustee of Tropica-
na Hotel Corporation a dissolved Neva-
da Corporation, and Mitzi Stauffer 
Briggs, individually, Appellants and 
Cross-Respondents, 
v. 
Nila SPEER, Executrix of the Estate of 
Lloyd D. Speer, a/k/a Don Speer, de-
ceased, Respondent and Cross-Appel-
lant. 
No. 13655. 
Supreme Court of Nevada. 
Jan. 4, 1985. 
Former employee filed suit against for-
mer employer alleging that oral employ-
ment contract had been breached by his 
termination without cause and that the par-
ty with whom he had negotiated regarding 
his employment breached an oral stock op-
tion agreement. The Eighth Judicial Dis-
trict Court, Clark County, Howard W. Bab-
cock, J., found that the binding oral agree-
ments existed and that the employer had 
breached the employment contract and 
awarded former employee liquidated dam-
ages but found that the statute of frauds 
rendered the stock option agreement unen-
forceable. Cross-appeals were taken. The 
Suggested form 30, appended to the NRCP and 
approved of by NRCP 84, is identical to the 
federal form 30. 
3. The Honorable John Mowbray voluntarily re-
cused himself from consideration of this case. 
4US 1>iev- 03^ r A u n t iu.ruK'1'LK, za M^KIC^ 
Brenda BARTO, Appellant, 
v. 
Charles WEISHAAR, d/b/a Milex 
Precision Auto Tuneup, 
Respondent. 
No. 15163. 
Supreme Court of Nevada. 
Jan. 3, 1985. 
Negligence based personal injury ac-
tion was brought. The Eighth Judicial Dis-
trict Court, Clark County, Stephen L. Huf-
faker, J., dismissed complaint with preju-
dice, and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme 
Court held that where suggestion of de-
fendant's death was neither filed by nor 
identified successor representative the 90-
day limitation period for motion for substi-
tution of party, on penalty of dismissal, 
was never triggered. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Parties <s=>60 
Suggestion of death must either be 
made by successor in interest to the de-
ceased or must identify the successor rep-
resentative and absent such information 
the suggestion does not trigger the 90-day 
period for seeking substitution of party, on 
penalty of dismissal; rejecting Farmers 
Insurance Gr. v. District Court of Sec. 
J.D., 181 Colo. 85, 507 P.2d 865. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 25(a)(1). 
Gentile & Massi, and Gene T. Porter, Las 
Vegas, for appellant. 
Morse-Foley, and Kevin C. Sewell, Las 
Vegas, for respondent. 
OPINION 
PER CURIAM: 
This is an appeal from an order granting 
respondent's motion to dismiss appellant's 
complaint with prejudice. On December 
1. NRCP 25(a)(1) provides in pertinent part: 
If a party dies and the claim is not thereby 
extinguished, the court may order substitution 
of the proper parties. The motion for substi-
tution may be made by any party or by the 
successors or representatives of the deceased 
party and, together with the notice of hearing, 
19, 1980, appellant filed her complaint 
against respondent, seeking, in part, recov-
ery for personal injuries she allegedly sus-
tained as a result of respondent's negli-
gence. Respondent subsequently answer-
ed the complaint, and the parties pursued 
discovery. 
On August 14, 1982, respondent died. 
Respondent's counsel filed a suggestion of 
death upon the record, pursuant to NRCP 
25(a)(1), on December 8, 1982. The sugges-
tion of death did not contain the name of 
respondent's successor representative. 
Thereafter, in April of 1983, respondent's 
counsel moved to dismiss appellant's com-
plaint on the ground that she had failed to 
effectuate substitution of a proper party 
within the ninety days prescribed by NRCP 
25(a)(1).1 
Following a hearing, the district court 
denied the motion to dismiss, and allowed 
appellant sixty days within which to effec-
tuate substitution. Thereafter, on the six-
tieth day following the lower court's ruling, 
appellant filed a motion to substitute the 
public administrator of Clark County, al-
legedly having located no other representa-
tive. On August 15, 1983, the district 
court conducted another hearing on the 
matter and, having concluded that the pub-
lic administrator was not a proper party for 
substitution, dismissed appellant's com-
plaint on the ground that appellant failed 
to substitute timely a proper party litigant 
under NRCP 25(a)(1). 
Appellant contends that the district court 
improperly dismissed her action because a 
suggestion of death filed pursuant to 
NRCP 25(a)(1) must either be made by the 
successor in interest to the deceased, or 
must identify the successor representative. 
Absent such information, appellant con-
tends, the suggestion of death is ineffec-
tive, and therefore cannot operate to trig-
ger the ninety-day filing limitation con-
shall be served on the parties . . . Unless the 
motion for substitution is made not later than 
90 days after the death is suggested upon the 
record by service of a statement of the fact of 
death as provided herein for the service of the 
motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the 
deceased party. (Emphasis added.) 
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by purchasers' suggestion of death upon the 
record, absent personal service upon vendors' 
successors or representatives. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Miller, C.J., filed opinion concurring in 
part and dissenting in part 
1. Courts <s=*85(3) 
State Supreme Court employs circuit 
court procedural rules unless specific statute 
or rule directs otherwise. SDCL 15-24-1. 
2. Appeal and Error <3=>334(1) 
Because state Supreme Court has not 
adopted separate rule to govern appellate 
procedure for substitution of parties, it em-
ploys circuit court procedural rules and, thus, 
suggestion of death upon the record and 
substitution of parties can be effected when 
case is pending before supreme court. 
SDCL 15-6-25(a)(l), 15-24-1. 
3. Appeal and Error <S=>334(7) 
Where appellants notified state Supreme 
Court of appellees' deaths one week before 
appeal was decided, but no personal service 
was made upon decedents' successors or rep-
resentatives, 90-day limitation period for mo-
tions for substitution of parties was not in-
voked by appellants' "suggestion of death 
upon the record," even though service was 
made upon decedents' counsel. SDCL 15-6-
25(a)(1). 
4. Appeal and Error ®»1146,1167 
State Supreme Court may vacate, modi-
fy, or otherwise disturb judgment if refusal 
to take such action appears to court inconsis-
tent with substantial justice because parties' 
substantial rights will otherwise be jeopar-
dized. 
Reed C. Richards of Richards & Richards, 
Deadwood, and John J. Delaney, Sr. of 
Estes, Porter & Delaney, Rapid City, for 
plaintiffs and appellants. 
Gene N. Lebrun of Lynn, Jackson, Shultz 
& Lebrun, Rapid City, for defendants and 
appellees. 
SABERS, Justice. 
[11J Trial court granted defendants' mo* 
tion to dismiss on the basis that the motion 
to substitute parties for deceased plaintiff 
was untimely. 
FACTS 
[112.] In November 1992, Lester and Mau-
rine Ripple (Ripples) entered into a contract 
for deed and a personal care agreement with 
Roger and Nancy Wold (Wolds). Ripples 
agreed to sell approximately eighty-seven 
acres of land to Wolds for $60,000 and Wolds 
agreed to personally care for Ripples. For 
each month they provided personal services, 
Wolds were to receive a $250 credit against 
their monthly payment on the contract for 
deed. When a dispute arose under the per-
sonal care agreement, Ripples sued Wolds, 
claiming breach of both agreements. Rip. 
pies sought foreclosure of the contract for 
deed and injunctive relief to prohibit Wolds 
from living on the property. 
[H3.] In August of 1994, the trial court 
granted Wolds' motion for summary judg-
ment on Ripples' foreclosure action, ruling 
that Wolds had not defaulted on the contract 
for deed. Ripples successfully moved to 
amend their complaint to seek rescission on 
the contract for deed. Wolds then moved to 
dismiss the rescission claim, arguing that by 
first seeking foreclosure, Ripples afiBrmed 
the contract for deed and were then barred 
by the "election of remedies" doctrine from 
disaffirming the contract through rescission 
The trial court denied Wolds' motion to dis-
miss the amended complaint, and this court 
granted Wolds' petition to appeal from that 
intermediate order. We affirmed the denial 
of Wolds' motion to dismiss. See Ripple v. 
Wold, 1996 SD 68, 549 N.W^d 673 (RippU 
I). 
[14.] Lester and Maurine Ripple both died 
before Ripple I was decided. See id at n. 1: 
"At the time this appeal began Lester and 
Maurine Ripple were 92 and 85 years old, 
respectively. Maurine died on October 19» 
1995 and Lester died on March 5, 1996.* 
Ripple I was decided June 5,1996. 
[115.] Approximately one week before Rip 
pie I was decided, Wolds informed this court 
RIPPLE v. WOLD S. D. 439 
Cite as 572 N.W.2d 439 (S.D. 1997) 
[118.] The decision of the circuit court is render our well-established standard of re-
versed with directions that it be remanded view meaningless. 
to the Board for further proceedings consis-
tent with this decision. [H 24.] AMUNDSON, J., joins this dissent. 
[119.] MILLER, C.J., and 
GILBERTSON, J., concur. 
[120.] SABERS and AMUNDSON, JJ., 
dissent. 
[121.] LOVRIEN, Circuit Judge, for KO-
NENKAMP, J., disqualified. 
SABERS, Justice (dissenting). 
[122.] I dissent. We do not need to re-
mand to conclude that the circuit court cor-
rectly reversed the Board. In fact, it would 
be error to do so. The Board failed to make 
t finding of fact that Brown did not comply 
with the conditions of the suspended sen-
tence requiring sex offender participation. 
Therefore, Board's revocation of his suspend-
ed sentence was an abuse of discretion and 
an error as a matter of law. See, e.g., 
Schroeder v. Department ofSoc Servs., 1996 
SD 34,112, 545 N.W.2d 223, 229: 
Findings of fact must support conclusions 
of law. The Commission's decision to rein-
state Schroeder was not supported by its 
°wn factual findings, an error as a matter 
of law. We thus affirm the circuit court's 
decision to reverse. 
(citing Hartpence v. Youth Forestry Camp, 
^ N.W.2d 292, 297 (S.D.1982) ("A well-
established rule is that the findings of fact 
must support the conclusions of law.") 
freeing with the circuit court's reversal of 
Career Service Commission's factually un-
^Pported legal conclusion)); see also Bald-
**» v. National College, 537 N.W^d 14, 19 
&D.1995) ("This court has consistently held 
^ the conclusions of law . . . must find 
JPport in the findings."); accord State v. 
NJ*> 536 N.W.2d 714, 716 n. 1 (S.D.1995); 
J*« Dakota Nat'l Bank v. Maxon, 534 
N
^A137,40 (S.D.1995). 
I w 23.] The conference opinion incorrectly 
^ p t s to fill in the blank for the Board 
larding what its finding of fact must state 
°rder for its decision to be upheld. It is 
r° kte. Allowing Board to rewrite its find-
^ of fact to support its conclusion would 
1997 SD 135 
Lester K. RIPPLE and Maurine 
H. Ripple, Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
v. 
ROGER WOLD and Nancy Wold, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 19987. 
Supreme Court of South Dakota. 
Considered on Briefs Oct 21, 1997. 
Decided Dec. 17, 1997. 
Rehearing Granted Jan. 13, 1998. 
Vendors sued purchasers, seeking fore-
closure on contract for deed and claiming 
breach of contract for deed and personal care 
agreement. The Circuit Court entered sum-
mary judgment for purchasers on foreclosure 
action, granted vendors' motion to amend 
complaint to seek rescission of contract, and 
denied purchasers' motion to dismiss amend-
ed complaint. Purchasers appealed. The 
Supreme Court, 549 N.W.2d 673, affirmed. 
Approximately one week before appeal was 
decided, purchasers informed state Supreme 
Court of vendors' deaths. Purchasers subse-
quently moved to dismiss for failure to sub-
stitute parties within 90-day period, and mo-
tion was made to substitute parties. The 
Circuit Court, Eighth Judicial Circuit, Law-
rence County, Warren G. Johnson, J., denied 
motion to substitute and granted motion to 
dismiss, and appeal was taken. The Su-
preme Court, Sabers, J., held that: (1) sug-
gestion of death upon the record and substi-
tution of parties can be effected when case is 
pending before the state supreme court, and 
(2) 90-day limitation period was not invoked 
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ploys those rules unless a specific statute or 
rule directs otherwise. See SDCL 15-24-1: 
Except as otherwise indicated by statute 
or rule, the statutes and rules of practice 
and procedure in the circuit courts of this 
state shall apply to practice and procedure 
in the Supreme Court 
Therefore, the argument that a suggestion of 
death upon the record is not effective in a 
pending appeal is without merit. Ripples' 
argument that substitution of parties cannot 
be accomplished before this court fails for 
the same reason. Since this court has not 
adopted a separate rule to govern appellate 
procedure for substitution of parties,4 we em-
ploy circuit court procedural rules pursuant 
to SDCL 1&-24-1.5 
[111.] 2. WHETHER THE NINETY-
DAY LIMITATION PERIOD WAS IN-
VOKED BY WOLDS* "SUGGESTION 
OF DEATH UPON THE RECORD" IN 
THE ABSENCE OF PERSONAL SER-
VICE UPON RIPPLES' REPRESEN-
TATIVES. 
[112.] According to SDCL 15-6-25(a)(l),6 
both the suggestion of death and the motion 
to substitute parties must be personally 
served upon "persons not parties,,—that 
term has been construed to mean "specifical-
ly the successors or representatives of the 
deceased party's estate." Fehrenbacher v. 
Quackentmsh, 759 F.Supp. 1516, 1518 
(D.Kan.1991) (citing Grandbouche v. LoveU, 
913 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir.1990) (per cu-
riam)). The Grandbouche court noted: 
While service of a suggestion of death on 
counsel will satisfy the requirement of 
Rule 25(a)(1) for service of parties to the 
4. See, e.g., NDRAppP 43 (adopting FedRAppP 
43, which provides for substitution of parties 
upon the death of a party at the appellate level). 
5. Cf. McCormick Harvesting Much. Co. v. Snedi-
gar, 3 S.D. 625, 626-27, 54 N.W. 814, 814 
(1893): 
If this cause of action had ever been properly 
in our court by appeal, and one of the parties 
had died or become disqualified to act pending 
the appeal, then this court could exercise its 
power to bring the legal representative into the 
case as one of the incidents of the exercise of 
its jurisdiction. 
6. SDCL 15-6-25(a)(1) is virtually identical to Fe-
dRCivP 25(a)(1). 
litigation, the service required by R ^ 
25(a)(1) on nonparties, specifically the suc-
cessors or representatives of the deceased 
party's estate, must be service pursuant to 
FedRCivP 4.7 See Fariss v. Lynchburq 
Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 961 (4th Cir.1985) 
(to satisfy Rule 25(a)(1), motion for substi-
tution or suggestion of death must be per-
sonally served on nonparty representative 
of deceased, rather than deceased's attor-
ney) In the instant case, because the 
personal representative of decedents es-
tate did not receive service of any purport-
ed suggestion of death, the ninety-day limi-
tations period did not begin to run. See 
[United States v. Miller Bros. Constr. Co., 
505 F.2d 1031, 1034-35 (10th Cir.1974)]' 
913 F.2d at 837 (emphasis added); accord 
Barlow v. Ground, 39 F.3d 231 (9th Cir. 
1994). See also 7C Wright, Miller & Kane, 
Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 2d 
§ 1956, at 551 (1986) ('Thus the procedures 
of [FedRCivP] Rule 4 must be followed in 
serving the motion [for substitution] on the 
representative or successor of a deceased 
party.") (emphasis added). 
[3,4] [113.] Here, no personal service 
was made upon Ripples' successors or repre-
sentatives. According to the certificate of 
service appended to the suggestion of death, 
the only persons served were the attorneys 
who had represented the decedents. Wolds 
state in their brief that "A copy of that 
Statement of Fact of Deaths was mailed to 
both attorney Reed C. Richards and attorney 
John J. Delaney, Sr. by first class mail, 
postage prepaid, on May 29,1996. The origi-
nal of the Statement of Fact of Deaths was 
7. South Dakota's parallel statute is SDCL 15-6-4 
and requires personal service of the summons. 
SeeSDCL15-6-4(d)(10): 
The summons shall be served by delivering a 
copy thereof. Service in the following manner 
shall constitute personal service: 
(10) In all other cases, to the defendant person-
allyfj 
See also subdivision (9): "Whenever the manner 
of service of process is specified in any statute or 
rule relating to any action, remedy or special 
proceedings the manner of service so specified 
shall be followedf.]" (Emphasis added). 
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of the deaths of Ripples by a document dated 
May 29, 1996. The Clerk's office acknowl-
edged receipt by return letter dated May 30, 
1996. On September 3, 1996, Wolds moved 
to dismiss for failure to substitute parties 
within the ninety days of SDCL 15-6-
25(a)(1), which provides the procedure for 
substitution of parties when a party dies: 
If a party dies and the claim is not thereby 
extinguished, the court may order substi-
tution of the proper parties. The motion 
for substitution may be made by any party 
or by the successors or representatives of 
the deceased party and, together with the 
notice of hearing, shall be served on the 
parties as provided in § 15-6-6 and upon 
persons not parties in the manner provided 
in § 15-6-4 for the service of a summons. 
Unless the motion for substitution is made 
not later than ninety days after the death 
is suggested upon the record by service of 
a statement of the fact of the death as 
provided herein for the service of the mo-
tion, the action shall be dismissed as to the 
deceased party. 
Ripples* made a motion to substitute parties 
on September 5, 1996; assuming the ninety-
day rule was properly invoked, the last day 
the motion could have been timely filed was 
September 2, 1996.2 Ripples' motion to sub-
stitute parties was denied and Wolds' motion 
to dismiss granted. 
[116.] Ripples appeal, claiming that since 
SDCL 15-6-25(a)(l) prescribes the proce-
dure for substitution of parties at the circuit 
court level, the ninety days did not begin to 
run until the settled record was returned to 
the Lawrence County Clerk of Courts. They 
claim that while the case was on appeal to 
this court, "the record was set and was not 
*• Since the appeal was taken in their name, we 
will continue to refer to Ripples, even though 
they are no longer parties. 
*• This takes into account SDCL 15-6-6(e): 
Whenever a party has the right or is required 
to do some act or take some proceedings with-
in a prescribed period after the service of a 
notice or other paper upon him, or whenever 
such service is required to be made a pre-
scribed period before a specified event, and the 
notice or paper is served by mail, three days 
shall be added to the prescribed period 
3
- SDCL 15-26A-56 provides: 
modifiable*1 and therefore, Wolds' "efforts to 
suggest the deaths on the record were fu-
tile." We disagree but reverse and remand 
because the ninety-day rule was not properly 
invoked. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[f 7.] This appeal requires us to construe 
SDCL 15-&-25(a)(l), which provides for ser-
vice of notice and substitution of parties upon 
the death of a party. The construction of 
that statute and its application to these facts 
present questions of law, which we review de 
novo. Kern v. City of Sioux Falls, 1997 SD 
19, 14, 560 N.W.2d 236, 237 (citing Johnson 
v. Rapid City Softball Ass'n, 514 N.W^d 693, 
695 (S.D.1994)). 
[18] 1. WHETHER THE SUGGESTION 
OF DEATH UPON THE RECORD OR 
SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES CAN BE 
EFFECTED IN THE SOUTH DAKOTA 
SUPREME COURT. 
[19.] Ripples argue that suggestion of 
death "upon the record" cannot be effected 
when a case is pending before this court. 
They claim that SDCL 15-6-25(a)(l) has no 
application to Supreme Court procedure, and 
that the settled record can only be modified 
on appeal in accordance with SDCL 15-26A-
56.3 Therefore, they argue, the ninety-day 
provision of SDCL 15-6-25(a)(l) was not 
triggered by Wolds' suggestion of death and 
the motion to substitute parties was timely 
made. 
[1,2] [110.] SDCL 15~6-25(a)(l) is part 
of SDCL ch. 15-6 "Rules of Procedure in 
Circuit Courts." However, this court em-
If anything material to either party is omitted 
from the record, is misstated therein, or is 
improper, the parties by stipulation, or the 
trial court, before the record is transmitted to 
the Supreme Court, or the Supreme Court, on 
motion by a party or on its own initiative, may 
direct tine record be corrected and if necessary 
require a supplemental record be approved 
and transmitted. 
Because the suggestion of death does not consti-
tute omitted, misstated, or improper material, 
this statute has no application to this case; it 
does, however, demonstrate this court's authority 
to modify the record. 
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cessor or representative, who must decide 
whether to pursue the claim, is aware of the 
substitution requirement" Fariss, 769 F.2d 
at 962. Under these circumstances, allowing 
this case to be dismissed against Ripples' 
estates would cause prejudice to their sub-
stantial rights. Tollman, 1997 SD 49 at 114, 
562 N.W.2d at 897. Accordingly, we reverse 
and remand for further proceedings. 
[1118.] AMUNDSON, KONENKAMP, and 
GILBERTSON, JJ., concur. 
[H 19.] MILLER, C.J., concurs in part and 
dissents in part 
MILLER, Chief Justice (concurring in 
part, dissenting in part). 
[1120.] I agree that SDCL 15-6-25(a)(l) 
applies to this Court, and therefore the nine-
ty-day provision of that statute was triggered 
by Wolds' suggestion of death upon the rec-
ord. However, the principle of judicial re-
straint dictates that I must respectfully dis-
sent from the rest of the majority opinion. 
The issue of ineffective service was not prop-
erly before this Court and should not be 
considered.9 
[121.] Ripples never argued ineffective 
service to the trial court or tc this Court 
SDCL 15-6-12(h)(l) provides: 
A defense of lack of jurisdiction over the 
person, insufficiency of process, or insuffi-
ciency of service of process is waived (A) if 
omitted from a motion in the circum-
stances described in § 15-6-12(g), or (B) if 
it is neither made by motion under § 15-
6-12 nor included in a responsive pleading 
or an amendment thereof permitted by 
§ 15-6-15(a) to be made as a matter of 
course. (Emphasis added). 
See also Matter ofRP., 498 N.W.2d 364, 367 
(S.D.1993); WUliams Ins. v. Bear Butte 
9. While the majority holds that Ripples were not 
personally served, the fact remains that it is 
raising an issue sua sponge *nd I fee! that is 
inappropriate. No matter what the maiority 
states, it cannot be denied that the issue of inef-
fective service of process was never argued to the 
trial court nor this court. 
10. The majority relies on In re Estate of Tollman, 
1997 SD 49, 114, 562 N.W.2d 893, 897, and 
SDCL 15-6-61, to hold that this Court has the 
Farms Partnership, 392 N.W.2d 831, 834 
(S.D.1986). It seems clear that in past cases 
this Court has not chosen to make an argu-
ment for a party as to insufficiency of service 
of process, so why start now? 
[f 22.] While the present case raises the 
issue of when the ninety-day period begins to 
run and not a jurisdictional issue as was the 
case in Williams Ins. and Matter of R.P., 
there is our general rule that u[w]e will not 
address issues raised for the first time on 
appeal." Mash v. Cutler, 488 N.W^d 642, 
648 (S.D.1992) (citations omitted). The issue 
was never raised to the trial court and should 
therefore be deemed waived. See Gesinger 
v. Gesinger, 531 N.W2d 17, 22 (S.D.1995) 
(citing Fullmer v. State Farm Ins. Co., 514 
N.W.2d 861 (S.D.1994); Hepper v. Triple U 
Enterprises, Inc., 388 N.W.2d 525, 527 n. 3 
(S.D.1986)). Further, the issue was never 
raised to this Court and should also be 
deemed waived. See Id. (citing Zens v. Chi-
cago, Milwaukee, St Paul & Pac, 479 
N.W.2d 155, 159 (S.D.1991)). Ripples had 
two strikes at this issue and failed to raise it; 
this Court should not now pinch hit for Rip-
ples' attorneys. We are a reviewing court 
and should not consider matters not properly 
before us or matters not determined by the 
trial court Schull Constr. Co. v. Koenig, 80 
S.D. 224, 229, 121 N.W.2d 559, 561 (1963). 
[H23.] The majority argues that to hold 
other than it does would be to prejudice the 
substantial rights of Ripples. But cannot the 
same be said for all the countless parties in 
the p:^t whose arguments we have not ad-
dressed because they were not properly be-
fore us? Were the situations of these other 
parties different because they actually tried 
to present their issues to us? It is not the 
responsibility, nor the duty of this Court to 
make an argument for a party because that 
party's attorney failed to make it10 As to 
power to disturb a judgment for the sake of 
promoting substantial justice. While we do have 
such power, it should be used cautiously. Tall-
man involved this Court recognizing that a party 
had made a judicial admission and should be 
bound by it lest another party be required to pay 
twice on a debt. In Tollman, we were not mak-
ing arguments for the parties. What the majority 
is attempting to do in the present case is to play 
a more affirmative role in disturbing the lower 
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mailed on the same day to the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court for filing." Even if the suc-
cessor or representative had actual knowl-
edge of Ripples' deaths, the ninety-day rule 
is not invoked absent formal suggestion of 
death upon the record, and "formal sugges-
tion" includes personal service on those non-
parties. Grandbouche, 913 F.2d at 836-37. 
[114.] The rationale for requiring personal 
service on the representative or successor is 
explained as follows: 
Personal service of the suggestion of 
death on the representative achieves a sa-
lutary litigation function. It alerts the 
nonparty to the consequences of death for 
a pending suit, signaling the need for ac-
tion to preserve the claim if so desired. 
In addition to insuring that the dece-
dent's representative has notice of the liti-
gation, a supplemental reason for rejecting 
service on decedent's attorney alone is 
based on the law of agency. Because the 
attorney's power to act ceases with the 
client's death, counsel has no power to 
continue or terminate an action on behalf 
of a dead client. 
6 Moore's Federal Practice, § 25.10[3][e], at 
25-21 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.) (citations and 
internal quotation omitted); accord Federal 
Practice & Procedure, supra, § 1955, at 545 
& n. 12: 
[The attorney for the deceased] is not him-
self a party to the action and, since his 
authority to represent the deceased termi-
nated on the death, he is not a "represen-
tative of the deceased party" of the sort 
contemplated in the rule. 
(Citations omitted) (noting also that the dece-
i t ' s attorney may not suggest the death on 
toe record). 
[U15.] Ineffective service was not avgued 
by Ripples, but it was not necessary to Jo so. 
*ne statute expressly provides that dismissal 
18
 Conditioned upon proper service of the 
Cedent's representatives.8 See SDCL 15-
6-25(a)(l), reproduced supra 115. See also 
0e
«o v. Oveson, 307 N.W.2d 862, 863 (S.D. 
1981); 
Contrary to the dissent, we are not raising an 
^ditional issue or argument as to "ineffective" 
^rvice of process. There was no service of 
Process made on Ripples' heirs or representa-
While the service can be waived by ap-
pearance where a summons has been actu-
ally issued and later filed, the failure to 
issue, file, or serve a summons, as in this 
case, deprives the court of jurisdiction. 
Black v. Circuit Court of Eighth Judicial 
Circuit, 78 S.D. 302, 101 N.W^d 520 
(1960); Ayers, Weatherwax & Reid Co. v. 
Sundback, 5 S.D. 31, 58 N.W. 4 (1894); 
SDCL 15-2-30,15-2-31,15-6-3, and 15-6-
5(d). We conclude by noting that the ques-
tion of jurisdiction may be raised at any 
time and even by the reviewing court's 
own mation. Medley v. Salvation Army, 
Rapid City Corps, 267 N.W.2d 201 (S.D. 
1978). 
(Emphasis added). 
[f 16.] In addition, we may "vacate," "mod-
ify," or "otherwise disturb" a judgment if 
"refusal to take such action appears to the 
court inconsistent with substantial justice" 
because "substantial rights of the parties" 
will otherwise be jeopardized. In re Estate 
of Tollman, 1997 SD 49, 114, 562 N.W^d 
893,897. See SDCL 15-6-61: 
No error in either the admission or the 
exclusion of evidence and no error or de-
fect in any ruling or order or in anything 
done or omitted by the court or by any of 
the parties is ground for granting a new 
trial or for setting aside a verdict or for 
vacating, modifying or otherwise disturb-
ing a judgment or order, unless refusal to 
take such action appears to the court in-
consistent with substantial justice. The 
court at every stage of the proceeding 
mast disregard any error or defect in the 
proceeding which does not affect the sub-
stantial rights of the parties. 
(Emphasis added). 
[1117.] Here, the limitation period would 
impose upon Ripples' successors or represen-
tatives an obligation which had to be fulfilled 
within ninety days—even though they were 
not personally served as required by SDCL 
15-6'-25(a)(l). "Absent personal service, 
there is no reason to presume that the suc-
tives. Therefore, under SDCL 15-6-2 5 (a)(1), the 
trial court cannot dismiss the lawsuit as against 
the heirs. It is a simple matter of statutory 
construction. 
CRAMER v. SMITH 
Cite as 572 N-WUd 445 (SJ> 1997) 
tbe majonty raising the issue of ineffective 3. Husband and Wife G»279(l) 
grvice, all that can be said is: The point 
ippears here in its virgin state, wearing all 
as maiden blushes, and is therefore out of 
place" Cleveland v Chambliss, 64 Ga. 352, 
359(1879) 
S.D. 445 
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Diane R. CRAMER, formerly known 
as Diane R. Smith, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Murray T. SMITH, Defendant 
and Appellee. 
No. 19994. 
Supreme Court of South Dakota. 
Considered on Bnefs Sept 11, 1997. 
Decided Dec. 23, 1997. 
Former wife sought to have former hus-
band held in contempt for alleged violation of 
divorce and property settlement agreement. 
The Circuit Court, Second Judicial Circuit, 
Minnehaha County, Gene Paul Kean, J., de-
cked, and former wife appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Amundson, J., held that former 
husband was not m contempt. 
Affirmed. 
1
 Husband and Wife <S>279(1) 
Court applies contract principles when 
^terpretmg property settlement agreement 
tocorporated into divorce decree, and inter-
pretation of these agreements is a matter of 
kw for courts to decide. 
2
- Contempt <s=>20 
Contempt requires showing of willful 
^obedience of vahd court order with knowl-
^ge of contents of order and ability to com-
% with terms of order 
Where property settlement agreement 
did not provide clear obligation as to money 
set-aside, and agreement had been given dif-
ferent meaning from plam meaning of words, 
it was necessary and proper for trial court to 
consider all circumstances surrounding exe-
cution of agreement as well as subsequent 
acts of spouses, 
4. Husband and Wife e=>281 
Former wife, having signed agreement 
stipulating that "$152,182 has been paid" to-
ward tax liabilities, was conclusively pre-
sumed to know its contents and to assent to 
them, in absence of fraud, misrepresentation, 
or other wrongful act by another contracting 
party 
5. Husband and Wife <3=>279(2) 
Taxes resulting from "draw down" dis-
tributions intended to reduce book value of 
company, a marital asset, to agreed upon 
book value before actual sale closmg, were 
"taxes resulting from the sale" of the asset, 
and thus, husband's payment of those taxes 
from funds set aside for tax obligations aris-
ing from the sale did not violate property 
settlement agreement. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def 
mitions 
Mark F. Marshall and Scott N. Heide-
pnem of Johnson, Heidepnem, Miner & 
Marlow, Sioux Falls, for plaintiff and appel-
lant. 
Richard A. Johnson of Strange, Farrell, 
Johnson & Casey, Sioux Falls, for defendant 
and appellee. 
AMUNDSON, Justice. 
[H1 ] Diane R. Cramer (Cramer) appeals 
the circuit court's decision declining to hold 
Murray T. Smith (Smith), her former hus-
band, m contempt for an alleged violation of 
their divorce stipulation and property settle-
ment agreement We affirm 
court s judgment Such affirmative action sets a bad precedent 
CAMPBELL v. CAMPBELL 
Cite as 878 P.2d 1037 (Old. 1994) 
SOIL the majority holds that there must al- death of former wife, 
Okl. 1037 
ways be a showing of prejudice. As authori-
ty, Dutsch v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 845 P.2d 
187 (Okla.1992) is cited. But Dutsch did not 
deal with a situation where the entire theory 
of recovery was omitted from the jury's con-
sideration. In Dutsch we were faced with 
the question of whether the instructions ade-
quately presented the defense of the defen-
dants. We held that they did. Unlike 
Dutsch, here the plaintiffs theory of recov-
ery was not given to the jury. Contrary to 
the majority's position, Dutsch did not re-
quire a showing of prejudice for a theory 
wholly omitted by the instructions. 
Prejudice is implicit when a party's basis 
for recovery or defense is not explained to 
the jury. The court gave a one line instruc-
tion defining "ordinary care", another defin-
ing "direct cause/' and a third explaining 
Brandy's incapacity for negligence due to her 
age. But the jury was not told of the conse-
quences of the lack of "ordinary care", or 
what "direct cause" had to do with the case, 
or even what "negligence" was in the eyes of 
the law. In other words, the plaintiffs theo-
ry on which she sought to recover was never 
explained. No other showing of prejudice 
need be demonstrated. I would reverse and 
remand as to the defendants Okeene Public 
Schools and Okeene Public Works Authority. 
I concur in the Court's affirmance of the 
directed verdict for the City of Okeene. 
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice 
HODGES, Justice WILSON and Justice 
KAUGER join in these views. 
[ O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
William H. CAMPBELL, Appellant, 
v. 
Donna M. CAMPBELL, Appellee. 
No. 76020. 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma. 
July 12, 1994. 
Former husband sought modification of 
child custodv. reauestine sole custodv. After 
the District Court, 
Cleveland County, Preston A. Trimble, J., 
granted wife's motion to reduce child support 
arrearage to judgment and deemed motion 
for modification moot. Husband appealed. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Certiorari 
was granted. The Supreme Court, Laven-
der, V.C.J., held that: (1) upon death of 
former wife, trial court lost its authority to 
proceed pending filing of suggestion of death; 
(2) former wife's oral motion was sufficient to 
commence action for arrearage so that it 
remained pending after her death; (3) for-
mer wife's attorney had no authority to ap-
pear on her behalf after her death; and (4) 
failure of former husband to file suggestion 
of death did not waive his right to raise on 
appeal necessity for such suggestion. 
Court of Appeals' judgment vacated; re-
versed and remanded. 
Opala, Alma Wilson, and Kauger, JJ., 
concurred in result. 
1. Divorce e=>83 
Upon death of former wife, authority of 
court to rule on her motion to reduce child 
support arrearage to judgment, in proceed-
ings initiated by former husband for modifi-
cation of custody, became suspended pending 
filing of statutorily required suggestion of 
death by either party to litigation or repre-
sentative of decedent. 12 Okl.St.Ann. 
§ 2025, subd. A, par. 1. 
2. Parties <s=>61 
Pending filing of suggestion of death of 
litigant substantially in form prescribed by 
statute, action remains pending. 12 Okl.St. 
Ann. § 2025, subd. A, par. 1. 
3. Divorce c=>83 
Former wife's oral motion for judgment 
for child support arrearage made during 
hearing on former husband's motion to modi-
fy child custody order was sufficient com-
mencement of action for such arrearage, so 
that action remained pending after former 
wife's death. 12 Okl.St.Ann. §§ 2007, subd. 
B. oar. 1. 2025. subd. A. nar. 1. 
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4. Divorce O=>70 
Upon death of former wife, her attorney 
no longer had authority to appear on her 
behalf with respect to her motion to reduce 
child support arrearage to judgment, in pro-
ceedings initiated by former husband for 
modification of custody; attorney was not 
party, was not person who could be made 
party, and was not representative of former 
wife as contemplated by rule governing sub-
stitution of party upon death of party. 12 
Okl.St.Ann. § 2025, subd. A, par. 1. 
5. Divorce €=>179 
Failure of former husband to file, in 
proceedings which he initiated to modify cus-
tody, suggestion of former wife's death did 
not waive his right to raise necessity for such 
suggestion on appeal from order, entered 
after wife's death, reducing child support ar-
rearage to judgment on wife's motion. 12 
Okl.St.Ann. § 2025, subd. A, par. 1. 
6. Motions <3=>1 
Written motion may be orally or infor-
mally supplemented and broadened in scope 
at time of its presentation. 
7. Abatement and Revival <3=>59.1, 62.1 
With some exceptions, upon death of 
party to litigation, pending action in any 
court does not abate. 12 Okl.St.Ann. § 1052. 
8. Courts C=>97(1) 
As rule governing substitution of party 
upon death of party is taken from Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, court may look to 
federal courts for guidance in interpretation 
and application of rule. 12 Okl.St.Ann. 
§ 2025, subd. A, par. 1; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 
Rule 25(a)(1), 28 U.S.C.A. 
9. Attorney and Client o=>78 
Power of attorney terminates upon 
death of his client and attorney does not act 
for deceased client's representatives or suc-
cessors until those successors are officially 
appointed and after they retain deceased's 
attorney. 
10. Attorney and Client <3=>S8 
Attorney, after death of client, has no 
authority either to move for substitution of 
party or to suggest death of his client upon 
record. 12 Okl.St.Ann. § 2025, subd. A, par. 
1. 
11. Parties e=>59(l) 
Attorney is not legal "representative" 
for purpose of rule governing substitution of 
party upon death of party. 12 Okl.StAnn. 
§ 2025, subd. A, par. 1. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
12. Parties <s=>61 
After death of party, either remaining 
part}- or deceased party's representatives 
may suggest death, but it is not mandatory 
on either party to make initial suggestion of 
death. 12 Okl.St.Ann. § 2025, subd. A, par. 
1. 
13. Divorce <3=»83 
Former husband did not have burden, in 
proceedings on his motion to modify custody, 
to suggest former wife's death to trial court 
in order to suspend proceedings. 12 Okl.St. 
Ann. § 2025, subd. A, par. 1. 
Certiorari to the Court of Appeals, Divi-
sion No. 4, Appeal from the District Court of 
Cleveland County; Preston A. Trimble, Trial 
Judge. 
Appellant non-custodial parent sought 
modification of child custody in district court. 
During the pendency of the action Appellee 
custodial parent's attorney made an oral mo-
tion before the court to reduce child support 
arrearage Appellant owed Appellee to judg-
ment. Appellee died subsequent to the mak-
ing of the oral motion. At the hearing, two 
months later, the court granted Appellee's 
motion and declared Appellant's request for 
custody modification moot. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed. Held: Where the right of 
action survives the death of a party to pend-
ing litigation, the action may only proceed 
upon proper application of 12 O.S.1991, 
§ 2025(A)(1), Substitution of Parties. 
CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANT-
ED; COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION VA-
CATED; DISTRICT COURT'S JUDG-
MENT REVERSED. 
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William H. Campbell, Oklahoma City, for 
appellant. 
Peggy Stockwell, Daye Stockwell, Stock-
well Law Offices, Norman, for appellee. 
LAVENDER, Vice Chief Justice. 
[1,2] This matter presents the issue of 
the effect of 12 O.S.1991 § 2025(A)(1) upon a 
pending motion to reduce unpaid child sup-
port to a judgment in favor of the mother of 
the children where the mother dies before 
the judgment is rendered. We hold that 
upon the death of the mother the trial court 
lost its authority to proceed except in the 
manner prescribed by the statute. We fur-
ther hold that pending the filing of the sug-
gestion of the death of the litigant substan-
tially in the form prescribed by the statute, 
the action remains pending. 
[3] The court further holds that the 
mother's oral motion for a judgment for the 
arrearage made during the hearing on the 
father's motion to modify the child custody 
order, was a sufficient commencement of the 
action for such arrearage so that the action 
remained pending. 
[4] We further hold that upon the death 
of his client the attorney for the mother no 
longer had the authority to appear on her 
behalf. 
We further hold that upon such death the 
authority of the court became suspended 
pending the filing of the statutorily required 
suggestion of the death and that such sug-
gestion of death is required to be filed by 
either a party to the litigation or by the 
representative of the decedent. 
[5] We also find that the failure of the 
husband to file the statutory suggestion of 
the death of his ex-wife did not work a 
waiver of his right to raise the necessity for 
such a suggestion upon the power of the 
court to enter the judgment appealed here. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
William H. Campbell, Appellant, (Camp-
bell) and Donna M. Campbell, (Appellee) 
were divorced in 1986. Appellee was made 
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custodial parent of the couple's son. The 
court ordered Campbell to pay monthly child 
support. Due to Appellee's health problems 
Campbell sought modification of custody in 
1989, requesting sole custody. During the 
pendency of the custody action several con-
tinuances were requested by both parties, 
some due to the poor health and hospitaliza-
tion of Appellee. Appellee's counsel moved 
for another continuance on April 6, 1990 be-
cause Appellee was hospitalized in the inten-
sive care unit at a local hospital. The court 
continued the hearing to June 22, 1990. 
At the time of the continuance request. 
April 6, Appellee, through her counsel made 
an oral motion before the court to reduce 
child support arrearage owed by Campbell to 
Appellee to judgment. Later that same day 
Appellee's counsel prepared and filed a writ-
ten motion to the same effect. That motion 
stated that Campbell owed Appellee $3,000 in 
child support. Sometime on April 6 after the 
making of the oral motion and before the 
filing of the written motion, Appellee died. 
The hearing was held on June 22, 1990. 
Appellee's motion to reduce child support 
arrearage to judgment was granted. The 
trial court deemed Campbell's motion to 
modify the custody order was mooted by the 
death of the appellee. 
Campbell appealed the arrearage judg-
ment claiming the court had acted without 
authority because there was no party to the 
action following Appellee's death and Appel-
lee's counsel could not act in Appellee's 
stead. Campbell also argued the arrearage 
judgment wTas made without evidence or veri-
fication of an amount owed to Appellee. 
Campbell stated in his appeal brief that he 
made all these objections to the trial court. 
However, there is no transcript of the hear-
ing in the record. The court minute simply 
states that Appellee's motion to reduce ar-
rearage to judgment is sustained and Camp-
bell's motion to modify custody is moot. On 
appeal Campbell further ?/ rued that the trial 
court wras awrare of Appeaee's death at the 
time of the June 22, 1990 hearing and its 
knowledge formed the basis for the court 
deeming the modification action moot.1 
1- Campbell relied on Turley v. Turley, 638 P.2d 469 (Okla.1981) for the proposition that legal 
x vrn.JLJL.it, za dtiKlES 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court, holding that Campbell did not inform 
the trial court that Appellee had died prior to 
the court's action and Campbell made no 
objection to Appellee's motion regarding the 
arrearage. The Court of Appeals in its 
memorandum concluded that Appellee died 
at or around the time of the judgment and 
stated that Campbell may not remain silent 
on an issue and then attempt to raise it for 
the first time on appeal. Campbell's request 
for rehearing was denied. Certiorari has 
previously been granted and the matter is 
now before us. 
ARGUMENTS 
Campbell argues that the April 6 written 
motion regarding arrearage was filed after 
Appellee's death by Appellee's counsel. 
Campbell asserts that because the motion 
was not filed until after Appellee's death the 
court was without authority to enter judg-
ment herein. He also argues in the alterna-
tive that because the trial court was aware of 
Appellee's death at the time of the June 22 
hearing its judgment for Appellee was void. 
He relies on Hambright v. City of Cleveland 
wherein we held that the court's authority is 
suspended at the death of a party.2 Camp-
bell argues that whether or not he raised 
objection to the court's proceeding after the 
death is of no consequence since a court or 
reviewing court can question at any time its 
jurisdiction over a matter. Therefore, 
Campbell argues, the Court of Appeals 
should have questioned the trial court's juris-
diction over the matter regardless of any 
objection Campbell did or did not make. 
Campbell also contends that Appellee's coun-
sel presented no evidence to show proof of 
arrearage and has shown no authority that 
permits an attorney to proceed in an action 
absent a client. 
Appellee's counsel contends in opposing 
Campbell's petition for certiorari that Camp-
bell failed to raise the issue of the trial 
court's lack of jurisdiction at the trial level 
custody of a minor transfers to the noncustodial 
parent upon the death of the custodial parent. 
This is Campbell's explanation as to why the trial 
court rendered his motion for custody modifica-
tion moot. 
and cannot raise it for the first time on 
appeal. Appellee also maintains Campbell 
did not file an objection to Appellee's arrear-
age motion and cannot do so for the first 
time on appeal. 
ANALYSIS 
A. 
Campbell argues that the written motion 
regarding arrearage was made after Appel-
lee's death and therefore a nullity in that an 
action cannot be brought by a dead person. 
This action was not howrever, commenced 
by a dead person as Campbell alleges, but 
rather, by Campbell himself when he filed his 
motion to modify custody provisions on July 
25, 1989. It is true that Appellee's written 
motion regarding arrearage wras filed after 
1
 Appellee's death. However, under 12 O.S. 
1994, § 2007(B)(1.) "[a]n application to the 
\ court for an order shall be by motion which, 
unless made during a hearing or trial shall 
be made in writing, shall state with particu-
larity the grounds therefore, and shall set 
forth the relief or order sought . . . ." (Em-
* phasis added). At the hearing on the motion 
to continue held the morning of April 6th, 
Appellee's counsel made an oral motion to 
' reduce child support payments to judgment. 
Campbell does not dispute that there was an 
3
 oral motion before the court, regarding this 
issue prior to Appellee's death however, 
5
 Campbell argues that "[i]t is a fundamental 
concept that an action is not commenced until 
1
 it is filed." 
[6] As stated, this "action" was already 
commenced prior to the April 6th hearing, 
Appellee's counsel merely made an oral mo-
1
 tion regarding an arrearage to the court as 
provided for during a hearing under 12 O.S. 
g 1994, § 2007(B)(L). Case law also holds that 
h [o]ral motions are acceptable in this jurisdic-
il tion. A written motion may be orally or 
>1 informally supplemented and broadened in 
d 2. 360 P.2d 493 (Okla.1960). 
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scope at the time of its presentation.3 
Campbell's argument that this matter was 
not commenced pnor to Appellee's death ei-
ther by Campbell's own motion to modify 
custody or by the motion to continue and oral 
motion to reduce arrearage to judgment pre-
sented by Appellee prior to her death is 
without merit. 
B. 
Campbell also maintains that this court 
was without jurisdiction to proceed in this 
case after Appellee's death. Appellee's coun-
sel argues that since Campbell did not object 
to lack of jurisdiction, service or evidence, at 
the trial court level, Campbell cannot object 
to it on appeal. Appellee's counsel further 
maintains that Campbell, by failing to deny 
the Request for Admission according to 12 
(XS § 3236 A has admitted owing Appellee 
the $3000.00 arrearage and that therefore, 
pursuant to 43 O.S. § 1374 there was already 
a valid judgment in existence. Hence, all 
Appellee requested on April 6, 1990 when the 
oral motion was made, was to reduce this 
existing judgment to writing. Therefore, 
Appellee argues, in that the judgment was in 
e>astence prior to Appellee's death at approx-
imately noon on April 6, 1990, the Court had 
jurisdiction to merely order the judgment 
reduced to writing. 
As we have already determined, the cause 
of action was commenced prior to Appellee's 
death. The question becomes, what was the 
result of her death as to this cause of action? 
3. John Deere Plow Co v Owens, 194 Okla 96, 
100, 147 P2d 149, 154 (1943) 
4. The relevant portion of 43 O.S 199 § 137 
states 
A Anv pavment or installment of child sup-
port ordered pursuant to any order, judgment 
or decree of the district court or administrative 
order of the Department of Human Services is 
on and after the date it becomes past due a 
judgment by operation of law (Emphasis add-
ed) 
5. 12 O S 1991, § 1052 states 
No action pending in any court shall abate by 
the death of either or both the parties thereto, 
except an action for libel, slander or malicious 
prosecution, which shall abate b> the death of 
the defendant 
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[7,8] With certain exceptions not applica-
ble here, the law m Oklahoma is that upon 
the death of a party to litigation a pending 
action in any court does not abate.5 Ho\ve\ -
er, pursuant to 12 O.S.1991, § 2025(A)(1) 
[i]f a party dies and the claim is not there-
by extinguished, the court may order sub-
stitution of the proper parties. The mo-
tion for substitution may be made by any 
party or by the successors or representa-
tives of the deceased party and, together 
with the notice of hearing, shall be served 
on the parties as provided m Section [2005 
of this title] and upon persons not parties 
m the manner provided m Section [2004 of 
this title] for the service of a summons. 
During the pendency of an action any par-
ty may file with the court a statement of 
the death of another party conforming sub-
stantially to Form 22 of Section [2027 of 
this title] along with proof of death and 
serve the statement of death and proof of 
death on all other parties in the manner 
provided m Section [2005 of this title]. 
Unless the motion for substitution is made 
within ninety (90) days of service of the 
statement of death, the action shall be 
dismissed without prejudice as to the de-
ceased party.6 
Oklahoma case law is sparse regarding the 
application and interpretation of 
§ 2025(A)(1). In that § 2025(A)(1) is taken 
from Rule 25(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.CApp. Rule 25(a)(1) 
(1988), we may look to the federal courts for 
The current version of 12 O S § 1052 remains 
the same as that during the time of the 1990 
hearing As to this particular cause of action, see 
Abrego v Abrego, 812 P 2d 806 808 (Okla 1991), 
"Insofar as accrued payments remain unpaid at 
death, an action for child support does not abate 
on the death of a parent " In Ah ego, it was the 
noncustodial parent that died owing the unpaid 
payments In our case, it is the custodial parent 
who died, however, the principal holding of Abie-
go, that the debt survives, is unaffected by this 
fact In any event, this issue is not raised by 
Campbell 
6. The current version of this statute remains the 
same as that during the 1990 hearing Section 
2025 was added b\ Law 1984, c 164 § 27, eff 
Nov 1, 1984 replacing 12 O S 1981, § 1080 
which was repealed in 1984 
-, 4»U O L l I V l L ) ^ 
guidance in interpretation and application of 
the rule.7 
Federal Civil Procedure Rule 25(a)(1) 
(Rule 25), authorizes a representative of the 
deceased party to mov~ for substitution for 
the action to continue when the claim is not 
extinguished by the death.8 In Landry v. 
Landry,3 the mother filed a petition for writ 
of habeas corpus directing the father to relin-
quish the physical custody of the child and a 
rule for contempt and past due child support. 
Both were continued indefinitely. The moth-
er filed a second rule for past due child 
support and a rule to increase child support. 
These were also continued indefinitely. The 
mother died and a testamentary executor of 
the estate filed suit for contempt and past 
due child support and attorney's fees. The 
court in Landry stated, "[a] custodial parent 
has the right to enforce an obligation for past 
due support. That right does not abate upon 
death. The succession representative is the 
proper party\ and the only party, to enforce 
that right"10 
In Wells v. Wells n the trial court decided 
the case on the merits regarding a modifica-
tion of a divorce decree, even though the wife 
died while the husband's petition was pend-
ing. In reversing and remanding the Ala-
bama Appeals Court explained 
[t]he issue before this court, although not 
raised by either party . . . is whether the 
trial court had jurisdiction to act where a 
party before the court dies and proper 
substitution of parties under Rule 25(a) 
. . . was not made. We determine that the 
trial court did not have authority to pro-
ceed . . . and reverse and remand. The 
question of jurisdiction is always funda-
mental, and if there is an absence of juris-
diction over either the person or the sub-
ject matter, a court has no power to act. 
7. See 12 O.S.A.1993, Ch. 39 Oklahoma Pleading 
Code (Application of the Oklahoma Pleading 
Code in Oklahoma state courts will be facilitated 
by reference to the appellate decisions from fed-
eral and state courts construing the Federal 
Rules . . . . Where the text of the Federal Rules 
has been adopted in the Oklahoma Pleading 
Code, the construction placed on it by federal 
and state courts should be presumed to have 
been adopted as well.); Laubach w Morgan, 588 
P.2d 1071, 1073 (Okla.1978). 
[T]here was subject matter jurisdiction in 
the instant case. However, there was no 
party-defendant before the court. 
The authority of defense counsel to act for 
the decedent was terminated by the dece-
dent's death. 
Likewise in Matthews v. Matthewsn 
where the wife died during post divorce pro-
ceedings, the Alabama Court of Appeals held, 
"because a proper party wras not substituted 
for the wife . . . we conclude that the trial 
court lacked jurisdiction to enter a judgment 
for the wife." 
Based on federal application of Rule 25 
and the interpretation and application given 
it by persuasive state law, we conclude that 
the trial court's authority in the instant case 
was suspended by Appellee's death and any 
subsequent action taken by the court could 
only follow the substitution of Appellee by 
her representative pursuant to the procedure 
outlined in 12 O.S.1991, § 2025(A)(1). 
C. 
Given the facts of this case, we also consid-
er whether a substitution was made such as 
would satisfy § 2025 so that the court's ac-
tions thereafter were not void. The record 
before us shows that no one other than Ap-
pellee's counsel continued to press Appellee's 
claim after her death. The question becomes 
whether Appellee's attorney was or could be 
her representative pursuant to § 2025 or 
Rule 25 so that § 2025 was at least substan-
tially complied with and the court's judgment 
was properly made. We conclude however, 
that Appellee's counsel lost authority to rep-
resent Appellee upon the client's death and 
8. Boggs v. Dravo Corp., 532 F.2d 897, 901 (3d 
Cir.1976). 
9. 516 So.2d 217 (La.Ct.App.1987). 
10. Id. at 219 (emphasis added). 
11. 376 So.2d 750, 751 (Ala.Civ.App.1979) (em-
phasis in original). 
12. 599 So.2d 1218, 1222 (Ala.Civ.App.1992). 
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therefore, no substitution could have oc- or to file the motion regarding arrearage 
curred. following her death. 
[9,10] Under Oklahoma law we have held 
that the authority of a deceased party's at-
torney ceases upon the death of that party.13 
"[T]he attorney cannot represent a dead per-
son; and, upon such death, the real party in 
interest is the personal representative or 
heirs." 14 Federal courts hold likewise. "It 
is well settled that for a suggestion of death 
to be valid and invoke the 90 day limit, [for 
substitution of party] it must identify the 
successor or representative who may be sub-
stituted for the decedent." 15 Although an 
attorney is retained to represent his client, 
the attorney is not a party, is not a person 
who could be made a party, and is not the 
representative of the deceased party as con-
templated by Rule 25.16 The power of an 
attorney terminates upon the death of his 
principal and that attorney does not act for 
the deceased's representatives or successors 
until those successors are officially appointed 
as representatives and after they then retain 
the deceased's attorney.17 Under Rule 25 
the decedent's attorney has no authority ei-
ther to move for substitution or even to 
suggest the death of his client upon the 
record.18 "Such action could clearly preju-
dice the rights of a successor party to whom 
that attorney bears no legal relationship." 19 
[11] Clearly, the use of the term "repre-
sentative" in § 2025 refers to the legal repre-
sentatives of the deceased party made so by 
or after the death of that party. The party's 
attorney is not the legal representative for 
purpose of § 2025. We therefore conclude in 
the instant case that Appellee's counsel's au-
thority to represent Appellee ceased at Ap-
pellee's death and Appellee's counsel had no 
authority to represent a deceased client at 
the hearing before the trial court on June 22 
13. Hambnght, 360 P.2d at 495. 
14. Id. 
15. Smith v. Pianos, 151 F.R.D. 547, 549 
(S.D.N.Y.1993) (citations omitted). 
16. Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983, 985 (D.C.Cir. 
1969). 
17. In re Klein, 36 B.R. 390, 392 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y. 
\QZA\ 
By so concluding we distinguish Sivick v. 
Swick20 and that line of cases wherein we 
held the attorney had standing after the 
client's death to bring a claim in the attor-
ney's name for attorney fees. In Swick, for 
example, the trial court had. while the client 
was still alive, expressly reserved the issue of 
fees for a later hearing and we held that the 
client's death did not "oust the trial com! of 
jurisdiction over the divorce action."21 In 
the instant case Appellee's counsel is not 
acting in her own right in that she is seeking 
an attorney's lien on an amount of unpaid 
child support that has not yet been reduced 
to judgment. The result being with Appel-
lee's death there is no party to carry the 
claim forward until a representative is substi-
tuted. 
D. 
While we have already determined no sub-
stitution as would satisfy § 2025 was accom-
plished, we must also address the issue as to 
whether Campbell had the burden to suggest 
the death of Appellee and by failing to do so, 
waived his right to argue on appeal, lack of 
jurisdiction in the trial court. Appellee's 
counsel contends that Campbell had the bur-
den of suggesting Appellee's death to the 
court under our ruling in Hambright In 
Hambright, which was decided under our old 
revival statutes, we stated that to require the 
defendant to make the suggestion of death 
would be placing the burden "on the defen-
dant to diligently protect the rights of the 
plaintiff." n However, we also held that "the 
situation [notice of death of a party] is analo-
gous to an affirmative defense such as the 
statute of limitations—it must be pleaded 
18. Id. at 393. 
19. Id. 
20. 864 P.2d 819 (Okla.1993). 
21. Id. at 823. 
22. Id. at 496. 
and brought to the attention of the court, 
such death not ordinarily being a matter of 
record in the case."23 
As to this second ruling of Hambright, we 
herein distinguish our holding for we have 
found no cases wherein the court held the 
defendant waived the right to later argue the 
court's authority was not suspended (and 
therefore the court's actions were valid) upon 
the death of a party for failing to make a 
suggestion of death upon the record under 
§ 2025.24 Neither did we find any federal 
cases to that effect. Although, there are 
numerous federal cases dismissed for failing 
to comply with the 90 days limit for substitu-
tion once the suggestion of death was made 
on the record in accordance with the statuto-
ry requirements, we did not find any cases 
where the court found that the defendant had 
waived the right to argue the court's authori-
ty was not suspended because the defendant 
had not filed a suggestion of death. 
[12] Furthermore, a plain reading of the 
statute affirms that it was not Campbell's 
burden to make the suggestion of death al-
though, he could have done so. Section 2025 
states 
[djuring the pendency of the action any 
party may file with the court a statement 
of the death of another party . . . along 
with the proof of death and serve the 
statement of death and proof of death on 
23. Id. 
24. However, if in fact it is not jurisdiction over 
the subject matter or the person that the court 
loses at the death of one of the parties, but the 
court's authority to proceed, in other words, if 
jurisdiction and authority, are not one and the 
same, then there is an argument to be made that 
in fact Hambright correctly decided that the right 
to raise this defense is an affirmative defense that 
can be waived by failing to do so. At least, this 
would be true under the old revival statutes that 
Hambright was interpreting. In any event, we 
do not see that this issue has been presented or 
argued for determination. Campbell argues that 
jurisdiction can be raised at any time, however, it 
is, more precisely subject matter jurisdiction that 
can be raised at any stage of the litigation and 
Campbell does not argue that he is raising lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. And while Appellee's 
counsel cites us Hambright for the proposition 
that Campbell has waived his right to argue lack 
of jurisdiction on appeal, counsel presents no 
legal basis for so arguing jurisdiction has been 
waived under § 2025 nor what type of jurisdic-
tion has been waived. 
all other parties in the manner provid-
ed (Emphasis added). 
In applying Rule 25, federal courts have 
held that service of statement of death may 
be made either by representatives of the 
deceased party or by any other party to the 
action, but may not be made by the deceased 
party acting through counsel.25 It is not 
however, a remaining party's burden to sug-
gest the death of the party. We further note 
[a] motion to substitute may be made by 
any party or by the representative of the 
deceased party without awaiting the sug-
gestion of death. Indeed, the motion will 
usually be so made. / / a party or the 
representative of the deceased party de-
sires to limit the time within which anoth-
er may make the motion, he may do so by 
suggesting the death upon the record . . . 
thus triggering the 90-day period which 
begins with suggestion of death.26 
In other words, a remaining party may 
suggest the death following the procedure of 
§ 2025 or a deceased party's representatives 
may suggest the death. It seems logical 
that whoever is more interested in the fur-
therance of the action would be the one to 
suggest the death and trigger the remaining 
procedure of § 2025, but under the statute, it 
is not mandatory on either party to make the 
initial suggestion of death.27 
25. Al-Jundi v. Rockefeller, 88 F.R.D. 244, 246 
(W.D.N.Y.1980). See also Smith v. Pianos. 151 
F.R.D. 547, 549 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (decedents attor-
ney has no authority to suggest the death of his 
client upon the record). 
26. Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983, 985 (D.C.C:r. 
1969) (emphasis in original). Cf. National 
Equip. Rental v. Whitecraft Unlimited, 75 F.R.D. 
507, 509 (E.D.N.Y.1977) (The burden of suggest-
ing the party's death is that of the deceased 
party's representative if he desires to delimit the 
period during which substitution may be made.). 
27. While our research did reveal at least one 
federal case wherein the court stated the proper 
procedure to be followed was for the defendant 
to suggest the death of the plaintiff, whereupon 
the plaintiff would then file its motion to substi-
tute, (see Roberts v. Rowe, 89 F.R.D. 398. 400 
(S.D.W.Va.1981)) the court gave no legal basis 
for its statement and we find other federal cases 
(see Tolliver v. Leach, 126 F.R.D. 529. 531 
(W.D.Mich. 1989)) that would suggest it is a dis-
cretionary procedure as so stated in the federal 
rule. 
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E. by proper application of 12 O.S.1991, § 2025, 
Appellee's counsel had no authontv to pro-
Finally, we address Appellee's counsel's ^ ^ f t e r A p p e l l e e« s d e a t h , ^ * w a s n o t 
contention, relied on by the Court of Appeals
 c ^ ^ W < u to ^ < ^ A^ltatf* 
w affirm the trial court25 that Campbell d e a t h t 0 t h e ^ c o m t i n o r d e r t 0 s u s p e n d 
cannot raise the issue of Appellee's motion 
regarding arrearage for the first time on 
appeal since he did not file such objection 
tfith the trial court. We conclude that coun-
sel's contention is, if anything, premature, 
•fhe instant action was suspended with Ap-
pellee's death. There is no authority under 
u'hich any further proceedings could have 
t^ ken place until a substitution was made 
following the suggestion of Appellee's death 
a£ outlined in § 2025. The action halts at 
tfie party's death and can only be reactivated 
by the proper application of § 2025. Since 
proper application was not made, the action 
remams halted (suspended) with Appellee's 
death.29 
the proceedings. For the reasons stated 
herein the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
is VACATED and the judgment of the trial 
court as to the arrearage is REVERSED 
and REMANDED in accordance with the 
views expressed herein. 
HODGES, C.J.. and SIMMS, 
HARGRAVE, SUMMERS and WATT, JJ., 
concur-
OPALA, ALMA WILSON and KAUGER, 
JJ., concur in result. 
2> 
CONCLUSION 
In closing we emphasize that we are not 
addressing the question nor do we make a 
finding as to who would be the proper party 
in the instant case to substitute for Appellee 
or to pursue the motion for child support 
arrearage.30 We simply conclude that the 
action in the instant case cannot proceed 
without proper substitution pursuant to 
§ 2025. 
[13] We hold that this action was proper-
ly commenced prior to Appellee's death, that 
the proceedings were suspended on her 
death and could only have been reactivated 
2& The Court of Appeals relies on Jones v. Alpine 
Investments, Inc., 764 P.2d 513 (Okla.1987), Cor 
the rule that parties on appeal are limited to the 
issues presented at the trial level in holding 
Campbell could not raise the issue on appeal of 
Appellee's motion for arrearage because he had 
not raised the objection before the trial court 
Under the circumstances of this case however, 
the death of Appellee occurred after the motion 
^as oralh made by Appellee's counsel and be-
fore the hearing was held over two months later. 
*he proceedings became dormant following Ap-
pellee s death Whether Campbell filed an objec-
fcon to the motion is immaterial in that no action 
should have been taken subsequent to the death 
" t^il the proceedings were reactivated bv proper 
application of Section 2025. 
4 • We do not address application of the 90 day 
Period under Section 2025 by which substitution 
David W. ROUT, Appellant, 
v. 
CRESCENT PUBLIC WORKS 
AUTHORITY, Appellee. 
No. 78903. 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma. 
July 12, 1994. 
Writ of certiorari was granted after 
Court of Appeals affirmed decision of District 
may he made Since there was no suggestion of 
death under § 2025 there is no need for us to 
consider the 90 day component, other than to sa> 
based on the record before us the 90 day period 
has not been triggered 
30. See Rende v Kay, 415 F.2d 983, 986 (D C Cir. 
1969) ("No injustice results from the require-
ment that a suggestion of death identify the rep-
resentative or successor of an estate who may be 
substituted as a party for the deceased before 
Ru^ 25(a)(1) may be invoked by those who rep-
resent or inherit from the deceased If the heirs 
or counsel fear that delay may prejudice the 
litigation the> may move promptl} for appoint-
ment of a representative, either under the law of 
the domicile or by special order in the court 
wherein the litigation is pending.") 
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1. Attorney and Client *=76(2) 
Parties *=>60 
Deceased defendant's attorney was not 
authorized to suggest defendant's death on 
record and, therefore, such suggestion of 
death did not trigger 90-day period for 
making motion for substitution; thus, mo-
tion of plaintiffs' counsel to substitute de-
fendant's estate as party defendant was 
timely. Superior Court Civil Rules 25, 
25(aXD, DeLCAnn.; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 
Rules 26, 25(aXD, 25 note, 28 U.S.C.A. 
representative of deceased defendant 
in meaning of substitution rule s **** 
Court Civil Rule 25(aXD, D e l . C . A n n ^ 
CtRules, Rule 31(a, b), DeLCAnn/' ** 
Sidney Balick, Wilmington, on behalf 
plaintiffs below, appellants. °* 
James B. Ropp (argued) and RichjlM 
Galperin of Morris, James, Hitcheni71 
Williams, Wilmington, on behalf of defe J 
ant below, appellee. n* 
Before HORSEY, WALSH and 
HOLLAND, JJ. 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
In this appeal, the appellants-plaintiffc 
below, Pamela J. Hoffman and Warren 8, 
Hoffman ("the Hoffmans"), argue that the 
Superior Court erred in dismissing their 
complaint. The basis for the Superior 
Court's dismissal was its conclusion that 
the Hoffmans had filed an untimely mo. 
tion, pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 
25, for the substitution of a party following 
the death of the appellee-defendant below, 
Roland F. Cohen ("Cohen"). In reaching 
its decision, the Superior Court expressly 
declined to follow the line of federal cases 
interpreting Rule 25 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure upon which the Superior 
Court Rule 25 is modeled. We find the 
reasoning of the federal cases persuasive 
and reverse the decision of the Superior 
Court. 
Pertinent Facts 
The Hoffmans filed a lawsuit against 
Cohen on July 10, 1984, in the Superior 
Court, for damages arising out of an auto-
mobile accident. Discovery and settlement 
negotiations proceeded following the Smf 
of Cohen's answer to the complaint 0i 
October 23,1985, Cohen's attorney wrote s 
letter to the Hoffmans'attorney. This* 
ter stated that his client, Cohen, had <W 
on August 27,1985, and that he was m At 
process of preparing trie necessary 
work" to have the estate substituted •• * 
party for Cohen. 
2. Attorney and Client <*»76(2) 
Attorney was not authorized to sug-
gest defendant's death upon record as re-
sult of his having been retained originally 
to represent defendant by defendant's in-
surance carrier; neither insurance carrier 
nor attorney was party or successor or 
Plaintiffs brought action against de-
fendant for damages arising out of automo-
bile accident. Following death of defend-
ant, the Superior Court, New Castle Coun-
ty, Vincent J. Poppiti, J., dismissed com-
plaint, determining that plaintiffs filed un-
timely motion for substitution of party, and 
plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Holland, J., held that: (1) defendant's attor-
ney was not authorized to suggest defend-
ant's death upon record and, thus, 90-day 
provision for moving to substitute party 
was not triggered, and (2) attorney's being 
retained originally to represent defendant 
by insurance carrier did not authorize at-
torney to move for suggestion of death 
upon record. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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However, on November 19, 1985, instead 
of receiving a stipulation for substitution 
of the estate, the attorney for the Hoff-
mans was served with a "Suggestion of 
Death Upon the Record," which was filed 
with the Superior Court by Cohen's attor-
ney. A letter, sent simultaneously from 
Cohen's attorney to the Hoffmans' attor-
ney, stated that he understood suggesting 
Cohen's death upon the record was "the 
extent of [his] burden in this situation." 
The depositions of the Hoffmans were tak-
en three days later by Cohen's attorney, on 
November 22, 1985, as previously sched-
uled. 
A request for a pretrial conference was 
made by the Hoffmans' attorney on June 2, 
1986. On June 13, 1986, Cohen's attorney 
filed a motion to dismiss the action because 
of the Hoffmans' failure to substitute Co-
hen's estate as a party in accordance with 
Superior Court Civil Rule 25. Upon receipt 
of the motion to dismiss, the Hoffmans' 
attorney contacted Cohen's attorney to 
ascertain the name of the personal repre-
sentative of Cohen's estate or the name of 
the attorney handling the estate. Cohen's 
attorney gave him the name of another 
Delaware attorney that he believed Claire 
Cohen, the widow of Cohen, had retained to 
represent the estate of Roland F. Cohen. 
The Hoffmans' counsel then contacted that 
attorney to determine if he was handling 
the estate and, if so, the name of the per-
sonal representative of the estate. The 
Hoffmans' attorney was advised that the 
estate had not yet been opened. 
The estate was opened on June 20, 1986, 
and letters testamentary were granted 
unto Claire Cohen. On June 24, 1986, the 
Hoffmans' attorney filed a motion for sub-
stitution of Cohen's estate as a party de-
fendant. On August 15, 1986, the Hoff-
mans filed a motion for enlargement of 
time under Superior Court Civil Rule 6. 
The Superior Court granted Cohen's motion 
to dismiss, denied the Hoffmans' motion 
for an enlargement of time under Superior 
Court Civil Rule 6, and denied the Hoff-
mans' motion for the substitution of Co-
hen's estate as a party defendant under 
Rule 25(a). The Superior Court's ruling 
was based upon its decision not to follow 
the line of federal cases that had interpret-
ed Federal Rule 25, i.e., Rende v. Kay, 415 
F.2d 983 (D.C.Cir.1969), and its progeny. 
The Superior Court acknowledged that, ac-
cording to Rende, the suggestion of death 
by Cohen's attorney would have been a 
nullity and the motion for substitution by 
Hoffmans' attorney would have been time-
ly. 
History of Superior Court Rules 
We begin our review with an examina-
tion of the correlation between the Superior 
Court Civil Rules and the corresponding 
federal rules. The rules of the Superior 
Court of the State of Delaware were 
changed substantially as of January 1, 
1948. The publisher of the Superior Court 
Rules noted at that time that Rules 1-86 of 
the Civil Rules of the Superior Court were 
patterned upon the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure that had been in effect since 
1938. Preface to Vol. 13A DeLC, Superi-
or Court Rules at vi (West 1971). To the 
extent that the Superior Court did not 
adopt a particular federal rule or subdivi-
sion of a rule, this fact was identified by 
the publishers in an analysis that preceded 
the text of the rules. The publishers also 
noted that the many court decisions con-
struing the federal rules "should be of 
considerable interest and value to the 
Bench and Bar of Delaware when consider-
ing the interpretation of corresponding 
State court rules." Id. at vii. See also 
Superior Court Rules analysis at 2-13 
(West 1971). 
In 1948, one of the first reported cases 
which interpreted the newly adopted Supe-
rior Court Civil Rules was written by 
Judge, later Justice, Carey. Justice Carey, 
who had joined in promulgating those rules 
only a few months earlier, wrote: 
In those instances where our present 
rule is exactly the same as the Federal 
rule, it is desirable to follow the interpre-
tation placed upon it by the Federal 
Courts, especially where those Courts 
have been so nearly unanimous in their 
rulings, unless some good reason ap-
pears for adopting a contrary construc-
tion. 
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Patterson v. Vincent, DeLSuper., 61 A.2d 
416, 417 (1948). This Court has also held 
that because the 1948 Superior Court Civil 
Rules are basically the 1938 Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, the construction of 
these latter rules by the federal judiciary is 
of "great persuasive weight in the con-
struction of the present Superior Court 
Rules." Canaday v. Superior Court, Del. 
Supr., 119 A.2d 347, 352 (1956). 
History of Delaware Rule 25 
Superior Court Civil Rule 25 received its 
first careful examination in 1959 by then 
Judge, now Chief Justice, Christie. Tiffa-
ny v. OToole Realty Co., DeLSuper., 153 
A.2d 195 (1959). At that time, Superior 
Court Civil Rule 25(a)(1) provided in part 
that "[i]f a party dies and the claim is not 
thereby extinguished, the court within 2 
years after the death may order substitu-
tion of the proper parties." Super.Ct. 
Civ.R. 25(a)(1), quoted in Tiffany v. 
OToole Realty Co., 153 A.2d at 196. In 
Tiffany, the defendants moved to dismiss 
the plaintiffs case because more than two 
years had elapsed since the death of Harold 
E. Tiffany without the substitution of a 
proper party in his place. 153 A.2d at 196. 
In analyzing the defendants' motion in 
Tiffany, the court found that since Superi-
or Court Civil Rule 25 was virtually identi-
cal to Federal Rule 25 "the reasoning in the 
federal cases must be given great weight 
in interpreting the rule." Id. at 199. The 
Tiffany court followed the interpretation in 
the federal cases which had construed Rule 
25 and granted the defendants' motion to 
dismiss. However, the Tiffany court ob-
served that Professor Moore had described 
Federal Rule 25 as "easily the poorest rule 
of all Federal Rules." Id. at 199 (quoting 4 
J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 
1125.01[7] (2d ed. 1950)). The Tiffany court 
also noted that the advisory committee for 
the federal courts had suggested changes 
1. Professor Moore's treatise states: 
Rule 6(b) was amended in 1963, to remove 
Rule 25 from the list of exceptions to the 
applicability of Rule 6. [Rule 6] provides for 
the enlargement of time for the taking of an 
act required by the Civil Rules, in the court's 
discretion for cause shown. Thus, even the 
in Federal Rule 25(a)(1) along the lines 
proposed by Professor Moore. Id. at 199 n 
1. 
Amendment of Delaware and 
Federal Rule 25 
The two year provision remained in Fed-
eral Rule 25 and continued to be strictly 
applied until 1963. In 1961, the Federal 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules sug-
gested that Rule 25(a)(1) be made more 
flexible. In 1963, the United States Su-
preme Court completely rewrote Federal 
Rule 25(a)(1) and also made concurrent 
changes in Federal Rule 6(b).1 
The 1963 amendment to Federal Rule 25 
provides that any party to the action or any 
successor or representative of a deceased 
party can file a motion for substitution 
within ninety days after the death of a 
party is suggested upon the record. There-
fore, instead of limiting the ability for sub-
stitution to two years from the death of a 
party, the new limit upon substitution is 
tied to the suggestion of the death of the 
party upon the record. Once the death of a 
party has been suggested upon the record, 
the 1963 amendment to Federal Rule 25 
provides that if a substitution is not made 
within ninety days, the action is to be dis-
missed as to the deceased party. 3B J. 
Moore & J. Kennedy, Moore's Federal 
Practice 11 25.06[2.-l] (2d ed. 1987). 
Since the time limit for making a substi-
tution as a result of the 1963 amendment is 
now measured from the suggestion of 
death on the record, the ability to suggest 
a death is uniquely important. The Federal 
Advisory Committee anticipated this. The 
Committee Notes explaining the 1963 
amendments state: 
Present Rule 25(a)(1), together with 
present Rule 6(b), results in an inflexible 
requirement that an action be dismissed 
as to a deceased party if substitution is 
not carried out within a fixed period mea-
ninety-day time limit of amended Rule 25(a) 
is now subject to enlargement pursuant to 
Rule 6 if good cause can be shown as to why 
substitution could not have been made within 
the time limit for substitution. 
3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, Moore's Federal 
Practice, H 25.06[2.-2] (2d ed. 1987). 
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sured from the time of death. The hard-
ships and inequities of this unyielding 
requirement plainly appear from the 
cases. 
The amended rule establishes a time 
limit for the motion to substitute based 
not upon the time of the death, but rath-
er upon the time information of the death 
is provided by means of a suggestion of 
death upon the record 
A motion to substitute may be made 
by any party or by the representative of 
the deceased party without awaiting the 
suggestion of death. Indeed, the motion 
will usually be so made. If a party or 
the representative of the deceased party 
desires to limit the time within which 
another may make the motion, he may 
do so by suggesting the death upon the 
record. 
28 U.S.C.A., Fed.R.Civ.P. 25 advisory com-
mittee notes at 121 (1972) (citations omit-
ted) (emphasis added), quoted in Rende v. 
Kay, 415 F.2d 983, 985 (D.C.Cir.1969). It 
was clearly the view of the Federal Adviso-
ry Committee that the amendments to Rule 
25(a)(1) would limit entities who may sug-
gest death upon the record to those who 
may move for substitution. 
The Delaware Superior Court amended 
its own Civil Rules 6(b) and 25(a)(1) to 
conform completely with the 1963 amend-
ments to Federal Rules 6(b) and 25(a)(1). 
Superior Court Civil Rule 25(a)(1) now 
reads: 
If a party dies and the claim is not 
thereby extinguished, the Court may or-
der substitution of the proper parties. 
The motion for substitution may be made 
by any party or by the successors or 
representatives of the deceased party 
and, together with the notice of hearing, 
shall be served on the parties as provided 
in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in 
the manner provided in Rule 4 for the 
service of a summons, and may be served 
in any county. Unless the motion for 
substitution is made not later than 90 
days after the death is suggested upon 
the record by service of a statement of 
the fact of the death as provided herein 
for the service of the motion, the action 
shall be dismissed as to the deceased 
party in all cases except those in which 
an application for an interlocutory appeal 
has been made. 
Super.CtCiv.R. 25(a)(1). The interaction of 
Superior Court Civil Rules 6 and 25, as 
amended, was discussed by this Court in 
Doherty v. Straughn, DeLSupr., 407 A.2d 
207, 210-11 (1979). 
Federal Construction of Rule 25 
As Amended 
The seminal federal case interpreting the 
1963 amendments to Federal Rule 25 was 
written in 1969. Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 
983 (D.C.Cir.1969). The facts in the Rende 
case are strikingly similar to the facts in 
this case. In Rende, the defendant Kay 
(here Cohen), died during the course of the 
litigation. The defendant's attorney sug-
gested the defendant's (Kay's) death on the 
record and subsequently filed a motion to 
dismiss when the plaintiffs (there Rende, 
here the Hoffmans) made no motion for 
substitution within ninety days. The Unit-
ed States District Court for the District of 
Columbia granted Kay's motion to dismiss. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit reversed that 
decision. Id. at 986. 
In reversing the District Court, the D.C. 
Circuit reviewed the history of Federal 
Rule 25 and the commentary from the Ad-
visory Committee Notes, which we have 
already quoted. Id. at 984-85. The D.C. 
Circuit concluded that under Federal Rule 
25 as amended in 1963: 
[E]ither a party or "the successors or 
representatives of the deceased party" 
may avoid delay in effecting substitution 
for the deceased party either by filing a 
motion for substitution or by suggesting 
death on the record and thus triggering 
the 90-day period which begins with sug-
gestion of death. 
Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d at 985. The D.C. 
Circuit then held: 
Although the attorney for the defendant 
was retained to "represent" the deceased 
as his counsel, he is not a person who 
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could be made a party, and is not a 
"representative of the deceased party" in 
the sense contemplated by Rule 25(a)(1). 
In our opinion the Rule, as amended, 
cannot fairly be construed, as the defend-
ant's attorney argues, to make his sug-
gestion of death operative to trigger the 
90-day period even though he was nei-
ther a successor nor representative of 
the deceased, and gave no indication of 
what person was available to be named 
in substitution as a representative of the 
deceased. Counsel's construction would 
open the door to a tactical maneuver to 
place upon the plaintiff the burden of 
locating the representative of the estate 
within 90 days. 
Id. at 985-86 (footnote omitted).2 
Federal Construction Adopted for 
Superior Court Civil Rule 25 
[1] The Delaware Superior Court origi-
nally adopted Rule 25 in a form that was 
identical to the corresponding federal rule. 
The Delaware Superior Court adhered to 
the federal courts' interpretation of Rule 
25 in Tiffany despite its apparent harsh-
ness. See 153 A.2d at 198-200. There-
after, the Delaware Superior Court amend-
ed Rule 25(aXD and Rule 6(b), adopting 
verbatim the 1963 amendments to the same 
federal rules. 
The Superior Court's amendment to Rule 
25(a) was effective July 1, 1970. This ef-
2. The D.C. Circuit also pointed out that: 
The Advisory Committee, in outlining that 
suggestion of death could be made by "the 
representative of the deceased party" plainly 
contemplated that the suggestion emanating 
from the side of the deceased would identify a 
representative of the estate, such as an execu-
tor or administrator, who could be substituted 
for the deceased as a party, with the action 
continued in the name of the representative. 
The addition of "successor" in the Rule would 
take care of the case of, say, the distributee of 
an estate that had been distributed, but would 
not make a material difference in the aspect 
under consideration. 
Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983, 985 (D.C.Cir.1969) 
(emphasis added). Noting that it was "pro Jed 
in order to expedite and facilitate implementa-
tion" of the 1963 amendment to Federal Rule 
25, the D.C. Circuit quoted Form 30 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which pro-
vides: 
fective date was one year after the Rende 
decision. Therefore, in 1970, the Superior 
Court had access to the federal amendment 
to Rule 25, the Federal Advisory Commit-
tee's Notes explaining the reasons for the 
amendment, and the Rende decision con-
struing the amendment. The record does 
not support a conclusion that the Superior 
Court adopted an amendment that was 
identical to the federal changes but reject-
ed the Federal Advisory Committee's com-
mentary and the subsequent construction 
of amended Rule 25(a) by the federal 
courts. 
We find the reasoning of Rende and its 
progeny3 not only persuasive but compel-
ling in this case. We hold, for the reasons 
stated in Rende, that the deceased's (Co-
hen's) attorney was not authorized to sug-
gest Cohen's death pursuant to Superior 
Court Civil Rule 25(a)(1). This conclusion 
is entirely consistent with the general rule 
that upon the death of a client, a pre-exist-
ing attorney-client relationship is complete-
ly severed and any action taken on behalf 
of the deceased client by his former attor-
ney is a nullity. In re Cakoonfs Will, 
Del.Super., 82 A.2d 920, 922 (1951). See 
also 7 AmJur.2d Attorneys at Law § 171 
(1980); 7A CJ.S. Attorney and Client 
§ 224 (1980). 
Since the suggestion of death by Cohen's 
attorney was a nullity and ineffective to 
trigger the ninety-day provision in Rule 25, 
the motion by the Hoffmans' attorney to 
A.B. [describe as a party, or as executor, 
administrator, or other representative or suc-
cessor of CD., the deceased party] suggests 
upon the record, pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1), 
the death of CD. [describe as party] during 
the pendency of this action. 
Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d at 985 (emphasis omit-
ted). However, the surviving party need not 
identify a representative of the estate in a sug-
gestion of death. Yonofsky v. Wernick, 362 
F.Supp. 1005, 1011-12 (S.D.N.Y.1973). 
3. McSurely v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88, 97-99 
(D.CCir.1985) (per curiam), cert denied, 474 
U.S. 1005, 106 S.Ct. 525, 88 L.Ed.2d 457 (1985); 
Boggs v. Dravo Corp., 532 F.2d 897, 90(M)1 (3d 
Cir.1976); Al-Jundi v. Rockefeller, 88 F.RJX 
244, 245-48 (W.D.N.Y.1980); Gronowicz v. 
Leonard, 109 F.R.D. 624, 626-27 (S.D.N.Y.1986); 
In re Klein, 36 B.R. 390, 392-93 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y. 
1984). 
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substitute Cohen's estate as a party de-
fendant was timely.4 Therefore, the deci-
sions of the Superior Court dismissing the 
Hoffmans' complaint and denying the Hoff-
mans' motion for substitution are reversed. 
No Insurance Company Exception 
[2] At oral argument in this case, Co-
ben's attorney raised a new theory for au-
thorizing his suggestion of Cohen's death 
upon the record. The attorney represented 
to this Court that he had been retained 
eriginally to defend Cohen in the Superior 
Court by Cohen's insurance carrier. Since 
this argument was not presented to the 
Superior Court, it cannot be properly raised 
at this time. Supr.CtR. 8. However, in 
the interest of justice and for the guidance 
of future cases, we will address this con-
tention. Our conclusion would be the same 
if this issue had been properly raised and 
presented. 
This Court has previously recognized 
that representation pursuant to a contract 
of insurance, when the client does not r e 
tain or control the attorney in the perform-
ance of his services, falls within an excep-
tion to the general rule that the death of a 
"client" terminates the relationship and re-
vokes the authority of the attorney to act. 
Coleman v. Durden, Del.Supr., 338 A.2d 
570, 570-71 (1975) (per curiam). In Cole-
man, the defendant had died after the Su-
perior Court entered judgment against him. 
A personal representative was not appoint-
ed for the estate within the statutory time 
period. The deceased defendant's attorney 
subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal 
to this Court. Id. at 570. Relying on the 
general rule enunciated in In re Cahoon's 
Will, 82 A.2d at 922, the plaintiff moved to 
dismiss the appeal, arguing that the attor-
ney-client relationship had been completely 
severed upon the death of the defendant. 
4. A suggestion of death upon the record is not a 
prerequisite to a motion for substitution. 
5. The ability to perfect an appeal to protect the 
interest of a deceased client has since been 
extended to all attorneys by this Court. Supr.Ct. 
R. 7(e). 
6. In this case, the attorney retained by Cohen's 
insurance company took the depositions of the 
Hoffmans subsequent to Cohen's death. With-
The attorney for the deceased defendant 
had been retained by an insurance company 
pursuant to a contract with the decedent 
That contract authorized and required the 
company to defend the decedent's interests 
in the lawsuit This Court denied the mo-
tion to dismiss and held that the attorney-
client relationship of the deceased defend-
ant and his counsel, through the insurance 
carrier, fit within the exception to the gen-
eral rule outlined above.6 Coleman v. 
Durden, 338 A.2d at 570-71. 
In this case, at oral argument, "Cohen's" 
attorney argued that he was capable of 
suggesting Cohen's death to protect the 
interest of his client—the insurance carrier. 
We continue to recognize that, in some 
instances, an attorney retained by an insur-
ance company may act to protect the inter-
est of that company in pending litigation 
subsequent to the death of the insured 
party.6 However, the ability to act to pro-
tect the interests of the insurance company 
is subject to limitation. 
This action was commenced by the Hoff-
mans against Cohen pursuant to 10 DeLC. 
§ 3703. That statute provides that such 
actions do not abate at death. However, 
this Court has held that 10 DeLC § 3703 
"does not preclude [the] imposition by Rule 
25(a)(1) of a time limitation on a motion for 
substitution of parties " Dokerty v. 
Straughn, Del.Supr., 407 A.2d 207, 210 
(1979). Just as Superior Court Civil Rule 
25 can impose a limitation (ninety days) 
upon the time for filing a motion to substi-
tute a party following a proper suggestion 
of death, it can impose a limitation upon 
who can suggest a death on the record. 
There is no provision in Rule 25 for the 
suggestion of death by a deceased party's 
attorney even if that attorney was engaged 
pursuant to a contract of insurance. Cf. 
out ruling upon that action, we note that if an 
insured pairty dies, the attorney selected by his 
insurance carrier to represent him can protect 
the carrier, e.g., when there is a fear that a delay 
may prejudice the litigation, by moving for the 
appointment of a personal representative or per-
haps a temporary representative, either under 
the probate law or by special order of the trial 
court. Cf. Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d at 986. 
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id. The construction of Rule 25 by the 
federal courts, which we adopt, limits enti-
ties who may suggest death upon the 
record to those who may move for substitu-
tion. In fact, the rules of this Court pro-
vide for a suggestion of death only by the 
personal representative of the deceased 
party or by another party in interest. 
Supr.CtR. 31(aHb). 
Neither the insurance company nor the 
attorney it had retained was a party or the 
successor or representative of the deceased 
defendant within the meaning of Rule 
25(a)(1) and, therefore, was not qualified to 
file a suggestion of death. Cf. Rende v% 
Kay, 415 F.2d at 985-86. Moreover, the 
corollary of finding that the insurance com-
pany was a representative of the deceased 
who is qualified to suggest death upon the 
record would be to find that the insurance 
company could be substituted for the de-
ceased insured as a party. This would be 
contrary to the long-established practice ir\ 
Delaware that the existence of insurance 
coverage is not to be disclosed to the trier 
of fact. Catalfano v. Higgins, Del.Supr.* 
188 A.2d 357, 359 (1962) (quoting Steen* 
burg v. Harry Braunstein, Inc., Del.S^ 
per., 77 A.2d 206, 208 (1950)). See also 
Murray v. James, Del.Super., 326 A.2d 
122, 123 (1974); DeVincentis v. Maryland 
Casualty Co., Del.Super., 325 A.2d 610, 
612 (1974). 
Conclusion 
The decisions of the Superior Court 
granting Cohen's motion to dismiss and 
denying the Hoffmans' motion for substitu^ 
tion are both REVERSED, This case is 
remanded to the Superior Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion, 
STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff, 
v. 
William J. LeCOMPTE, Defendant 
Supreme Court of Delaware. 
Submitted: Nov. 17, 1987. 
Decided: Feb. 18, 1988. 
Defendant was convicted in the Superi-
or Court, New Castle County, of first-de-
gree robbery and possession of deadly 
weapon during commission of that robbery, 
and he appealed imposition of consecutive 
sentences. The Supreme Court, 516 A.2d 
898, upheld imposition of separate sen-
tences for offenses, and remanded matter 
for determination of retroactive application 
of its decision. The Superior Court certi-
fied question whether decision should be 
applied retroactively. The Supreme Court 




Decision of Supreme Court that de-
fendant could be separately sentenced for 
first-degree robbery and possession of 
deadly weapon during commission of that 
robbery, which expressly overruled prior 
decision, did not apply retroactively to 
crimes committed before appellate decision 
and intervening decision which eroded prior 
decision; although defendant was techni-
cally on notice that law was changing, rela-
tive foreseeability of change was diminish-
ed by timing and character of intervening 
decision, and retroactive application of sep-
arate sentence rule would not meet concept 
of fairness which due process embraced. 
11 Del.C. §§ 832(a)(2), 1447; U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 14. 
Richard E. Fairbanks, Jr., Chief of Ap-
peals Div., Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, 
for plaintiff. 
Nancy Jane Perillo, Asst. Public Defend-
er, Office of the Public Defender, Wilming-
ton, for defendant. 
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Judi KISSIC 
v. 




Supreme Court of Alabama. 
April 15, 1994. 
Insured and his wife brought suit 
against insurer, one of its agents, and in-
sured's father. Plaintiffs sought damages 
based on allegations that defendants fraudu-
lently induced insured to make his father 
rather than his wife the designated beneficia-
ry. Insurer and agent filed cross-claim 
against father. Wife filed motion for joinder 
to add her two minor children as plaintiffs. 
In both cross-claim and motion for joinder, 
reference was made to death of insured. 
The Circuit Court, Talladega County, No. 
CV-89-209, William C. Sullivan, J., dismissed 
decedent's claims for noncompliance with 
rule governing substitution, and appeal was 
taken. The Supreme Court, Houston, J., 
held that neither passing reference to death 
of insured contained in cross-claim, nor simi-
lar reference contained in motion for joinder, 
was sufficient to start running of six-month 
period in which to file motion for substitu-
tion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Abatement and Revival ®=>59.1, 62.1 
Rule providing for dismissal of action as 
to deceased party, unless motion for substitu-
tion is made not later than six months after 
death is suggested upon the record by ser-
vice of a statement of the fact of death, 
requires that statement suggesting death of 
party, in addition to being properly served, 
provide sufficient notice that the time period 
has begun for substituting proper party for 
deceased party. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
25(a)(1). 
2. Abatement and Revival 0=59.1 
Neither passing reference to plaintiff 
death contained in defendants* eross-c]^ 
nor similar reference contained in survive 
plaintiffs motion for joinder, was sufficient r! 
start running of six-month period in which u 
file motion of substitution to preclude d^ 
missal of action as to deceased plaintiff. 
overruling Matthews v. Matthews, 599 So i^ 
1218. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 25(a)(1). 
3. Abatement and Revival 059.1, 62.1 
Although service of suggestion of death 
on an attorney will satisfy requirement of 
substitution rule for service on parties to 
litigation, service required by substitution 
rule on interested nonparties, specifically 
successor or representative of deceased par. 
ty's estate, must be pursuant to personal 
service rule. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 4 
25(a)(1). 
G. Gregory White, Birmingham, for Judi 
Kissic. 
R. Blake Lazenby of Wooten, Thorton. 
Carpenter, O'Brien, Lazenby & Lawrence. 
Talladega, for Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co., Inc. 
and Robert Daniel Bice, Jr. 
G. Rod Giddens of Ghee & Giddens, Anni-
ston, and J. Stanton Glasscox, Oneonta, for 
Onnie Leon Kissic. 
HOUSTON, Justice. 
On June 9, 1989, Ronnie Kissic and his 
wife, Judi Kissic, sued Liberty National Life 
Insurance Company, Inc. ("Liberty Nation-
al"); one of its agents, Robert Daniel Bice, 
Jr.; and Ronnie Kissie's father, Onnie Leon 
Kissic, seeking damages based on allegations 
that thevdefendants had fraudulently induced 
Ronnie Kissic to change the designated bene-
ficiary under his life insurance policy from 
Judi Kissic to Leon Kissic. The record indi-
cates that Ronnie Kissic and Judi Kissic were 
represented by the same attorney and that 
Ronnie Kissic died sometime after Septem-
ber 6, 1990, but before February 25, 1991. 
On February 25, 1991, Liberty National and 
Bice filed a crossclaim against Leon Kissic 
which in the second paragraph referred to 
"the death of plaintiff Ronnie Kissic." The 
KISSIC v. LIBERTY 
Cite as 641 So.2d 
grossclaim, which was served on Leon Kissic 
md Judi Kissic's attorney, stated a claim 
ggainst Leon Kissic for the amount of life 
insurance proceeds paid to him under the 
policy, in the event that it was determined 
that the payment of those proceeds was im-
proper. (The authority of Judi Kissic's attor-
ney to act on behalf of Ronnie Kissic had 
ceased upon Ronnie Kissic's death. See 
Brown r. Wheeler, 437 So.2d 521 (Ala.1983), 
overruled on other grounds, Hayes v. Brook-
uwd Hospital 572 So.2d 1251 (Ala.1990).) 
On May 3, 1993, Judi Kissic filed a "motion 
for joinder" to add her two minor children as 
plaintiffs in the action. This motion was 
served on the three defendants. In the sec-
ond paragraph of that motion, Ronnie Kissic 
was referred to as "now deceased," and in 
the fourth paragraph reference was made to 
"the death of Ronnie Kissic." On October 
13, 1993, 31 months and 18 days after the 
crossclaim was filed and 5 months and 10 
days after the motion for joinder was filed, 
and after a hearing on August 11, 1993, 
during which the parties stipulated that Ron-
nie Kissic was, in fact, deceased, the trial 
court dismissed Ronnie Kissic's claims for 
noncompliance with Rule 25, A.R.Civ.P. It is 
undisputed that a proper party was never 
substituted for Ronnie Kissic following his 
death. 
u] The dispositive issue is whether ei-
ther the crossclaim filed by Liberty National 
^d Bice against Leon Kissic or the motion 
f
°r joinder filed by Judi Kissic was sufficient 
10
 constitute a suggestion of death on the 
^ord,
 s o a s t0 commence the running of the 
sl
*-month period for substituting a proper 
^ y under Rule 25. 
Rule 25(a)(1) provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
Unless the motion for substitution is 
made not later than six months after the 
tooth is suggested upon the record by ser-
Vlce
 of a statement of the fact of the death 
«°ft the parties as provided in Rule 5, 
Ak.R.Civ.P„ and on nonparty successors 
t* representatives as provided in Rule 4 
•w the service of a summons], the action 
shall be dismissed as to the deceased par-
ty/' 
NAT. LIFE INS. CO. Ala. 251 
250 (Ala. 1994) 
(Emphasis added.) Our research has dis-
closed little Alabama caselaw interpreting 
the emphasized language above. In Big Red 
Elephant v. Bryant 477 So.2d 342 (Ala.1985), 
this Court held that a statement suggesting 
death does not have to include the date of the 
party's death, and in Winter v. Cox, 553 
So.2d 60 (Ala. 1989), we held that a notation 
on a case action summary sheet as to a 
party's death is not a sufficient statement to 
initiate the running of the period for filing a 
motion for substitution under Rule 25(a)(1), 
at least where there is no evidence that a 
copy of the case action summary sheet was 
served in accordance with the rule. Al-
though Winter v. Cox is not determinative of 
the issue presented in the present case, it 
does suggest that Rule 25(a)(1) requires that 
a statement suggesting the death of a party, 
in addition to being properly served, must 
provide sufficient notice that the time period 
has begun for substituting a proper party for 
a deceased party. 
[2] We note that that part of Rule 25 
requiring service of a "statement of the fact 
of death" is identical to its federal counter-
part, and, as we have stated many times, we 
look to the federal courts' interpretation of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when 
those rules are similar to our own. Our 
research indicates that the federal courts 
require a formal statement suggesting death 
on the record in order to initiate the running 
of the time period for substituting the proper 
party. See 3B Moore's Federal Practice, 
§ 25.06(3) (2d ed. 1991); 7C C. Wright, A. 
Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and 
Procedure, § 1955 (1986); Grandbouche u 
Lovell 913 F.2d 835 (10th Cir.1990) (mere 
reference in court proceedings or pleadings 
to a party's death is not sufficient to start the 
running of the limitations period for filing a 
motion for substitution; a formal suggestion 
of death on the record is required, regardless 
of whether the parties have knowledge of a 
party's death); United States v. Miller 
Brothers Construction Co., 505 F.2d 1031 
(10th Cir.1974) (the plaintiffs knowledge of 
the defendant's death was insufficient to 
start the running of the 90-day time period 
for substitution; a formal suggestion of death 
was required); Kaldawy v. Gold Service 
Movers Inc, 129 F.R.D. 475 (S.D.N.Y.1990) 
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(court's order noting the plaintiffs death and 
placing the case on the suspended calendar, 
which was mailed to the attorneys for all of 
the parties, including the decedent's attor-
ney, was insufficient to start the running of 
the 90-day limitations period); Blair v. 
Beech Aircraft Corp., 104 F.R.D. 21 (W.D.Pa. 
1984), affirmed, 787 F.2d 580 (3rd Cir.1986) 
(a passing reference to a party's death in a 
pleading was not the equivalent of a formal 
suggestion of death on the record); ACRI v. 
International Association of Machinists & 
Aerospace Workers, 595 F.Supp. 326 
(N.D.Cal.1983), affirmed, 781 F.2d 1393 (9th 
Cir.1986), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 816, 107 
S.Ct. 73, 93 L.Ed^d 29 (1986) (incidental 
reference to a party's death in answers to 
interrogatories was not sufficient to start the 
running of the 90-day period under Rule 25); 
National Equipment Rental Ltd. v. White-
craft Unlimited, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 507 
(E.D.N.Y.1977) (a formal statement suggest-
ing death on the record and served on all the 
parties is required to conform to Rule 25); 
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Leflcowitz, 454 F.Supp. 59 
(D.C.N.Y.1977) (90-day period begins to run 
only after a formal statement of the fact of 
death is filed); Dolgow v. Anderson, 45 
F.R.D. 470 (E.D.N.Y.1968) (oral statement 
made in passing during a deposition was not 
a "statement of the fact of death" within the 
meaning of Rule 25; a formal, written state-
ment was required). See, also, Official Form 
30, Fed.R.Civ.P., entitled "Suggestion of 
Death Upon the Record Under Rule 
25(a)(1)." All of these cases make it very 
clear that the federal courts place great em-
phasis on formality when reviewing cases of 
this kind and that they do not consider an 
incidental or passing reference in a pleading 
or during discovery to be the equivalent of a 
"statement of the fact of death" under Feder-
al Rule 25. The rationale underlying the 
federal courts' interpretation of Federal Rule 
25 was succinctly stated by the district court 
in Dolgow v. Anderson at 471: 
"Attorneys are sometimes so harassed 
during the course of a litigation that they 
may well overlook an informal suggestion 
of death. When the consequences to the 
client of a slightly delayed reaction may be 
severe and the burden of providing formal 
notice is slight, insistence on the observ 
ance of procedural ritual is justified." 
We find the rationale of the federal coim 
persuasive. It is quite simple under Ruje 9-
to start the running of the time period for 
substituting a proper party for a deceased 
party by filing a clearly designated "state 
ment of the fact of death" or "suggestion of 
death" and by serving that statement in
 ac% 
cordance with the requirements of the rule 
Rule 1, A.R.Civ.P., states that our rules of 
civil procedure should be construed so as t0 
secure the just determination of even* action 
It is not the purpose of our rules to foreclose 
or bar potentially meritorious claims. Hai^ 
v. Brookivood Hospital supra. Any con-
struction of Rule 25 on our part that could 
under certain circumstances, create a trap 
for an unwary attorney would surely violate 
the spirit, if not the letter, of our rules of 
civil procedure. Therefore, we conclude, as 
the federal courts have, that requiring adher-
ence to the simple procedure contemplated 
by Rule 25(a)(1) is preferable to embarking 
on a case-by-case review to determine under 
what circumstances the filing and service of a 
document during litigation would be suffi-
cient to start the running of the six-month 
limitations period. For the foregoing rea-
sons, we hold that neither the passing refer-
ence to Ronnie Kissic's death contained in 
the crossclaim, nor the one contained in the 
motion for joinder, was sufficient under Rule 
25 to start the running of the six-month 
period. 
[3] Furthermore, we note that a sugges-
tion of death must be served in accordance 
with Rule 25(a)(1). The record indicates that 
the crossclaim filed by Liberty National and 
Bice, although personally served on Leon 
Kissic, was served on Judi Kissic's attorney 
following Ronnie Kissic's death. As previ-
ously stated, Judi Kissic's attorney, at the 
time he was served with the crossclaim, no 
longer represented Ronnie Kissic, and the 
record does not indicate that a personal rep-
resentative was ever appointed to represent 
Ronnie Kissic's estate or that, if one was in 
fact appointed, the personal representative 
was served with the crossclaim in accordance 
with Rule 4. Although service of a sugges-
tion of death on an attorney will satisfy d* 
COMPASS POINT CONDO. v. FIRST FED. SAV. Ala. 253 
Cite as 641 So^d 253 (Ala. 1994) 
requirement of Rule 25(a)(1) for service on 
parties to the litigation, the service required 
by Rule 25(a)(1) on interested nonparties, 
specifically the successor or representative of 
the deceased party's estate, must be served 
pursuant to Rule 4. Therefore, even if the 
crossclaim had been sufficient to constitute a 
proper suggestion of death in this case, be-
cause the personal representative of Ronnie 
Kissic's estate was never served with it the 
six-month limitations period would not have 
begun to run. See Grandbouche v. Lovell 
supra; Kaldatvy supra. 
We further note that the record does not 
show whether Judi Kissic's attorney also rep-
resented the personal representative of Ron-
nie Kissic's estate, or whether the motion for 
joinder filed by Judi Kissic was served on the 
personal representative of Ronnie Kissic's 
estate in accordance with the requirements 
of Rule 4, if a personal representative was 
ever appointed. Therefore, even if that mo-
tion had been sufficient to constitute a prop-
er suggestion of death, we could not hold 
that the time period for substituting the 
proper party for Ronnie Kissic would have 
commenced to run. In any event, the trial 
court dismissed Ronnie Kissic's claims less 
than six months (specifically, 5 months and 
10 days) after the motion for joinder was 
filed and served; therefore, even if the mo-
tion for joinder had met the specificity and 
service requirements of Rule 25(a)(1), the 
dismissal of Ronnie Kissic's claims would 
have been premature. 
To the extent that Matthews v. Matthews, 
599 So.2d 1218 (Ala.CivApp.1992), is incon-
sistent with our holding in this case, it is 
hereby overruled. 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's 
judgment of dismissal is due to be reversed 
and the case remanded for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, 
ALMON, INGRAM and COOK, JJ., concur. 
O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
^ * ^ V a> 
COMPASS POINT CONDOMINIUM 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, et al. 
v. 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION OF 
FLORENCE, et al. 
1921555. 
Supreme Court of Alabama. 
April 15, 1994. 
Purchasers of units in condominium 
complex filed complaint asserting fraud 
against vendor for failing to disclose engi-
neering report concerning water intrusion 
mto complex. The Circuit Court, Baldwin 
County, No. CV-90-506, Charles C. Partin, 
J., entered summary judgment in favor of 
vendor, and purchasers appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Maddox, J., held that purchas-
ers failed to show that suppression of report 
prevented them from discovering water in-
trusion before closing, that failure to disclose 
report induced them to act or refrain from 
acting, or that they suffered damage as re-
sult of failure to disclose report. 
Affirmed. 
Hornsby, C.J., concurred specially with 
opinion. 
Kennedy and Ingram, JJ., dissented. 
1. Fraud e=16 
In order to establish fraudulent conceal-
ment, plaintiff must show: that defendant 
had duty to disclose material fact; that de-
fendant either failed to disclose or concealed 
that material fact; that defendant's failure to 
disclose, or concealment of, that material fact 
induced plaintiff to act or to refrain from 
acting; and that plaintiff suffered damage as 
result of the action, or inaction, induced by 
defendant's failure to disclose, or conceal-
ment of, the material fact. 
681 P.2d 1193, Russell v. Martell, (Utah 1984) 
*1193 681 P.2d 1193 
David RUSSELL and Eileen Russell, Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
v. 
Sterling B. MARTELL, dba Martell Holding 
Company, Grant C. 
Mills, et al., Defendants and Appellants. 
No 18160. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 30, 1984. 
Defendant sought reversal of an order by the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, *G. Hal Taylor, J., 
denymg defendant's motion to set aside a default 
judgment which had been entered against him. The 
Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that: (1) even 
assuming that subparagraph of the Rule of Civil 
Procedure providing for relief from judgment for "(7) 
any other reason justifying rehef from the operation of 
the judgment" was available to defendant, his 
undenied statements that he felt no legal obligation to 
respond to plaintiffs' claims supported the trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion to set aside the default 
judgment entered against him; those statements of 
defendant evmced a complete indifference by him and 
negated any diligence on his part in pursuing the 
opportunity to defend, but (2) the default judgment 
had to be reversed because of the trial court's failure 
to follow the applicable Rule of Civil Procedure 
providing that, when plaintiffs' claim is for other than 
a sum certain or an amount that by computation can 
be made certain, judgment by default may not be 
entered by the clerk of court but must be entered by 
the court, which may conduct such hearings and take 
such evidence as is necessary to determine the 
damages. 
Affirmed m part; reversed and remanded m part. 
1. APPEAL AND ERROR <®= 9^82(1) 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court 
30k982 Vacating Judgment or Order 
30k982(l) In general. 
[See headnote text below] 
1. JUDGMENT <§=>344 
228 — 
228K Op - Jig or Vacating 
228k344 Discretion of court. 
Copynght (c) West Group 2000 
Pagel 
Utah 1984. 
Broad discretion is accorded the trial court in ruling 
on rehef from a judgment, and the Supreme Court 
will reverse that ruling only if it is clear that the trial 
court abused its discretion. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 
60(b). 
2. JUDGMENT @=>345 
228 — 
228IX Opening or Vacating 
228k345 Judgments which may be opened or 
vacated. 
Utah 1984. 
Subparagraph 7 of the civil procedure rule providing 
for rehef from judgment for "any other reason 
justifying rehef from the operation of the judgment" 
may not be resorted to when the ground asserted for 
rehef falls within subparagraph 1, allowing rehef on 
the basis of "mistake, indvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect"; otherwise, the three-month 
limitation imposed on rehef under subparagraph 1 
would be averted. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 60(b)(l, 7). 
3. JUDGMENT ® ^ 138(2) 
228 — 
228IV By Default 
228IV(B) Opening or Setting Aside Default 
228kl38 Right to Rehef m General 
228kl38(2) Neghgence m suffering default. 
Utah 1984. 
Even assuming that subparagraph of the Rule of 
Civil Procedure providing for rehef from judgment 
for "(7) any other reason justifying rehef from the 
operation of the judgment" was available to defendant, 
his undenied statements that he felt no legal obligation 
to respond to plaintiffs' claims supported the trial 
court's denial of defendant's motion to set aside the 
default judgment entered against him; those 
statements of defendant evmced a complete 
indifference by him and negated any diligence on his 
part in pursuing the opportunity to defend. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b)(7). 
4. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT ®=*77 
45 — 
45D Retainer and Authority 
45k77 Scope of authority in general. 
Utah 1984. 
Any neglect by defendant's attorney was attributable 
to defendant through principles of agency. 
5. JUDGMENT @=>131 
228 — 
228IV By Default 
claim to onginal U.S. Govt, works 
681 P.2d 1193, Russell v. Martell, (Utah 1984) Page 2 
228IV(A) Requisites and Validity 
228kl31 Entry of judgment in general. 
Utah 1984. 
Default judgment entered against defendant had to 
be reversed because of the trial court's failure to 
follow the applicable Rule of Civil Procedure 
providing that, when plaintiffs' claim is for other than 
a sum certain or an amount that by computation can 
be made certain, judgment by default may not be 
entered by the clerk of court but must be entered by 
the court, which may conduct such hearings and take 
such evidence as is necessary to determine the 
damages Rules Civ.Proc , Rule 55(b)(2), U.C.A 
1953, 61-l-22(l)(b) 
6 JUDGMENT ®=> 131 
228 — 
228IV By Default 
228IV(A) Requisites and Validity 
228kl31 Entry of judgment m general. 
Utah 1984. 
Courts are not at liberty to deviate from the Rules of 
Civil Procedure governing entry of judgment against a 
defaulting party just because one party is in default 
and is not entitled to be heard on the merits of the 
case 
*1194 Ralph J. Marsh, David B. Boyce, Salt Lake 
City, for defendants and appellants. 
Earl D. Tanner, David Eccles Hardy, Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiffs and respondents. 
HOWE, Justice: 
Appellant Grant C. Mills seeks the reversal of the 
trial court's denial of his motion to set aside a default 
judgment which had been entered against him. 
On July 7, 1981 Mills was served with a summons 
and a copy of the plaintiffs' complaint. When he did 
not file an answer in response, his default was entered 
by the court. After an ex parte hearing on a motion 
made by plaintiffs for judgment, judgment was 
granted for $63,200, attorney's fees of $5,000 and 
costs of the action. In December of 1981 Mills filed a 
motion to set aside the default judgment supported by 
affidavits. Plaintiffs, David Russell and Eileen 
Russell, also filed affidavits m opposition to the 
motion. 
In his affidavit, Mills claimed to have sent tus 
summons and copy of the complaint to his attorney to 
be handled by him. He was located m another city 
and was also representing other co-defendants m this 
case. The attorney, because of confusion in his 
office, failed to file an answer m Mills' behalf. After 
a writ of execution was issued against his property in 
November, Mills retained another attorney who filed 
the motion to set aside the judgment. Mills claimed 
that he had not taken action more quickly because he 
had relied upon representations of the clerk of the 
court who he telephoned that no judgment had been 
entered against him. 
On the other hand, Mr Russell swore that on July 
15 Mills informed him that he intended to take no 
action on the summons and complaint. In an affidavit 
by Russell's attorney, he stated that on August 18 he 
informed Mills m a telephone conversation that a 
default judgment had been taken against him. Mills 
replied that he felt no legal obligation to Russell and 
did not feel motivated by the lawsuit to address 
Russell's claims. Neither of these statements was 
demed by Mills. 
Upon review of the affidavits, the trial court demed 
Mills' motion to set aside the judgment. An order to 
stay the execution of Mills* property pending this 
appeal was entered thereafter. 
I. 
Mills' first point is that the trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing to set aside the default 
judgment. Rule 60(b) of Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which provides for relief from a judgment, 
states in pertinent part: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; 
... or (7) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be 
made within a reasonable time and for [reason] (1) 
... not more than three months after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. 
Mills claims that the circumstances here do not fall 
within subparagraph (1), with whose three month time 
limitation he did not comply. Rather, he argues, the 
judgment should have been set aside under 
subparagraph (7) smce despite his diligence he failed 
to timely answer the complaint. 
Copynght (c) West Group 2000 No claim to onginal U.S. Govt, works 
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[1] Broad discretion is accorded the trial court m 
ruling on relief from a judgment; and, this Court will 
reverse that ruling only if it is clear the trial court 
abused its discretion. Valley Leasing v. *1195 
Houghton, Utah, 661 P.2d 959 (1983); Heath v. 
Mower, Utah, 597 P.2d 855 (1979); Airkem 
Intermoumain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 
P.2d 429 (1973). 
[2] We have held that subparagraph 7 may not be 
resorted to for relief when the ground asserted for 
relief falls within subparagraph 1. Pitts v. 
McLachlan, Utah, 567 P.2d 171 (1977); Colder 
Bros Co v Anderson, Utah, 652 P.2d 922 (1982); 
Laub v South Central Telephone Ass'n, Utah, 657 
P.2d 1304 (1982); Gardiner & Gardiner Builders v. 
Swapp, Utah, 656 P.2d 429 (1982). Otherwise, the 
three month limitation imposed on rehef under 
subparagraph 1 is averted. 
[3] [4] However, even assuming that subparagraph 7 
is available to Mills, his undenied statements that he 
felt no legal obligation to respond to the plaintiffs' 
claims support the trial court's denial of his motion. 
Those statements evince a complete indifference by 
him and negate any diligence on his part in pursuing 
the opportunity to defend. Further, any neglect by 
Mills' attorney is attributable to Mills through 
principles of agency. Gardiner & Gardiner Builders 
v. Swapp, supra We find under these facts no abuse 
of discretion by the trial court m denying rehef from 
the judgment. 
n. 
[5] [6] Although we will not disturb the default of 
Mills, we do hold under the authority of Pitts v. Pine 
Meadow Ranch, Inc., Utah, 589 P.2d 767 (1978), and 
J.P.W. Enterprises, Inc. v. Naef, Utah, 604 P.2d 486 
(1979), that the judgment agamst Mills must be 
reversed because of the failure of the trial court to 
follow Rule 55(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 54(c)(2) and Rule 55 prescribes the 
procedure to be followed by trial courts m entering 
judgments against defaultmg parties. Courts are not 
at liberty to deviate from those rules just because one 
party is m default and is not entitled to be heard on 
the merits of the case. For example, Rule 54(c)(2) 
provides that a judgment by default may not be 
different in kind from or exceed in amount that 
specifically prayed for m the demand for judgment. 
See Hayes v. Towles, 95 Idaho 208, 506 P.2d 105 
(1973). Another rule governing the entry of default 
judgments is Rule 55(b)(2), which is applicable m the 
instant case. It provides that when the plaintiffs 
claim is for other than a sum certain or an amount that 
by computation can be made certain judgment by 
default may not be entered by the clerk of the court, 
but must be entered by the court, which may conduct 
such hearings and take such evidence as is necessary 
to determine the damages. In the instant case, 
plaintiffs seek damages under U.C.A., 1953, § 
61-l-22(l)(b), part of die Utah Uniform Securities 
Act, which provides that an aggrieved party may 
[RJecover the consideration paid for the security, 
together with interest at 8% per year from the date 
of payment, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees, 
less the amount of any mcome received on the 
security, upon the tender of the security or for 
damages if he no longer owns the security. 
According to the plaintiffs' complaint, Mills acted as 
a securities agent without having been registered, and 
he made untrue representations to the plaintiffs 
concerning the security pledged to secure the note m 
violation of our Securities Act. The promissory note 
that he sold the plaintiffs was for $48,000 principal. 
It was due m six months at which tune $7,200 m 
interest would accrue, making a total of $55,200 due. 
However, it is not alleged m the complaint that 
$48,000 was paid for the note and under the statute 
plaintiffs are limited to the recovery of the 
consideration paid for the security. That being the 
case, the plaintiffs' claims for damages against Mills 
were not for sums certain and under Rule 55(b)(2) a 
hearing should have been conducted by the trial court 
to ascertain the amount of the damages to which the 
plaintiffs were entitled. Furthermore, under § 
61-l-22(l)(b), evidence should have been adduced as 
to the amount of mcome, if any, the plaintiffs had 
received on the security (which Mills claims was 
$16,800) so that it *1196. could be deducted m the 
calculation of the plaintiffs' damages. Although it 
appears that a hearing was held, it dealt only with the 
reasonableness of the attorney's fees to be awarded 
the plaintiffs. 
The judgment below is reversed on this point, and 
the case is remanded to the trial court for further 
proceedings in conformity with this opinion. No costs 
on appeal are awarded. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, OAKS and 
DURHAM, JL, concur. 
Copynght (c) West Group 2000 No claim to onginal U.S. Govt, works 
WICK v. WATERMAN Wis. 873 
C1UU421 N.W.2d 173 (WlaJfcpp. IMS) 
Mogilka v. Jeka, 181 Wis.2d Accord, Al-Jundi v. Rockefeller, 88 F.R.D. tion of law. 
459, 471, 389 N.W.2d 859, 864 (CtApp, 
1986). We owe no deference to the trial 
court's views on a question of law. Rivera 
v. Safford, 126 Wis.2d 462, 465, 877 N.W. 
2d 187, 188 (CtApp.1985). 
In Wheeler v. General Tire & Rubber 
Co., 142 Wis.2d 798, 807, 419 N.W.2d 881, 
334 (Ct.App.1987), we noted that sec. 803.-
10(lXa), Stats., is almost identical to and is 
based on Rule 25(a)(1) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Federal precedents 
may have value when we construe a Wis-
consin procedural rule based on a federal 
rule. Id. We therefore looked to federal 
cases for guidance in construing sec. 803.-
10(l)(a). We again do so. 
Relying on the history of the federal 
rule, Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983 (D.C.Cir. 
1969), held that a suggestion of death 
which failed to identify a proper party to 
substitute for a deceased defendant did not 
trigger the running of the 90-day period. 
1. Three state courts have rejected the Rende 
rationale: Farmers Insurance Gr. v. District 
Court of Sec. J.D., 507 P.2d 865, 867-68 (Colo. 
1973), cert, denied, 414 VS. 878, 94 S.Ct. 156, 38 
L.Ed.2d 123 (1973) (party who receives notice of 
death must inquire to determine identity of per-
son to be substituted); Mullis v. Bone, 238 S.E. 
244, 24ft-47 (W.D.N.Y.1980); Yonofiky v. 
Wernick, 862 F.Supp. 1005, 1011-12 (S.D. 
N.Y.1978). We agree with the Rende court 
that a contrary construction 4<would open 
the door to a tactical maneuver to place 
upon the plaintiff the burden of locating 
the representative of the estate within 90 
days/' 415 F.2d at 986.1 Here that same 
burden led to the absurd result of Wick 
having himself appointed as the representa-
tive of the estate of the very person he had 
sued, no other person having been appoint-
ed or having sought the appointment 
Judgment reversed. 
UYNUMIIRSYSTM 2> 
2d 748, 750, 143 GaApp. 407, (1977) (Georgia 
rule allows 180 days, twice as long as the feder-
al rule, to substitute and may be extended); 
New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. KimbrelU 343 So.2d 
107, 109 (Fla-Dist.CtApp.1977) (to follow Rende 
would engraft exception to state rule but other 
relief from failure to comply available). 
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only allows federally authorized deductions 
to be used in computing state taxable in-
come if these deductions are reflected on 
Line 30 of Federal Income Tax Form 1120-
New Mexico does not permit a revised 
wage deduction to decrease the Line 30 
amount A taxpayer, therefore, cannot 
claim the federal credit on its federal re-
turn then add in the wage deduction it 
forfeited on its federal return when calcu-
lating state taxable income. 
[3,4] A taxpayer has the burden of 
showing that it comes within the terms of £ 
statute permitting a tax deduction. Mobil 
Oil Corp. v. State Tax Commission of 
Missouri, 513 S.W.2d 319 (Mo.1974). Fed-
eral or state deductions are a matter of 
legislative grace and a way of achieving 
policy objectives. New Colonial Ice Co. v. 
Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 54 S.Ct 788, 78 
[5] A taxpayer's claim to a higher wage 
deduction must be denied in the absence of 
a showing of clear legislative intent to per-
mit the deduction. See Caterpillar Trac-
tor Co. v. Lenckos, 77 IlLApp.3d 90, 32 
IlLDec. 786, 395 N.E.2d 1167 (1979), af-
firmed, 84 I11.2d 102, 49 IlLDec. 329, 417 
N.E.2d 1343 (1981). A taxpayer who 
makes an election for federal purposes i£ 
bound by that election in calculating the 
amount of its state taxes. Id. 
The order denying the tax refund is af-
firmed. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
HENDLEY and MINZNER, JJ.t concur. 
104 N.M. 636 
Fred T. JONES, et aL, 
Plaintiffs-Appellant*, 
• . 
MONTGOMERY WARD & COMPANY, 
INC., Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 7450. 
Court of Appeals of New Mexico. 
Oct 10, 1985. 
The District Court, Dona Ana County, 
Joe H. Galvan, D J., granted motion to dis-
miss personal injury action for failure to 
prosecute and failure to substitute parties. 
The plaintiff appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals affirmed. Upon grant of certiorari, 
the Supreme Court, Sosa, S J., 103 N.M. 45, 
702 P.2d 990^ reversed and remanded. Thft 
Court of Appeals, Alarid, J., held that plain-
tiffs former attorney was not proper party 
to receive effective notice of suggestion of 
plaintiffs death so as to trigger 90-day 
period for substitution of parties. 
Order dismissing complaint set aside. 
1. Attorney and Client «=>76(2) 
General rule is that death of a party 
terminates power of his attorney to act in 
his favor. 
2. Parties *»61 
Former attorney of plaintiff, who died 
before case had gone to trial, was not prop-
er party to receive effective notice of plain-
tiffs death so as to commence running of 
the 90-day substitution of parties period, 
either under procedural rule governing pro-
cess or procedural rule governing service 
and filing of pleadings and other papers. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rules 4, 5, 25(aXl). 
3. Courts *»85(3) 
Procedural rule pertaining to service 
and filing of pleadings and other papers is 
applicable only after court has acquired in 
personam jurisdiction over person to be 
served. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 5. 
JONES v. 
4. Court* *=>mZ) 
If court has not acquired personal jur-
isdiction over person to be served with sug-
gestion of death of party, procedural rule 
governing process is proper mechanism to 
effectuate proper notice. Rules Civ.Proc., 
Rule 4. 
Alejandro Duran, Jr., Salvador Ramirez, 
£1 Paso, Tex., for plaintiffs-appellants. 
John R. Gerbracht, Martin, Cresswell & 




This case comes before this court on 
remand from the supreme court, 103 N.M. 
45, 702 P.2d 990 after that court reversed 
our first opinion, which sustained the trial 
court's dismissal of plaintiffs action under 
NMSA 1978, Civ.P.R. 41(e) (RepLPamp. 
1980). In its opinion, the supreme court 
directed this court to consider the remain-
ing issue which challenges the district 
court's dismissal under NMSA 1978, Civ. 
P.R. 25(a) (Repl.Pamp.1980). We hold that 
dismissal was not proper under Rule 25(a) 
and reverse the trial court 
PACTS 
This action arose out of a one-vehicle, 
tractor-trailer accident which occurred on 
July 11,1974. Plaintiff (Fred T.Jones), the 
driver of the rig, filed suit pro se on July 8, 
1977 to recover damages for personal inju-
ry and property damage. Plaintiff alleged 
that defendant (Montgomery Ward and 
Company, Inc.), through its employees, 
negligently installed a new inner tube on 
his vehicle without inspecting the tire's flap 
for creases. It is alleged that there were 
creases when the tire was installed. The 
creases caused a pinhole leak and a subse-
quent blowout of the tire months later, 
causing plaintiffs tractor-trailer to over-
turn, which resulted in his injuries. 
Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint 
July 19, 1977 with the aid of counsel. He 
MONTGOMERY WARD & CO., INC N. M. 837 
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filed a second amended complaint May 5, 
1978. 
Defendant moved on June 18, 1981 to 
dismiss for failure to prosecute, but the 
district court denied this Rule 41(e) motion 
because plaintiff had been diligent in pur-
suing concurrent litigation in Texas against 
alleged joint tortfeasors. 
The case had not yet gone to trial on 
June 25,1982 when plaintiff died. Defend-
ant filed a suggestion of death on February 
2, 1983, after learning of plaintiffs death. 
Rule 25(a). Notice of the suggestion was 
served upon decedent's former counsel, 
Alejandro Duran, Jr. 
On August 16, 1983, the district court 
dismissed plaintiffs action for failure to 
prosecute under Rule 41(e) and for failure 
to substitute parties within ninety days of 
the suggestion of death as required under 
Rule 25(a). Deceased plaintiffs former 
counsel filed the notice of appeal. 
We consider only the propriety of dismis-
sal under Rule 25(a). 
DISCUSSION 
WHETHER DEFENDANT PROPERLY 
SUGGESTED PLAINTIFFS DEATH SO 
AS TO COMMENCE THE RUNNING OF 
THE NINETY DAY SUBSTITUTION OF 
PARTIES PERIOD UNDER NMSA 1978, 
CIV.P. RULE 25(a) (Repl.Pamp.1980). 
Rule 25(aXl) provides as follows: 
If a party dies and the claim is not 
thereby extinguished, the court may or-
der substitution of the proper parties. 
The motion for substitution may be made 
by any party or by the successors or 
representatives of the deceased party 
and, together with the notice of hearing, 
shall be served on the parties as provided 
in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in 
the manner provided in Rule 4 for the 
service of a summons. Unless the mo-
tion for substitution is made not later 
than 90 days after the death is suggested 
upon the record by service of a state-
ment of the fact of the death as provided 
herein for the service of the motion, the 
action shall be dismissed as to the de-
ceased party. 
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The rule's own terms require a death, no-
nextinguishment of decedent's claim by the 
fact of death, and a motion by a party or 
successor or representative of the deceased 
for substitution. Such motion must be 
filed within ninety days of the proper filing 
of a suggestion of death. 
[1,2] It is undisputed that plaintiff 
died, and that his cause of action survives 
his death, see Rodgers v. Ferguson, 89 
N.M. 688, 556 P.2d 844 (CtApp.1976). No 
substitution of parties was proposed, but 
defendant, it is argued, forced substitution 
within ninety days when it suggested plain-
tiffs death on February 2, 1983. Before 
the ninety day period will commence, how-
ever, notice of suggestion of death must be 
served on all parties (under Rule 5) and 
interested nonparties (under Rule 4). Only 
decedent's attorney here was notified of 
the suggestion. The general rule is that 
the death of a party terminates the power 
of his attorney to act in his favor. Mubi v. 
Broomfield, 108 Ariz. 39, 492 P.2d 700 
(1972); Fountas v. Breed, 118 IU.App.3d 
669, 74 IU.Dec. 170, 455 N.E.2d 200 (1983); 
State v. Dickens, 214 Kan. 98, 519 P.2d 750 
(1974); Hamilton v. Hughey, 284 Or. 739, 
588 P.2d 38 (1978); Vincent v. Vincent, 16 
Wash.App. 213, 554 P.2d 374 (1976). The 
question is whether decedent's former at-
torney here can receive effective Rule 
25(a)(1) notice, either under NMSA 1978, 
Civ.P. Rule 4 or 5, as would properly trig-
ger the ninety day period. We hold that he 
cannot 
[3,4] Ransom v. Brennan, 437 F.2d 
513 (5th Cir.1971), considered whether the 
method prescribed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 4 or 5 
must be followed to fulfill the Rule 25(aXD 
notice requirement Rule 5 is clerical and 
administrative in nature; it pertains only to 
papers "subsequent to the original com-
plaint" The rule is applicable only after 
the court has acquired in personam juris-
diction over the person to be served. Ran-
souu If the party is represented by coun-
sel, these papers are served only on such 
counsel unless otherwise directed by the 
court Rule 5(b). If the court has not 
acquired personal jurisdiction over the per-
sons to be served with a Rule 25(a)(1) sug-
gestion of death, then Rule 4 is the proper 
mechanism to effectuate proper notice, be-
cause this latter rule is jurisdictionally 
rooted. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. 
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 66 S.Ct 242, 90 
LEd. 185 (1946); Ransom. Notice in the 
present case was defective and did not 
start the ninety day period running either 
under Rule 4 or 5. 
Assuming that Mrs. Jones was properly 
made her deceased husband's representa-
tive and that the district court had jurisdic-
tion over Mrs. Jones, Rule 5 requires that 
she be served, through her attorney, with 
papers of legal import A Rule 25(a)(1) 
suggestion of death requires such service. 
One problem under Rule 5 is that Mrs. 
Jones was not directly served with the sug-
gestion, and there is no evidence that attor-
ney Duran (the actual recipient of the sug-
gestion) was her counsel or that he was 
authorized to receive service for her at the 
time service was given. 
If the assumptions on jurisdiction and 
naming of Mrs. Jones as representative are 
not correct, then the court cannot rely on 
Rule 5 service because Mrs. Jones is not a 
"party" and has not been brought within 
the court's authority. No record evidence 
suggests Mrs. Jones or anyone else had 
been chosen as representative for dece-
dent's estate when defendant filed its Feb-
ruary 2, 1983 suggestion of death. If so, 
there would have been no one legally em-
powered to receive valid service under Rule 
5. "It is elementary that one is not bound 
by a judgment in personam resulting from 
litigation in which he is not designated as a 
party or to which he has not been made a 
party by service of process." Zenith Ra-
dio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 
U.S. 100, 89 S.Ct 1562, 1569, 23 LEd.2d 
129 (1969). Decedent's attorney is not a 
person who could be made a party, he is 
not a representative of the deceased under 
Rule 25(a)(1), and therefore, he could not 
himself receive effective suggestion of 
death notice. Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983 
at 985. 
STATE v. DURANTE 
CtUw 725 F J d t * (NJLApp. I f f * ) 
Furthermore, Ransom rejected the idea Wellman 2d ed. 
that a court acquires automatic jurisdiction 
over a decedent's legal representative by 
virtue of its authority over the deceased. 
The new party to be substituted must be 
served with process and notice of sugges-
tion under Rule 4. See Mercer v. Morgan, 
86 N.M. 711, 526 ?J2d 1304 (CtApp.1974). 
Because the estate of Fred T. Jones (if in 
fact it now exists) never received Rule 
25(aXl) notice under Rule 4, the district 
court here was without authority over the 
estate to determine its rights, and there-
fore, the ninety day substitution of parties 
was not triggered. 
The case of Yonofsky v. Wernick, 862 
F.Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y.1973), suggests that 
notice to plaintiffs former counsel is suffi-
cient for purposes of Rule 25(aXl). The 
court pointed out that "it would be difficult 
for defendant to know whom else to serve 
beside [sic] plaintiffs former counsel." Id. 
at 1012. We do not dispute the potential 
difficulty for a defendant, who may not 
know whom to serve with the suggestion 
other than the plaintiffs former counsel. 
Yonofsky, however, ignores the important 
jurisdictional problem noted in Ransom. 
Rule 25(aXl) at this point leaves us in a 
quandry. The rule was tailored to permit 
parties or successors or representatives of 
the deceased to avoid delay in effecting 
substitution. Rende, 415 F.2d at 985. Yet, 
the rule's notice requirements as explained 
above appear to impede defendant in quick-
ening the substitution process. Plaintiff 
decedent's former counsel need only foot-
drag in seeking appointment of a repre-
sentative to evade defendant's suggestion 
of death triggering of the ninety day peri-
od. Fred T. Jones died June 25, 1982, so 
under the Probate Code, plaintiff could con-
ceivably delay appointment three or more 
years. NMSA 1978, § 4&-3-108(A). 
Therefore, one of Rule 25(aXl)fs crucial 
purposes appears to be frustrated. 
However, there are counterbalancing in-
centives upon interested survivors of a de-
cedent to get on with the process of set-
tling the estate. See generally 1 Uniform 
Probate Code Practice Manual 289-65 (R. 
N.M. 839 
1977). Foot-dragging in 
legal proceedings may in the proper case 
be visited with dismissal of plaintiffs ac-
tion for failure to proceed. Rule 41(e). 
Moreover, a motion to substitute is granted 
in the discretion of the trial court, and if a 
party has unreasonably delayed filing such 
a motion, it may be denied and the case 
dismissed SB J. Moore and J. Kennedy, 
Moore's Federal Practice § 25.01[15] (2d 
ed. 1985). In any case, parties in defend-
ant's position may petition a court for ap-
pointment of a personal representative or 
special administrator of the estate upon 
whom they might properly serve a sugges-
tion of death in full compliance with Rule 
25(aXl) notice requirements. See, eg., 
NMSA 1978, § 45-S-414 to -618. Defend-
ant here did not do so and should not now 
be permitted to rely on its service of a 
defective suggestion of death upon dece-
dent's former attorney to save its dismis-
sal. 
The order of the district court dismissing 
plaintiffs complaint is set aside and the 
trial court is instructed to reinstate the 
case on its docket for trial on the merits. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
HENDLEY and MINZNER, JJ., concur. 
UYMIMIftSVSTl*> 
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Court of Appeals of New Mexico., 
March 4, 1986. 
Certiorari Denied March 26, 1986. 
Defendant was convicted in the Dis-
trict 'Court, McKinley County, Louis E. De-
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Arizona Groundwater Management Act 
specifies the factors to be considered 
when drawing basin and sub-basin 
boundaries; that such factors are exclu-
sive in nature in that no other factors 
should be considered under the auspices 
of the Public Trust Doctrine; and that 
the Department of Water Resources was 
therefore correct in not considering any 
factors under such doctrine. 
The ranchers' constitutional and public 
trust doctrine arguments are based upon 
their claim that since A.R.S. § 45-544(1) 
permits transportation of groundwater 
within a basin where there are no sub-ba-
sins without payment of damages, Salt Riv-
er Project has no incentive to conserve 
water from its wells for use in its St Johns 
generating plant and will pump the Little 
Colorado River Plateau Basin dry, result-
ing in a decrease in the value of the state's 
school trust lands leased for grazing. 
The simple answer to that complex argu-
ment is found in other sections of the com-
prehensive Groundwater Management Act 
of 1980. The ranchers can request and 
present evidence to the Department in sup-
port of the creation of subsequent active 
management areas, A.R.S. § 45-412, 
and/or take steps to comply with the provi-
sions of § 45-415 which permits local resi-
dents in Apache County to initiate an active 
management area. Within an active 
management area the Groundwater 
Management Act provides for strict control 
over most groundwater through a statu-
tory scheme of rights for users. A.R.S. 
§ 45-451. The ranchers cannot require nor 
will the courts permit a designation of 
boundaries for basins and sub-basins that 
do not meet the statutory definitions of 
those terms provided by the legislature in 
A.R.S. § 45-402(12) and (28). 
In addition, if and when the ranchers 
acquire evidence which could establish the 
existence of sub-basins within the Little 
Colorado River Basin as defined by statute, 
they can present that evidence to the De-
partment pursuant to A.R.S. § 45-404(D) 
and request further hearings on the issue. 
A refusal to grant a hearing to consider 
such evidence could then be reviewed by 
the trial court pursuant to §§ 45-405 and 
12-901. 
The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed in part and reversed in part as 
stated above. 
HOWARD, PJ., and HATHAWAY, 
J., concur. 
156 Ariz. 476 
Raymond N. VARELA, and Edna Varela, 
individually and as husband and wife, 
Nadine Varela, Debbie Varela, Janice 
Varela, and Rachel Varela, Plain-
tiffs/Appellants, 
v. 
Jane ROMAN, Defendant/Appellee. 
No. 2 CA-CV 87-0126. 
Court of Appeals of Arizona, 
Division 2, Department A. 
Nov. 17, 1987. 
Reconsideration Denied Dec. 15, 1987. 
Review Denied May 3, 1988. 
Tenants appealed from an order of the 
Superior Court, Pima County, Cause No. 
217666, Robert B. Buchanan, J., denying a 
motion for substitution of parties. The 
Court of Appeals, Hathaway, J., held that 
filing by landlord's counsel of motion to 
withdraw mentioning fact of landlord's 
death was not sufficient to trigger rule 
requiring motion for substitution to be 
made within 90 days of suggestion of 
death. 
Reversed with directions. 
1. Parties *=>61 
Rule providing for substitution of par-
ty upon party's death contemplates that 
suggestion of death be filed by a party or 
representative of deceased party in accord-
ance with rule governing service and filing 
VARELA v. 
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of pleadings and other papers. 16 A.R.S. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 5, 25(a). 
2. Parties <s=>60 
Statement by landlord's counsel in mo-
tion to withdraw as counsel mentioning 
death of landlord was insufficient to trig-
ger rule requiring motion for substitution 
of parties to be made within 90 days of 
suggestion of death of party; rule plainly 
required that suggestion of death be filed 
by a party or representative of deceased 
party, and landlord's counsel was neither at 
time he filed his motion to withdraw. 16 
A.R.S. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 5, 25(a). 
Lionel F. Larriva, Tucson, for plain-
tiffs/appellants. 
Bury, Moeller, Humphrey & O'Meara by 




This appeal is taken from the trial 
court's denial of a motion for substitution 
of parties. 
Appellants were tenants in a residence 
owned by appellee. After a house fire in 
which appellants' property was destroyed, 
they filed suit against appellee alleging 
faulty wiring as the cause of the fire. Suit 
was filed July 3, 1984. Appellee died July 
3, 1985. Co-personal representatives were 
appointed January 16, 1986. Appellants 
filed a motion for substitution of parties on 
January 6,1987. The trial court denied the 
motion and granted summary judgment for 
appellee. 
Appellants argue that the requirements 
of Rule 25(a), Ariz.R.Civ.P., 16 A..R.S., were 
not complied with by appellee and there-
fore their motion was timely. The rule 
states: 
(1) If a party dies and the claim is not 
thereby extinguished, the court may or* 
der substitution of the proper parties, 
The motion for substitution may be made 
by any party or by the successors or 
representatives of the deceased party 
and, together with the notice of hearing, 
ROMAN Ariz. 157 
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shall be served on the parties as provided 
in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in 
the manner provided in Rule 4 for the 
service of a summons. Unless the mo-
tion for substitution is made not later 
than 90 days after the death is suggested 
upon the record by service of a state-
ment of the fact of the death as provided 
herein for the service of the motion, the 
action shall be dismissed as to the de-
ceased party. 
Appellants maintain that no suggestion of 
death was made upon the record and there-
fore the 90-day period specified in the rule 
had not begun to run. We agree and re-
verse. 
[1,2] The rule clearly states that the 
suggestion of death must be made "upon 
the record by service of a statement of the 
fact of the death as provided herein for the 
service of the motion." The motion re-
ferred to is the motion for substitution 
which must be served pursuant to Rule 5, 
which governs the service and filing of 
pleadings and other papers. Rule 5, Ariz. 
R.Civ.P., 16 A.R.S. Appellants correctly 
claim that no suggestion of appellee's 
death was ever made upon the record and 
served as required by Rule 5. 
Appellee's attorney argues that the 
record indicates that appellants' attorney 
was aware of the fact of appellee's death. 
In correspondence between attorneys, 
which is part of the record, appellee's death 
is mentioned. Based upon this, it is argued 
that appellants had actual notice of the 
death no later than October 3, 1986, there 
fore the motion, filed January 6, 1987, was 
untimely. The problem with appellee's ar-
gument is that the requirements of Rule 
25(a) are specific, and we believe they have 
not been fulfilled. 
This case is one of first impression in 
Arizona. Because Arizona has substantial-
ly adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, great weight is given to federal inter-
pretations of the rules. Edwards v. 
Young, 107 Ariz. 283, 486 P.2d 181 (1971). 
In Gronowicz v. Leonard, 109 F.R.D. 
624 (S.D.N.Y.1986), the court addressed a 
situation similar to that before us. There, 
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as here, there was an exchange of corre-
spondence between attorneys in which the 
fact of the death of one of the parties was 
mentioned. The court there stated: "... 
nor is there any indication that the letters 
were served and filed pursuant to Rule 5. 
Thus, no valid suggestion of death has 
been made and the 90 day period did not 
commence based on the letters." Id. at 
627. A similar result should obtain here. 
Even though appellee's counsel men-
tioned the fact of appellee's death in a 
motion filed with the court wherein he 
moved to withdraw as counsel, we do not 
believe that was sufficient to trigger the 
90-<iay period of Rule 25(a)(1). 
We believe the rule plainly contemplates 
that the suggestion of death be filed by a 
party or the representative of the deceased 
party. Appellee's counsel was neither at 
the time he filed his motion to withdraw. 
He clearly was not a party to the action 
and the record reveals that others were 
appointed as personal representatives of 
the deceased's estate. Furthermore, his 
motion failed to identify the personal repre-
sentatives. We agree with the holding in 
Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983 (D.C.1969), 
where the court, dealing with the identical 
federal rule, Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a)(1), held that 
a suggestion of death which was neither 
filed by nor identified by a successor or 
representative of the deceased, thereby giv-
ing no indication of who was available or 
who was to be named in substitution, 
opened the door to "... a tactical maneu-
ver to place upon the plaintiff the burden 
of locating the representative of the estate 
within 90 days." 415 F.2d at 986. The 
court in Rende v. Kay observed that the 
90-day period was not intended as a bar to 
meritorious actions. The court also noted 
that: 
No injustice results from the require-
ment that a suggestion of death identify 
the representative or successor of an es-
tate who may be substituted as a party 
for the deceased before Rule 25(a)(1) may 
be invoked by those who represent or 
inherit from the deceased. If the heirs 
or counsel fear that delay may prejudice 
the litigation they may move promptly 
for appointment of a representative, per-
haps a temporary representative, either 
under the law of the domicile or by spe-
cial order in the court wherein the litiga-
tion is pending. 
Id. 
In the instant case no suggestion of 
death was placed on the record by a succes-
sor or representative of the deceased, nor 
did it identify such individual, and it was 
therefore ineffective to trigger the 90-day 
period. See also Barto v. Weishaar, 101 
Nev. 27, 692 P.2d 498 (1985). 
There having been no proper suggestion 
of death as required by Arizona's Rule 
25(a), the order denying appellants' motion 
for substitution of parties is reversed. The 
motion having been timely made, the trial 
court is directed to permit the substitution. 
Reversed with directions. 
LACAGNINA, CJ., and HOWARD, 
PJ., concur. 
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husband and wife, d/b/a Gipson's Tow-
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of the Estate of Henry Wick, 
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v. 
Dale WATERMAN, individually, and 
Eleanor Waterman, husband and wife, 
and in relation to their marital proper-
ty, Defendants-Respondents. 
No. 87-1232. 
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin. 
Submitted on Briefs Dec. 9,1987. 
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Opinion Filed Feb. 25, 1988. 
Personal representative of estate 
brought action against former personal 
representative alleging wrongful acquisi-
tion of estate assets. The Circuit Court, 
La Crosse County, Michael J. Mulroy, J., 
dismissed complaint for failure to timely 
serve notice of substitution for defendant 
within 90 days of suggestion of his death 
on record. On appeal the Court of Ap-
peals, Gartzke, PJ., held that suggestion 
cf death of party, v/hich failed to identify 
proper substitute pcrty, was insufficient to 
trigger Tanning- of 90-day period in which 




Suggestion of death of party, which 
failed to identify proper substitute party, 
was insufficient to trigger running of 90-
day period in which opponent was required 
to move to substitute. W.S.A. 803.10(lXa). 
James H. Mathis and Schechter and 
Mathis, La Crosse, for plaintiff-appellant. 
Bryant Klos and Steele, Klos & Flynn-
Chartered, and Al-s: Cameron and Camer-
on, Nix. Collins & <uillan, Ltd., La Cror.se. 
for defendants-respondents. 
Before GARTZKE, PJ., and 
DYKMAN and SUNDBY, JJ. 
GARTZKE, Presiding Judge. 
Wilbert Wick is the personal representa-
tive of the estate of Henry Wick. He ap-
peals from a judgment dismissing his com-
plaint against Dale Waterman. Waterman 
died during the litigation. The trial court 
dismissed the complaint because Wilbert 
Wick failed to serve notice of substitution 
for Waterman within 90 days of the sug-
gestion of his death on the record. Sec. 
803.10(lKa), Stats. 
The dispositive issue is whether under 
sec. 803.10(lXa), Stats., a suggestion of 
death of a party which fails to identify a 
proper substitute party triggers the run-
ning of the 90-day period to move to sub-
stitute. We hold that the suggestion of 
death is insufficient and therefore does not 
trigger the 90-day period. For that rea-
son, we conclude that the trial court should 
not h^ve dLmissed the corr.pLini, and v-e 
reverse. 
The complaint alleges that Wilbert Wick 
succeeded to Dale Waterman as personal 
representative of the Estate of Henry Wick 
and that Waterman wrongfully acquired 
estate assets. After the act?cn "\.s ccri-
merrced. Waterman died. Waieriiun's at-
torney of record, in his own name, mailed a 
formal "Suggestion of Death of One of ihe 
Parties Defendant" to the trial court and to 
Wilbert Wick. The "suggestion" states the 
place and date of Waterman's death and 
his residence but does not identify a person 
who could be substituted for Waterman. 
Ninety days later, even though he had 
not yet been appointed, Wilbert Wick 
moved to substitute himself as special ad-
ministrator of Watennan's estate. It is 
undisputed that no other person had been 
appointed or had petitioned to appoint a 
persona] representative of Waterman's es-
tate. Wick petitioned to appoint himself 
and was later appointed special administra-
tor. Trie trial court dismissed \> ick s com-
plaint because he had not been appointed 
until after the 90-day period provided in 
sec. 803.10(lXa), Stats., had run. 
The construction and application of a 
statute to the established facts is a ques-
CUtuttl KJW2& 
tion of law. Mogilka v. Jeka, 131 Wis.2d 
459, 471, 389 N.W.2d 359, 364 (CtApp. 
1986). We owe no deference to the trial 
courts views on a question of :aw. Rivcrz 
v. Sufford, 126 Wis.2d 462, 465, 377 N.V\ 
2d 1?7. 188 (CtApp 1955). 
In Wneeler v. General Tire & Rubes-
Co., 142 Wis.2d 79S, 807, 419 X.W.2d 331, 
334 (CtApp. 1987), we noted that sec. 803.-
10{1)< a). Slats., is almos: identical to and is 
based on Rule 25(a)(1) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Federal precedents 
may have value when we construe a Wis-
consin procedural rule based on a federal 
rule. Id. We therefore looked to federal 
cases for guidance in construing sec. 803.-
10(l)(a). We again do so. 
Relying on the history of the federal 
rule, Re?ide v. Kay. 415 F.2d 983 (D.C.Cir. 
1969), held that a suggestion of death 
which failed to identify a proper party to 
substitute for u deceived d?feno?nt d.n not 
trigger ihe running of the 90-d<*y period. 
i. Three *:atc cv^r.s r i » : rejected :he Fcr.dt 
rationale. Farmers hiswance G~. i. Ihsinc: 
Court of Sec. J.D, 507 P.2d 865, 867-68 (Colo. 
1973), cert, denied, 414 US. 878, 94 S.Ct. 156, 38 
L.Ed.2d 123 (1973) (party who receives notice of 
death must inquire to determine identity of per-
son to be substituted); Mullis v. Bone, 238 S.E. 
872 (WUJipp. 1988) 
Accord, Al-Jundi v. Rockefeller, 88 F.R.D. 
244, 246-47 (W.D.N.Y.1980); Yonofaky v. 
Wernicke 362 F.Supp. 1005, 1011-12 (S.D. 
X.Y.1973). Vt e agree with the Reside court 
that a contrary construction "would open 
the door to a tactical maneuver to place 
upon the plaintiff the burden of locating 
the representative of the estate within 90 
days." 41-5 F.2d at 9S6.1 Here that same 
burden lee io the absurd result of Wick 
having himself appointed as the representa-
tive of the estate of the very person he had 
sued, no other person having been appoint-
ed or having sought the appointment 
Judgment reversed. 
2u 74? 7'C. 1-3 Ga.Arp. 4^7. tlTT) (CK . Y»;-
njie aiious 180 cays, twice as long zz the feder-
al rule, to substitute and ma\ be extended); 
Sew Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Kimb^ell 343 So.2d 
107, 109 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1977) (to follow Rende 
would engraft exception to state rule but other 
relief from failure to comply available). 
716 P.2d 796, Terracor v. Utah Bd. of State Lands & Forestry, (Utah 1986) Pagel 
*796 716P.2d796 
31 Ed. Law Rep. 1014 
TERRACOR, a Utah corporation, Plaintiff, 
v. 
The UTAH BOARD OF STATE LANDS & 
FORESTRY, George Buzianis, 
Chairman of the Utah Board of State Lands & 
Forestry, the 
Utah Division of State Lands & Forestry, Ralph 
Miles, 
Director of the Division of State Lands & Forestry, 
Utah 
Department of Natural Resources, Temple A. 
Reynolds, 
Executive Director of the Utah Department of Natural 
Resources, Bloomington Knolls Association, a Utah 
nonprofit 
association, Joseph E. Jones, Roy Hardy, principals 
of 
Bloomington Knolls Association, Defendants. 
No. 20270. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 7, 1986. 
Firm which had sought to exchange property it held 
for school lands held by Board of State Lands and 
Forestry sought mandamus following Board's decision 
to lease the property to another firm, alleging that the 
lease procedures were contrary to state law. The 
Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that the firm lacked 
standing. 
Petition demed. 
Howe, J., dissented and filed opinion in which 
Durham, J., concurred. 
1. PARTIES <@=>76(3) 
287 — 
287VI Defects, Objections, and Amendment 
287k76 Want of Capacity or Interest 
287k76(3) Answer. 
Utah 1986. 
Supreme Court could raise issue of a party's 
standing to bring a petition to challenge legahty of 
lease of property by state land board sua sponte, 
regardless of parties' failure to raise or address the 
question. 
2. MANDAMUS <®=>22 
250 — 
2501 Nature and Grounds in General 
250k21 Persons Entitled to Relief 
250k22 In general. 
Utah 1986. 
Petitioner for extraordinary relief must have 
standing, just as any other litigant must. 
3. ACTION <S=*13 
13 — 
131 Grounds and Conditions Precedent 
13kl3 Persons entitled to sue. 
Utah 1986. 
Supreme Court will not lightly dispense with 
requirement that litigant have a personal stake in 
outcome of a specific dispute. Const. Art. 5, § 1 
4 ACTION <®=>13 
13 — 
131 Grounds and Conditions Precedent 
13k 13 Persons entitled to sue. 
Utah 1986. 
General standards for determining whether a litigant 
has standing are: that plaintiff be able to show that he 
has suffered some distinct and palpable injury, that, if 
plaintiff does not have standing under this criterion, 
he may have standing if no one else has greater 
interest in outcome and issues are unlikely to be 
raised at all unless that particular plaintiff bad 
standing to raise issue and, even if standing is not 
found under the first two criteria, plaintiff may 
nonetheless have standing if issues are unique and of 
such great public importance that they ought to be 
decided in furtherance of pubhc interest. Const. Art. 
5 , § 1 . 
5. MANDAMUS ®^23(1) 
250 — 
2501 Nature and Grounds m General 
250k21 Persons Entitled to Relief 
250k23 Interest in Subject-Matter 
250k23(l) In general. 
Utah 1986. 
Firm which had sought to exchange property with 
Board of State Lands and Forestry for purpose of 
developmg it lacked standing to seek mandamus to 
challenge Board's subsequent decision to lease the 
property due to existence of potential plaintiffs with a 
more direct interest where firm specifically conceded 
that challenge was not based on failure to accept the 
proposal, but on procedures used. Const. Art. 5; 
U.C.A.1953, 65-1-68; Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 
65B(b)(3); Rules App.Proc., Rule 19. 
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Rosemary J. Beless, Michelle Mitchell, Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Anne M. Stirba, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Clark Arnold, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants. 
STEWART, Justice: 
Pursuant to Rule 65B(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, (FN1) the plaintiff, Terracor, 
petitions this Court for extraordinary relief in the 
nature of a wnt of mandamus, directmg the Board of 
State Lands and Forestry and the Division of State 
Lands and Forestry to rescind a special use lease 
(MSULA 593 ") issued by the Board to Bloomington 
Knolls Association. Terracor alleges that (1) the 
Board violated U.C.A., 1953, § 65-1-68, (FN2) which 
permits the Board to sell subdivided school trust lands 
by public auction but does not allow the Board to 
dispose of such lands by negotiated leases; and (2) 
the Board breached its fiduciary responsibility to 
obtain the highest possible return from school trust 
lands by issuing SULA 593 without competitive 
bidding. Terracor claims that extraordinary relief is 
necessary because it has no plain and adequate 
remedy at law smce section 65-1-9, (FN3) which 
provides for appeals from some kinds of Board 
decisions, does not expressly state that appeals should 
be to the district court and that under decisions of this 
Court it is not clear whether this Court or the district 
court is the proper forum for an appeal in the first 
instance. Terracor also claims extraordinary relief is 
appropriate because the language of section 65-1-68 is 
clear and mandatory, and under Archer v. Utah State 
Land Board, 15 Utah 2d 321 392 P.2d 622, 623 
(1964), and Hamblin v. State Board of Land 
Commissioners, 55 Utah 402, 187 P. 178 (1919), as 
well as Rule 65B, mandamus is an appropriate remedy 
where a public agency or official has violated a clear 
duty mandated by statute. The defendants counter that 
extraordinary relief *798 is improper because 
Terracor only seeks clarification of an unclear statute 
and that Terracor had a plain and adequate legal 
remedy by means of an appeal under section 65-1-9. 
Smce we deny Terracor's petition for an 
extraordinary wnt because it lacks standing, we do 
not decide these issues. 
In late 1983 or early 1984, Terracor approached the 
State Land Board and sought to acquire the 10.9-acre 
parcel of land at issue by exchanging an equivalent 
amount of property that Terracor owned. Some time 
after that, Bloomington Knolls applied to the Land 
Board to lease the same 10.9 acres, with the intention 
of subdividing the parcel for development as 
homesites. The Board notified Terracor of the 
competing proposal and explained that to make the 
land exchange acceptable Terracor would have to 
offer more land m exchange, or land of a greater 
value, smce the land Terracor had offered would not 
be developable for several years. The Board also 
notified Terracor that approval of the lease to 
Bloomington Knolls would, m effect, constitute a 
rejection of Terracor's proposal. Terracor did 
nothing more toward negotiating an exchange. In 
May, 1984, the Board leased the 10.9 acres of school 
trust land to Bloomington Knolls. 
Terracor protested the Land Board's leasing 
procedure on the ground that it was contrary to state 
law and that it would result m unfair competition. On 
September 18, 1984, the Board ruled that Terracor 
had waived its right to protest by domg nothing to 
indicate a continuing interest m the land after bemg 
informed of Bloomington Knolls' proposal. The 
Board also ruled that its procedures were m 
compliance with state law and that it had not violated 
its fiduciary responsibilities with respect to the 
administration of state school trust lands by leasmg 
the disputed parcel pursuant to a negotiated lease 
rather than by auction. 
Terracor then filed this petition for extraordinary 
relief directly m this Court. Terracor does not assert 
in this action that the Board erred in refusing 
Terracor's proposed exchange. Indeed, m its 
"Petition for Relief Under Rule 65B(b)(3)" filed m 
this Court, Terracor admits that it does not now 
challenge the granting of the lease to Bloomington 
Knolls rather than to it. Thus, the action in this Court 
is not based on Terracor's losmg out to Bloomington 
Knolls for the parcel m question. Rather, Terracor 
asserts only that the Board violated state law by 
leasmg rather than selling the parcel m question and 
violated its fiduciary duty to maximize the return on 
all school trust lands by negotiating a lease of a 
portion of those lands rather than requiring 
competitive bidding. It is noteworthy that Terracor's 
aborted efforts to acquire the land were based on the 
same type of negotiated procedure that it now alleges 
is illegal. 
[1] [2] The parties have not raised or addressed the 
question of Terracor's standing to bring this petition 
to challenge me legality of the Land Board's lease. 
However, this Court may address that issue sua 
sponte. Utah Restaurant Association v. Davis County 
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Board of Health, Utah, 709 P.2d 1159 (1985); Heath 
Tecna Corp. v. Sound Systems International, Inc., 
Utah, 588 P.2d 169, 170 (1978). A petitioner for 
extraordinary relief must have standing, just as any 
other litigant must have. See, e.g., Startup v. 
Harmon, 59 Utah 329, 336, 203 P. 637, 640-41 
(1921); Crockett v. Board of Education, 58 Utah 303, 
309, 199 P. 158, 160 (1921). 
[3] The doctrine of standing is intended to assure the 
procedural integrity of judicial adjudications by 
requiring that the parties to a lawsuit have a sufficient 
interest in the subject matter of the dispute and 
sufficient adverseness that the legal and factual issues 
which must be resolved will be thoroughly explored. 
Unlike federal law where standing doctrine is related 
to the "case or controversy" language of Article IH of 
the United States Constitution, our standing law arises 
from the general precepts of the doctrine of separation 
of powers found in Article V of the Utah Constitution. 
Under Utah law, the doctrine of standing operates as 
gatekeeper to *799 the courthouse, allowing in only 
those cases that are fit for judicial resolution. 
Important jurisprudential considerations dictate that 
courts confine themselves to resolution of those 
disputes most effectively resolved through the judicial 
process, i.e., crystalized disputes concerning specific 
factual situations. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 
S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968); Jenkins v. Swan, 
Utah, 675 P.2d 1145, 1149 (1983). Thus, the 
doctrine of standing limits judicial power so that there 
will not "be a significant inroad on the representative 
form of government, cashing] the courts in the role of 
supervising the coordinate branches of government ... 
[and converting] the judiciary into an open forum for 
the resolution of political and ideological disputes 
about the performance of government." Baird v. 
State, Utah, 574 P.2d 713, 717 (1978). See also 
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188-92, 
94 S.Ct. 2940, 2952-54, 41 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) 
(Powell, J., concurring). For this reason, this Court 
will not lightly dispense with the requirement that a 
litigant have a personal stake in the outcome of a 
specific dispute. Jenkins v. Swan, supra, 675 P.2d at 
1150; see also Stromquist v. Cokayne, Utah, 646 
P.2d 746, 747 (1982); Jenkins v. Finlinson, Utah, 
607 P.2d 289, 290 (1980); Jenkins v. State, Utah, 
585 P.2d 442, 443 (1978); Sears v. Ogden City, 
Utah, 572 P.2d 1359, 1362 (1977). Nevertheless, it 
is difficult to make useful, all-inclusive generalizations 
that determine whether standing exists in any given 
case, since the issue often depends on the tacts of 
each case. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake 
County, Utah, 702 P.2d 451, 453 (1985); Association 
of Data Processing Sendee Organizations, Inc. v. 
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151, 90 S.Ct. 827, 829, 25 
L.Ed.2d 184 (1970). 
[4] This Court has referred to three general 
standards for determining whether a litigant has 
standing. (FN4) Jenkins v. Swan, supra, 675 P.2d at 
1150; see also Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake 
County, supra, 702 P.2d at 454. The premise upon 
which these standards have been constructed is that 
issues should generally be litigated by those parties 
with the most direct interest in resolution of those 
issues, although in some cases a party who does not 
have the most immediate or direct interest may have 
standing. 
The first general criterion is that the "[p]laintiff must 
be able to show that he has suffered some distinct and 
palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in the 
outcome of the legal dispute." Jenkins v. Swan, 
supra, 675 P.2d at 1148. See also Kennecott Copper 
Corp. v. Salt Lake County, supra, 702 P.2d at 454; 
Stromquist v. Cokayne, supra, 646 P.2d at 747; Sears 
v. Ogden City, supra, 572 P.2d at 1362; Main 
Parking Mall v. Salt Lake City Corp., Utah, 531 P.2d 
866 (1975); Johnson v. State Tax Commission, 17 
Utah 2d 337, 342 n.7, 411 P.2d 831, 834 n.7 (1966); 
State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 504, 94 P.2d 414, 420 
(1939) (must be personally affected by operation of 
statute to attack its validity). 
Second, if a plaintiff does not have standing under 
the first criterion, he may have standing if no one else 
has a greater interest in the outcome of the case and 
the issues are unlikely to be raised at all unless that 
particular plaintiff has standing to raise the issue. 
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, supra, 
702 P.2d at 454; Jenkins v. Swan, supra, 675 P.2d at 
1150. See also Startup v. Harmon, 59 Utah 329, 
336, 203 P. 637, 640-41 (1921); Crockett v. Board of 
Education, 58 Utah 303, 309, 199 P. 158, 160 (1921). 
Third, even though standing is not found to exist 
under the first two criteria, a plaintiff may nonetheless 
have standing if the issues are unique and of such 
great public importance that they ought to be decided 
in furtherance of the public interest. Jenkins v. Swan, 
supra, 675 P.2d at 1150; Jenkins *800 v. Finlinson, 
supra, 607 P.2d at 290; Jenkins v. State, supra, 585 
P.2dat443. 
[5] Terracor meets none of these requirements. It 
has not alleged any "particularized injury to [itself! by 
virtue of the claimed wrong/ Jenkins v. Swan, 
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supra, 675 P.2d at 1151 (emphasis m original). 
Terracor's proposed exchange of land for the tract 
which was subsequently leased to Bloomington Knolls 
by SULA 593 does not provide a valid basis for 
standing smce Terracor has specifically conceded in 
its pleadings that its challenge is not based on the 
Board's failure to accept that proposal. Indeed, 
Terracor does not assert that its proposal was of 
greater value or advantage to the State than 
Bloomington Knolls' proposal. In fact, Terracor's 
own proposal for a negotiated exchange was wholly 
inconsistent with the position it now asserts that such 
lands can only be disposed of by public auction. 
Terracor fares no better under the second part of 
the Jenkins analysis. There are others who could 
raise the same challenges raised by Terracor, and 
who would have a greater, more direct interest in 
domg so. For example, one who attempts to purchase 
the same school lands as another and loses out to the 
other would have standing if the basis of the action 
was the failure of the Board to lease to that particular 
person rather than the competition to one's business 
or a result of a lease to another party. Furthermore, 
beneficiaries of the school trust land would no doubt 
have standing to assert a violation of the Board's 
fiduciary responsibility to maximize the return from 
school trust lands. Thus, the State Treasurer, who 
receives 20% of all momes collected by the Division 
pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, § 65-1-13, and possibly the 
Attorney General, would have standing to assert a 
violation by the Board of its legal and fiduciary 
responsibilities. 
Smce there are "other potential plaintiffs with a 
more direct interest" m the issues m this case, we 
decline to reach the third test, whether the public 
importance of the issues raised is so great that they 
ought to be litigated m any event. Jenkins v. Swan, 
supra, 675P.2dat 1151. 
Smce Terracor does not have standing, we do not 
address the question whether Terracor has an 
adequate remedy at law by way of an appeal under 
section 65-1-9. 
Petition demed. No costs. 
HALL, C.J., and SCOTT DANIELS, District 
Judge, concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate herein. 
SCOTT DANIELS, District Judge, sat. 
HOWE, Justice (dissenting): 
I dissent from what I perceive to be a very narrow 
application of the rules of "standing" to the plaintiff. 
The Land Board had before it two competing 
proposals. Terracor's proposal was to exchange 
land. Bloomington Knolls' proposal was to lease the 
state land and subdivide it for home sites. The Board 
rejected Terracor's proposal and accepted the 
proposal of Bloomington Knolls'. Terracor protested 
to the Board, and now protests to this Court, that the 
Board has no statutory authority to lease state lands 
and that in so domg unfair competition resulted 
The majority concedes that "one who attempts to 
purchase the same school lands as another and loses 
out to the other person, would have standing." Yet 
the majority holds that Terracor has no standing even 
though it was attempting to acquire the same lands as 
its competitor Bloomington Knolls but proposed to do 
so by exchange rather than by leasing. Why that 
difference should destroy Terracor's standing 
completely eludes me. The majority seems to find 
comfort m the fact that Terracor declined the Board's 
invitation to make its proposal more attractive. 
Terracor, thereafter, the majority argues, had no 
interest and lacked standing to question what the 
Board did with the land. 1 cannot subscribe to this 
reasoning. In the first place, Terracor's rejection 
came simultaneous with Bloomington Knolls' 
acceptance. The rejection and the acceptance *801. 
were not separated by a period of time. Secondly, the 
interest of a competitor does not necessarily dissipate 
when its proposal is rejected. It remains interested m 
what the Board does thereafter with the land, 
especially when, as alleged here, the Board disposes 
of it m an alleged unlawful transaction which should 
be set aside and the land restored to the Board. 
The majority endeavors to find support for its 
holding that Terracor lacks standing because " 
Terracor does not assert m this action that the Board 
erred m refusing Terracor's proposed exchange." 
That argument leads nowhere. Of course, the Board 
has discretion m choosmg proposals before it. 
Neither Terracor nor any other competitor could 
validly argue that the Board was obliged to accept its 
proposal. However, what Terracor is contending for 
is that the Board accepted a proposal which it could 
not lawfully do. When unlawful proposals are 
removed from consideration by the Board, the Board 
is left to reconsider the remaining proposals. 
Furthermore, as long as the land remains m the hands 
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of the Board, a competitor is afforded the continuing 
opportunity to "sweeten" his proposal. 
DURHAM, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of 
HOWE, J. 
FN1. Terracor's petition was filed with this Court 
October 29, 1984. A petition for extraordinary writ 
to a judge or agency filed with this Court after 
January 1, 1985, would be governed by Rule 19 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
FN2. Section 65-1-68 states: 
Any portion of the public lands of this state not 
occupied by bona fide settlers having preference 
right of purchase, may be subdivided into lots, and 
sold as provided in this chapter, the board first being 
satisfied that by a subdivision of any tract into lots a 
sale of the same can be made for a greater amount 
than if sold in legal subdivisions. The board may 
survey such tracts and direct their subdivision. A 
plat of the survey shall be filed in the office of the 
county recorder of the county wherein the land is 
situated, and a copy in the office of the board. 
Tracts so subdivided shall not be subject to lease, 
but each lot shall be sold at public auction at such 
times as the board may direct. The manner of 
appraisement and sale of such subdivided lands shall 
be in all respects the same as in the case of other 
lands sold. 
FN3. Section 65-1-9 states: 
(1) Where contests arise as to the preference rights 
of claimants for lands under the control of the board, 
it shall have full power to hold a hearing thereon and 
to direct the taking of evidence concerning the 
questions involved, which hearing shall be reported 
in full. The board shall make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, enter its order with respect 
thereto, and notify the parties to such hearing of its 
findings, conclusions and order. 
(2) No claimant for lands under control of the board 
can appeal for judicial review of a decision of the 
board involving any sale, lease, or disposition of 
state lands, or any action relating thereto, unless 
such claimant files a written protest with respect 
thereto with the board within ninety days after the 
final decision of the board relating to such matter; 
or, with respect to decisions rendered prior to the 
effective date of this act, within ninety days after 
such effective date. This provision shall not relate 
to disputes between the board and any party as to the 
ownership or title to any lands. 
FN4. In addition, taxpayers may have standing to 
challenge an illegal expenditure. E.g., Lyon v. 
Bateman, 119 Utah 434, 228 P.2d 818 (1951); 
Tooele Building Association v. Tooele High School 
District, 43 Utah 362, 134 P. 894 (1913). 
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MINI SPAS, INC., Plaintiff, 
v. 
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY, Defendant. 
No. 860212. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 3, 1987. 
Employer appealed a decision of the Board of 
Review that its former employee was eligible for 
unemployment benefits. The Supreme Court held 
that: (1) the Department of Employment Security did 
not abuse its discretion m refusing to consider 
employer's untimely protest to benefits awarded, and 
(2) administrative law judge's refusal to consider 
untimely protest did not contravene claimed public 
policy to relieve party of default for "mistake" or 
"excusable neglect." 
Affirmed. 
Howe, J., concurred in the result. 
1. SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC WELFARE 
<®=*620.10 
356A — 
356AVIH Unemployment Compensation 
356AVm(G) Proceedings 
356AVm(G)6 Administrative Review 
356Ak620.5 Review by Board or Commission 
356Ak620.10 Proceedings for review; time for 
proceedings. 
Utah 1987. 
Department of Employment Security did not abuse 
its discretion m refusing to consider employer's 
untimely protest to unemployment compensation 
benefits awarded where, after employer withdrew 
prior appeal by agreement, it had another opportunity 
to timely request relief and knew, or should have 
known, that a notice of potential liability would be 
forthcoming, yet employer failed to act for over three 
weeks after due date, and employer's only excuse for 
untimely response was that notice was "inadvertently 
stuck together m the employer's drawer." 
U.C.A.1953, 35-4-7(c)(3)(E). 
2. SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC WELFARE 
@=*620.10 
356A — 
356AVHI Unemployment Compensation 
356AVm(G) Proceedings 
356AVIEI(G)6 Administrative Review 
356Ak620.5 Review by Board or Commission 
356Ak620.10 Proceedings for review; time for 
proceedings. 
Utah 1987. 
Administrative law judge's refusal to consider 
employer's untimely protest to award of 
unemployment compensation benefits did not 
contravene claimed public policy to relieve party of 
default for "mistake" or "excusable neglect" where 
employer had knowledge that notice of potential 
liability was forthcoming and a response was 
necessary, yet it failed to act timely. Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rule 60(b), (b)(1), U.C.A.1953, 
35-4-7(c)(3)(E). 
*131 W. Andrew McCullough, Orem, for plaintiff. 
K. Allan Zabel, Salt Lake City, for defendant. 
PER CURIAM: 
Plaintiff-employer Mini Spas, Inc., appeals a 
decision of the Board of Review that its former 
employee is eligible for unemployment benefits. That 
determination of eligibility affirmed the ruling of the 
administrative law judge that the employer had failed 
to timely protest a determination of benefits by the 
Department of Employment Security. (FN1) 
The two issues on appeal, as framed by the 
employer, are: (1) whether the Department abused its 
discretion m refusing to consider the employer's 
protest to the benefits awarded because the protest 
was not filed within ten days; and (2) whether the 
administrative law judge's refusal to consider the 
untimely protest contravenes a claimed public policy 
to relieve a party of default for "mistake" or 
"excusable neglect." Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1). We 
reject both contentions and affirm the Board of 
Review. 
The facts material to the employer's untimely protest 
are not disputed. In any event, we are bound by the 
factual findings of the administrative tribunal. (FN2) 
In December 1985, the employer withdrew its 
appeal from an audit determination by the Department 
of Employment Security that the employee-claimant 
performed services "in employment." The appeal 
was withdrawn under its agreement with the 
Department that the employer would have another 
opportunity to protest the benefit determination and to 
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request relief from the charge for those benefits. 
As a result of the agreement, the Department again 
sent to the employer Form 607, "Employer Notice of 
Claim Filed and Potential Benefit Costs." At the 
request of the employer, the notice was mailed 
directly to its attorney at his office address on 
December 18, 1985. The notice advised the employer 
of its potential liability and cautioned that relief from 
the benefits charged against it could not be granted 
unless the employer's protest was submitted in writing 
by December 28, 1985. This ten-day limit for the 
filing of a protest of benefit charges is required by 
section 35-4-7(c)(3)(E). (FN3) 
The employer did not file any written protest until 
after January 20, 1986. It claims that its delay may 
have been due to the fact that the notice had to be 
forwarded from the attorney to the employer. 
However, any such delay was the direct result of its 
insistence that the notice be sent directly to the 
attorney. The attorney acknowledged receipt and, 
purportedly, forwarded it to his client. Whether prior 
communications from the Department were received 
*132, by the employer is irrelevant when timely 
receipt on this occasion is acknowledged by the 
employer's designated agent. 
[1] After the employer withdrew its prior appeal by 
agreement, it had another opportunity to timely 
request relief of the charges and knew, or should have 
known, that the notice would be forthcoming. Yet the 
employer failed to act for over three weeks after the 
due date. This delay in filing a written protest was 
not due to circumstances beyond the employer's 
control, and the finding below of lack of "good cause" 
to excuse the default is affirmed. In view of the 
employer's admissions that the only excuse for 
untimely response was that the notice was 
"inadvertently stuck together in the employer's 
drawer," we find no abuse of discretion. (FN4) 
Mini Spas, Inc., further contends that under Rule 
60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
defendant must excuse its neglect to timely file its 
protest of the charges. It claims that the standard of 
"good cause," as applied by defendant's 
administrative rules to excuse default, is contrary to 
an implied public policy in Rule 60(b). It appears to 
us that the more pertinent public policy to be applied 
in this case is found in section 35-4-2, section 
35-4-10(e) (permitting the Department to prescribe its 
own procedural rules), and sections 35-4-7, -6, and 
-10 (imposing various ten-day filing requirements). 
[2] Rule 60(b)(1) confers discretion upon a trial 
court judge to set aside a judgment for "excusable 
neglect." We have heretofore defined "excusable 
neglect" as the exercise of "due diligence" by a 
reasonably prudent person under similar 
circumstances. (FN5) Even if we were to consider 
any argued distinction between "good cause" and 
"excusable neglect," which we expressly decline to 
do, the undisputed facts here do not support any claim 
that the employer diligently acted in a reasonably 
prudent manner in failing to file its response until 
three weeks after it was due. With knowledge that the 
notice was forthcoming and a response was necessary, 
the employer's neglect or mistake was not excusable. 
Cf. Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986). The 
Department's refusal to consider it was reasonable 
and rational under sections 35-4-7 and 35-4-10. 
We find the arguments on appeal to be without 
merit, and the decision of the Board of Review is 
affirmed. 
HOWE, J., concurs in the result. 
FN1. § 35-4-7(c)(3)(E); all statutory citations herein 
are to U.C.A., 1953 (1974 ed., Supp. 1986). 
FN2. § 35-4-10(i); Utah Department of 
Administrative Services v. Public Service 
Commission, 658 P.2d 601, 608-09 (Utah 1983). 
FN3. Section 35-4-7(c)(3)(E) provides, in part: 
Any employing unit that receives a notice of the 
filing of a claim may protest payment of benefits to 
former employees or charges to the employer if the 
protest is filed within ten days after the date the 
notice is issued. 
FN4. See Kirkwood v. Department of Employment 
Security, 709 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1985); Wood v. 
Department of Employment Security, 680 P.2d 38 
(Utah 1984); Thiessens v. Department of 
Employment Security, 663 P.2d 72 (Utah 1983). 
FN5. Airkem v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429 
(1973). 
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PROWSWOOD, INC., et al., Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
v. 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY CO., Defendant and 
Respondent. 
PROWSWOOD, INC., et al., Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
v. 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY CO., Defendant and 
Appellant. 
No. 18404, 18511. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 6, 1984. 
Developer brought action against supplier of air-
conditioning units for breach of contract and negligent 
misrepresentation. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, G. Hal Taylor, J., dismissed the action 
with prejudice but extended time for filing notice of 
appeal, and the parties cross-appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Hall, C.J., held that District Court abused its 
discretion in determining that inadvertent mistake of 
counsel in failing to enclose requisite docketing fee 
with notice of appeal was excusable neglect and, 
therefore, the appeal would be dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Howe, J., concurred in part and dissented in part 
and filed opinion in which Oaks, J. concurred. 
1. APPEAL AND ERROR @=*370 
30 — 
30VE Transfer of Cause 
30VE(C) Payment of Fees or Costs, and Bonds 
or Other Securities 
30k370 Payment of fees on appealing. 
Utah 1984. 
Failure to pay, within requisite period, docketing fee 
required for appeal is a defect of jurisdictional 
magnitude. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 17(a). 
2. APPEAL AND ERROR <§=*370 
30 — 
30VH Transfer of Cause 
30VII(C) Payment of Fees or Costs, and Bonds 
or Other Securities 
30k37( ; Payment of fees on appealing. 
Utah 19S4. 
Inadvertence m failing to remit requisite filing fee 
for appeal could not be excused by reason of court 
clerk's improvident filing of notice of appeal without 
such fees. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 17(a). 
3. APPEAL AND ERROR ®=^370 
30 — 
30VH Transfer of Cause 
30VH(C) Payment of Fees or Costs, and Bonds 
or Other Securities 
30k370 Payment of fees on appealing. 
Utah 1984. 
District court abused its discretion in determining 
that inadvertent mistake of counsel in failing to 
enclose requisite docketing fee with notice of appeal 
was excusable neglect and, therefore, the appeal 
would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rule 17(a). 
Bill Thomas Peters, Michael Z. Hayes, Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiffs and appellants. 
Robert S. Campbell, Salt Lake City, for defendant 
and respondent. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
These consolidated appeals arise out of an action 
commenced by Prowswood Corporation (hereinafter " 
Prowswood") against Mountain Fuel Supply 
Company (hereinafter "Mountain Fuel") for damages 
resulting from the alleged breach of an oral contract 
and the alleged negligent misrepresentation made in 
connection with the promotion and sale of gas air 
conditioning. Following a dismissal of the action with 
prejudice, Prowswood filed an appeal based on the 
following contentions: (1) the lower court's dismissal 
for failure to prosecute the action in the name of the 
real party in interest violated the purpose and 
language of Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; (2) incorporation of Prowswood's 
negligent misrepresentation cause of action in the final 
pretrial order precluded the dismissal of said claim on 
the first day of trial; (3) the lower court disregarded 
statutory procedural safeguards in dismissing 
Prowswood!s tort claim on the basis of Mountain 
Fuel's motion in limine; (4) Mountain Fuel's 
circumvention of statutory procedural rules through 
improper implementation of the motion in limine had 
a prejudicial impact upon Prowswood; and (5) the 
lower court erroneously dismissed Prowswood's 
claim for negligent misrepresentation as not being a 
judicially recognized cause of action. 
Mountain Fuel subsequently filed a response in the 
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Prowswood appeal and in *953 addition filed a 
separate appeal from an order of the lower court 
granting Prowswood's motion for an extension of 
time to file its notice of appeal. As the basis for this 
appeal, Mountain Fuel contends that the timely 
payment of the docketing fee and filing fee is required 
to perfect an appeal and that failure to perfect an 
appeal due to mere inadvertence or oversight does not 
constitute excusable neglect. 
The facts that precipitated Prowswood's cause of 
action and that pertain equally to both appeals are set 
forth immediately hereafter. Following this, the 
specific procedural facts givmg rise to the 
Prowswood appeal and those giving rise to the 
Mountain Fuel appeal are stated separately. 
Prowswood is a closely held corporation engaged in 
the development of real estate. It is presently owned 
by Richard Prows and Robert Wood and then* 
families. (FN1) During the years 1969 through 1974, 
Messrs. Prows and Wood, serving m their official 
corporate capacities as president and vice-president 
respectively, were approached by sales representatives 
of Mountain Fuel with the prospect of installing gas 
air-conditiomng units m their apartment projects. It is 
alleged by Prowswood that the sales representatives, 
particularly one Riley, made the following oral 
representations with respect to the gas air-conditionmg 
proposal: 
(A) The initial costs would be greater with gas air 
conditioning, but there would be no maintenance cost 
because Mountain Fuel would perpetually service and/ 
or maintain all the units. 
(B) Mountain Fuel would guarantee the air-
conditiomng units if they were installed according to 
the sizing recommendations and instructions furnished 
by Mountain Fuel. 
(C) Mountain Fuel would maintain a complete parts 
inventory to provide for rapid replacement of parts for 
the units. 
Prowswood further contends that it relied upon 
these representations when it purchased gas air-
conditiomng equipment and installed such equipment 
m a large apartment complex known as Lake Pines 
Apartments. 
According to the allegations of Prowswood's 
amended complaint, as well as Mr. Prows' testimony 
at trial, the air-conditioning units installed m the Lake 
Pines Apartments developed serious operational 
problems. When called upon to service the 
malfunctioning units, Mountain Fuel demed having 
made the alleged warranties and promises and 
ultimately refused to repair the units. Consequently, 
Prowswood brought this action against Mountain Fuel 
for breach of contract and negligent 
misrepresentation. 
Facts Pertinent to the Prowswood Appeal 
This action, although commenced on March 10, 
1977, did not proceed to trial until January 20, 1982 
Prior to the trial, a final pretrial order was prepared, 
approved as to form by both parties and filed pursuant 
to the court's order. The order sets forth 
Prowswood's claim for damages based on both 
breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation 
theories. 
On January 19, 1982, the day before the scheduled 
trial, counsel for Mountain Fuel served upon counsel 
for Prowswood a motion m limine to dismiss 
plaintiffs fraud claim. On the next day, January 20, 
prior to commencement of the trial, counsel for 
Prowswood served upon opposmg counsel a reply and 
objection to the motion m limine. Argument was then 
heard by the court on this motion (prior to trial), 
resulting m the dismissal of Prowswood's claim for 
negligent misrepresentation. The court concluded that 
although the allegations of the amended complaint 
were legally sufficient to state a cause of action for 
breach of contract, the allegations were insufficient to 
state a claim for misrepresentation. 
After the jury was impaneled and during the 
presentation of Prowswood's case in chief, it was 
discovered through testimony given by Mr. Prows 
that the owner of the *954 Lake Pines Apartments at 
the time the alleged oral contract was entered into was 
a partnership entity known as Lake Pines 
Development Company (hereinafter "Lake Pines") 
and not Prowswood, the plaintiff m the action. 
Counsel for Mountain Fuel therefore made a motion 
to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute in the name 
of the real party m interest. (FN2) Argument on this 
motion was then heard outside the presence of the 
jury. Counsel for Prowswood, while conceding its 
mistake as to the legal ownership of the Lake Pines 
Apartments, offered to have the partnership (Lake 
Pines Development) ratify the action or be substituted 
therein pursuant to Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Prowswood argued that the 
ownership composition of both Prowswood and Lake 
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Pines is the same with the exception of the children of 
Messrs. Prows and Wood. It further argued that 
Prowswood Corporation was a managing entity with 
respect to the subject apartments and that m its 
managerial capacity it had entered into the oral 
agreement with Mountain Fuel for the benefit of the 
owner/principal, Lake Pines Development. 
Notwithstanding Prowswood's arguments, the court 
dismissed the action with prejudice, reasoning that a 
substitution or ratification of the action by Lake Pines 
would not solve or reconcile the factual dilemma of 
Prowswood's having privity of contract with 
Mountain Fuel but no damages and Lake Pines' 
having damages but no privity of contract. 
Facts Pertinent to the Mountain Fuel Appeal 
A final judgment m this matter, together with 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, was entered 
on March 18, 1982. A notice of appeal was then 
prepared by counsel for Prowswood and filed by way 
of a "runners" service on April 14, 1982. 
On April 23, 1982, some five days after the 
expiration of the statutory thirty-day period for filing 
an appeal, (FN3) Prowswood received notice from 
the district court clerk's office that neither the filing 
fees nor the docketing fees had been received on the 
date the notice of appeal had been filed. Prowswood 
immediately filed an ex parte motion for an extension 
of time for filing notice of appeal, which motion was 
summarily granted, extending the time for completing 
the filing to April 28, 1982. 
Counsel for Mountain Fuel became apprised of 
Prowswood's motion for extension on April 28, 1982. 
Thereafter, on May 7, 1982, Mountain Fuel filed a 
motion to set aside the order that extended the tune 
for filing the notice of appeal. At the May 14 hearing 
on the motion, the court set aside the April 23 order 
on the basis of Prowswood's failure to give proper 
notice, which demed Mountain Fuel an opportunity to 
be heard. However, upon further hearing it was 
determined that Prowswood's inadvertent failure to 
accompany the notice of appeal with the requisite fees 
was excusable neglect, and the time for paymg such 
fees was extended to May 17, 1982. From this order, 
Mountain Fuel appeals. 
The focus of this appeal is upon two provisions of 
Rule 73(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
These two provisions, as they appear m the text of 
said rule, are as follows: 
(a) When an appeal is permitted from a district 
court to the Supreme Court, the time within which 
an appeal may be taken shall be one month from the 
date of the entry m the Register of Actions of the 
judgment or order appealed from unless a shorter 
tune is provided by law, [1] except that upon a 
showing of excusable neglect, the district court may 
extend the time for filing the nonce of appeal not 
exceeding one month from the expiration of the 
onginal time herem prescribed. Such an extension 
may be granted by the district court before or after 
the expiration of the original time herem prescribed; 
A party may appeal from a judgment by filing with 
the district court a notice of appeal, together with 
sufficient copies *955 thereof for mailing to the 
Supreme Court and all other parties to the judgment, 
[2] and deposinng therewith the fee required for 
dockeang the appeal m the Supreme Court. The 
clerk of the district court shall forthwith transmit 
one copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of 
filing, together with the required fee, to the Supreme 
Court where the appeal shall be duly docketed. 
Failure of the appellant to take any of the further 
steps to secure the review of the judgment appealed 
from does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is 
ground only for such remedies as are specified m 
this rule or, when no remedy is specified, for such 
action as the Supreme Court deems appropriate, 
which may include dismissal of the appeal. 
[Emphasis added.] 
[1] The first issue raised with regard to this rule is 
whether the provision requiring the payment of a 
docketmg fee constitutes a jurisdictional requirement 
that, if not satisfied within "one month from the date 
of the entry ... of the judgment," would render an 
appeal invalid. We conclude that failure to pay the 
docketmg fee within the requisite period is a defect of 
jurisdictional magnitude. 
It is axiomatic m this jurisdiction that failure to 
timely perfect an appeal is a jurisdictional failure 
requiring dismissal of the appeal. (FN4) The plain, 
unambiguous language of Rule 73(a) requires two 
steps to perfect an appeal, both of which must be 
performed within the requisite thirty-day period: (1) a 
notice of appeal must be filed with die district court, 
and (2) a docketmg fee must be deposited therewith. 
This interpretation draws support no* only from the 
clear language of the statute itself, but also from 
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judicial precedent in this jurisdiction, as well as many 
other jurisdictions. 
This Court has had occasion to mle on the 
importance of the filing fee m several cases. In the 
case of In Re Estate of Ratliff, (FN5) die appellant 
sent his notice of appeal to the clerk's office withm 
one month after the denial of his motion for a new 
trial However, he did not pay the statutory filing fee 
until one week after the deadline had passed. 
Consequently, the clerk did not file the notice at the 
tune it was received; rather, she filed it on the date 
the filing fees were paid. This Court ruled that it 
lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal due to the 
appellant's failure to comply with the statutory filing 
requirements In so holding, the Court quoted the 
following language from a former opinion, Jacobsen 
v Jeffries: (FN6) "Leaving a paper with a filing 
officer, a fee for the filing of which is by the statute 
required to be paid m advance, is not a filing." (FN7) 
The events that precipitated the Court's statement in 
Jacobsen, supra, and the further reasoning applied 
therein are also apropos to this issue. There, the 
appellant made arrangements with the clerk to have 
his notice of appeal filed and his filing fees paid later. 
Before the notice of appeal was filed, however, a new 
clerk took over and did not file the notice until the 
fees were received, which was after the penod for 
filing had expired. This Court dismissed the appeal 
for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning, as stated above, 
that the delivery of a notice of appeal without the 
requisite filing fee does not constitute a filing. Thus 
rationale was based upon an earlier decision, Gee v. 
Smith, (FN8) mvolvmg the validity of the filing of a 
trial transcript with the Supreme Court without the 
requisite filing fee. The Court m that case articulated 
the following rule: 
Under our law the filing of the record consists of 
two acts, one of which is payment of the fee, and the 
other of which is delivering the record to the cleik. 
Neither act standing alone is a *956 filing, or a 
half filing, or of any avail as a filing. (FN9) 
We note that at the time the Gee and Jacobsen 
decisions were handed down, the rules of appellate 
procedure, particularly those respecting the payment 
of filing fees, were not precisely as they are now nor 
as they were at the tune Ratliff was decided. 
Notwithstanding, however, the Court in Ratliff applied 
the same interpretation and analysis of the filing fee 
requirements as it had in Gee and Jacobsen. 
Inasmuch as those requirements are the same at 
present as they were at the time RatUff was decided, 
we likewise consider the rule articulated in Gee, 
supra, and followed in Jacobsen and Ratliff, 
applicable here. 
As a rejoinder to the principles stated in Ratliff and 
Jacobsen, Prowswood avers that those cases are 
distinguishable on then- facts and therefore inapropos 
to the present issue. The major distinction pointed out 
by Prowswood is that the nouce of appeal m Ratliff 
and Jacobsen, although timely delivered, was not filed 
by the clerk within the statutory penod, while in the 
instant matter, the nouce of appeal was not only 
delivered timely, but also filed by the clerk within the 
requisite penod. Thus, Prowswood claims that the 
Court's statements in Ratliff and Jacobsen do not 
support the proposition urged by Mountain Fuel that 
the payment of the filing fees widun the statutory 
penod is necessary and jurisdictional, rather, they 
support the proposition that only the actual filing of 
the notice of appeal within said penod is necessary 
and jurisdictional. 
Akhough we concede that the factual distinction 
drawn by Prowswood exists, we do not countenance 
Prowswoodfs position that the scope of application of 
the rule stated m the Ratliff and Jacobsen decisions is 
limited by virtue of that distinction. The rule clearly 
articulates the consequence of failure to pay filing fees 
within the statutory penod; it does not condition such 
consequence, as Prowswood suggests, upon the 
clerk's refusal or failure to actually file the notice of 
appeal. The rule states unequivocally that the delivery 
of the notice of appeal wuhout the required filing fees 
is ineffectual. 
In further justification of Prowswoodfs position that 
the payment of filing fees is not jurisdictional, it 
alleges that the legal duty to insure compliance with 
the filing fee requirement rests m the clerk of the 
court rather than in the parties themselves. This 
proposition is purportedly supported by both the 
Jacobsen and Ratliff decisions. However, we do not 
find such support m Uiose cases. In Ratliff, the Court 
merely noted that the clerk's refusal to file the nouce 
of appeal without the filing fee was proper inasmuch 
as U.C.A., 1953, § 21-2-2 requires the clerk to 
receive the proper filing fee before filing the notice of 
appeal. (FN10) The Court did not hold, nor did it 
even imply, that the clerk's duty under § 21-2-2 (or § 
21-2-1) supersedes or vitiates or m any way lessens 
the party's responsibility to pay said fees pursuant to 
Rule 73(a). Similarly, in Jacobsen the Court 
recognized the clerk's responsibility with respect to 
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filing fees and made the following hypothesized 
observation: 
Should such officers inadvertently or otherwise file a 
paper for which a fee is required to be paid, he is 
forthwith bound to account for such fee whether or 
not he collected the fee at the tune the paper was left 
for filing. (FN11) 
We do not interpret this observation, as Prowswood 
does, to mean that the inadvertent filing of the notice 
of appeal by the clerk without the appropriate filing 
fees validates or perfects the appeal. The statement 
was not intended to extend the clerk's accountability 
into the realm of the party's responsibility. Indeed, 
such an interpretation would run squarely against the 
rule of law laid out m that case, to wit: "fljeaving 
*957 a paper with a filing officer, a fee for the filing 
of which is by the statute required to be paid m 
advance, is not a filing," supra. 
Prowswood's argument with respect to the court 
clerk's duty goes a step further. It alleges that the 
clerk had an opportunity to discover the mistake (i.e., 
inadvertent filing of the notice of appeal without the 
fees) prior to the expiration of the thirty-day period 
and failed to do so inasmuch as counsel for 
Prowswood allegedly contacted the clerk the day after 
the notice of appeal had been dehvered (which was 
approximately three days before the thirty-day 
deadline) and was assured by the clerk that the appeal 
had been filed. Prowswood complains that at that 
point m time, had the clerk recognized the error m 
filing the notice without fees or refused to file the 
notice without payment of said fees imposed by 
statute, Prowswood would have had time to pay the 
fees before the deadline, and no extension would have 
been necessary. 
Again, this argument is an attempt to transfer the 
duty to perfect an appeal from the movmg litigant (to 
whom the duty legally belongs) to the clerk of the 
court. That the clerk is not responsible for 
discovering and rectifying the procedural mistakes 
made by the litigants is illustrated m the case of Gee 
v. Smith, supra. There, the appellant sought to 
excuse his failure to timely remit filing fees by 
showmg that the clerk of the district court had 
received a letter from the clerk of this Court 
indicating that the filing fees had not been received 
and that the transcript could not be filed until such 
fees were received, and that the clerk failed to 
communicate the contents of the letter to the appellant 
m tune for him to pay the fees. The Court rejected 
this excuse, placing the burden of compliance with the 
procedural rules upon the movmg litigant: "We must 
hold that appellant and his attorneys knew that the 
record would not be filed unless the filing fee was 
paid/ (FN 12) The Court went on to articulate the 
rule stated above respecting the consequence of failure 
to timely remit filing fees. 
Consistent with the conclusion reached m Gee with 
respect to the clerk's responsibility are the 
pronouncements of the Missouri Supreme Court m a 
case mvolvmg almost identical circumstances as those 
present here. In Keeney v. State, (FN 13) the court 
clerk lmprovidently filed a notice of appeal without 
having received the required filing fee of $20. The 
Missouri court held widi respect to that improvident 
filing: "The filing of the notice of appeal by the 
circuit clerk was invalid and ineffective." (FN 14) 
[2] Accordingly, we hold that Prowswood cannot 
have its inadvertence m failing to remit the requisite 
filing fee excused by reason of the court clerk's 
improvident filing of the notice of appeal without such 
fees. 
A division of authority exists in other jurisdictions 
upon the question presently before us. The principal 
authority for the position urged by Prowswood, to 
wit: that the filing fee requirement is not 
jurisdictional, is a U.S. Supreme Court case entitled 
Panssi v. Telechron, Inc. (FN15) In that case, the 
petitioner failed to include with its notice of appeal the 
$5 filing fee required by the pertinent federal statute, 
(FN 16) and the clerk consequently refused to file the 
notice. The tune for filing the appeal then lapsed 
before the payment was made. The Court reversed 
the circuit court's dismissal, stating: 
*958 We think that the clerk's receipt of the notice 
of appeal within the thirty (30) day period satisfied 
the requirement of Section 2107, and that untimely 
payment of the Section 1917 fee did not vitiate the 
validity of petitioner's notice of appeal. (FN 17) 
Yet another federal decision relied upon by 
Prowswood with respect to this issue is the case of 
Gould v. Members of New Jersey Division of Water 
Policy & Supply. (FN18) There, the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals, on its own motion, raised the issue 
of an untimely fee payment and held, citmg Parissi: 
It is thus clear that the filing fee requirement cannot 
operate to render untimely a notice of appeal that is 
timely received m the clerk's office. (FN 19) 
Copynght (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
676 P.2d 952, Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., (Utah 1984) Page 6 
This Court accords considerable weight to decisions 
that interpret federal procedural rules identical or 
substantially similar to the procedural rules of this 
state. However, such similarity does not exist 
between the federal rules respecting filing fees and 
this state's Rule 73(a). 
The language of Rule 73(a) differs from the federal 
rules at issue m Panssi and Gould (to wit: 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1917 & 2107), as well as the more current Rule 
3(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, in 
one important regard. Rule 73(a) sets forth the 
requirements of delivery of the notice of appeal and 
payment of the docketing fees within the statutory 
penod and then continues: 
Failure of the appellant to take any of the further 
steps to secure the review of the judgment appealed 
from does not effect the validity of the appeal .... 
[Emphasis added.] 
We believe the manifest intent of the underscored 
language is to make jurisdictional the two steps for 
securing the appeal which precede that language (i.e , 
filing the notice of appeal and paymg the docketmg 
fees). Only the steps which follow that language are 
nonjunsdictional. 
The federal niles interpreted m Panssi and Gould do 
not include a provision such as that stated above, 
separating the jurisdictional requirements from the 
nonjunsdictional. Rule 3(a) of the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure does, however, contain a similar 
provision. The Rule begins by stating the single 
requirement that a notice of appeal be filed with the 
clerk of the court; it does not also mclude at that 
point, as our Rule 73(a) does, the requirement that the 
filing fees be paid. It then continues: 
Failure of an appellant to take any step other ttain 
the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect 
the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for 
such action as the court of appeals deems 
appropriate, which may mclude dismissal of the 
appeal.... 
In the Advisory Committee's notes on appellate 
rules, the following statement appears with respect to 
the importance of this provision m determining what 
is and what is not a jurisdictional requirement: 
In view of the provision in Rule 3(a) that "[flailure 
of an appellant to take any step other than the timely 
filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the 
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such 
action as the court of appeals deems appropriate, 
which may mclude dismissal of the appeal," the case 
law indicates that the failure to prepay the statutory 
filing fee does not constitute a jurisdictional defect. 
See Panssi v. Telechront 349 U.S. 46 [75 S.Ct. 
577, 99 L.Ed. 867] (1955); Gould v. Members of 
NJ. Division of Water Policy <fc Supply, 555 F.2d 
340 (3d Cir. 1977). [Emphasis added.] (FN20) 
*959 This Court does not stand alone in its 
conclusion that filing fees rise to the level of 
jurisdictional magnitude. Under circumstances 
similar to those before us, other state courts have 
articulated the same conclusion. The Washington 
State Supreme Court has held: 
The timely filing of a proper written notice of appeal 
and the timely payment of the required filing fee are 
jurisdictional prerequisites in the appeal of all civil 
cases.... (FN21) 
The Supreme Court of the state of Missouri has 
held: 
This notice of appeal was not timely filed because 
the docket fee, without which the notice of appeal is 
ineffective, was not deposited ...; therefore we do 
not have jurisdiction of the appeal. (FN22) 
And the Nebraska Supreme Court has observed: 
The Supreme Court has no power to exercise 
appellate jurisdiction ... unless the appellant shall 
have filed a notice of appeal and deposited a docket 
fee ... within the tune fixed .... (FN23) 
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the timely 
payment of a filing fee, like the timely delivery of a 
notice of appeal, is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the 
perfection of an appeal before this Court. 
We turn now to the final issue raised m connection 
with Rule 73(a). This issue arises out of the following 
provision of the Rule: "except that upon a showing of 
excusable neglect, the district court may extend the 
time for filing the notice of appeal ...." By virtue of 
this provision, notwithstanding the jurisdictional 
nature of the filing fee requirement, if the appellant 
can show that its failure to timely pay said fees was 
due to "excusable neglect/ the tune for paymg the 
fees and perfecting the appeal may be extended. The 
pivotal issue is, therefore, whether the district court 
abused its discretion m determining that the excuse 
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offered by Prowswood for its failure to timely remit 
the fees constitutes "excusable neglect." 
The excuse proffered by Prowswood at the hearing 
on May 14, 1982, for the failure to pay the docketing 
fee was that counsel for Prowswood was mvolved m 
"another matter" on the day of the attempted filing 
and "inadvertently" failed to include a check for the 
fees with the notice of appeal, which was sent through 
a runner service Counsel further informed the Court 
that he telephoned the district court the next day 
(which was three days prior to the expiration of the 
thirty-day deadline) and was assured by an 
unidentified deputy clerk that the appeal was filed. 
When the question of "excusable neglect" arises m a 
jurisdictional context {e.g., Utah R.Civ.P. 73(a)), as 
opposed to a nonjunsdictional context {e.g., Utah 
R Civ.P 60(b)), the standard contemplated thereby is 
necessarily a strict one. (FN24) This strict standard 
was recognized and explained relative to the parallel 
federal rule (i.e., Federal Appellate Rule 4(a)) as 
follows. 
The Committee intended that the standard of 
excusable neglect remain a strict one, however. We 
did not want lawyers to be taking advantage of this 
extra thirty (30) days as a matter of course; it is not 
meant to cover the usual excuse that the lawyer is 
too busy, which can be used, perhaps truthfully, in 
almost every case. It is hoped that the bar will 
mvoke and the courts give effect *960 to this less 
stringent standard m the spirit m which it was 
wntttn-that is to take care of emergency situations 
only. [Emphasis added.] (FN25) 
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, m the 
case of Maryland Casualty Company v. Conner, 
stated that the rule was not intended to permit an 
extension "in the absence of circumstances that are 
unique or extraordinary." (FN26) Inadvertence or 
mistake of counsel does not constitute the type of 
unique or extraordinary circumstances contemplated 
by this strict standard. (FN27) 
The application of this rule is well illustrated m the 
following cases In Feltch v. General Rental Co., 
(FN28) appellants sought to excuse the untimely filing 
of their notice of appeal on the basis of a mistake they 
had made m interpreting a rule of appellate procedure. 
In rejectmg this excuse, the court noted the strict 
construction given the "excusable neglect" concept m 
federal forums, supra, and held: 
A flat mistake of counsel about the meaning of a 
statute or rule may not justify relief: relief is not 
extended "to cover any kind of garden variety 
oversight.m (FN29) [Emphasis added.] 
In the case of Maryland Casualty Company v. 
Conner, supra, the nonce of appeal was filed late 
because the senior partner responsible for the 
litigation passed away suddenly, and another partner, 
who was unfamiliar with the litigation and absent from 
the office, was required to take over the litigation In 
the motion for extension, counsel referred to the 
volume of matters he had inherited as a result of his 
partner's death, indicating that through inadvertence 
and preoccupation with other matters, he neglected to 
file the notice within the statutory period The Tenth 
Circuit held that counsel's involvement m other 
matters did not show excusable neglect within the 
meamng of the rule. 
In Selph v. Council of City of Los Angeles, (FN30) 
the excuse given for the late filing was that counsel 
had been preoccupied with a change of employment 
and had been unusually busy. The court rejected his 
excuse and dismissed the appeal. 
Counsel for Prowswood have openly admitted that 
the failure to timely remit the filing fees was due to 
their own neglect and inadvertence occasioned by the 
press of business. Notwithstanding, they claim then-
neglect was excusable simply because they received 
assurances over the telephone from an unidentified 
deputy court clerk that the appeal had been filed and 
because Mountain Fuel was not prejudiced by the 
untimelmess of the payment of filing fees. 
The assertion that prejudice or the lack thereof has a 
bearing upon the determination of the excusable 
neglect question is erroneous. This point is well 
illustrated in the case of United States v. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, (FN31) where the 
appellant attempted, as does Prowswood here, to shift 
the focus from "excusable neglect" to "injustice." 
The court rejected appellant's position upon the 
following reasoning: 
It is always just that one should have an appeal from 
a trial court and it would seem that it would always 
be an injustice to deny such an appeal merely 
because *961 of the inadvertent missing of an 
arbitrarily drawn deadline.... Surely what is just on 
the 30th day does not become unjust on the 31st 
merely because the 31st day has come. Thus, if the 
justice or injustice of the question is to be the basis 
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for granting or denying a motion for an extension, 
the Court should not look to the acts or omissions ol 
appellant but, instead, to any prejudice that mighi 
accrue to appellee from a granting of the extension. 
This is clearly and explicitly not what the rule 
requires. The rule requires that the conduct of the 
appellant only be looked to and that only if 
excusable neglect be shown on appellant's part 
should an extension be granted. [Emphasis added.] 
(FN32) 
As to the excuse that the clerk's assurances over the 
telephone misled counsel for Prowswood and thus 
justified counsel's late payment of the fee, it is again 
to be observed that the clerk of the court is noit 
responsible for discovering and rectifying procedural 
errors committed m the first instance by the litigants 
The dissent's position on this particular question is 
contradictory. It agrees that the payment of the filing 
fee is the responsibility of the appellant alone and is m 
no way that of the court clerk. It then, however, 
shifts that responsibility, or at least part thereof, to the 
court clerk by suggesting that the clerk's failure to 
mention die appellant's omission of the filing fee is a 
factor in determining the excusabihty of appellant's 
neglect. We note that the oversight and inadvertence 
of counsel m this case preceded and occurred whoDy 
independently of the purported error of the deputy 
court clerk. This excuse did not support 
Prowswood's argument, supra, with respect to the 
nature of the filing fee requirement, and it likewise 
does not support Prowswood's argument regarding 
"excusable neglect." 
[3] We hold that the district court abused its 
discretion m finding the inadvertent mistake of 
counsel to be "excusable neglect" within the 
recognized meaning of that term. Our resolution of 
this appeal makes it unnecessary to address the merits 
of the issues set forth m the Prowswood appeal. 
The appeal of Prowswood is dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
HOWE, Justice (concurring and dissenting): 
I concur with the conclusion of the majority opinion 
that the timely payment of the filing fee is a 
jurisdictional prerequisite to the perfection of an 
appeal before this Court. However, I dissent from the 
conclusion of the majority that the district court 
abused its discretion in finding the neglect of counsel 
in this case to be "excusable" within the meaning of 
Rule 73(a), and therefore that Prowswood was not 
entitled to an extension of time to perfect its appeal 
The majority opinion states that "the standard 
contemplated by the term 'excusable neglect' is 
universally considered to be a very strict one." The 
only cases which support that statement, however, are 
cases from federal courts. The term "excusable 
neglect" appears not only in our rules m Rule 73(a), 
but also in Rule 60(b) providing for the setting aside 
of judgments (usually default judgments) obtained 
when a party or his counsel has been guilty of 
"excusable neglect." In interpreting Rule 60(b) we 
have given the district courts wide discretion in 
determining what constitutes "excusable neglect," and 
only m rare cases have we overruled their decisions 
that have set aside default judgments after finding 
"excusable neglect." Warren v. Dixon Ranch, 123 
Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953). I see no reason why 
the same broad interpretation should not apply to the 
meaning of "excusable neglect" as used m Rule 73(a). 
The majority opinion states "inadvertence or mistake 
of counsel does not constitute the type of unique or 
extraordinary *962. circumstances contemplated by 
this strict standard." That statement imposes a much 
higher test than we have heretofore required under 
Rule 60(b). Under the latter rule we have required 
only reasonable justification or excuse for the 
defendant's failure to appear. May hew v. Standard 
Glsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 (1962). 
See also Wesnnghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Larsen 
Contractor Inc., Utah, 544 P.2d 876 (1975), where 
we said only a reasonable excuse need be shown to 
merit the vacatmg of a default judgment. 
I agree that the payment of the filing fee so that the 
appeal is properly "filed" is the responsibility of the 
appellant. However, I think that the trial court, in 
determining whether the neglect of counsel for 
Prowswood was excusable, might well consider the 
fact that the clerk accepted the filing of the notice of 
appeal without mentioning the omission of die 
necessary fee. This silence itself is very unusual 
(FN1) and compounded the neglect of counsel. That 
fact, coupled widi die fact that counsel later called die 
clerk's office and received assurance that the notice of 
appeal had been filed with no mention bemg made of 
the lack of the filing fee, would seem to me to give a 
basis m reason for concluding that the neglect of 
counsel was excusable. I have no quarrel with the 
committee note to Federal Appellate Rule 4(a) to the 
effect that the committee did not want lawyers to be 
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taking advantage of the extra thuty days as a matter of 
course, and that it was not meant to cover the usual 
excuse that the lawyer is too busy. That is not the 
instant case. Here, counsel for the appellant was not 
too busy. He filed his notice of appeal well ahead of 
the onginal one-month deadline. By oversight he 
neglected to pay the fee, which ordinarily would be 
detected by the clerk of the court. Counsel used 
further diligence in checking with the court to make 
sure that the appeal was filed and he received that 
assurance. The diligence, care and effort expended 
by the appellant m attempting to properly file its 
appeal bears on whether its neglect of one step should 
be excused. 
I would not disturb the district court's determination 
that counsel's neglect was excusable. 
OAKS, J., concurs m the concurring and dissenting 
opinion of HOWE, J. 
FN1 The record indicates that Prowswood was 
formerly owned by Messrs. Prows and Wood and 
that their families became shareholders sometime 
after 1970. 
FN2. Pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 17(a). 
FN3. Utah R.Civ.P. 73(a). 
FN4. See Tracy v. University of Utah Hosp., Utah, 
619 P.2d 340 (1980); Watson v. Anderson, 29 Utah 
2d 36, 504 P.2d 1003 (1973); Anderson v. 
Anderson, 3 Utah 2d 277, 282 P.2d 845 (1955). 
FN5. 19 Utah 2d 346, 431 P.2d 571 (1967). 
FN6. 86 Utah 587, 47 P.2d 892, 893 (1935). 
FN7. Supra n. 5, 431 P.2d at 573. 
FN8. 52 Utah 602, 176 P. 620 (1918). 
FN9. Supra n. 6, 47 P.2d at 893, quoting from Gee v. 
Smith, 52 Utah at 621, 176 P. 620. 
FN10. To be more specific, the requirement that 
clerks collect fees m advance is found m § 21-2-1. 
Section 21-2-2 enumerates the fees to be collected 
by the county clerk. 
FN11. Sap/ran. 6. 
FN12. Supra n. 8, 176 P. at 621. 
FN13. Mo., 556 S.W.2d 514 (1977). 
FN 14. Id. at 515. It is noted that Missouri also has a 
statute requiring the clerk to receive the filing fees 
in advance of filing the notice of appeal. 
Notwithstanding this statute, however, the court held 
as it did with respect to the improvident filing. 
FN15. 349 U.S. 46, 75 S.Ct. 577, 99 L.Ed. 867 
(1955). 
FN 16. The five-dollar filing fee requirement is found 
m 28 U.S.C. § 1917 and reads thus: 
Upon the filing of any separate or joint notice of 
appeal or application for appeal or upon the receipt 
of any order allowing, or notice of the allowance of, 
an appeal or of a writ of certiorari $5 shall be paid 
to the clerk of the district court, by the appellant or 
petitioner. 
FN17. 349 U.S. at 47, 75 S.Ct. at 577. 
FN18. 555 F.2d 340 (3d Cir.1977). 
*962_ FN 19. Id. at 341. Prowswood also cites the 
following cases from two state jurisdictions wherein 
the rule articulated in Panssi was followed: City of 
Gainesville v. nomas, Fla., 229 So.2d 833 (1969); 
Williams v. State, Fla., 324 So.2d 74 (1975); 
Kalauli v. Dim, 57 Hawaii 168, 552 P.2d 355 
(1976). 
FN20. 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 3(a), Notes of Advisory 
Committee on Appellate Rules, note to subdivision 
(e). 
FN21. Myers v. Harris, 82 Wash.2d 152, 509 P.2d 
656, 657 (1973). 
FN22. State v. Brookshire, Mo., 400 S.W.2d 61 
(1966). See also Kattering v. Franz, 360 Mo. 854, 
231 S.W.2d 148 (1950); Keeney v. State, supra n. 
13. 
FN23. American Legion Leo Brinda Post No. 90 v. 
Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 199 Neb. 429, 
259 N.W.2d 36 (1977). 
FN24. Varnum v. Grady, 90 Nev. 374, 528 P.2d 
1027 (1974); Feltch v. General Rental Co., 383 
Mass. 603, 421 N.E.2d 67, 73 (1981); State of Or. 
v. Champion Intern. Corp., 680 F.2d 1300 (9th 
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Cir.1982); Selph v. Council of City of Los Angeles, 
593 F.2d 881 (9th Cir.1979) (quoting Advisory 
Committee Notes to 1966 amendment to 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, the predecessor of Fed.R.App.P. 
4(a)). 
FN25. R. Stern, Changes m the Federal Appellate 
Rules, 41 F.R.D. 297, 299. 
FN26. 382 F.2d 13, 16-17 (10th Cir.1967). See also 
United States v. Kallevig, 534 F.2d 411 (1st 
Cir.1976). 
FN27. 9 Moore's Federal Practice T 204.13 at 4-97 to 
4-98, Sprout v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 681 
F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1982). 
FN28. Supra n. 24. 
FN29. Id. at 74 (quoting from Goldstein v. Barron, 
382 Mass. 181, 414 N.E.2d 998 (1980)). 
FN30. Supra n. 24. 
FN31. 508 F.Supp. 187 (E.D.Va.1981). See also 
Spound v. Mohasco Industries, Inc., 534 F.2d 404 
(1st Cir.1976), where the appellant made the same 
argument advanced by Prowswood. It was 
summarily rejected, the court declaring that the 
"rule makes no provision for plaintiffs contention 
that the defendant was not prejudiced. Such an 
exception would be limitless." /rf. at 411. 
FN32. United States v. Commonwealth of Virgima, 
supra n. 31, at 192. 
FN1. U.C.A., 1953, § 21-2-1 requires county officers 
to collect fees in advance for the use and benefit of 
the county. 
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*878 887P.2d878 
Estate of Martm HARO, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Maria Guadalupe HARO and Everardo Haro, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No 930702-CA. 
Coun of Appeals of Utah 
Dec 20, 1994 
Estate of guest who died as result of carbon 
monoxide poisoning while staying m defendants' 
home sued defendants for wrongful death. The 
Second District Court, Davis County, W. Brent West, 
J., dismissed action. Estate appealed. The Coun of 
Appeals, Bench, J., held that: (1) estate was proper 
plaintiff, and (2) decedent's heirs could not be 
substituted as real parties in interest. 
Affirmed. 
1. DEATH @=*31(1) 
117 — 
117in Actions for Causing Death 
117111(A) Right of Action and Defenses 
117k31 Persons Entitled to Sue 
117k31(l) In general. 
Utah App 1994 
Decedent's estate was neither "heir*' nor his 
"personal representative" and, thus, could not 
maintain action under Utah's wrongful death statute. 
U.C.A 1953,78-11-7. 
See pubhcation Words and Phrases for other judicial 
constructions and definitions. 
2. DEATH <§=>44 
117 — 
117in Actions for Causing Death 
117m(E) Parties 
117k44 Intervention, addition, or substitution 
of parties. 
Utah App. 1994. 
Because decedent's estate had no capacity to bring 
action for wrongful death, complaint was nullity, and 
there remained no cause of action m which to 
substitute decedent's heirs as real parties m interest. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-11-7; Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 17(a). 
Scott Holt, Layton, for appellant. 
Robert H. Henderson and Richard A. Van Wagoner, 
Salt Lake City, for appellee Maria Haro. 
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J. Kent Holland, Salt Lake City, for appellee 
Everardo Haro. 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and WILKINS, JJ. 
*879 OPINION 
BENCH, Judge 
Plaintiff estate appeals from the trial court's 
dismissal of its wrongful death action We affirm 
FACTS 
On February 24, 1991, Martm Haro died as a result 
of carbon monoxide poisoning he had sustained while 
staying in the home of his ex-wife, Maria Haro On 
January 12, 1993, plaintiff brought a wrongful death 
action against Maria Haro and Juan Haro, claiming 
that then* negligence caused Martm Haro's injuries 
and eventual death. On February 26, 1993, plaintiff 
filed an amended complaint naming Maria Haro and 
Everardo Haro as defendants. 
Defendants brought a motion to dismiss plaintiffs 
amended complaint on the ground that Martin Haro's 
estate was neither an hen- nor his personal 
representative and therefore could not maintain an 
action under Utah's wrongful death statute. Plaintiff 
then brought a motion to substitute the real parties m 
interest, pursuant to rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The trial court ruled that because 
the "Estate of Martm Haro is not an hen* and did not 
have the capacity to sue, the Complaint and Amended 
Complaint are nullities." The trial court therefore 
granted defendants' motion and demed plaintiffs 
motion with prejudice. This appeal followed. 
ANALYSIS 
Proper Plaintiff m Wrongful Death Action 
[1] Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by 
ruling that it did not have the capacity to sue. 
Specifically, plaintiff argues that an estate has an 
interest m recovering for the decedent's wrongfiil 
death. We disagree. 
Utah's wrongful death statute provides that "when 
the death of a person not a minor is caused by the 
wrongful act or neglect of another, his heirs, or his 
personal representatives for the benefit of his heirs, 
may maintain an action for damages against the 
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person causing the death." Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-7 
(1992) (emphasis added). The underlying purpose of 
this statute is "to provide compensation to those who 
were dependent upon the decedent as a sole or 
supplemental means of economic and emotional 
support." Dennis C. Farley, Note, Decedent's Heirs 
Under the Utah Wrongful Death Act, 1979 Utah 
L.Rev. 77, 80. 
In In re Behm's Estate, 117 Utah 151, 213 P.2d 657 
(1950), the Utah Supreme Court addressed the 
separate identities of a decedent's heirs and a 
decedent's estate under the wrongful death statute. 
(FNl) The court held that a claim for wrongful death 
isa 
separate and independent cause of action and is not a 
continuation of the right of action of the injured 
party for personal injuries. The death creates a new 
cause of action for the loss suffered by the hen's by 
reason of the death, and only comes into existence 
upon the happening of the death. 
Id. 213 P.2d at 660-61. The court also held that die 
proceeds from a wrongful death award may not be 
intermingled with the res of the estate. 
[T]he legislature intended that the proceeds obtained 
from the wrongdoer would not be intermingled with 
other assets of the estate of the deceased. 
Otherwise, the cause of action would have been 
vested m the personal representative alone and the 
amount would have been subjected to administration 
by him m the same manner as other estate assets. 
Id. 213 P.2d at 660. 
Section 78-11-7 clearly delineates that the decedent's 
heirs or his or her personal representative (on beteilf 
of the heirs) are the only parties that may maintain an 
action for wrongful death. Section 78-11-7 does not 
allow for the decedent's estate to bring and maintain a 
wrongful death action. We therefore conclude that the 
trial court was correct *880. m ruling that plaintiff m 
the present case lacked the necessary capacity to sue. 
(FN2) 
Plaintiffs Rule 17(a) Motion 
[2] Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred by 
not allowing it to amend its complaint to substitute 
decedent's heirs as the real parties m interest pursuant 
to rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
We disagree. 
Rule 17(a) provides, m pertinent part: 
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the 
real party in interest. An executor, administrator, 
guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a party 
with whom or m whose name a contract has been 
made for the benefit of another, or a party 
authorized by statute may sue m that person's name 
without joining the party for whose benefit the action 
is brought.... 
This rule contemplates that the party bringing suit 
has the capacity to sue on behalf of the "real party m 
interest.H If the suit is brought by a party that does 
not have the capacity to sue on behalf of the "real 
party m interest," the suit is a nullity. Because 
Martin Haro's estate had no capacity to bring an 
action for wrongful death, the complaint was a nullity 
and there remained no cause of action m which to 
substitute parties. Therefore, the trial court did not 
err m denymg plaintiffs motion to substitute real 
parties m interest. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not err by dismissing plaintiffs 
cause of action. Additionally, the trial court did not 
err m denymg plaintiffs motion to substitute parties. 
Affirmed. 
BILLINGS and WILKINS, JJ., concur. 
FNl. The 1924 version of Utah's wrongful death 
statute, like the current version, provided that suit 
could only be brought by decedent's heirs or 
decedent's personal representative. 
FN2. The trial court also ruled that plaintiffs action 
against Everardo Haro was not initiated within the 
two-year statute of limitations. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-28 (1992). Plaintiff contends that the statute 
of limitations for wrongful death actions violates 
article XVI, section 5 of the Utah Constitution, 
which provides that "[t]he right of action to recover 
damages for injuries resulting m death, shall never 
be abrogated/ In light of our holding that the 
estate is not a proper plaintiff, we need not reach 
plaintiffs constitutional argument. We note, 
however, that statutes of limitations do not abrogate 
rights to sue, but merely proscribe the time in which 
those rights must be asserted. See Lee v. Gauftn, 
867 P.2d 572, 575 (Utah 1993) (statutes of 
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limitations "do not abolish a substantive right to sue, 
but simply provide that if an acaon is not filed 
within the specified time, the remedy is deemed to 
have been waived.... [T]he barring of the remedy is 
caused by a plaintiffs failure to take reasonable 
steps to assert the cause of action within the time 
afforded by statute"). 
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INTERSTATE EXCAVATING, INC., Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
AGLA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 16599. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 18, 1980. 
Defendant appealed from an order of the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Jay E. Banks, J., 
which demed its motion to stt aside a default 
judgment rendered against it for labor and materials 
furnished m construction of water and sewer system. 
The Supreme Court, Crockett, C. J., held that where 
defendant did not receive notice of trial date from its 
attorney after attorney's withdrawal from case and 
where, upon receipt of notice of default judgment, 
defendant immediately contacted its present counsel 
who thereafter proceeded with diligence to attack 
default judgment, interests of justice would be best 
served by setting aside the default judgment. 
Judgment vacated; case remanded. 
Hall, J., filed dissenting opinion m which Wilkins, 
J., jomed. 
1. JUDGMENT <@=>92 
228 — 
228IV By Default 
228IV(A) Requisites and Validity 
228k92 Nature of judgment by default. 
Utah, 1980. 
In appropriate circumstances, default judgments are 
justified, and when so justified, they are invulnerable 
to attack. 
2. JUDGMENT ®=^92 
228 — 
228IV By Default 
228IV(A) Requisites and Validity 
228k92 Nature of judgment by default. 
Utah, 1980. 
Default judgments are not favored m the law, 
especially where a party had timely responded with 
challenging pleadings. 
3. JUDGMENT <@=>135 
228 — 
228IV By Default 
228IV(B) Opening or Setting Aside Default 
228kl35 Nature and scope of remedy. 
Utah, 1980. 
Policy of the law is to accord litigants the 
opportunity for a hearing on the merits where that can 
be done without serious injustice to other party; thus, 
courts are generally indulgent toward setting aside of 
default judgments where there is reasonable 
justification or excuse for defendant's failure to 
appear and where timely application is made to set it 
aside. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 60(b). 
4. JUDGMENT®^ 135 
228 — 
228IV By Default 
228IV(B) Opening or Setting Aside Default 
228kl35 Nature and scope of remedy. 
Utah, 1980 
Where there is doubt about whether a default 
judgment should be set aside, doubt should be 
resolved m favor of domg so. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rule 60(b). 
5. JUDGMENT «»143(11) 
228 — 
228IV By Default 
228IV(B) Opening or Setting Aside Default 
228kl43 Excuses for Default 
228kl43(l 1) Mistake or neghgence of counsel as 
to tune or place of appearance or trial. 
[See headnote text below] 
5. JUDGMENT * » 153(1) 
228 — 
228IV By Default 
228IV(B) Opening or Setting Aside Default 
228kl53 Tune for Application 
228kl53(l) In general. 
Utah, 1980. 
Where defendant did not receive notice of trial date 
from its attorney after attorney's withdrawal from 
case and where, upon receipt of notice of default 
judgment, defendant immediately contacted its present 
counsel who thereafter proceeded with diligence to 
attack default judgment, interests of justice would be 
best served by setting aside the default judgment. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 60(b). 
*370 Robert M. McRae of McRae & DeLand, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant and appellant. 
E. H. Fankhauser, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and 
respondent. 
Copynght (c) West Group 2000 No claim to ongmal U.S. Govt, works 
611 P.2d 369, Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Agla Development Corp., (Utah 1980) Page 2 
CROCKETT, Chief Justice: 
Defendant Agla Development Corporation seeks 
reversal of the denial of its motion based on Rule 
60(b), U.R.C.P., (FN1) to set aside a default 
judgment for $46,101.70 for labor and materials 
furnished in construction of water and sewer systems 
in two subdivisions being developed by the defendant 
in Salt Lake County. 
Plaintiff commenced this action on May 16, 1978. 
Defendant responded with an answer asserting 
defenses and a counterclaim. A pre-trial conference 
was held on April 16, 1979, at which defendant's 
counsel Robert J. Haws requested that he be allowed 
to withdraw, which request the court granted. The 
court instructed plaintiffs attorney to notify the 
defendant to obtain new counsel, and that the case was 
set for trial on May 7, 1979. Plaintiffs attorney 
certifies that on April 16, such a notice was mailed to 
the defendant addressed to its business office. The 
record also contains a certification by defendant's then 
counsel, Mr. Haws, that he mailed to the defendant a 
notice of the trial setting and of his withdrawal as 
counsel. As opposed to the foregoing stands the 
defendant's denial that it ever received such notices. 
On the day set for trial, May 7, no one appeared on 
defendant's behalf; and upon the basis of evidence 
presented, judgment was entered for the plaintiff and 
defendant's counterclaim was dismissed. 
In support of its motion to set aside the default 
judgment, defendant avers that its former counsel, 
Mr. Haws, withdrew from a number of cases 
simultaneously; and that the notice to appoint counsel 
may have been misplaced with numerous papers 
served upon the defendant's office by mail. And 
further, that it had no notice of the trial until it 
received the notice of the judgment dated May 14, 
whereupon it immediately *371 contacted present 
counsel, who proceeded with diligence to prepare the 
motion (he avers it was prepared within four days) 
and filed the motion May 31, 1979 (17 days after 
receiving the notice of judgment). 
[1][2] It is not to be questioned that in appropriate 
circumstances default judgments are justified; and 
when they are, they are invulnerable to attack. 
However, they are not favored in the law, especially 
where a party has timely responded with challenging 
pleadings. When that has been done some caution 
should be observed to see that the party is not taken 
advantage of. Speaking generally about such 
problems, it is to be kept in mind that access to the 
courts for the protection of rights and the settlement of 
disputes is one of the most important factors in the 
maintenance of a peaceable and well-ordered society. 
(FN2) This of course must be done in obedience to 
rules; and it is to be conceded that there is a 
possibility that the defendant was less than diligent in 
attending to its interest in this lawsuit. But no 
evidence was taken, nor did the court make any 
findings other than the order denying defendant's 
motion. 
This is admittedly a perplexing case. From the 
standpoint of the plaintiff and its counsel, they appear 
to have proceeded without any impropriety, including 
appearing on the trial date and presenting their case. 
Defendant counters with the averments that it received 
no such notice. Supportive or the defendant's 
position, are the facts that the justification for its 
default rests upon the assertion of service of notice by 
ordinary mail; and that immediately upon learning of 
the judgment, it proceeded diligently with efforts to 
set it aside and contest the issues on the merits. 
[3] [4] The uniformally acknowledged policy of the 
law is to accord litigants the opportunity for a hearing 
on the merits, where that can be done without serious 
injustice to the other party. (FN3) To that end, the 
courts are generally indulgent toward the setting aside 
of default judgments where there is a reasonable 
justification or excuse for the defendant's failure to 
appear, and where timely application is made to set it 
aside. (FN4) Consistent with the objective just 
stated, where there is doubt about whether a default 
should be set aside, the doubt should be resolved in 
favor of doing so, to the end that each party may have 
an opportunity to present his side of the controversy 
and that there be a resolution in accordance with law 
and justice. (FN5) 
[5] Application of the principles discussed herein to 
the instant situation leads us to the conclusion that the 
interests of justice will best be served by setting aside 
the default judgment and giving the parties that 
opportunity. In that connection, we call attention to 
the prefatory clause of Rule 60(b) that "upon such 
terms as are just" a party may be relieved from a 
judgment. This authorizes the trial court to impose 
such terms as may be just as a condition to setting 
aside the default. 
The default judgment is vacated and the case 
remanded for further proceedings. No costs awarded. 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
611 P.2d 369, Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Agla Development Corp., (Utah 1980) Page 3 
MAUGHAN and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
HALL, Justice (dissenting): 
I respectfully dissent. 
In denying defendant's motion to vacate judgment, 
the trial court was applying a specific statutory 
standard' "On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may m the furtherance of justice relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; . . . ." (FN1) It is not to be 
questioned that the policy of the law favors the 
granting of *372 such relief m the case of a default 
judgment (FN2) and that the remedy should be 
liberally administered m order to grant the defaulting 
party his day in court. (FN3) It is likewise beyond 
dispute, however, that such judicial policy remains 
coexistent with the broad latitude of discretion 
accorded the trial court m ruling upon such motions. 
(FN4) Indeed, the implementation of the policy is a 
matter which this Court has specifically committed to 
the trial court as follows: 
The trial court is endowed with considerable latitude 
of discretion m granting or denying a motion to 
relieve a party from a final judgment under Rule 
60(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and this 
court will reverse the trial court only where an 
abuse of this discretion is clearly established . . . 
(t)he rule that the courts will incline toward granting 
relief to a party, who has not had the opportunity to 
present his case, is ordinarily applied at the trial 
court level, and this court will not reverse the 
determination of the trial court merely because the 
motion could have been granted. For this court to 
overturn the discretion of the lower court m refusing 
to vacate a valid judgment, the requirements of 
public policy demand more than a mere statement 
that a person did not have his day in court when full 
opportunity for fair hearing was afforded him or his 
legal representative. (FN5) 
Such trial court discretion has, m fact, been given 
the widest berth by reviewmg courts m the area of 
motions to vacate judgment which are based on 
allegations of mistake, inadvertence, and excusable 
neglect. (FN6) As such, a determination at the trial 
level that a given course of conduct did or did not 
constitute such "mistake, inadvertence, or excusable 
neglect" as should justify rehef of a default judgment 
will hence be disturbed on appeal only in the presence 
Copynght (c) West Group 2000 No 
of a manifest abuse of discretion. (FN7) 
This Court has previously stated that neglect, to be 
excusable, must occur despite the exercise of due 
diligence. (FN8) Other jurisdictions have defined 
excusable neglect as "such as might have been the act 
of a reasonably prudent person under the same 
circumstances." (FN9) It has also been held that 
simple carelessness does not rise to the statutory 
standard, (FN 10) nor do simple business difficulties 
which allegedly prevent the dedication of adequate 
attention to the litigation m question. (FN 11) 
Moreover, this Court has held that the failure of a 
party to appear in court, allegedly occasioned by 
failure of notice due to withdrawal of counsel, does 
not constitute such "excusable neglect" as to justify 
rehef from judgment where the evidence was that 
ample notices of the procedures were mailed, and the 
defaulting party was well aware of the withdrawal of 
counsel in advance of the proceedings from which he 
was absent. (FN 12) 
*373. It is to be noted that, in the present case, 
defendant bases his claim for rehef from judgment on 
the allegation that he did not receive notice of the trial 
date. It is defendant's assertion that this lack of notice 
was occasioned by the withdrawal of defendant's 
counsel. The majority opinion makes no reference to 
the fact that this "withdrawal" was occasioned by 
defendant's personal dismissal of counsel due to 
intractable differences. Such being the case, 
defendant can hardly claim to have been unaware that 
it was without legal counsel, and that some further 
action would be necessary in order adequately to 
protect its interests in the pending lawsuit. 
Furthermore defendant does not deny receiving the 
mailed notices. In its motion to vacate judgment, 
defendant alleged that "notice to appoint counsel was 
misplaced with numerous pleadings served upon 
defendant's office by mail." It is thereby implicitly 
admitted that the mailed notice did reach defendant's 
offices. The trial court unquestionably took such facts 
into consideration m arriving at its decision to deny 
the motion to vacate judgment. I cannot agree that, 
given such circumstances, this Court may properly 
usurp the lower court's disposition of the present 
matter, and rule that, as a matter of law, defendant's 
conduct constituted "excusable neglect." To do so 
deprives the trial court of its discretionary function. 
I would affirm the decision of the trial court denymg 
defendant's motion to vacate judgment. 
WILKINS, J., concurs m the dissent of HALL, J. 
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FN1. The rule provides that: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
coun may in the furtherance of justice relieve a 
party . . . from a final judgment . . . for the 
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect . . . . The motion 
shall be made . . . not more than three months after 
the judgment. . . was entered . . . . 
FN2. Sec. 11, Art. I, Utah Constitution. 
FN3. Locke v. Peterson, 3 Utah 2d 415, 285 P.2d 
11U (1955). 
FN4. See Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Company, 
14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 (1962). 
FN5. See Cutler v. Haycock, 32 Utah 354, 90 P. 897 
(1907); Locke v. Peterson, footnote 3 above. 
FN1. Rule 60(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
FN2. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. 
Larson Contractor, Inc., Utah, 544 P.2d 876 (1975). 
FN3. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 
260 P.2d 741 (1953); Board of Educ. of Granite 
School Dist. v. Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806 
(1963); Cutler v. Haycock, 32 Utah 354, 90 P. 897 
(1907). 
FN4. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., supra, footnote 3; 
Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 
376P.2d951 (1962). 
FN5. Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 
2d 65, 513 P.2d 429 (1973). 
FN6. Board of Educ. of Granite School Dist. v. Cox, 
supra, footnote 3; Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite 
Co., supra, footnote 4; Swauger v. Lawler, 116 
Utah 347, 209 P.2d 930 (1949); see also Manhattan-
Waid, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 490 F.2d 1183 (2nd 
Cir. 1974). 
FN7. Heath v. Mower, Utah, 597 P.2d 855 (1979). 
FN8. Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, supra, 
footnote 5. 
FN9. Kromm v. Kromm, 84 Cal.App.2d 523, 191 
P.2d 115 (1948); see also Elms v. Elms, 72 
Cal.App.2d 508, 164 P.2d 936 (1946). 
FN 10. Doyle v. Rice Ranch Oil Co., 28 Cal.App.2d 
18, 81P.2d980(1938). 
FNll . Usery v. Weiner Bros., Inc., 70 F.R.D. 615 
(D.C.1976). 
FN12. Heath v. Mower, supra, footnote 7. 
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